我国现代企业中知识型人才的激励现状与探究

现代企业的发展被越来越多的管理者认为是人的发展,而企业中知识型人才的作用在企业中起着至关重要的作用,因此,如何对知识型人才进行有效的激励管理,使他们的潜能得到充分的发挥,成为当代企业员工激励制度的一个重要问题,本文通过对现有的企业激励制度的问题分析以及国内外企业的先进激励制度的比较,对现代企业中知识型人才的激励进行了思考。     

浅谈企业知识型员工管理存在的问题及策略

目前我国已经全面进入了知识经济时代,而知识型员工也成为了绝大多数企业发展的重要资源,直接关系着企业和核心竞争力。在这种背景下,如何科学有效的对知识型员工进行全面管理就成为了企业发展的重心所在。本文先阐述了企业知识型员工的诸多特征,接着在探讨知识型员工管理存在问题的基础上,从建立完善的个人职业生涯规划体系、创设人性化的工作环境和管理体制、制定合理的现代化薪酬激励制度三个方面,探讨了知识型员工管理的优化策略。     

基于需求的知识型员工激励体系研究

今天的社会,已经发展成为所谓的"知识社会",知识作为一种资源,已经被提到和资本、土地等一样重要的位置,甚至由于知识可能带来的"杠杆效应",它的重要程度相对于传统资源要更强。在一个"知识就是财富"的时代里,企业要成为知识型企业。知识经济时代的社会里,真正最有价值的是所谓"知识型员工",他们具有和传统工人不同的特点,因此对他们的激励管理是摆在企业面前的全新的课题。     

心理契约视角下知识型员工的激励研究

在知识型经济时代,知识成为社会发展最稀缺的资源,也是企业提高其市场竞争力的决定性因素。知识型员工作为知识资本的载体,自然成为企业最重要的人力资源,也是企业创新和发展的主力军。知识型员工渴望实现自身价值,对企业依赖性弱,使得传统契约式约束方法不再适用。心理契约理论与知识型员工的特征具有一定程度的复合性,这一点从根本上决定了心理契约对激励知识型员工的作用。本文在心理契约、知识型员工等理论的基础之上,结合知识型员工的激励机制的现状和困境,提出了利用心理契约改善知识型员工激励模式的新思路。     

知识型员工的特点及其激励策略

在知识经济时代,知识成为重要的生产力。知识型员工凭借掌握着先进的文化知识,在企业中处于创造知识、利用知识、使知识增值的重要地位,因而成为了企业核心竞争力形成和发展的关键,知识型员工的管理成为企业人力资源管理的重点。事实上,正确认识知识型员工的特点,采取有效方法激励知识型员工已经成为企业人力资源管理的核心问题。     

知识型员工的特点及其激励策略

<正>在知识经济时代,知识成为重要的生产力。知识型员工凭借掌握着先进的文化知识,在企业中处于创造知识、利用知识、使知识增值的重要地位,因而成为了企业核心竞争力形成和发展的关键,知识型员工的管理成为企业人力资源管理的重点。事实上,正确认识知识型员工的特点,采取有效方法激励知识型员工已经成为企业人力资源管理的核心问题。     

知识型员工激励浅析

21世纪企业最激烈的竞争是人才,知识型员工是企业知识竞争力的重要体现。本文在对知识型员工定义、特点、需求分析的基础上,重点对知识型员工的激励措施进行分析,探讨企业知识型员工的管理方法,以提高企业的核心竞争力。     

基于需求特征的知识型员工的激励组合研究

知识经济时代,知识型员工作为知识的载体,是诸多企业核心能力的拥有者。如何有效激励知识型员工,充分调动他们的积极性和创造性,成为现代企业探讨的重要问题。本文通过对知识型员工的需求特征分析,构建了针对知识型员工显性激励和隐性激励的组合模型,从而加大激励强度,降低激励成本,增加激励效应。     

知识型员工激励浅析

21世纪企业最激烈的竞争是人才,知识型员工是企业知识竞争力的重要体现.本文在对知识型员工定义、特点、需求分析的基础上,重点对知识型员工的激励措施进行分析,探讨企业知识型员工的管理方法,以提高企业的核心竞争力.     

基于需求特征的知识型员工的激励组合研究

知识经济时代,知识型员工作为知识的载体,是诸多企业核心能力的拥有者.如何有效激励知识型员工,充分调动他们的积极性和创造性,成为现代企业探讨的重要问题.本文通过对知识型员工的需求特征分析,构建了针对知识型员工显性激励和隐性激励的组合模型,从而加大激励强度,降低激励成本,增加激励效应.     

企业经理人报酬契约的嵌入性结构分析

"经济人"假设前提下的企业经理人激励理论对现代企业存在的某些现象无法给出合理解释,我们在放宽了"经济人"假设前提的关系合同理论基础上,通过对合同治理结构(权威治理和双边治理)和嵌入人际关系(对称结构和非对称结构)的匹配对经理人的报酬契约进行分析,认为国有企业属于权威型的不对称结构,而民营企业属于双边治理的对称结构。因此,国有企业经理人的报酬契约模式相对单一且倾向于政府干预,而民营企业经理人的报酬契约模式更加多样化并倾向于市场治理。     

THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Despite the substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. corporations in the past 20 years, there is little evidence that institutional investors have acquired the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in the corporate governance process. Institutional ownership remains widely dispersed among firms and institutions in large part because of significant legal obstacles that discourage institutional investors both from taking large block positions and from exercising large ownership positions to control corporate managers. Thus, although much of the growth of institutional ownership since 1980 has been accounted for by the growth of mutual funds and private pension funds, there continue to be strong deterrents to the accumulation and use of large ownership positions to influence corporate managers. Another potentially important factor discouraging concentrated investments are incentive schemes that effectively reward money managers for producing returns that do not vary much from the S&P 500 (or whatever sector the manager is supposed to be representing). Using a very different incentive scheme that offers managers a share of the excess returns (as well as penalties for failure to meet benchmarks), a relatively new class of “hedge funds” has emerged that provides both more concentrated ownership positions and higher risk‐adjusted rates of return. To encourage mutual funds to take a more activist corporate governance role and to behave more like hedge funds, the authors recommend that current legal restrictions on mutual funds be relaxed so that mutual funds have a greater incentive to hold large ownership positions in companies and to use those positions to more effectively monitor corporate managers. In particular, the “five and ten” portfolio rules applicable to mutual funds could be repealed and replaced with a standard of prudence and diligence more in keeping with portfolio theory; mutual funds could be given greater freedom to adopt redemption policies that would be more conducive to holding larger ownership positions; and institutional investors could be permitted to employ a variety of incentive fee structures to encourage fund managers to pursue more pro‐active investment strategies. The prospect of actively involving institutional fund managers in the corporate governance process may be our best hope for improving U.S. corporate governance.     

On IT governance structures and their effectiveness in collaborative organizational structures

Organizations today engage in various forms of alliances to manage their existing business processes or to diversify into new processes to sustain their competitive positions. Many of today's alliances use the IT resources as their backbone. The results of these alliances are collaborative organizational structures with little or no ownership stakes between the parties. The emergence of Web 2.0 tools is having a profound effect on the nature and form of these alliance structures. These alliances heavily depend on and make radical use of the IT resources in a collaborative environment. This situation requires a deeper understanding of the governance of these IT resources to ensure the sustainability of the collaborative organizational structures. This study first suggests the types of IT governance structures required for collaborative organizational structures. Semi-structured interviews with senior executives who operate in such alliances reveal that co-created IT governance structures are necessary. Such structures include co-created IT steering committees, co-created operational committees, and inter-organizational performance management and communication systems. The findings paved the way for the development of a model for understanding approaches to governing IT and evaluating the effectiveness for such governance mechanisms in today's IT‐dependent alliances. This study presents a sustainable IT-related capabilities approach to assessing the effectiveness of suggested IT governance structures for collaborative alliances. The findings indicate a favorable association between organizations' IT governance efforts and their ability to sustain their capabilities to leverage their IT resources. These IT-related capabilities also relate to measures business value at the process and firm level. This makes it possible to infer that collaborative organizations' IT governance efforts contribute to business value.     

Managerial Discretion and Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded Firms: Evidence From the Property–Liability Insurance Industry

We study the incremental impact of corporate governance in mitigating managerial discretion, controlling for incentive alignment of managerial ownership. We extend the managerial discretion hypothesis to predict that for firms with the same set of governance tools, those that utilize governance tools more stringently to control agency costs will command greater contracting cost advantages, leading them to specialize in business with greater managerial discretion. Using 72 publicly traded insurers from 1994 to 2006, we find evidence supporting our hypothesis. Our findings complement the finance literature that focuses on the role of financing policies in mitigating agency costs of managerial discretion.     

商业银行股权激励的特殊意义与现实问题分析

银行业普遍存在的管制,使银行面临着有限的控制权市场和接管威胁,从而大大降低了市场约束银行管理者的能力,因此对银行而言,通过股权激励机制协调股东和管理者的利益、降低代理成本显得尤为重要.我国商业银行实施股权激励不应盲目照搬西方国家的范例,应慎重选择股权激励的实施范围,目前最好只局限在高级管理人员,通过对股权激励机制的合理设计来充分发挥其长期激励效应,切不可盲目扩大激励范围,将股权激励演变成一种新的福利措施.应尽快建立起以经济资本为核心的业绩考核体系,在经济资本的约束下实现业务发展模式和盈利模式的转变.股权激励机制的有效实施离不开完善的银行治理结构.     

商业银行公司治理：进展及改革着力点

随着我国金融业的全面对外开放,银行面临更多更大的挑战。如何有效应对?银行公司治理是个关键。巴塞尔原则和我国有关的法规制度,对银行公司治理有积极作用。但是,公司治理是否有效,还需通过银行的商业实践来验证。优化董事会结构、加强内部控制建设并重视利益相关者的作用,是银行公司治理的重要内容;提高创新能力、服务能力和抗风险能力,是银行保持长久竞争力和实现利润最大化的基础和前提。     

关于我国商业银行组织结构变革的探讨

企业管理是公司治理的微观基础,而组织结构则是充分发挥资源效率的关键所在。纵向配置资源、削减中间科层,是我国商业银行组织结构变革的方向。而商业银行的组织机构变革需要实现信息流的循环、业务线内的整体行动、业务线间的有效协同、对无序竞争和地区亚文化的抑制。在实施方面,要坚持零售业务线先行,事先消除对变革的误解。     

Executive incentive compatibility and selection of governance mechanisms

Executive incentive compatibility plays a crucial role in firm's selection of corporate governance mechanisms. We provide a simple model to explain why firms with enough executive incentive compatibility still prefer having external governance mechanisms, and firms with poor executive incentive compatibility have to rely on a combination of large investors monitoring and external governance. This model facilitates a better understanding of the co-existence of the two governance mechanisms and also reconciles conflicting findings with respect to a substitutive and complementary relationship between the two governance mechanisms. Empirical evidence supports there is a substitutive relation between large investors monitoring and executive compensation.     

我国发展社区银行的路径选择

社区银行是依托社区而设立,与传统沿街而设的银行相比,这种入住居民小区的新型银行,以其“近在身边、贴身服务、自助方便”的特点,让居民感到便捷,温馨。社区银行不但化解了银行高柜台给客户带来的心理隔阂,客户也能根据自己的消费习惯选择金融服务方式,享受更为人性化的服务,近几年,我国的社区建设发展很快,对金融服务提出了新的要求,组建社区银行迫在眉睫。本文分析了我国发展社区银行的原因,在此基础上,提出了我国发展社区银行的路径选择。