Trade credit and credit rationing

Asymmetric information between banks and firms can precludefinancing of valuable projects. Trade credit can alleviate thisproblem by incorporating the lending relation the private informationheld by suppliers about their customers. Incentive compatibilityconditions prevent collusion between two of the agents (e.g.,the buyer and the seller) against the third (e.g., the bank).Consistent with the empirical findings of Petersen and Rajan(1995), firms without relationships with banks resort more totrade credit, and sellers with greater ability to generate cashflows provide more trade credit. Finally small firms react tomonetary contractions by using trade credit, consistent withthe empirical results of Nilsen (1994).     

On the nature of credit demand and credit rationing in competitive credit markets

Conventional analyses of the credit rationing problem seek to explain that problem within the context of classic demand analysis. In this paper we demonstrate that it is generally inappropriate to apply the notion of classic demand to credit markets, consequently, conventional notions of credit rationing must be rejected. In providing a new definition of credit rationing we also establish the previously rejected characterized by credit rationing.     

Bank credit rationing and the customer relation

This paper investigates the theory that preference in situations of bank rationing is given to those customers with the strongest customer relation. It has shown that, within a certainty model where competitive pressure among banks requires full compensation for other bank relationships, neither deposit levels nor intertemporal demand would produce the preferential treatment claimed. It has also been shown that the prime borrowers would be unable to bargain effectively for credit line protection from such occasions of credit restriction.     

中国金融周期:基于信贷配给视角

本文首先基于我国企业层面的数据分析当前我国的信贷配给规则,其次通过理论和实证的方法厘清信贷配给规则与金融周期的内生机制,再次利用信贷配给规则划分我国金融周期,对当前周期进行分析,最后基于金融经济平稳运行的角度,提出完善信贷配给规则的对策建议。本文的主要研究结论如下:一是国有企业和大型企业等经济主体更容易获得银行贷款,反映出当前信贷配给规则的主要特征;二是当前配给规则会对银行不良贷款产生显著的负面影响效应;三是基于信贷配给规则的金融周期仍在相对高位运行,当前信贷配给规则还有深度调整的必要性。     

Counterparty credit risk and the credit default swap market

Counterparty credit risk has become one of the highest-profile risks facing participants in the financial markets. Despite this, relatively little is known about how counterparty credit risk is actually priced. We examine this issue using an extensive proprietary data set of contemporaneous CDS transaction prices and quotes by 14 different CDS dealers selling credit protection on the same underlying firm. This unique cross-sectional data set allows us to identify directly how dealers' credit risk affects the prices of these controversial credit derivatives. We find that counterparty credit risk is priced in the CDS market. The magnitude of the effect, however, is vanishingly small and is consistent with a market structure in which participants require collateralization of swap liabilities by counterparties.     

Wholesale bank funding,capital requirements and credit rationing

This paper analyzes how different types of bank funding affect the extent to which banks ration credit to borrowers, and the impact that capital requirements have on that rationing. Using an extension of the standard Stiglitz–Weiss model of credit rationing, unsecured wholesale finance is shown to amplify the credit market impact of capital requirements as compared to funding by retail depositors. Unsecured finance surged in the pre-crisis years, but is increasingly replaced by secured funding. The collateralization of wholesale funding is found to expand the extent of credit rationing.     

Information asymmetry and firms’ credit market access: Evidence from Moody's credit rating format refinement

I exploit Moody's 1982 credit rating refinement to examine its effects on firms’ credit market access, financing decisions, and investment policies. While firms’ ex ante yield spread can partially predict the direction of refinement changes, firms with refinement upgrades experience an additional decrease in their ex post borrowing cost compared with firms with downgrades. The former subsequently also issue more debt and rely more on debt financing over equity than the latter. Lastly, upgraded firms have more capital investments, less cash accumulation, and faster asset growth than downgraded firms. These findings show that credit market information asymmetry significantly affects firms’ real outcomes.     

Public inputs and the credit market

This paper studies the impact of public goods provision in an adverse selection environment. Public inputs used collectively by firms have indirect spillovers in imperfect credit markets by affecting the random returns of borrowers in this market. Public inputs change the nature of the binding incentive constraint and mitigate distortions in the credit market. The magnitude of such indirect benefits depends upon the ‘type’ of the public input being considered. Public inputs targeted to benefit the less-efficient borrowers in the economy have greater indirect benefits as compared to pure public inputs that benefit all. These additional efficiency gains, emerging out of information-asymmetries in the credit market, should be considered in the cost-benefit analysis of such public inputs. JEL Classification: H4 · D8 · O16     

The role of loan guarantee schemes in alleviating credit rationing in the UK

It is a widely held perception, although empirically contentious, that credit rationing is an important phenomenon in the UK small business sector. In response to this perception the UK government initiated a loan guarantee scheme (SFLGS) in 1981. In this paper we use a unique dataset comprised of small firms facing a very real, and binding, credit constraint, to question whether a corrective scheme such as the SFLGS has, in practice, alleviated such constraints by promoting access to debt finance for small credit constrained firms. The results broadly support the view that the SFLGS has fulfilled its primary objective.     

Finance and inequality: The distributional impacts of bank credit rationing

We analyze reductions in bank credit using a natural experiment where unprecedented flooding in Pakistan differentially affected banks that were more exposed to the floods. Using a unique data set that covers the universe of consumer loans in Pakistan and this exogenous shock to bank funding, we find two key results. First, following an increase in their funding costs, banks disproportionately reduce credit to borrowers with little education, little credit history, and seasonal occupations. Second, the credit reduction is not compensated by relatively more lending by less-affected banks. The empirical evidence suggests that a reduction in bank monitoring incentives caused the large relative decreases in lending to these borrowers.     

Competition in the Dutch consumer credit market

This paper considers the degree of competitiveness of the Dutch consumer credit market. We use the well-known Bresnahan–Lau method that estimates a structural model consisting of a demand relation and a supply relation, based on aggregate data. The level of competition is derived from the estimated conjectural variation elasticity. Our empirical results show that there is no evidence of market power.     

Stock return expectations in the credit market

In this paper we compute long-term stock return expectations (across the business cycle) for individual firms using information backed out from the credit derivatives market. Our methodology builds on previous theoretical results in the literature on stock return expectations and, empirically, we demonstrate a close relationship between credit-implied stock return expectations and future realized stock returns. We also find stock portfolios selected based on credit-implied stock return forecasts to beat equally- and value-weighted portfolios of the same stocks out-of-sample. Contrary to many other studies, our expectations/predictions are made at the individual stock level rather than at the portfolio level, and no parameter estimations using historical stock price- or credit spread observations are needed.     

信用对金融市场的价值--专访美国康乃尔大学金融学教授黄明

信用对于金融市场意味着什么?中国优秀的信用评级机构怎样产生?针对信用建设和金融市场发展等的诸多问题,本刊记者采访了美国康乃尔大学金融学教授黄明,相信黄教授的理念会带给我们新的思考,会让我们体味久违的诚信价值.     

The impact of securitization on credit rationing: Empirical evidence

We study whether banks’ involvement into different types of securitization activity – asset backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds – in Spain influences credit supply before and during the financial crisis. While both ABS and covered bonds were hit by the crisis, the former were hit more severely. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that firms with banks that were more involved in securitization see their credit constraints more relaxed in normal periods. In contrast, only greater covered bonds issuance reduces credit rationing during crisis periods whereas ABS aggravates these firms’ credit rationing in crisis periods. Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions that a securitization instrument that retains risk (covered bond) may induce a more prudent risk behavior of banks than an instrument that provides risk transferring (ABS).     

Interaction of market and credit risk

Experience during the financial crisis illustrates that the integrated measurement and management of different forms of risk remains a challenge for industry practitioners, researchers and financial supervisors alike. In the context of related literature, this article summarizes new research on the interaction of market and credit risk and implications for risk management that is presented in this special issue. The research covered highlights in particular the errors that can occur in the aggregation of the two types of risk and the strong relationships between them that suggest caution in the use of pragmatic distinctions between them. The article also touches on some research-based lessons for supervisory policies and suggests some directions for future research.     

On the determinants of credit rationing: Firm-level evidence from transition countries

Using survey data for firms from Eastern European transition economies we investigate the determinants of credit rationing. Our rationing definition incorporates firms whose loan application was rejected, but also ‘discouraged’ potential borrowers. We employ a bivariate probit with censoring, approach that accounts for the underlying selectivity since rationed firms are a subset of those without a loan. We include firm-specific attributes related to the alleviation of informational asymmetries, and therefore expected to affect credit rationing. We find that credit rationing depends on firm size, profitability, sales growth, ownership type, legal status, sectoral heterogeneity and the country-specific level of domestic credit.     

信贷配给论与商业银行资产负债管理理论的内在关系

两种重要的现代西方金融理论——信贷配给论和商业银行资产负债管理理论之间存在若干内在关系,两者产生于相同的经济背景,具有同样的经济研究模式,“逆向选择效应”实质上是两种理论的共同基点。通过对这些内在关系的分析可得到与金融发展相关的启示。     

Product market competition and credit risk

This study theoretically and empirically investigates effects of product market competition on credit risk. We first develop a real-options-based structural model in a homogeneous oligopoly and show that credit spreads are positively related to the number of firms in an industry. The disparity of firm size in an industry is relevant to both product market competition and credit risk, and we therefore extend the model to an asymmetric duopoly case. In particular, we demonstrate that credit spreads of relatively small (large) firms within an industry are positively (negatively) related to Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and the relative firm size in an industry is an important determinant of credit risk. The models’ implications are empirically scrutinized by a reduced-form hazard model and generally supported. By performing out-of-sample analyses, the results demonstrate that firm size together with the interaction terms between intra-industry firm size dummies and competition intensity can effectively predict default.