Biases in international portfolio allocation and investor protection standards

Economic reasoning suggests that financial globalization that encourages optimal international portfolio investments should improve investor protection standards (IPS) of a country. In practice, however, investors manifest varying degrees of suboptimal international portfolio allocations. Using a panel dataset covering 44 countries spanning over 15 years we examine whether suboptimal equity portfolio allocation in part is associated with the cross-country variations in IPS. Consistent with economic reasoning we find robust indications that international portfolio allocation may play an important role in the development of IPS. More specifically, the quality of IPS improves with higher degrees of optimal international equity portfolio allocation of domestic and foreign investors.     

Individual and institutional herding and the impact on stock returns: Evidence from Taiwan stock market

Using high frequency intraday data, this paper investigates the herding behavior of institutional and individual investors in the Taiwan stock market. The study finds evidence of herding by both investors but a stronger herding tendency among institutional than among individual investors. Institutional investors herd more on firms with small capitalizations and lower turnovers and they follow positive feedback strategies. The portfolios that institutional investors herd buy outperform those they sell by an average of 1.009% during the 20 days after intense trading episodes. By contrast, individual investors herd more on firms with small sizes and higher turnovers, and they crowd to buy (sell) stocks with negative (positive) past returns. The portfolios that individual investors herd buy underperform those they sell by an average of − 0.829% during the following 20 days. Moreover, these return differences of both investors are more pronounced under a market with higher pressure and among small stocks. These findings suggest that the herding of institutional investors speeds up the price-adjustment process and is more likely to be driven by correlated private information, while individual herding is most likely to be driven by behavior and emotions.     

Limited partner performance and the maturing of the private equity industry

We evaluate the performance of limited partners? (LPs?) private equity investments over time. Using a sample of 14,380 investments by 1,852 LPs in 1,250 buyout and venture capital funds started between 1991 and 2006, we find that the superior performance of endowment investors in the 1991–1998 period, documented by prior literature, is mostly due to their greater access to the top-performing venture capital partnerships. In the subsequent 1999–2006 period, endowments no longer outperform, no longer have greater access to funds that are likely to restrict access, and do not make better investment selections than other types of institutional investors. Nevertheless, all investor types? private equity investments continue to outperform public markets on average. We discuss how these results are consistent with the general maturing of the industry, as private equity has transitioned from a niche, poorly understood area to a ubiquitous part of institutional investors? portfolios.     

Under-or-overreaction: Market responses to announcements of earnings surprises

We test whether the well-documented market reaction to the announcements of earnings surprises is a manifestation of an investor underreaction or overreaction to extremely good or bad earnings news. Using the market reaction in the three-day period surrounding the announcements of extreme earnings surprises (i.e., SUE) in quarter Q_t as a reference point, we show that firms reporting a high (low) SUE in subsequent quarter Q_t + 1 that confirms their initial quarter Q_t SUE ranking in the same highest or lowest SUE quintiles generate an incremental price run that moves in the same direction as that of the initial SUE. However, the price impact of the confirming SUE signal is weaker than that of its initial SUE. Our findings are robust to the Fama-French three-factor daily regression extended by the momentum factor and a number of other robustness tests. Our result is not consistent with the prevalent view that investors underreact to earnings news. To the contrary, the evidence suggests an initial investor overreaction to extreme SUE signals.     

Tax avoidance and ex ante cost of capital

This study examines the association between tax avoidance and ex ante cost of equity capital. Based on prior research, we develop two proxies for investors’ expectations of tax avoidance and explore whether deviations from those expectations result in higher ex ante cost of equity capital. We find that the ex ante cost of equity capital increases with tax avoidance that is either below or above investor expectations and that the increase is larger for tax avoidance that exceeds investors’ expectations. We then examine whether firms that alter their future tax avoidance exhibit a lowering of their ex ante cost of equity capital and find that tax avoidance decreases (increases) from the prior year for firms that were above (below) investors’ expectations in the prior year. These results are consistent with the trade‐off suggested by the Scholes and Wolfson framework and reinforce the notion that balancing tax benefits and non‐tax costs is an important feature of firms’ tax planning.     

The nexus between financial integration and real economy: Solow-growth model concept

This paper aims to investigate the nexus between financial integration and the real economy in ASEAN + 3 economies based on the concept of Solow-Growth Model. The equity indices as a proxy for financial markets are collected from each ASEAN + 3 members and are segmented between two periods; before and after the financial cooperation agreement period. The finding presents several outcomes; 1) no cointegration nexus is found in the system during the pre-agreement periods; 2) the markets are found cointegrated during the post-agreement period, 3) financial integration is found to influence the real sectors of ASEAN + 3 economies. Finally, this study offers policy implications to improve financial integration for stabilizing the real economy.     

The effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on the timely disclosure of restricted stock trading

Our paper investigates the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the disclosure timeliness of restricted stock trading. Insiders selling restricted stock are required to file a Form 144 because the stock is restricted and also a Form 4 because they are an insider. We confirm that mandatory filing requirements under Section 403 of SOX reduced the Form 4 disclosure delay for restricted stock transactions from 24 days in the pre-SOX period to the mandated 2 days in the post-SOX period. Although SOX did not mandate changes to Form 144 filings, we expect that disclosure timeliness of Form 144 filings is likely impacted by SOX. We find that Form 144 filings of restricted stock sales have become less timely. In the post-SOX period, Form 144, the intent to sell restricted stock, is almost always reported after the Form 4 disclosure of the executed trade. Thus, an unintended consequence of SOX is that by making the Form 4 filing more timely than the Form 144, market participants will know about a trade sooner, but have less information about the type of equity traded. An implication of this finding is that Section 403 of SOX may not have unambiguously improved investor protection as intended.     

Frequency of observation and the estimation of integrated volatility in deep and liquid financial markets

Using two newly available ultrahigh-frequency datasets, we investigate empirically how frequently one can sample certain foreign exchange and U.S. Treasury security returns without contaminating estimates of their integrated volatility with market microstructure noise. Using the standard realized volatility estimator, we find that one can sample dollar/euro returns as frequently as once every 15 to 20 s without contaminating estimates of integrated volatility; 10-year Treasury note returns may be sampled as frequently as once every 2 to 3 min on days without U.S. macroeconomic announcements, and as frequently as once every 40 s on announcement days. Using a simple realized kernel estimator, this sampling frequency can be increased to once every 2 to 5 s for dollar/euro returns and to about once every 30 to 40 s for T-note returns. These sampling frequencies, especially in the case of dollar/euro returns, are much higher than those that are generally recommended in the empirical literature on realized volatility in equity markets. The higher sampling frequencies for dollar/euro and T-note returns likely reflect the superior depth and liquidity of these markets.     

Sovereign wealth fund investment and the return-to-risk performance of target firms

This paper investigates the relationship between sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment and the return-to-risk performance of target firms. Specifically, we find that target firm raw returns decline following SWF investment. Though risk also declines following SWF investment, we find that SWF investment is associated with a reduction in the compensation of risk over the 5 years following acquisition. Firm volatility decomposition suggests that idiosyncratic risk is what mainly drives these impacts toward decline. Employing a multinomial logit framework wherein combinations of target returns and risk movements are categorized, we see that, in cases of foreign investment, SWFs’ target firm performance most closely resembles that of other government-owned firms. The observed results are inconsistent with predictions of higher volatility and improved returns due to monitoring firm activities from the institutional investor literature. This suggests that SWFs may not provide some of the benefits that are offered by other institutional investors.     

Nonprofessional investors' perceptions of the incremental value of continuous auditing and continuous controls monitoring: An experimental investigation

In this study, we investigate nonprofessional investors' perceptions of the incremental value of additional assurance provided by continuous auditing (CA) and continuous controls monitoring (CCM) relative to traditional periodic auditing. We also examine whether nonprofessional investors' perceptions of incremental value of CA and CCM depend on whether the procedure is performed by internal or external auditors, given that external auditors are likely to be perceived as more independent and objective than internal auditors. We conduct two experiments, one using 120 nonprofessional investors recruited by a national survey company, and the second using 184 participants recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform. The first experiment employed a 2 × 2 between-participants design in which we manipulate the type of assurance (CA or CCM) and the source of assurance (internal or external auditors). The second experiment was identical to the first experiment, with the addition of a fifth condition to test a conjecture stemming from the results of the first experiment. The results from both experiments indicate that although nonprofessional investors believe that continuous auditing decreases the likelihood of material errors and asset misappropriation, nonprofessional investors do not concomitantly increase their investment upon learning about the implementation of these sophisticated continuous assurance techniques. Evidence from the second experiment provides support for the contention that the reason why nonprofessional investors do not increase their investment pursuant to implementation of CA or CCM is due to the salience of the additional costs of these techniques. These results have important implications for firms considering the implementation of additional assurance procedures such as CA and CCM.     

The economics of PIPEs

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.     

The home bias is here to stay

Over the last 15 years, dramatically decreasing foreign investment costs have not reduced the home bias. We show that the home bias induced by a given cost is proportional to the factor ρ/(1 − ρ), where ρ is the average correlation between markets. This factor is very sensitive to the correlation, especially when the correlation is high. Empirically, correlations have been steadily increasing from 0.4 in the 90’s to about 0.9 today. Thus, the decreasing extra costs are increasingly magnified, explaining the persistence of the home bias, and predicting its continuation.     

The risk level discriminatory power of mutual fund investment objectives: Additional evidence

We reexamine the information content of mutual fund investment objectives to learn whether investors can use them to infer risk. For investment objectives to properly convey risk, risk must be heterogeneous between investment objective groups and homogeneous within them. The present study differs from earlier work in two important ways: (1) it reaches a generally different conclusion about within-objective class fund risk, and (2) it is being done against a backdrop of industry-wide incentive compensation structures that rely on these classifications as proxies for fund volatility. Empirical testing suggests that risk is heterogeneous within groups.     

Investor sentiment and stock returns: Wenchuan Earthquake

This paper exploits a natural experiment (the Wenchuan Earthquake in China) to study the effects of investor sentiment on stock returns. We find that during the 12 months following the earthquake, stock returns are significantly lower for firms headquartered nearer the epicenter than for firms further away. Further analyses indicate that this pattern of stock returns does not exist before or long after the earthquake, and cannot be explained by actual economic losses or a change in systematic risk. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the interaction of local bias and investor sentiment affecting stock returns.     

The effects of the method used to present a complex item on the face of a financial statement on nonprofessional investors' judgments

Our study is motivated by standard setters' (FASB, 2010; IASB, 2010a) interest in better understanding the effects of item complexity and disaggregation of financial information on users' decision processes. We examine whether the method used to present a complex item on a financial statement influences nonprofessional investors' judgments. We also examine whether disaggregation influences how different levels of item complexity are associated with judgments. Using a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment, we manipulate variables representing presentation method (disaggregation versus aggregation) and level of item complexity (which is defined pension cost with high versus low volatility). With a sample of 114 nonprofessional investors, we find that when the complex item defined pension cost is disaggregated into its component parts and displayed in different sections of the statement of comprehensive income, nonprofessional investors acquire more information about the item and are able to more accurately understand the function of the item. This, in turn, helps the nonprofessional investors decide whether the information is useful in certain judgments. Additionally, we find that when a complex item is disaggregated, nonprofessional investors place even greater weight on their perceptions of level of item complexity in certain judgments. The results of this study are of value to managers, standard setters, and investors. For instance, results suggest that disaggregating a complex item across a financial statement can help nonprofessional investors learn how the component(s) driving a complex item relates to different economic events, improving their ability to understand and process the information in their judgments.     

The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks stocks. Some evidence of shift contagion in Europe

This paper analyzes the influence of the recent European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns for 15 countries. Our data span the period December 14th 2007 - March 8th 2013 that encompasses several episodes of economic and financial turmoil since the collapse of the subprime credit market. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we use an explicit multifactor model of equity returns extended with a sovereign risk factor. Second, we adopt a Smooth Transition Regression (STR) framework that allows for an endogenous definition of crisis periods and captures the changes in parameters associated with shift contagion. We find that the negative impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns has been mostly confined to European banks, whereas U.S. banks appear to be unharmed by its direct impact and may even have benefited from it. Besides, we find some evidence of shift contagion across Europe.     

How costly is the Sarbanes Oxley Act? Evidence on the effects of the Act on corporate profitability

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was intended to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. However, critics have argued that the costs of SOX far outweigh its intended benefits. Prior studies based on stock-price reactions to SOX-related events document mixed evidence on the expected impact of SOX. In contrast, we provide evidence on the net realized costs of SOX by examining its impact on operating profitability. We find that average cash flows decline by 1.3% of total assets after SOX. These costs are more significant for smaller firms, for more complex firms, and for firms with lower-growth opportunities. Annually, these costs range from $6 million for smaller firms to $39 million for larger firms. Further, we document that net SOX-related costs are not limited to one-time expenses associated with internal-control design and implementation. In aggregate, for the 1428 firms in our sample, these costs amount to about $19 billion per year. Profitability is lower for up to four years post-SOX. To our knowledge, ours are the first estimates of the realized net costs imposed by SOX.     

Foreign investment with inflation-linked securities: A natural hedge under Fisher theory?

All foreign holders of U.S. dollars currencies face significant risk of unfavorable currency exchange movements, proportional to the amounts they hold. Some of these risks can be hedged to an extent, but the costs of doing so can be significant, and errors in execution or maintenance of the hedges can cause serious capital losses. Today the vast holdings of China and others creates currency risk on an unprecedented scale. China alone now has a total in excess of a trillion (1 × 10¹²) U.S. dollars, which makes traditional approaches to hedging problematic at best.¹ This paper analyzes the potential hedging effectiveness of investing foreign dollar holdings in U.S. inflation-indexed securities under Fisher's Identity. To the extent that Fisher's Identity and its derivative theories hold, foreign investors can effectively protect the purchasing power of their dollar balances, and earn an assured rate of return. Investment in inflation-indexed securities does not incur the additional expenses that swaps and currency hedges do.     

Blockholder ownership: Effects on firm value in market and control based governance systems

In this study, Granger tests are used to examine the relationship between blockholder ownership and the values of the largest companies in the European Union and the US. Previous studies on US data have found that blockholder ownership has no systematic effect on performance. We propose that these results may not apply to Continental Europe, where ownership concentration is typically higher, the level of investor protection is lower, and influential blockholders may have objectives other than shareholder value. In accordance with previous research, we find no significant association between blockholder ownership and prior or subsequent firm value in either the US or the UK. Nonetheless, in Continental Europe we find a negative association between blockholder ownership and firm value or accounting returns in the next period. Further analysis reveals that this association is significant only for companies with high initial levels of blockholder ownership (> 10%). We interpret this finding as evidence of conflicts of interest between blockholders and minority investors. The percentage of blockholder ownership in Continental Europe may be too high from a minority shareholder value viewpoint.     

Predicting firms' corporate governance choices: Evidence from Korea

This paper contributes to a new literature on the factors that affect firms' corporate governance practices. We find that regulatory factors are highly important, largely because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large firms (assets > 2 trillion won). Industry factors, firm size, and firm risk are also important. Other firm-specific factors only modestly affect governance even when they are statistically significant. This suggests that many Korean firms do not choose their governance to maximize share price. Among firm-specific factors, the most significant are size (larger firms are better governed) and firm risk (riskier firms are better governed). Long-term averages of profitability and equity finance need are significant, where short-term averages are not. This is consistent with “sticky governance”, in which firms alter their governance slowly in response to economic factors.