Customer choices of manufacturer versus retailer brands in alternative price and usage contexts

This article offers a context-dependent theory of how price changes influence consumer purchase choice for fast moving consumer goods (FMCGs) for manufacturer (large household share) and retailer (small household share) brands. The theory proposes that the influence of price on demand is systematically very sensitive to context effects; more specifically, the theory includes the hypothesis that elasticity is much greater when the price change results in the manufacturer and retailer brands having the same price compared to when the price change keeps the manufacturer brand price above the retailer brand price. The implicit and/or explicit association with higher quality with the manufacturer versus retailer brand may be the main reason for buying the higher priced manufacturer brand. Decreasing the price of the manufacturer brand to equal the retailer brand's price takes away the primary reason for buying the retailer brand (i.e., saving money); increasing the price of the retailer brand to equal the manufacturer brand's price has the same effect. The empirical findings in the studies that this article reports support the hypothesis and confirm Scriven and Ehrenberg's [2004. Consistent consumer responses to price changes. Australas. Mark. J. 12(3), 21–39] major conclusion that relative order of price is more important than relative distance.     

Analyzing the effects of private-label supplier disclosure on retailer image

Private-label retailers' disclosures of dual manufacturing agreements—that is, agreements with manufacturers that produce both their own national brands and private labels—can affect the images associated with the retailers. In this study, an experiment reveals moderating effects on retailer images, according to the images of both the national brand manufacturers and the retailers; and also depending on the brand equity of the private label. A low-image retailer's disclosure that a national brand manufacturer supplies its private label causes consumers to perceive that the retailer has a higher image. However, the positive effects of private label supplier disclosure on the retailer's image are weaker when the private label enjoys high equity.     

A Positive Theory of Private Label: A Strategic Role of Private Label in a Duopoly National-Brand Market

This article offers an economic rationale for national brands to provide private labels to their retailers. We build a game-theoretic model that analyzes the interactions among two national brand manufacturers and one common retailer. In an interesting strategic role, the private label mitigates the promotion competition between the two national brands and provides benefits for all three members in the channel. Our analysis shows that offering a private label can be a credible commitment from a national brand manufacturer that it will not engage in promotions and decrease the incentive of the national brand rival to engage in promotions. In this way, we attempt to provide a reason for why national brand manufacturers provide retailers with private labels in practice. In addition, we discuss the optimal quality level of private labels.     

Brand and quality effects on introduction of store brand products

This paper considers a supply chain with a single manufacturer selling a national brand product via a single retailer. The retailer has the option to introduce a product under his own brand into the market with the same functionality as the national brand product. We simultaneously consider the consumer bases of the national brand and store brand along with consumers' willingness to pay for quality and the supply chain control (centralized vs. decentralized). By analyzing the game-theoretic models, we offer managerial insights about the influences of brands' consumer bases on the quality and pricing decisions of the retailer, and on the manufacturer's willingness-to-collaborate when the retailer introduces the store brand product. We find that, although it is usually easier for the retailer to introduce a product under a store brand with a large consumer base, doing so with manufacturers of well established national brands can be difficult, when the retailer often has to greatly mark down his store brand product's quality and price. We also find that a store brand product with a small consumer base shall be launched only when the supply chain is switched to a centralized control and when the manufacturer's national brand has a large consumer base. These important findings offer guidance to both national brand manufacturers and retail store managers regarding the launch of store brand products.     

Are they always promising? An empirical analysis of moderators influencing consumer preferences for economy and premium private labels

The identification of conditions under which premium or economy private labels are more promising from a consumer perspective is of high managerial relevance. This paper is first to analyze the moderating impact of store-, category-, and private label-characteristics on consumer preferences for premium vs. economy private labels. The results reveal that premium (economy) private labels are more preferred at high-priced (low-priced) retailers and in categories of high (low) brand relevance. However, consumers' believes whether the private label is produced by a well-known manufacturer or the retailer itself do not moderate consumer preferences for premium vs. economy private labels.     

Factors that influence manufacturer and store brand behavioral loyalty

This study examines the factors that are linked to consumer goods brands having unusually high or low behavioral loyalty, after controlling for the association between brand size and loyalty that occurs due to the ‘double jeopardy’ effect. Behavioral, or repeat-purchase loyalty is measured as the brand's average share of category requirements (in volume) among its buyers over a 12-month period. We examine a range of factors that theory or past evidence suggests are associated with higher or lower behavioral loyalty, including brand type (store brand/manufacturer brand), price level, promotion intensity, as well as average brand volume per occasion and pack size. Using extensive US panel purchasing data, we find that store brands exhibit relatively higher behavioral loyalty than manufacturer brands. We explain the theory behind this result. We also find that the brand's average pack size and volume bought per occasion has a markedly positive association with behavioral loyalty. Finally, we find that the effect of low price on excess loyalty is moderated via a positive association with average volume purchase per occasion. These findings add to the body of knowledge relating to patterns in behavioral brand loyalty for both manufacturer and store brands, as well as the marketing-mix factors that influence it.     

Bridge,Focus, Attack,or Stimulate: Retail Category Management Strategies with a Store Brand

We investigate a monopolist retailer's category management strategy where the main strategic decisions are how to horizontally position a store brand relative to the incumbent national brands and how to price the store and national brands for retail category profit maximization. We analyze a market composed of two consumer segments with differing tastes and heterogeneity with respect to willingness to pay and a product category consisting of two competing national brands and one store brand. We find that contrary to the existing literature, it is not always optimal for a retailer to position its store brand against the leading national brand; instead there are many situations where it is best to position the store brand close to the weaker national brand or to position it in the “middle” so it appeals to both national brands' target segments. In the process we identify four distinct category management strategies that a retailer can use with a store brand. In three of these the optimal store brand price is the brand's monopoly price, while in the remaining one strategy the price is lower. We also suggest an easy to implement means for a retailer to determine which strategy is best to use, depending on the particular competitive environment present before the introduction of the store brand and the relative quality of the store brand. We find that the store brand entry is most beneficial to the retailer when the national brands are moderately differentiated. Finally we show that introducing a store brand not only allows the retailer to garner a higher share of the channel profits through higher retail margins, but also often provides the retailer the benefit of increases in national brand unit sales as well as incremental sales from the store brand. JEL Classification: M310     

Implementing online store for national brand competing against private label

We propose a game-theoretic model in three contexts. First, only the national brand (NB) is offered through a traditional retailer. Second, the private label (PL) is introduced by the traditional retailer. Finally, the NB's manufacturer opens an online store. We reassess the benefit of introducing the PL and investigate the profitability of implementing an online store. We found that the retailer is not always enjoying the PL's introduction. Also, the manufacturer could benefit from that strategy. The quality differential between the NB and the PL, the PL's potential and the cross-price competitions are all important factors to determine the result of PL's introduction. Hence, the manufacturer opens the online store either to counter the threat of such strategy or to expand his market.     

Entry mode selection and its impact on an incumbent supply chain coordination

This paper considers a supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. In such a market, a potential entrant can make a substitute product by imitating the incumbent's product and then sells it to the common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling through the incumbent's retailer, (ii) selling through another independent retailer, or (iii) selling directly to consumers. Faced with the entrant's entry, the manufacturer has managed to offer a value-added service to add to its product's value at a cost. We investigate the entrant's optimal entry mode when the manufacturer offers profit-sharing contracts to the retailer and when it does not, and discuss the impact of the potential invader's entry on the incumbent firms' performances. The results show that: (1) the entrant sells directly to consumers when faced with weak value competition, and sells through another retailer against fierce value competition. (2) If the value competition is relatively fierce and the efficiency of the value-added service is relatively high as well, the incumbent firms can benefit from the new entry. (3) A profit-sharing contract, as a coordination policy, can fully coordinate the incumbent supply chain no matter whether there exists a potential entrant or not, yet the entry can affect the distribution of the profits between the incumbent manufacturer and retailer.     

Coupons and private labels: A cross-category analysis of grocery products

This article examines the influence of coupons on private label shares of grocery products. The impact of national brand and private label coupons, distributed by manufacturers and retailers, is examined. A consumer framework and a typology of coupon effects are developed to explain different types of coupon usage behavior. Aggregate scanner panel data on 480 product categories are used in the analysis. Both the type of coupon and the method of distribution (by manufacturer or by retailer) are found to be important determinants of private label share response. Couponing activities by the national brand manufacturer are negatively related to private label share, thus indicating that they may be effective deterrents of private label penetration. However, couponing activities related to private labels do not help increase private label shares. The surprising finding is that national brand store couponing activity is positively related to private label share.     

Store Brand Quality and Retailer’s Product Line Design

This study analyzes a retailer’s store brand quality decision in vertically differentiated product categories. We analyze a game theoretic model composed of one or two national brand manufacturers and a retailer, who strategically chooses the quality level(s) of its store brand(s) relative to the well-established national brand position(s) to maximize its category profit. Our analysis reveals that the nature of a retailer’s store brand quality positioning is quite different from the manufacturer’s national brand positioning decision, and that the best position for a store brand is not “as close to a national brand as possible” as previous studies suggest. Instead, the optimal quality position of each store brand is remarkably sensitive to the distribution of consumers’ willingness-to-pay. In particular, the relative proportions of quality sensitive consumers and price sensitive consumers determine the balance of three key strategic forces — the market expansion force, the retail margin force, and the consumer profitability force, leading to different optimal product line designs for store brands across different category environments. Interestingly, against multiple incumbent national brands, the retailer’s optimal product line design includes a store brand positioned at the highest quality level in the category only if most consumers are moderately quality conscious. We also analyze the implications of national brands’ brand equity for retailers’ store brand strategy.     

Private Label Vendor Selection in a Supply Chain: Quality and Clientele Effects

We model a supply chain consisting of a national brand manufacturer and an independent manufacturer, both of whom are potential suppliers of store brand to a single retailer. The retailer serves two customer segments—a quality sensitive segment (high type) and a price sensitive (low type) segment. The retailer serves these two segments by targeting the national and store brands to the quality and price sensitive segments, respectively. When the national brand manufacturer supplies the store brand he internalizes the effect of store brand quality on the national brand's retail prices. This leads the national brand manufacturer to choose a lower store brand quality than the independent manufacturer. This decrease in store brand quality has the benefit of increased revenues from the high type customers along with an associated cost of decreased revenues from the low type customers. Thus, when the benefit outweighs the cost the retailer chooses the national brand manufacturer to supply the store brand. We show that the retailer will choose the national brand manufacturer to supply the store brand when (a) the size of the high type customer segment is large relative to the low type customer segment, (b) the valuations of the high type customer segment is large relative to the low type customer segment, and (c) the retailer's margin requirement on the store brand is not very high. Overall, these results suggest that retailers who serve a bigger sized quality (price) sensitive clientele would have the national brand (independent) manufacturer supply the store brand.     

Offering value and capturing surplus: A strategy for private label sales in a new customer loyalty building scenario

The competition between private label brand and national brands in the diaper category is investigated from the view of the private label brand manager. In this category, new customers routinely enter the category buying entry-level diaper sizes (for infants) and then progress to buy larger diaper sizes over time (as their child grows older). Thus, consumer comparisons between the private label brand and national brands are focused on single diaper sizes during any single purchase scenario. Because private label brands are known to suffer from low quality perceptions that often understate the true quality levels of private label brands, this paper advances a pricing strategy to optimize private label performance in the category. The private label brand should price significantly low for small diaper sizes (maintaining a sizeable price gap from national brand competitors). Then, in most cases, the private label brand should shrink the size of this price gap for large diaper size offerings. This strategy will successfully offer initial value to new customers, build private label brand quality perceptions and loyalty, and then capitalize on these gains through higher dollar sales in the late stages of the customer relationship. The price gap shrinking strategy is found to be generally effective, but high national brand competition and too high of an initial price gap diminish the effectiveness of the strategy.     

Online channel strategies under different offline channel power structures

This study explores the manufacturer's marketing and pricing strategies for online channel under different offline channel power structures. Through these strategies, the manufacturer sells products through an offline retailer and an e-tailer. The manufacturer decides the cooperation mode with the e-tailer by the reselling or the agency selling mode and the pricing strategy on the basis of the power structures, i.e., vertical Nash structure (VN), manufacturer Stackelberg structure (MS), and retailer Stackelberg structure (RS). We find the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode when the commission rate is less than the given threshold. As long as the commission rate is more than another threshold, the manufacturer selects the online reselling mode under the VN structure; however, the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode under the other two structures. As well, the offline wholesale price is higher under the MS structure than those under the VN and RS structures. When the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode, the offline retail price is highest under the MS structure, and the online retail price is highest under the VN structure. Meanwhile, consumers can always obtain a higher surplus in the online agency selling mode under all offline power structures.     

Effect of Store Brand Introduction on Channel Price Leadership: An Empirical Investigation

In this study, we conduct an empirical investigation of the impact of store brand introductions on the price leadership relations in a distribution channel between a retailer and national brand manufacturers. We analyze a multi-product category retail database from a major grocery chain, which captures both a period before and a period after the introduction of a store brand in each product category. By applying the time series approach to this data set, we show that store brand introductions frequently lead to price leadership changes, generally in a more favorable direction for the retailer than for the national brand manufacturer, evidenced by either the decay of the manufacturers’ price leadership or the rise of the retailer’s price leadership. However, such a change is not universal but tends to be concentrated among a certain quality tier of national brands, which is not always the low-tier, but sometimes the top-tier despite the low-price low-quality position of the store brand. The patterns detected in the data suggest that these changes are likely to reflect the retailer’s strategic effort to reshape the price leadership environment in a product category aided by the enhanced bargaining power and managerial sophistication that accompanied the store brand introductions.     

Family influence on young adult's brand evaluation. An empirical analysis focused on parent–children influence in three consumer packaged goods

Throughout the years, there has been debate in the consumer research literature on how families influence their children's attitudes to brands. This paper analyses parent–young adult children influence on the creation of brand associations, perceived quality and willingness to pay a price premium. In order to fulfil these goals, an empirical analysis using a sample of 349 young adults has been conducted. Relationships have been analysed by means of structural equations models in three consumer packaged goods, and results obtained allow us to conclude that the information provided by parents may foster the creation of brand associations, it may favour young adults' positive perception of the brand's quality, and finally, it may lead young adults to be willing to pay a price premium for the brand.     

The value of private label brands to U.S. consumers: An objective and subjective assessment

This study investigates the value of private label brands to consumers using two approaches: First, subjective evaluations of the perceived relationships between price and quality for private label (PL) brand and national brand (NB) products based on survey responses; and second, objective measures of price and quality for PLs and NBs widely available in the U.S. Price was generally perceived to be a signal of quality for NBs, but not for PLs, an indication that consumers' knowledge may not have kept pace with quality improvement in PLs. Objective estimation of the quality gap potentially existing between PLs and NBs determined that the “quality premium” of NBs observed in the past has largely disappeared. Consumers, notwithstanding, sought a lower purchase price for PLs. In turn, the higher price they were willing to pay for NBs accorded with estimates of the actual “price premium” associated with NBs.     

Strategic Role of Retailer Bundling in a Distribution Channel

We study retailer bundling in a distribution channel when the manufacturer for one bundled product can strategically set the wholesale price. We show that the retailer can use a bundling option as a strategic leverage to extract concessions from the manufacturer in form of a lower wholesale price. This finding contributes a novel rationale for retailer bundling to the bundling literature. Whenever the bundling option causes this concession-extraction effect, the retailer always benefits from the lower wholesale price. The manufacturer, nevertheless, does not necessarily suffer because bundling can lead to a higher consumer demand. We also show that the manufacturer's marginal production cost plays a critical role in driving the retailer's bundling decision, concession extraction behavior and consequently the total channel profit.     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

Consumer Willingness to Pay for Local Designations: Brand Effects and Heterogeneity at the Retail Level

This study examines consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for packaged ice cream with local, private label, and national brands at the retail level. Data were collected through in-person surveys conducted at retail grocery outlets in Utah in 2012. Study results suggest that shoppers are willing to pay significantly more for the national and local brands over the retailer’s private label brand. In fact, the local brand with the state-sponsored designation (Utah’s Own) had a WTP equal to that of the national brand. The use of local designations or labels is important as shoppers were not willing to pay a premium for the local brands in absence of the locally produced or state-sponsored designation label. Additionally, consumer WTP for different brands and the degree of response to local designations varies substantially by consumer attributes. These differences suggest that locally designated products do not compete directly with private label products in the market. This study provides clear evidence of the value of state-sponsored designations, as well as locally produced labeling for food products marketed in a traditional retail setting.