Types of investor uncertainty and the cost of equity capital

We jointly test the effects of two types of investor uncertainty, one related to future firm performance and unrelated to accruals (cash flow uncertainty) and one directly related to accrual estimation errors (accounting quality uncertainty). Distinct from prior studies, our uncertainty estimates are based on a matched‐firm design that minimizes the mechanical relationship between the two uncertainty variables. We find a strong negative relationship between cash flow uncertainty and multiple estimates of the cost of equity capital. With respect to accounting quality uncertainty, we find a strong positive association with both expected stock returns and implied costs of equity, but only in settings that control for cash flow uncertainty. Collectively, our results suggest the need to consider different types of investor uncertainty when examining how investor uncertainty affects the cost of equity capital.     

Financial development,corporate governance and cost of equity capital

Existing research suggests that external governance is more relevant than internal governance in affecting a firm’s value. We contribute to the literature by explicitly examining the interactive role played by country-level financial development and legal institutions in influencing the impact of firm-level governance on the cost of equity capital. Using a comprehensive sample of 7380 firm years drawn from 22 developed countries, we show that firm-level corporate governance attributes affect the cost of equity capital primarily in the Common Law countries with high levels of financial development. Our study is the first to highlight the complementary effects of legal origin, financial development and firm-level governance attributes in influencing the cost of equity capital.     

The Cost of Equity Capital at the Corporate and Investor Levels Allowing a Rational Expectations Model with Personal Taxations

This paper argues that the conventional definition of the cost of equity at the corporate level is likely to be fundamentally flawed under conditions of personal taxation. A 'dimensionally consistent' definition is developed utilising the pioneering contributions of Auerbach and Elton and Gruber. Consequent benefits are straight-forward expressions for the cost of equity capital at the corporate level (for both retained earnings and new equity) as well as at the investor level (post personal tax) in terms of both the dividend discount and CAPM-type models, which are applicable to classical and imputation tax systems. A fundamental framework is thereby provided which succeeds in illuminating investor pesonal tax liabilities as they might be expected to impact on a firm's investment and related dividend policies.     

Compliance with goodwill-related mandatory disclosure requirements and the cost of equity capital

Theory suggests that increased levels of corporate disclosure lead to a decrease in cost of equity via the reduction of estimation risk. We examine compliance levels with International Financial Reporting Standard 3 Business Combinations and International Accounting Standard 36 Impairments of Assets mandated goodwill-related disclosure and their association with firms’ implied cost of equity capital (ICC). Using a sample of European firms for the period 2008–2011, we find a median compliance level of about 83% and significant differences in compliance levels across firms and time. Non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that reveals managers’ judgement and expectations. Overall, we find a statistically significant negative relationship between the ICC and compliance with mandated goodwill-related disclosure. Further, we split the sample between firms meeting (or not) market expectations about the recognition of a goodwill impairment loss in a given year to study whether variation in compliance levels mainly plays a confirmatory or a mediatory role. We find the latter: higher compliance levels matter only for the sub-sample of firms that do not meet market expectations regarding goodwill impairment. Finally, our results hold only in countries where enforcement is strong.     

Shareholder rights, financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital

This study extends research into whether shareholder rights and disclosures of financial-related attributes are associated with firms' costs of equity capital. Using cost-of-equity-capital estimates derived from expected earnings growth valuation models, we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights regimes and higher levels of financial transparency are associated with significantly lower costs of equity capital. We also find evidence that greater financial disclosure and stronger rights regimes interact in reducing firms' costs of equity capital, such that the effect of a high level of one mechanism is minimal when it is combined with a low level of the other. Finally, we document that neither factor dominates the other in their associations, and that there are tradeoffs between disclosure levels and shareholder rights in their influence on firms' implied costs of equity capital. JEL Classification G30 · M10     

Industry cost of equity capital: European evidence for multifactor models

We estimate the costs of equity capital for 117 industries from 16 European countries employing the CAPM and 8 multifactor asset pricing models as well as a variety of different econometric techniques. In doing so, we extend previous research on cost of equity estimation in mainly two ways. First, our study involves European instead of US or UK industries, which are investigated in previous research, and we find that cost of equity estimates obtained from the CAPM or multifactor asset pricing models are as imprecise for European industries as for US and UK industries. Second, in addition to the CAPM, the Fama and French [1993 Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 1993. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(93)90023-5[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56] three-factor model, and the Carhart [1997 Carhart, Mark M. 1997. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance.” The Journal of Finance 52 (1): 57–82. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance.” The Journal of Finance 52 (1): 57–82] four-factor model, which are usually employed, our study includes six multifactor models that have not yet been examined on their ability to provide precise estimates of the costs of equity: the five-factor model of Fama and French [1993 Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 1993. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(93)90023-5[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56] as well as the multifactor models of Pástor and Stambaugh [2003 Pástor, Lubos, and Robert F. Stambaugh. 2003. “Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns.” Journal of Political Economy 111 (3): 642–685. doi: 10.1086/374184[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns.” Journal of Political Economy 111 (3): 642–685]; Campbell and Vuolteenaho [2004 Campbell, John Y., and Tuomo Vuolteenaho. 2004. “Bad Beta, Good Beta.” American Economic Review 94 (5): 1249–1275. doi: 10.1257/0002828043052240[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Bad Beta, Good Beta.” American Economic Review 94 (5): 1249–1275]; Hahn and Lee [2006 Hahn, Jaehoon, and Hangyong Lee. 2006. “Yield Spreads as Alternative Risk Factors for Size and Book-To-Market.” Journal of Financial &; Quantitative Analysis 41 (2): 245–269. doi: 10.1017/S0022109000002052[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Yield Spreads as Alternative Risk Factors for Size and Book-To-Market.” Journal of Financial &; Quantitative Analysis 41 (2): 245–269]; Petkova [2006 Petkova, Ralitsa. 2006. “Do the Fama–French Factors Proxy for Innovations in Predictive Variables?” The Journal of Finance 61 (2): 581–612. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00849.x[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Do the Fama–French Factors Proxy for Innovations in Predictive Variables?” The Journal of Finance 61 (2): 581–612]; and Koijen, Lustig, and van Nieuwerburgh [2010 Koijen, Ralph S., Hanno N. Lustig, and Stijn G. van Nieuwerburgh. 2010. “The Cross-Section and Time-Series of Stock and Bond Returns.” Working Paper, University of Chicago, University of California at Los Angeles, New York University. [Google Scholar]. “The Cross-Section and Time-Series of Stock and Bond Returns.” Working Paper, University of Chicago, University of California at Los Angeles, New York University]. Our results suggest that these models provide even more imprecise cost of equity estimates. One main reason for these inaccurate estimates is the large temporal variation of the risk loadings on the non-traded factors in these models.     

Stock splits, trading continuity, and the cost of equity capital

We hypothesize that managers use stock splits to attract more uninformed trading so that market makers can provide liquidity services at lower costs, thereby increasing investors’ trading propensity and improving liquidity. We examine a large sample of stock splits and find that, consistent with our hypothesis, the incidence of no trading decreases and liquidity risk is lower following splits, implying a decline in latent trading costs and a reduced cost of equity capital. Further, split announcement returns are correlated with the improvements in both liquidity levels and liquidity risk. Our analysis suggests nontrivial economic benefits from liquidity improvements, with less liquid firms benefiting more from stock splits.     

The Impact of Personal Taxes on the Firm's Weighted Average Cost of Capital and Investment Behaviour: A Simplified Approach Using the Dempsey Discounted Dividends Model

The discounted dividends model advanced by Dempsey (1996) is extended to provide a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) assessment of investment opportunities with irregular cash flows. Thereafter, the framework is extended to an assessment of the implications of government tax policy for the firm's investment behaviour. The developed framework is consistent with the empirical evidence of Poterba and Summers (1985) which — over the period of UK tax history 1950–1983 encompassing four major tax on equity reforms — observes how the related dividend and investment politics of UK firms appear to be influenced by the level of dividend taxes.     

Valuation and Cost of Capital Formulae with Corporate and Personal Taxes: A Synthesis Using the Dempsey Discounted Dividends Model

This paper advances expressions for the firm's valuation and cost of capital as a function of leverage. The framework is arrived at by introducing leverage in Dempsey's (1996 and 1998) cost of capital framework and is applicable in the context of both classical and imputation tax systems. The framework reveals that both the historical stability of corporate leverage and the firm's choice of financing structure as revealed by the Pecking Order hypothesis are consistent with a tax-based explanation.     

Degrees-of-freedom problem and implied cost of equity capital

Bias in implied cost of equity estimates arises from analyst optimism and a degrees-of-freedom problem. The common practice in empirical studies of using a proxy for the earnings forecast horizon beyond two years in the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (OJ) model is potentially biased. We derive a generalized OJ model over a T period forecast horizon and indicate the extent of this bias. The implied cost of equity capital is obtained from a quadratic equation, where our constant term comprises T short-term annual earnings per share growth rates, rather than just the next-period counterpart in the OJ model.     

Carbon disclosure,emission intensity and cost of equity capital: multi-country evidence

This study examines the joint effect of carbon disclosure and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on firms’ implied cost of equity capital (COC). Based on 4655 firm-year observations across 34 countries, we find firms’ GHG emission intensity to be positively associated with COC. However, we find also that the penalty linked with higher COC is moderated by extensive carbon disclosure. We provide evidence that the extent of carbon disclosure helps reduce the premium required by investors to compensate for poor carbon performance. Our study provides insights to policymakers, investors and managers on the combined effect of carbon disclosure, and emission intensity.     

Religious atmosphere and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

The cost of equity capital (ICC) is a crucial component of investment decisions and corporate performance evaluations. This study explores the effect of a region’s religious atmosphere on ICC and finds that ICC tends to be lower when stronger religious atmosphere is created. We further use the mediation effect method to clarify the specific channel through which religious atmosphere reduces ICC, and find that earnings quality, corporate investment efficiency and corporate social responsibility partially mediate the effect of religious atmosphere on ICC. Moreover, the relationship between religious atmosphere and ICC is more pronounced in firms with stronger external law environments and higher audit quality, indicating that formal institutions and religious tradition complement each other.     

Disclosure,conservatism and the cost of equity capital: A review of the foundation literature

In this review piece, we survey the literature on the cost of equity capital implications of corporate disclosure and conservative accounting policy choice decisions with the principle objective of providing insights into the design and methodological issues, which underlie the empirical investigations. We begin with a review of the analytical studies most typically cited in the empirical research as providing a theoretical foundation. We then turn to consider literature that offers insights into the selection of proxies for each of our points of interest, cost of equity capital, disclosure quality and accounting conservatism. As a final step, we review selected empirical studies to illustrate the relevant evidence found within the literature. Based on our review, we interpret the literature as providing the researcher with only limited direct guidance on the appropriate choice of measure for each of the constructs of interest. Further, we view the literature as raising questions about both the interpretation of empirical findings in the face of measurement concerns and the suitability of certain theoretical arguments to the research setting. Overall, perhaps the message which is most clear is that one of the most controversial and fundamental issues underlying the literature is the issue of the diversifiability or nondiversifiability of information effects.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market.     

Practitioners' perspectives on the UK cost of capital

The aims of this study were to determine how UK finance practitioners derive and review the cost of capital, and to ascertain whether the final figure varied with the choice of method. To investigate behaviour in the real world a survey questionnaire was employed, eliciting responses from the finance directors of 193 UK quoted firms. The results suggest that the cost of capital calculation is subject to wide variation across firms, both with regard to the overall figure and the precise computation of its components. The intuitive appeal of the WACC and CAPM approaches appears to ensure their continued popularity in the real world. However, firms tend not to make all of the adjustments to the overall figure which academics might expect, only making simple adjustments for risk and the tax advantage to debt. The after-tax money cost of capital which is approximately 10%, is influenced by the choice of method, and firms do not appear to revise their overall cost figure rapidly in response to the environment. The cost of capital decision is of such strategic importance for the longer-term maintenance and expansion of firm value that it is nearly always made within the domain of the board of directors.     

The reaction of firm ex ante cost of equity capital to the resolution of shareholder class action lawsuits

Existing research provides evidence that providers of capital (banks, public debt, and equity) all increase the expected return on securities after the initiation of a shareholder lawsuit. Many of these lawsuits are dismissed or settled with trivial monetary penalties, which suggests that an across-the-board permanent increase in the cost of capital is misguided. After estimating the probable outcome of a shareholder lawsuit using only information available at the time the shareholder lawsuit is filed, we study the resolution of shareholder lawsuits to determine if market participants adjust their expected return after a case is resolved. We find an increase (decrease) in the ex ante cost of equity capital when there is a surprise settlement (dismissal), which is consistent with an efficient market. Further, we present evidence consistent with equity market participants monitoring the progress of shareholder lawsuits prior to resolution. Overall, our results suggest that firm ex ante cost of equity capital only changes after the resolution of a shareholder lawsuit if the outcome of the case is different than initially predicted.     

Policy and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital

This paper investigates the effect of voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies/oversight of corporate political activities/spending on the cost of equity capital for S&P 500 firms over the period 2015–2018. Using the CPA-Zicklin Index to measure the level of policies, oversight, and disclosure of corporate political activities, we find that firms with a greater level of policies and oversight enjoy a lower cost of equity capital. We also document that a higher index is associated with higher stock liquidity. The negative relation is more pronounced among firms with higher exposure to political risk and firms with higher dependence on government spending. We also find that a firm’s information environment plays an important role in moderating the relation between policies and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies and oversight mitigates risks and uncertainties related to firms’ political activities, thereby reducing information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital.     

The effect of management earnings forecast characteristics on cost of equity capital

This study uses a framework presented in Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008) to assess how differences in management earnings forecast characteristics influence a firm's cost of equity capital. I find that less specific forecasts, pessimistic forecasts, and forecasts that predict a loss for the period are associated with higher cost of equity capital levels and more timely forecasts and forecasts with more information content are associated with lower cost of equity capital levels. Analysis interacting control variables and forecast antecedents with forecast characteristics indicates that the effects forecast characteristics have on cost of equity capital are either enhanced or moderated depending on firm beta, firm size, firm book-to-market ratios, analyst following, prior forecast bias, and earnings quality. The results highlight the importance of interacting key variables when interpreting the market effect of management earnings forecasts.     

Voluntary disclosure,mandatory disclosure and the cost of capital

We examine the association between a firm's cost of capital and its voluntary and mandatory disclosures. We include two types of mandatory disclosure: those that are a function of periodic reports that are realizations of ex‐ante reporting systems and those that arise due to specific corporate events. To capture a firm's voluntary and event‐driven mandatory disclosures, we use information the firm provides via 8K filings. To capture periodic mandatory disclosures, we use earnings quality measures derived from the literature. Consistent with endogenous relations predicted by theory, we find that voluntary disclosure and both types of mandatory disclosure are correlated, although only event‐driven mandatory disclosures are significant in models that explain voluntary disclosure. We also find that the cost of capital is generally influenced by each of these disclosure types. We also find that controlling for periodic mandatory disclosure does not affect the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital, while controlling for event‐driven mandatory disclosure sometimes affects the relationship depending on the measures used. Our study suggests that a firm's disclosure environment includes the three types of disclosure examined, although the inclusion of mandatory disclosures does not affect the measured association between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital.