Which firms benefit from foreign direct investment? Empirical evidence from Indonesian manufacturing

Despite growing concern regarding the productivity benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI), very few studies have been conducted on the impact of FDI on firm-level technical efficiency. This study helps fill this gap by empirically examining the spillover effects of FDI on the technical efficiency of Indonesian manufacturing firms. A panel data stochastic production frontier (SPF) method is applied to 3318 firms surveyed over the period 1988–2000. The results reveal evidence of positive FDI spillovers on technical efficiency. Interesting differences emerge however when the samples are divided into two efficiency levels. High-efficiency domestic firms receive negative spillovers, in general, while low-efficiency firms gain positive spillovers. These findings justify the hypothesis of efficiency gaps, that the larger is the efficiency gap between domestic and foreign firms the easier the former extracts spillover benefits from the latter.     

China's outward foreign direct investment in the Belt and Road Initiative: What are the motives for Chinese firms to invest?

Because of the potentially large and important effects of the extremely ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by China in late 2013, considerable attention has been given to the motives for, and repercussions of, the BRI-driven infrastructural projects. Yet, the non-infrastructural outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from China to BRI countries, which varies quite substantially across different sectors and different countries, has not yet received much attention. In contrast to some recent studies showing that the massive initiative has increased China's total FDI outflows to fellow BRI countries, in this paper, based on our sector-level difference-in-differences models, we find that effect to be statistically insignificant. Yet, at the same time, we provide empirical evidence on the sectoral pattern of China's outward FDI before and after 2014 indicating that China's FDI outflows to BRI countries have significantly increased in sectors characterized by overcapacity and contributing to pollution in China, thereby demonstrating that China's BRI-driven outward FDI has been very selective in terms of sectors. We confirm these findings with a variety of robustness checks and show that it is BRI countries with relatively low institutional quality that have been more likely to receive these types of FDI from China. We thus speculate that Chinese firms have been motivated to place FDI investments in BRI countries for the sake of alleviating China's own overcapacity and pollution problems. Our findings lead us to suggest that, although these sectoral patterns are consistent with the different stages of economic development in which China and its fellow BRI-identified countries find themselves, Chinese investors and host country governments should be more concerned with the potential for unwanted side-effects of the FDI investments so that the mutually beneficial effects of the BRI can be sustained into the indefinite future among all countries involved.     

High productivity before or after exports? An empirical analysis of Korean manufacturing firms

This study investigates whether exporting is a cause or an effect of high productivity of firms’ in the Korean manufacturing industries. For this purpose, a panel database is assembled with 1335 firms from eight Korean manufacturing industries during 1997–2003. Evidence that high productivity causes exporting, referred to as self-selection, is found in three out of eight industries. However, we do not find support for the hypothesis that high productivity is affected by exporting, except in one industry. Sunk-cost or previous-export-experience effect on the current export status is statistically significant and robust across industries unlike that of firms’ productivity and size.     

How does trade affect the labor market? Evidence from Japanese manufacturing

This paper investigates how increased trade has affected labor demand at different levels of skills in Japanese manufacturing since the 1980s. First, the estimated loss of employment in aggregate manufacturing attributable to increased imports between 1980 and 1990 is 4.7 percent of the 1980 level of employment. Second, the rate of change in the relative wage of non-production to production workers attributable to the change in trade between 1980 and 1990 is 2.4 percent or less. These findings suggest that the effect of increased trade on the Japanese manufacturing labor market in the 1980s is not yet very large.     

Does foreign direct investment promote regional development in developed countries? A Markov chain approach for US states

This paper investigates the effects of inward FDI on per capita income and growth of the US states since the mid-1970s. Using a Markov chain approach, it shows that both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of FDI affect per capita income and growth. The empirical findings suggest that employment-intensive FDI, concentrated in richer states, has been conducive to income growth, while capital-intensive FDI, concentrated in poorer states, has not. Consequently, FDI has tended to be associated with weaker rather than stronger income convergence among US states. It appears to be less important whether FDI has been undertaken in the manufacturing sector of US states or in other sectors.     

Is the relationship between foreign direct investment and trade different across developed and developing countries? Evidence from Korea

Empirical studies that pool data from developed and developing countries may conflate the separate roles played. The pooled coefficient estimates may significantly misrepresent the true relationships. This paper analyses the impact of outward and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between Korea and developed and developing countries on Korean exports in 12 manufacturing sectors over the 1988–2006 period. The evidence suggests that the outward FDI to developing countries is likely to increase Korean exports to those countries than FDI to developed countries likely to increase exports to developed countries. Thus, pooling investment flows can lead to incorrect inferences.     

Does foreign direct investment cause long run economic growth? Evidence from the Latin American and the Caribbean countries

The empirical evidence about the temporal precedence between foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth in open developing economies is mixed. In this research effort, we explored the FDI-growth nexus for 16 developing countries of Latin American and the Caribbean countries during the last three decades, a period in which many of these countries introduced various economic and financial reforms. As a departure from many previous studies, the current analysis uses the Granger noncausality test procedure recently developed by Toda and Yamamoto (J Econ 66:225–250, 1995), and Dolado and Lutkepohl (Econ Rev 15:369–386, 1996)–TYDL. Our results suggest that the null hypothesis that ‘FDI does not Granger cause economic growth’ is rejected for all countries except Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica. There is also evidence of unidirectional causality from growth to FDI for all countries except Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Jamaica. We found bidirectional causality for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.     

What can we learn on Chinese aid allocation motivations from available data? A sectorial analysis of Chinese aid to African countries

Since the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, Chinese official development assistance (ODA) to Africa has increased drastically. Only few analyses on the determinants of Chinese ODA allocation to African countries are available. Moreover, existing literature mainly focused on total aid flows while Chinese motivations for aid allocation might differ depending on the ODA sector considered. Our objective is to study the factors associated with Chinese aid allocation to African countries by sector between 2000 and 2014. We consider three ODA broad sectors as defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): the social infrastructure and services sector, the economic infrastructure and services sector and the production sector. Chinese ODA is measured using AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, 2000–2014, Version 1.0. Over the 2000–2014 period, China allocated 971, 218 and 138 ODA projects to African countries in the social infrastructure and services sector, the economic infrastructure and services sector and the production sector respectively. Between 2000 and 2014, the economic infrastructure and services sector was the first sector in terms of ODA amount with a total of US$18.9 billion ahead from the social infrastructure and services sector with US$7 billion or the production sector with US$3.1 billion. Results of our analysis suggest that the motivations of Chinese aid allocation to African countries differ by sector. Chinese ODA in the social infrastructure and services sector appears more responsive to the economic needs of recipient countries but is also more driven by foreign policy considerations. Chinese economic interest, in particular for natural resources acquisition, is associated with China's ODA allocation in the economic infrastructure and services sector. Finally, while governance quality in recipient countries is not related to Chinese ODA in the social infrastructure and services sector, we find that China allocates more ODA in the economic infrastructure and services sector and the production sector to African countries with weaker institutions. One of the strong conclusions of this study is to show that considering only China's overall aid to Africa can be misleading as to its underlying determinants, and therefore to point out the need to disaggregate the analysis by ODA sectors.