Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use

Using a dynamic intergenerational game, this paper analyzes the effects of inequality among resource users and their access to outside markets and credit on cooperative use of a local commons. The study finds that, depending on the agents' harvest sharing rule, the conditions under which homogeneous agents can cooperate in equilibrium may not be sufficient for cooperation when agents differ in harvesting productivity. The resource users' access to outside markets or credit may have a negative effect on efficient local resource management.     

Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from, a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents, and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity, we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self‐evaluations even if agents' pay‐offs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their pay‐off.     

Resource scarcity,effort allocation and environmental security: An agent-based theoretical approach

It is widely feared that environmental degradation induced by climate change may lead to economic and political insecurity through channels such as resource scarcity and mass migration. In this paper, we have developed an agent-based model to study whether resource scarcity is likely to lead to an increase in the appropriation of resources in environments where adaptive agents can allocate a fraction of their effort to predatory behavior. By enriching a production and conflict model through the introduction of separate product and resource appropriations, we show how boundedly-rational agents capable of learning can update their adaptive expectations and optimize their allocation decisions using a genetic framework. Arising from a few simple rules, the results show a high level of complexity in agents' allocation behavior with outputs ranging from no statistically significant allocation changes to widespread conflict in the environment, depending on the initial conditions and the nature of the scenarios. Overall the results support previous empirical findings that the main link between resource scarcity and conflict is through changes in the distribution of resources rather than their overall availability.     

The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design

We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem—a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to “unit-demand” agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. When the agents' preferences are single-dimensional Myerson's seminal work (1981) shows that randomness offers no benefit—the optimal mechanism is always deterministic. In the multi-dimensional case, when agents' preferences are arbitrarily correlated, Briest et al. (2010) showed that the gap between the expected revenue obtained by an optimal randomized mechanism and an optimal deterministic mechanism can be unbounded even when a single agent is offered only 4 services. We show that when the agents' values involve no correlation or a specific kind of positive correlation, the benefit of randomness is only a small constant factor.     

Segregation in Friendship Networks

We analyze a network‐formation model where agents belong to different communities. Both individual benefits and costs depend on direct as well as indirect connections. Benefits of an indirect connection decrease with distance in the network, while the cost of a link depends on the type of agents involved. Two agents from the same community always face a low linking cost, while the cost of forming a relationship between two agents from different communities diminishes with the rate of exposure of each of them to the other community. We find that socialization among the same type of agent can be weak even if the cost of maintaining links within one's own type is very low. Our model also suggests that policies aimed at reducing segregation are socially desirable only if they reduce the within‐community cost differential by a sufficiently large amount.     

Can a raise in your wage make you worse off? A public goods perspective

We show that a seemingly paradoxical result is possible—an increase in one's wage can reduce one's welfare. Such outcome can occur in an economy populated by agents who value a private good bought using labor income and a public good produced by voluntary time contributions. A raise in the wage (in general, opportunity cost of time) makes each agent substitute away from contributing to the public good, failing to internalize the negative externality imposed on others. The result is a decrease in public good provision. Under quite general conditions, the implied cumulative negative effect on agents' welfare can more than offset the positive effect of the wage raise from increased private good consumption and lead to an equilibrium in which all agents are worse off. Our result is particularly relevant for developing economy settings as it holds for relatively low initial wage levels. We discuss the applicability of our findings to a number of important problems in development, such as market integration, cooperation in common pool resource conservation and social capital.     

Existence of a continuum of equilibria in a monetary random-matching model

In this paper, we study a monetary random-matching model where both goods and money are perfectly divisible, production is costly, and there is no exogenous upper bound on agents' money holdings, information on which is private to the agent. We show that there is a continuum of stationary equilibria where agents have either no money or a set amount, and buyers spend all their money. As in the previous studies, the equilibrium value function is step-like, which emerges as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The endogenous upper bound on agents' money holdings is the result of private information on agents' money holdings. Buyers post an offer that is accepted only by sellers without money, who set a higher value on money.     

In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala–Goyal [Bala, V., Goyal, S., 2000. A non-cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68, 1131–1230] model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by introducing agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents' types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a “star” structure. While equilibrium predictions fail completely with homogeneous agents, star networks frequently occur with heterogeneous agents. Stars are not born but rather develop: with a high-value agent, the network's centrality, stability, and efficiency all increase over time. A structural econometric model based on best response dynamics and other-regarding preferences is used to analyze individual linking behavior. Maximum-likelihood estimates of the underlying structural parameters, obtained by pooling data from several treatments, allow us to explain the main treatment effects.     

Resource-grabbing by status-conscious agents

We introduce a dynamic model of resource-grabbing by status-conscious agents, i.e., agents value not only their absolute consumption levels, but also the relative status within their reference group. We explore the effect of the concern for relative consumption on the growth rate and the welfare of an economy where agents appropriate from a common property resource. Our model shows that the greater is agents' concern about their relative status, the more aggressively they tend to behave. Consequently, social welfare is lower because the growth rate of the public asset is reduced due to higher extraction rate. We also consider the effect of increased heterogeneity, and show that social welfare decreases as the distribution of status-consciousness among agents widens.     

Influential listeners: An experiment on persuasion bias in social networks

This paper presents an experimental investigation of persuasion bias, a form of bounded rationality whereby agents communicating through a social network are unable to account for repetitions in the information they receive. We find that, after repeated communication within a social network, social influence depends not only on being listened to by many others, but also on listening to many others. We show that persuasion bias can be viewed as an extreme case of a generalized boundedly rational updating rule in which agents receive more or less attention depending on how many other agents they listen to. The results indicate that behavior in the experiment is consistent with an updating rule according to which agents' social influence is proportional to their indegree.     

Initial beliefs and the global stability of least squares learning

This article provides an operational framework of global stability analysis when Ljung's (1977) ordinary differential equation (ODE) approach is applied to the recursive stochastic system. We first establish the notion of stable set under which sufficient conditions for the equivalence between them can be translated to restrictions on initial beliefs in agents' forecasts. The maximum ODE-stable set is simply the largest range of initial beliefs. We then demonstrate how to implement this operational framework for the analysis of stability beyond the local sense in some well-known models in the learning literature.     

制造业质量提升的空间关联及传递机制研究

面对区域制造业质量发展不平衡问题,运用贝叶斯插补法测度2000-2018年中国内地30个省域质量提升率,利用VAR模型和Granger检验识别省际质量提升的空间溢出关系,并在社会网络分析框架下揭示网络结构特征和溢出效应。结果表明,质量提升关联网络呈交互性和全局化发展态势,网络结构稳定、流通性较好但紧密度不高,存在局部中心化现象;贵州、内蒙古、江苏、浙江的质量整合力和对外辐射力较强,属于中心行动者和中介桥梁;质量提升关联网络可分为4个功能板块,分别隶属于经纪人板块、双向溢出板块和主受益板块,呈现出东高西低态势;质量提升的传递机制具有联动特征,东部地区是质量提升动力源,与西部、北部地区形成良性互动并发挥引领作用。     

Local perfection

We investigate solution concepts for normal-form games with large strategy spaces. “Trembling hand” perfection (THP) is extended to games with compact metric strategy sets. A Nash equilibrium is THP if it is the limit of equilibria in which agents face vanishingly small uncertainty. We refine THP by imposing some structure on the kind of uncertainty that agents face: a THP equilibrium is locally perfect if the uncertainty is “predominantly local” in nature, i.e., if agents' probability assessments assign, in the limit, an overwhelmingly lage proportion of the total probability mass to events “in the vicinity of the truth.”     

Endogenous Persistent Occupations and Inequality

The paper argues that human capital is the leading force determining inequality persistence. We show that, in a context of a perfect capital market where agents inherit human capital and wealth, it is the inherited human capital level that determines agents' occupational choice and investment. The critical assumption is that the entrepreneurial activity is of increasing returns to scale. This creates a higher profile of revenue for entrepreneurs. Although every agent can choose to become an entrepreneur, and although there is no barrier of entry in entrepreneurship, only those who receive a relatively higher human capital will do so. Agents whose inherited human capital is lower than the human capital threshold, endogenously determined, are better off becoming workers. Even in the context of a perfect capital market, which allows less endowed agents to borrow and invest in education, it turns out that the agents who inherit a low level of human capital bear a greater utility cost in their education investment. So they are better off investing less in education, lending their savings, and working as workers. As a result, agents' occupational choice depends on the intergenerational transmission of human capital. In the long run, the population is polarized into the rich entrepreneurs and the poor workers, magnifying inequality persistence in human capital level and revenue.     

Diversification across ASEAN-wide sectoral and national equity returns

This paper examines the effects of local and global shocks on the sector indices and national returns of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by using the univariate AR-GARCH model. We find that regional and global shocks have different influences on the ASEAN-wide sector and national equity indices. There is evidence that the ASEAN-wide sectoral returns are mostly driven by local shocks, except for the insurance and technology sectors. The volatility of Singapore's and Vietnam's national returns mostly results from their own shocks rather than local and global shocks. Applying the trend spillover model, this paper also shows that the effects of regional and global shocks on return volatility have been decreasing for almost all ASEAN-wide sectors' equity indices, while the trend for the volatility spillover effects of those shocks are positive and significant for the production and industries group sectors, as well as the food and beverage sector. Comparing the variance ratios of ASEAN sectoral and national returns, it is evident that the percentage of national equity returns belonging to their own shocks is higher than that of sectoral returns, indicating that investors might be better off diversifying their assets across countries rather than sectors in ASEAN area. This finding is consistent with the results of the mean–variance frontiers, as the portfolio composed purely of ASEAN national returns has a stronger efficiency frontier than a portfolio of all ASEAN-wide sector equity returns. By using the spanning and intersection tests, the paper also indicates that adding ASEAN national equity returns might improve the efficiency frontiers of investors' holding portfolios.     

WAGE FLOORS,IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES,AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN

We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral‐hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however, induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under specialization. We further show that variations in the wage floor and the agents' reservation utility have significantly different effects on welfare and optimal job design.     

On the strength of corporate cultures

We model corporate culture(s) as production technologies for which employees have to undertake culture-specific investments that improve their effectiveness. At a later date, the organization can adopt cultural changes that make this investment partially redundant. This leads to under-investment. However, as agents invest more, the organization's opportunity cost of a change increases, which in turn increases each agents' incentives to invest. This externality among agents leads to multiple equilibria. Otherwise similar organizations can thus exhibit either high investment levels and low probability of changes (strong culture) or low investment levels and high probability of changes (weak culture). We also explore some implications for the nature and management of corporate culture.     

Anti-coordination and social interactions

This paper studies the first model of social interactions with anti-coordination. Agents have fixed partners with whom they play a common bilateral game of anti-coordination, like the chicken game. Partnerships are represented as links of a network. The paper asks: How do social interactions interplay with the incentives to anti-coordinate? How does the social network affect individual choices in equilibrium? The analysis shows that network effects are much stronger than when partners play a coordination game. The network notably affects how agents respond when a strategy becomes more advantageous. In the standard benchmark of complete interactions, more agents play the strategy. This result does not generally hold when the network is incomplete. On bipartite networks, agents' choices are unaffected, while on core-periphery networks, less agents may play the strategy.     

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy-freeness on awards.     

FISCAL STRUCTURAL REFORM AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: PUBLIC SPENDING AND PRIVATE EFFORT*

This paper explores governments' and private agents' incentives to implement or postpone fiscal structural reform attempts. Both fiscal consolidation and fiscal reorganization often create spillover effects and thereby induce free‐riding problems. It is thus important to cope with the free‐riding behaviour of interest groups. It is often argued that in order to attain successful outcomes, a good macroeconomic situation is needed, since we expect positive income effects. In this paper, we first explain the dynamic aspects of insufficient fiscal consolidation due to free‐riding problems in the framework of private provision of public goods. Then, using a static model between central and local governments, we examine the sign of income effects for reform attempts to pursue fiscal reorganization. It is shown that good economic circumstances do not necessarily enhance reform of reorganizing fiscal expenditures, although it could enhance fiscal reconstruction.