A Time Series Analysis of U.K. Lottery Sales: Long and Short Run Price Elasticities

This paper estimates the long- and short-run elasticities for Lotto. It is particularly concerned with the dynamic response to price variations since, for some goods, this has sometimes been used to infer the presence of addiction. The price elasticity is identified through variation in the expected value of a Lotto ticket induced by rollovers whose high frequency results in surprisingly high variation in the expected value of holding a ticket. Unit root tests are applied to the series in order to identify their time series properties and to avoid a spurious regression problem. The series are found to be stationary. We apply instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity which arises due to correlation between the expected value and the dependent sales variable. The estimated long-run elasticity exceeds the short-run elasticity and this supports the hypothesis that there is an element of addictive behaviour in sales. The Lottery is regulated and the regulator's objective is to maximize sales. Our estimated long-run price elasticity of demand is inconsistent with revenue maximization and we find that greater revenue for the 'good causes' could be raised from the game if a smaller proportion of sales revenue were allocated to them.     

基于二阶段博弈的碳排放权分配机制研究

建立了政府和两企业之间的一主两从Stackelberg博弈模型和企业之间的差异Bertrand价格博弈模型,将两者结合成一个二阶段博弈模型。对政府和企业之间的博弈行为以及决策变量之间的关系进行分析。研究证明碳排放交易市场可以通过每个企业的边际减排成本均等化实现排放权最终的优化配置,而政府通过确定碳排放权的初始分配比例实现社会的公平性。最后通过数据分析了环境污染程度、企业的减排技术对在均衡条件下的企业效益、政府决策偏好和社会公平性的影响。     

Expert product reviews and conflict of interest

Many firms that produce expert product reviews benefit from increased sales of the products they review, resulting in a conflict of interest. We evaluate expert product reviews from a video game magazine owned by a game retailer. We find evidence of review inflation for lower‐quality games and in periods shortly following the release of a game's corresponding hardware. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions for a firm that optimizes the trade‐off between sales revenue and the reputational costs associated with biasing reviews.     

A game theoretic approach to optimize multi-stakeholder utilities for land acquisition negotiations with informality

To combat the critical stresses of rising urbanization, the government acquires land from private owners using the power of eminent domain. This land assembly causes negative externalities such as increasing social tension and injustice that may impose a long-term threat to stability and sustainable development. Therefore, there is a need to make the land acquisition process more transparent and just. Considering the unique Indian context where informality has a strong presence, we propose an approach based on game theory that models the bargain through a three-stage Nash equilibrium game. Four agents – the government, the private developer, the landowner, and the free rider – are considered. We provide conditional solutions for the generalizable Case and proceed to model different stakeholder behavior patterns through two utility functional forms – linear and exponential. In the linear case, we find that the free rider obtains half of the revenue of the project, whereas the landowner gains between one-fourth and one-half of the revenue. Thus, we highlight the undeniably crucial role free riders play in land acquisition negotiations. However, closed form solutions cannot be obtained for the exponential form, due to which we use simulations to demonstrate a solution procedure. We conclude by stating that the proposed model can be useful in formulating future land policies in a sustainable and inclusive manner, with optimal utility derivations for all concerned stakeholders. Our model can also be extended to other spatial contexts where informality features heavily in the land market, especially in the Global South.     

Principal‐agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments

Effort provision in tournaments may depend on both social preferences towards the competitor and social preferences towards the principal who designed the tournament. In a laboratory experiment, we analyze agents' behavior in different tournament settings that vary the distribution of the prize between agents. The principal chooses between a low and a high guaranteed payment. Standard economic theory predicts the same effort provision in all situations. Instead, our results show that both the generosity of the principal and the strict separation between winner and loser increase the effort level in tournaments. Moreover, agents focus their preferences either on the principal or on the agent. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games

A sharing game is a very simple device for partially reconciling an organization’s goal with the interests of its members. Each member chooses an action, bears its cost, and receives a share of the revenue which the members’ actions generate. A (pure-strategy) equilibrium of the game may be inefficient: surplus (revenue minus the sum of costs) may be less than maximal. In a previous paper, we found that for a wide class of reward functions, no one squanders at an inefficient equilibrium (spends more than at an efficient profile) if the revenue function has a complementarity property. In the present paper, we examine the “opposite” of the complementarity property (Substitutes) and we study a class of finite games where squandering equilibria indeed occur if Substitutes holds strongly enough. Squandering equilibria play a key role when one traces the effect of technological improvement on a sharing game’s surplus shortfall. We then turn to the question of choice among reward functions in a principal/agents setting. We find that if we again assume complementarity then strong conclusions can be reached about the reward functions preferred by “society”, by the players (agents), and by the principal.     

房地产商与购房者的博弈分析

房价是一个关系社会民生的问题,而作为市场经济中的一部分,房地产商与消费者之间进行的是买卖交易,从而存在双方买卖博弈。从2007年至今的房价下调,是在政府干预下的房地产商与消费者的博弈结果。在继续对峙的时期,房地产商与购房者各自该如何决策,怎样达到双赢及社会福利的最大化,文中采用买卖博弈,找出纳什均衡策略。     

收益共享契约在考虑销售努力的出租供应链中的协调研究

在传统的出租供应链上各方独立决策,难以实现利润的最大化,收益共享契约的提出使此类问题的利润最大化成为可能。本文将销售努力考虑到此类问题的模型中,建立了由最佳销售努力和最优订货量联合确定的新的模型,设计了新的契约运行机制,使得模型更加贴近现实,并通过数学方法证实了收益共享契约在此类模型中仍具有可行性。在此基础上举出一个实例,通过对算例结果的分析进一步对模型进行了阐述。     

Tying in two-sided markets with heterogeneous advertising revenues and negative pricing

We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two-sided markets when below-cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying-good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting rent under separate sales and wish to use tying to directly capture the large advertising revenue created in the complementary segment. We uncover two distinct mechanisms by which tying raises monopoly profits but reduces social welfare. Our theory of tying can be applied to real-world antitrust law enforcement, such as the Google Android case.     

Financial competence,overconfidence, and trusting investments: Results from an experiment

Financial transactions sometimes occur in an environment where third-party enforcement is lacking. Behavioral explanations typically allude to the social preferences, where an individual’s utility is directly affected by another’s outcome, as the driver of the trusting investments and reciprocal returns. We hypothesize that, in part, these decisions are determined by an individual’s financial literacy and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Experimental evidence is coupled with an innovative financial literacy assessment, which measures general competence, numeracy skills, and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Results indicate that overconfidence is a significant determinant of behavior. Specifically, overconfident individuals make larger contributions in the investment game. We also document that there is an escalated effect in overconfident individuals who are also exhibit risk loving preferences.     

General equilibrium and optimal taxes

It is shown that if subsidies are not excessive, there exists a general competitive equilibrium in the presence of a complex tax structure. Furthermore, under certain continuity assumptions, a tax structure which is optimal from the social point of view can be determined. Procedures maximize quasi-concave after tax profit functions. Consumers have convex budget sets reflect- ing their income from sales and profits minus taxes on fixed income and progressive sales taxes. Their preferences are interdependent, intransitive and incomplete. The government provides public goods and determines the optimal tax regime on the basis of its preferences on the final competitive consumption allocation.     

Quantitative determination of the level of cooperation in the presence of punishment in three public good experiments

Strong reciprocity is a fundamental human characteristic associated with our extraordinary sociality and cooperation. Laboratory experiments on social dilemma games and many field studies have quantified well-defined levels of cooperation and propensity to punish/reward. The level of cooperation is observed to be strongly dependent on the availability of punishments and/or rewards. Here, we propose an operational approach based on the evolutionary selection of prosocial behaviors to explain the quantitative level of the propensity to punish in three experimental set-ups. A simple cost/benefit analysis at the level of a single agent, who anticipates the action of her fellows, determines an optimal level of altruistic punishment, which explains quantitatively experimental results on a third-party punishment game, the ultimatum game and an altruistic punishment game. We also report numerical simulations of an evolutionary agent-based model of repeated agent interactions with feedback by punishments, which confirms that the propensity to punish is a robust emergent property selected by the evolutionary rules of the model. The cost-benefit reasoning is not to be taken literally but rather to embody the result of the selection pressure of co-evolving agents that have make them converge to their preferences (which can be seen as either hard-wired and/or culturally selected). In this view, the prosocial preference of humans is a collective emergent process, robustly selected by adaptation and selection. Our main contribution is to use evolutionary feedback selection to quantify the value of the prosocial propensity to punish, and test this prediction on three different experimental set-ups.     

Efficient selection of copper sales contracts for small- and medium-sized mining

The purpose of this study is to generate efficient policies for the selection and postponement of copper sales contracts by a mining company. To do so, it uses a two-stage stochastic programming model that determines solutions considering different contract types, random prices, and risk aversion. The results show how it is possible for the selection to involve the lowest risk possible for different revenue levels required. During a period of high price volatility, an efficient solution may deliver an increase in monthly revenue of US$210,000 for a mining company that produces 50,000 tons per year, without any additional risk.     

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A MICROECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This paper provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Depending on whether an individual can be considered as selfish, or whether she has also social preferences, motives for CSR, can be explained in different ways. Furthermore, we explicitly highlight the influence of different Corporate Governance System on CSR as well as the relationship between firms' size and social commitment. Because it is difficult to distinguish between different theories in empirical studies, we argue that an experimental approach might be suitable to test theories of CSR.     

Rational Irrationality and Group Size: The Effect of Biased Beliefs on Individual Contributions Towards Collective Goods

The price of irrationality or belief manipulation varies as we move from small to large group settings. Individual members of large groups can more cheaply bias downwards their beliefs as to the immorality of their free‐riding thereby circumventing internal moral constraints. The relative anonymity inherent to large number settings moreover reduces social pressures against free‐riding stemming from some common ethical or moral norms. Both selfish individuals facing an internal moral constraint to behave altruistically and those with altruistic preferences have an incentive to bias upward their belief of the decisiveness of their contribution in large number settings. In addition, the impact of symmetry and the illusion of control can introduce biases regarding the expected reactions of others to one's own decisions. The loosening of moral constraints will tend to increase free‐rider behavior while biased beliefs about the decisiveness of one's contribution or the reaction of others to one's actions will tend to decrease such behavior.     

Do people trust more when they are happy or when they are sad? Evidence from an experiment

This paper deals with the role played by incidental emotions on trust decisions. Based on a laboratory experiment with monetary incentives, we explore the way positive and negative emotions impact transfers in a trust game. In addition, we investigate the mechanism through which risk intervenes in the relationship between emotions and trust. Our results suggest that negative emotions influence trust positively, whereas positive emotions decrease trust. This effect disappears once risk is included to the game. Furthermore, we found that transfer in the trust game is driven by other‐regarding preferences and by risk preferences.     

Zero-intelligence agents looking for a job

We study a simple agent-based model of a decentralized matching market game in which agents (workers or job seekers) make proposals to other agents (firms) in order to be matched to a position within the firm. The aggregate result of agents interactions can be summarised in the form of a Beveridge curve, which determines the relationship between unmatched agents, unemployed job seekers and vacancies in firms. We open the black box of matching technology, by modelling how agents behave (make proposals) according to their information perception. We observe more efficient results—in the form of a downward shift of the Beverage curve in the case of simple zero-intelligent agents. Our comparative statics indicate that market conditions, such as the heterogeneity of agents’ preferences, will also shift the Beveridge curve downwards. Moreover, market thickness affects movement along the Beverage curve. Movement right-down along the curve if there is an increasing number of agents compared to positions within firms. Furthermore, we show that frictions in re-matching, such as commitment to a match, could be another factor shifting the Beveridge curve toward the origin.     

Estimating economic impacts of the US-South Korea free trade agreement

ABSTRACT

We analyze the economic impacts of the United States-South Korea Free Trade Agreement by applying the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) computable general equilibrium model to highly disaggregated commodity flow data. The analysis calculates the impacts in terms of welfare effects, national economic indicators (such as GDP), and business performance metrics (such as sales revenue), which can be used by a variety of decision-makers. Our results suggest several trade-offs among these measures. Positive welfare gains between the US and South Korea are about the same in absolute terms, but favor the latter in relative terms, and very heavily so for GDP gains. Moreover, the US is projected to incur a loss of gross output (sales revenue) in several major manufacturing sectors that are heavily concentrated in geographic areas that have been promised a return of jobs by the Trump Administration.     

The Courts and College Football: New Playing Rules Off the Field?

A bstract . Oklahoma and Georgia, two outstanding college football contenders, challenged the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) long standing control over television sales of game broadcasts. The case, Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association vs. National Collegiate Athletic Association , alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. ¹ It captured the attention of those involved in sports and of the legal profession but its significance is wider. It involved basic economic issues. Plaintiffs held that television was not a threat to ticket revenues, the NCAA structure gave control to colleges with little or no interest in football. and the arrangement did not achieve competitive balance. The NCAA's behavior is found to be that of a classic cartel and ending its control widened consumer choice and upgraded product quality.