The impact of the Second World War on US productivity growth1

This paper considers the productivity impact on the US economy of the period of war mobilization and demobilization lasting from 1941 to 1948. Optimists have pointed to learning by doing in military production and spin‐offs from military R & D as the basis for asserting a substantial positive effect of military conflict on potential output. Productivity data for the private non‐farm economy are not consistent with this view, as they show slower total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1941 and 1948 than before or after. The paper argues for adopting a less rosy perspective on the supply side effects of the war.     

The Location of Manufacturing Exporters in Africa: Empirical Evidence

Abstract: The costs of accessing and using a port/export hub should be high on the list of priorities for export promotion agencies in Africa. This conclusion emanates from this paper focusing on the geographical location of manufacturing export industries in South Africa. Here manufacturing export firms tend to be spatially concentrated with about 84 per cent of total manufacturing exports produced in only 6 per cent of magisterial districts. Distance from an export hub is negatively related to the density of manufactured exports. The largest volumes of manufactured exports are generated within 100 km of an export hub. For electronics, about 98 per cent of manufacturing takes place within 100 km of an export hub. Comparison over time showed that the number of locations from which manufacturing exports occur increased by 15 per cent over 1996–2004 and that manufacturing exports increased in the band between 200 and 400 km from the nearest hub.     

Exporting and Productivity in the USA

Exporting is often touted as a way to increase economic growth.This paper examines the interaction between exporting and productivitygrowth in US manufacturing. While exporting plants have substantiallyhigher productivity levels, there is no evidence that exportingincreases plant productivity growth rates. The higher productivityof exporters largely predates their entry into exporting. However,within the same industry, exporters do grow faster than non-exportersin terms of both shipments and employment. Exporting is associatedwith the reallocation of resources from less efficient to moreefficient plants. In the aggregate, these reallocation effectsare quite large, making up over 40 per cent of total factorproductivity growth in the manufacturing sector. Half of thisreallocation to more productive plants occurs within industriesand the direction of the reallocation is towards exporting plants.     

A Tale of Two Tails: Establishment Size and Labour Productivity in United States and German Manufacturing at the Start of the Twentieth Century

This paper studies the importance of establishment size for the German/US labour‐productivity gap in manufacturing at the start of the twentieth century. First, we show that the left tail of the employment distribution by establishment size was larger in Germany than in the USA. Second, using US state data for 1909, we find a positive correlation between establishment size and labour productivity. Third, imposing the coefficients of these estimates on establishment‐size differences between Germany and the USA, we calculate that a redistribution of German employment to larger establishments, as in the USA, reduces the labour‐productivity gap by about 25 per cent.     

Agglomeration externalities and productivity growth: US cities, 1880–1930

We investigate the role of industrial structure in labour productivity growth in manufacturing in US cities during the ‘second industrial revolution’. We find that initially greater specialization was associated with faster subsequent productivity growth but that only the very high levels of diversity which obtained in some very large cities had a positive correlation. We interpret our results as demonstrating the existence of dynamic Marshallian externalities. The impact of industrial specialization in our sample of US cities after 1890 is found to have raised the level of labour productivity in manufacturing by about 4 per cent by 1920.     

EXPORTING AND PRODUCTIVITY: A FIRM‐LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE TAIWAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY

Based on the panel data of Taiwanese electronics firms, this paper explores the relationship between exporting and productivity. Contemporaneous levels of exports and productivity are indeed positively correlated. The causality tests show causality from productivity to exporting and vice versa, implying that self‐selection and learning‐by‐exporting effects coexist in the Taiwan electronics industry, while the learning‐by‐exporting effect is less supported. Exporting also has a positive impact on the productivity growth of firms, while the effect diminishes gradually after entering foreign markets. Decomposing the productivity growth shows that the reallocation effect accounts for only 20 per cent compared to the own‐effect share of 80 per cent, which is mostly contributed by firms that continually export.     

Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in Thailand

Using data from Thailand's 2007 Industrial Census, this research studied resource misallocation across manufacturing plants and its impact on manufacturing total factor productivity (TFP). It is found that there is more resource misallocation across plants in Thailand than in China, India, and the US, as well as in some other countries. When resource misallocation in Thailand is hypothetically reduced to the extent observed in the USA, manufacturing TFP increases by about seventy per cent. It is also found that manufacturing plants under government ownership or located in the northern region of Thailand have lower productivity, yet face lower input and output distortions than other plants. Also, medium‐sized plants face higher distortions than smaller and larger plants.     

The impact of war on Russian and Soviet development 1850–1950

This article discusses the magnitude of wartime losses to Russian capital stock and population, the prospect of benefits from wartime developments and the burden imposed by the transfer of resources to the war effort. Total losses of manpower and capital, and the deprivation of civilian consumers, were greater in the Civil War (1918–1920) than in 1914–1917, but were exceeded by the impact of the Second World War (1941–1945). Potential benefits are not found to be significant. This article also examines the losses of population and capital during the ‘internal war’ of the 1930s.     

Does foreign direct investment promote regional development in developed countries? A Markov chain approach for US states

This paper investigates the effects of inward FDI on per capita income and growth of the US states since the mid-1970s. Using a Markov chain approach, it shows that both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of FDI affect per capita income and growth. The empirical findings suggest that employment-intensive FDI, concentrated in richer states, has been conducive to income growth, while capital-intensive FDI, concentrated in poorer states, has not. Consequently, FDI has tended to be associated with weaker rather than stronger income convergence among US states. It appears to be less important whether FDI has been undertaken in the manufacturing sector of US states or in other sectors.     

Second World War spending and local economic activity in US counties, 1939–58

Studies of the development of local economies often point to large‐scale Second World War military spending as a source of economic growth, even though spending declined sharply after demobilization. We examine the relationship between war spending per capita and the changes in economic activity in US counties between 1939 before the war and a period several years after the war. In the longer term counties receiving more war spending per capita during the war experienced greater population growth, but growth in per capita measures of economic activity showed little relationship with per capita war spending.     

Fixed‐price contracts,learning, and outsourcing: explaining the continuous growth of output and labour productivity in the German aircraft industry during the Second World War1

In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm‐level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especially high in the early phase of the war, and secondly, that the regulatory setting of aircraft production management was rather constant and was not dramatically changed after 1941. In addition, we demonstrate that the driving forces of productivity growth were primarily learning‐by‐doing and outsourcing, the latter being generally neglected by economic historians.     

Britain as a debtor: Indian sterling balances, 1940–53

The British war effort in the Second World War depended on US Lend‐Lease and the accumulation of sterling balances by other countries, including the Empire. By the end of the war outstanding balances were equivalent to 60 per cent of British net receipts under Lend‐Lease. Of the total sterling balances, about a third was accumulated by India. This article seeks to evaluate the costs incurred by India in the reduction of balances after the war. The accumulation of balances and their use to repatriate India's sterling debt is described. British efforts to convince India to accept a partial cancellation of the balances are analysed, singling out the crucial role of Keynes. The negotiations after independence are detailed, including releases, transfers to Pakistan, settlement of pensions, purchase of military stores, and gold sales. The possible contribution of British divestment to reduce outstanding balances is assessed. The Indian case is compared with those of other holders, such as Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, and Egypt. The links between the accumulation of sterling balances and inflation are considered. In the end there was a significant reduction in the purchasing power of sterling balances, but not for the reasons anticipated by London.     

Catching up with the Technology Frontier: Finnish Manufacturing Productivity, 1975–2003

Abstract

Labour productivity in Finnish manufacturing industry grew at the rapid average annual rate of 5 per cent from 1975 to 2003. The labour productivity growth was broad-based, or yeast-like, in the 1970s and 1980s, with contributions from multi-factor productivity gains in the paper and metal industries dominating. In the 1990s productivity growth was much more mushroom-like, that is, concentrated in the electronics industry. The level of labour productivity in Finnish manufacturing matched that of the USA by the end of the second millennium. Labour costs and unit labour costs remained at only three-quarters of the US level, although real hourly compensation increased steadily. After 1995 manufacturing industry constituted a quarter of the Finnish economy but contributed a third of overall economic growth.     

Comparative output and labor productivity in manufacturing between China, Japan, Korea and the United States for ca. 1935 - A production-side PPP approach

Following the standard industry-of-origin methodology to measure production-side purchasing power parities (PPPs), this study for the first time provides a set of unit value ratios (UVRs) of manufacturing products between China, Japan, Korea and the US, based on which it derives PPP estimates for individual manufacturing industries for these East Asian countries with the US as the benchmark for ca. 1935. The estimated PPP for total manufacturing suggests that the relative level of the producer price in China, Japan and Korea was about half to two thirds of the prevailing market exchange rates, respectively. The estimated PPPs are used to calculate comparative output and labor productivity for individual industries of these countries for ca. 1935. It shows that the size of factory manufacturing in Japan was 12 percent of the US level and in China only about one percent of the US level. In terms of comparative labor productivity, measured as PPP$ per hour worked, Japanese and Korean manufacturing was 24 and 23 percent of the US level, whereas Chinese manufacturing was only 7 percent of the US level.     

Groeizaam financieel beleid

Summary Economic growth, and the level of savings required to finance it, have increased in the Netherlands since the second world war to a considerably larger extent than could reasonably have been expected. The Netherlands are among the countries which, after the period of recovery and economic revival, have become under the spell of the idea of economic growth. The country was able to realize this growth by using an amount in the order of magnitude of 20 per cent. of its national income (calculated at market prices) for the formation of capital.This percentage was attained thanks to the fact that savings of private individuals were largely supplemented by government savings, by business savings (effectuated through keeping appreciable portions of net profits in the business for the purpose of strengthening reserves), and by forming (or enlarging the amount of) funds, set aside for carrying out arrangements made for the payment of old age pensions, widows' pensions and the like. More than half of the above-mentioned total of 20 per cent. was due to savings of these three kinds. As such savings are often not felt by private individuals as sacrifices, they may be called disguised or veiled savings.The author pays special attention to government savings. They have been a permanent feature in the Netherlands since the end of the war; and they have contributed to no small extent towards financing economic growth. They emanated from surplusses of current central government income above current central government expenditure, and enabled the central government to finance important investments, also for the account of local authorities.For the year 1960 a savings quota of 23 per cent. of the national income was registered. Since then the percentage has gone back to 17 1/4 per cent. in 1963. In the meantime impulses towards economic growth have gained strength. With a view to this development the government recommends serious endeavours directed to re-establishing a savings quota of 23 per cent. of the national income. Given the strong tendency towards increased consumptive spending which has made itself felt during the last few years, the author realizes that this is a desideratum, by no means easy to be fulfilled. He does not, however, consider its fulfilment as a task which cannot be accomplished.Rede, uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van gewoon hoogleraar in de leer der openbare financiën aan de Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden op 2 december 1966.     

Dominion or Republic? Migrants to North America from the United Kingdom, 1870–1910

Late nineteenth–century Canada attracted a large number of immigrants from the UK, despite far lower average income per head there than in the US. While urban labour markets in the northern US were much larger than those in Canada, differences in outcomes between UK immigrants in Canadian and in northern US cities were small. Average annual real earnings by occupation group were only 10 to 15 per cent lower in Canadian cities. Individual–level census data indicate that the occupational distribution of UK immigrants in Canada was quite similar to that of their peers in the US.     

The role of sentiment in the US economy: 1920 to 1934

This paper investigates the role of sentiment in the US economy from 1920 to 1934 using digitised articles from The Wall Street Journal. We derive a monthly sentiment index and use a 10-variable vector error correction model to identify sentiment shocks that are orthogonal to fundamentals. We show the timing and strength of these shocks and their resultant effects on the economy using historical decompositions. Intermittent impacts of up to 15 per cent on industrial production, 10 per cent on the S&P 500 and bank loans, and 37 basis points for the credit risk spread suggest a large role for sentiment.     

Managing the renminbi: should China peg to a trade‐weighted basket?

Pegging the renminbi (RMB) to the US dollar since 1994 has characterised China's exchange rate policy under a fixed peg or appreciating crawling peg. The current policy, announced in June 2010, of ‘floating with reference to a basket’ made the RMB 25 per cent stronger against a trade‐weighted basket by early August 2015, while it was 10 per cent stronger against the US dollar. Thus, 14 percentage points arose from changes in the cross rates of the other currencies, notably from the fall of the euro since December 2014. Devaluation of the RMB by 3 per cent in August 2015 just covered the effective appreciation since December 2014. Effects of the cross rates of other currencies could be eliminated by managing the external value of the RMB with reference to a genuine trade‐weighted basket. This could be a suitable intermediary exchange rate regime for China, as the risks associated with free floating are still great. Diversifying further the currency composition of the foreign exchange reserves and other foreign assets of the Chinese government, from US dollars towards euro and yen assets, would be a natural parallel shift. The euro–US dollar–yen exchange rates in late summer 2015 may offer a good opportunity to carry out this move.     

A ‘blank cheque'? Portuguese Second World War sterling balances, 1940–73

The British effort in the Second World War required massive external financing which depended on Lend‐Lease and the accumulation of sterling balances. Indebtedness in sterling balances corresponded to almost 38 per cent of this total at the end of the war. Portuguese sterling balances, although a small share of the total, were important because of pre‐emptive purchases, especially of wolfram, and because of the ‘gold clause’ which was to be applied to outstanding balances. Portugal's willingness to finance British purchases contrasts with the requirement of German payments in goods or cash for their purchases in Portugal. The settlement of Portuguese sterling balances in August 1945 was singular as it preceded the Anglo‐American settlement of December 1945 which had important consequences for sterling balance holders, as the US insisted that the US$3.75 billion loan should not be used to settle British war debts. Postwar settlement of British debt through a long‐term loan from Portugal to Britain contrasts with settlements that involved the sale of British assets. Salazar's concerns about the postwar international position of Portugal, the Portuguese Empire, and the survival of the Portuguese regime are relevant in explaining his pro‐British stance during and after the war.     

A STUDY OF THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF FARMERS IN TAIWAN, 1931–1950

A quantitative analysis is made herein of the Taiwanese farmhousehold economy in 1931, 1937, 1941, and 1950. The results reveal (1) farm expenditure and income for all types of farmers in 1950 were less than in 1931, the only year for which comparable figures are available; (2) in 1950 both the consumption expenses for most farmers and Engel's Coefficient for all types of farmers showed inferior conditions for that year as compared to the earlier periods; (3) secondary living expenses in 1950 only amounted to two-thirds of those in the previous periods; (4) the poor situation in 1950 was caused by the decline of the rice price ratio and of cultivated area, which combined to offset the benefits derived from rent reduction for tenants, and (5) food expenses for all the periods, however, maintained a per capita annual level of 48–49 yen at the 1937 value.