Cryptocurrency,Security, and Financial Intermediation

In recent years, the use of cryptocurrencies has increased. As these currencies continue to play a larger role, they eventually will be an important component of banking system activity. Moreover, in addition to the standard role of financial intermediaries to facilitate lending, intermediaries can be valuable firms that help provide safekeeping of tokens. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate these important functions in a microfounded model of monetary exchange. Furthermore, we also consider the possibility that central banks issue their own digital currencies that may affect the level of intermediation in the private banking system.     

Bank and Nonbank Financial Intermediation

Conglomerates, trade credit arrangements, and banks are all instances of financial intermediation. However, these institutions differ significantly in the extent to which the projects financed absorb aggregate intermediary risk, in whether or not intermediation is carried out by a financial specialist, in the type of projects they fund and in the type of claims they issue to investors. The paper develops a simple unified model that both accounts for the continued coexistence of these different forms of intermediation, and explains why they differ. Specific applications to conglomerate firms, trade credit, and banking are discussed.     

Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation

Financial intermediation naturally arises when knowing how loan payoffs are correlated is valuable for managing investments but lenders cannot easily observe that relationship. I show this result using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers' payoffs are correlated. When projects have correlated outcomes, learning the state of one project (via enforcement) provides information about the states of other projects. A large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement. Thus, intermediation dominates direct lending, and intermediaries are financed with risk‐free deposits, earn positive profits, and hold systemic default risk.     

Investment Bank Reputation,Information Production,and Financial Intermediation

We model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market. Entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market, either directly, or using an investment bank. Investment banks, who interact repeatedly with the equity market, evaluate entrepreneurs' projects and report to investors, in return for a fee. Setting strict evaluation standards (unobservable to investors) is costly for investment banks, inducing moral hazard. Investment banks' credibility therefore depends on their equity-marketing history. Investment banks' evaluation standards, their reputations, underwriter compensation, the market value of equity sold, and entrepreneurs' choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously.     

财务动态治理论纲

传统财务治理理论侧重于财务治理结构和权利分布状态等静态范畴的研究,而忽略了财务动态治理的专门研究.财务治理可分解为基于企业公平的财务静态治理和基于企业效率的财务动态治理,它在本质上是一个二元价值体系,在实践上表现为企业公平和效率的并行与平衡.财务动态治理是对传统财务治理的继承和超越,它是剩余公司治理的集中领域和公司动态治理的核心,其理论基础溯源于企业产权契约理论、公司治理理论、公允价值会计计量理论和财务治理理论.以不完全合同中的完备部分和不完备部分为标准,财权可划分为通用财权和剩余财权.剩余财权配置是财务动态治理的核心,财务动态治理的基本内容包括动态治理结构、治理机制和治理行为规范.     

Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs

Optimistic beliefs are a source of nonpecuniary benefits forentrepreneurs that can explain the "Private Equity Puzzle."This paper looks at the effects of entrepreneurial optimismon financial contracting. When the contract space is restrictedto debt, we show the existence of a separating equilibrium inwhich optimists self-select into short-term debt and realistsinto long-term debt. Long-term debt is optimal for a realistentrepreneur as it smooths payoffs across states of nature.Short-term debt is optimal for optimists for two reasons: (i)"bridging the gap in beliefs" by letting the entrepreneur takea bet on his project’s success, and (ii) letting the investorimpose adaptation decisions in bad states. We test our theory on a large data set of French entrepreneurs.First, in agreement with the psychology literature, we findthat biases in beliefs may be (partly) explained by individualcharacteristics and tend to persist over time. Second, as predictedby our model, we find that short-term debt is robustly correlatedwith "optimistic" expectation errors, even controlling for firmrisk and other potential determinants of short-term leverage.     

International Business Cycle and Financial Intermediation

The paper extends a standard two‐country international real business cycle model to include financial intermediation by banks of loans and government bonds. The paper contributes an explanation for both the United States relative to the Euro‐area, and the United States relative to China, of cross‐country correlations of loan rates, deposit rates, and the loan premia. It shows a type of financial retrenchment for the United States relative to both Europe and China following a negative bank productivity shock, such as during the 2008 crisis. After 2008, results suggest that the Euro‐area has been more financially integrated with the United States, and China less financially integrated.     

Corporate Financial Policy and the Theory of Financial Intermediation

This paper examines the optimal structure of financial contracts in an economy subject to two forms of moral hazard. Multiple information problems are shown to generate a role for multiple classes of financial claimants. We then show that economic efficiency is enhanced if the financial structure of the economy consists of both direct and intermediated financial contract markets. Consequently, our results demonstrate a motivation for the complementarity between capital markets and depository financial institutions.     

Competition,Financial Intermediation,and Riskiness of Banks: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Region

From a sample of commercial banks in the Asia-Pacific region over the 1994–2009 period, this study highlights that banks in less competitive markets exhibit lower loan growth and higher instability. Such instability is further followed by a decline in deposit growth, suggesting that Asian banks are also subject to indirect market discipline mechanisms through bank competition. This study therefore sheds light on the importance of enhancing bank competition to overcome bank risk and strengthen financial intermediation. Likewise, this study advocates the importance of strengthening market discipline to reduce bank riskiness regardless of the degree of competition in the banking industry.     

Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims

This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product‐market channels. In existing models, a firm's choice of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior; here entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms. We find that to deter entry, the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky, that is, equity. This contrasts with the standard Brander and Lewis (1986) result that debt deters entry. This effect is more marked the less competitive the credit market is—so more credit market competition spurs more product market competition.     

完善金融治理体系提升金融治理能力

党的十八大以来,以习近平同志为核心的党中央总揽全局,创造性地提出推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化这一时代课题,并在党的十九届四中全会上作出全面部署,体现了高瞻远瞩的战略眼光和强烈的历史担当。我们要以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导,通过完善金融治理体系、提升金融治理能力,健全具有高度适应性、竞争力、普惠性的现代金融体系,有效防范化解金融风险,努力为推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化贡献金融力量。     

公司治理 财务契约与财务控制

本文着重分析公司的各种财务契约关系中索取权人之间的利益冲突,以及这些契约解决经济主体之间的利益冲突的主要机制。从财务控制的角度,分析不同的索取权人对公司实施投资控制、筹资控制和分配控制的主要机制和控制要点。从契约和控制的角度分析了现行公司治理结构的成因,探讨了财务控制权的配置问题。     

亚洲新兴市场银行系统:改革仍需继续

过去十年银行亚洲银行业系统的改革取得了很大进展,资本更为充足,减少了外部暴露,对信贷风险的管理更为有效,这使得亚洲银行能够较好地应对本次金融危机的冲击,但要说亚洲银行业的改革已经完成则为时尚早。亚洲银行业取得的成就不仅有内部改革的原因,也有宏观经济环境的因素。亚洲地区国内储蓄大幅上升,央行大规模的对冲干预以及宽松的货币政策,使得银行的融资条件极为宽松,银行信贷大幅扩张,政府债券持有量快速上升。其情况将如何演变,对亚洲银行业将带来什么样的影响尚不确定。未来亚洲银行系统仍应继续深化改革,监管当局需加强监管,防止亚洲大部银行系统中非常宽松的流动性状态造成市场风险和信用风险的过度积累。