TRADING WITH SMALL PRICE IMPACT

An investor trades a safe and several risky assets with linear price impact to maximize expected utility from terminal wealth. In the limit for small impact costs, we explicitly determine the optimal policy and welfare, in a general Markovian setting allowing for stochastic market, cost, and preference parameters. These results shed light on the general structure of the problem at hand, and also unveil close connections to optimal execution problems and to other market frictions such as proportional and fixed transaction costs.     

Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

EXPLICIT SOLUTIONS OF CONSUMPTION-INVESTMENT PROBLEMS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS WITH REGIME SWITCHING

We consider a consumption and investment problem where the market presents different regimes. An investor taking decisions continuously in time selects a consumption–investment policy to maximize his expected total discounted utility of consumption. The market coefficients and the investor's utility of consumption are dependent on the regime of the financial market, which is modeled by an observable finite-state continuous-time Markov chain. We obtain explicit optimal consumption and investment policies for specific HARA utility functions. We show that the optimal policy depends on the regime. We also make an economic analysis of the solutions, and show that for every investor the optimal proportion to allocate in the risky asset is greater in a "bull market" than in a "bear market." This behavior is not affected by the investor's risk preferences. On the other hand, the optimal consumption to wealth ratio depends not only on the regime, but also on the investor's risk tolerance: high risk-averse investors will consume relatively more in a "bull market" than in a "bear market," and the opposite is true for low risk-averse investors.     

Induced clean technology adoption and international trade with heterogeneous firms

This paper introduces an environmental externality and factor-biased technology adoption into a trade model with heterogeneous firms. This study explores how firms’ decisions of technology adoption and of exports are affected by openness to trade and the stringency of environmental regulations. It shows that: (1) these decisions induced by tightened environmental policies depend upon whether the upgraded technology is labor-biased or emission-biased; (2) the environmental impact of trade cost reductions on the aggregate emissions and price of emissions permits varies with the factor-biased feature; and (3) regardless of the factor-biased feature, the trade cost reduction induces firms to export and to upgrade the factor-biased technology, while it forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Moreover, the model is further calibrated to simulate policy scenarios of bilateral and unilateral variations in trade variable costs and environmental policies. The bilateral reduction of emissions cap may contribute to welfare gains in both home and foreign countries. The unilateral action of tightening environmental policy in the home country may hurt the home country, but makes the foreign country better off.     

Macro-control Polices on the Real Estate Market: 08 vs. 09

2008 is a year full of policy changes for the real estate market. On the one hand, real estate policies were launched one after another,most frequent in recent years. On the other hand, a major policy shift was emerging, most evident in financial and fiscal policies.Macro-control policies are meant to lunctlon as a [001 ior reverse regulation. When the market is overheated, macro policies are used to cool it down; when the market is down, they are used to stimulate its development. At present, the central government has basically confirmed its stand to help the real estate market out. If the market remains down in near future, more favorable policies will be put in place.     

R&D policies, trade and process innovation

We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.     

Barriers to Innovation among Spanish Manufacturing SMEs

Innovation is widely recognized as a key factor in the competitiveness of nations and firms. Small firms that do not embrace innovation within their core business strategy run the risk of becoming uncompetitive because of obsolete products and processes. Innovative firms are a perquisite for a dynamic and competitive economy.
This paper reports on the results of a study that examined barriers to firm innovation among a sample of 294 managers of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Spain. The study examined the relation between (1) product, process, and management innovation and (2) 15 obstacles to innovation, which can limit a firm's ability to remain competitive and profitable. Findings of the study show that barriers have a differential impact on the various types of innovation; product, process, and management innovation are affected differently by the different barriers. The most significant barriers are associated with costs, whereas the least significant are associated with manager/employee resistance. Additionally, the results demonstrate that the costs associated with innovation have proportionately greater impact on small than on larger firms.
The findings can be used in the development of public policy aimed at supporting and encouraging the innovation among SMEs in Spain. Government policies that encourage and support innovation among all firms, especially small firms, can help countries remain competitive in a global market. Public policy that encourages innovation can enable firms to remain competitive and survive, both of which have direct implications for employment and a country's economic viability. The results may also be insightful for managers who are attempting to encourage innovation. Understanding barriers can assist managers in fostering an innovative culture by supporting new ideas or by avoiding an attitude that creates resistance to new ideas.     

The role of stock markets on environmental degradation: A comparative study of developed and emerging market economies across the globe

It is well established in the literature that stock markets increase both economic activities and energy consumption across countries. Therefore, it is commonly believed that stock markets are expected to have a significant effect on CO₂ emissions. However, it is not known whether these stock markets can contribute to more or less CO₂ emissions. Hence, the goal of this study is to examine the impact of stock market indicators on CO₂ emissions across a global panel of both developed and emerging market economies. The results establish that stock market indicators have a significant negative and positive impact on carbon emissions in developed and emerging market economies, respectively. Furthermore, the findings illustrate the presence of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis, implying that stronger stock markets lead to a further decline in carbon emissions. Given these findings, the study argues that the role of stock markets in the abatement of CO₂ emissions significantly varies across both developed and emerging market economies. Significant implications have to do with the fact that developed markets might have initiated effective policies on listed firms to minimize carbon emissions, while emerging markets are yet to achieve this.     

Nonlinear price impact and portfolio choice

In a market with price impact proportional to a power of the order flow, we find optimal trading policies and their implied performance for long‐term investors who have constant relative risk aversion and trade a safe asset and a risky asset following geometric Brownian motion. These quantities admit asymptotic explicit formulas up to a structural constant that depends only on the curvature of the price impact function. Trading rates are finite as with linear impact, but are lower near the target portfolio, and higher away from the target. The model nests the square‐root impact law and, as extreme cases, linear impact and proportional transaction costs.     

UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT IN MARKETS WITH TRANSACTION COSTS

In this paper we investigate growth optimal investment in two-asset discrete-time markets with proportional transaction costs and no distributional assumptions on the market return sequences. We construct a policy with growth rate at least as large as any interval policy. Since interval policies are ε-optimal for independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) markets ( Iyengar 2002 ), it follows that our policy when employed in an i.i.d. market is able to "learn" the optimal interval policy and achieve growth optimality; in other words, it is a universal growth optimal policy for i.i.d. markets.     

Promoting the Entry of New Firms

Although in the beginning the entry in the market of new companies has a positive effect on production and employment, the results don't seem to be so obvious in the long term. On the one hand, the possibilities of survival of the new companies are very scarce, on the other, the new companies that survive expel the less efficient incumbents from the market. The results of the simulations show that the effects of the policies on the population of firms in the long term are quite small because the policies are strongly limited by the pressure that the new companies cause on the established ones. On the other hand, the policies favor on increase in productivity but in a different way depending on whether they favor the rotation or not.     

Transition to greener pulp: regulation,industry responses and path dependency

Although the dioxin alarm broke at the same time in Sweden and the US in the mid-1980s, Swedish pulp and paper (P&P) firms led the way towards the new market for low-chlorine and chlorine-free P&P products. This study explores the transition in the Swedish P&P industry and contrasts the Swedish case to the US experience. We highlight the importance of already established technological paths to deal with pollution, paths which were strongly formed by the different national environmental policies since the 1970s. Thus while US P&P firms were technologically locked-in when the dioxin alarm broke, the strategy of Swedish P&P firms to proactively collaborate in environmental research and development (R&D) together with a national policy that favoured process integrated abatement technology, helped Swedish firms take technological leadership. This article particularly stresses the implications of technological path-dependency and different national regulatory styles in understanding the evolution of different modes of corporate environmental strategies.     

Endogenous international joint ventures and the environment

This paper examines the welfare effects of emission taxes under a choice between an international joint venture (JV) and a full-ownership FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) by parent firms from a developed country (the North) and a developing country (the South), as well as their location and share decisions. If the South has a poor abatement technology, its best policy is to impose a relatively high emission tax to attract a full-ownership FDI. If it has a good abatement technology, the best policy is to impose a relatively low emission tax to attract the JV. Furthermore, deregulation of foreign ownership of the JV improves the quality of the environment.     

Bailouts,Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies to Manage the Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Problem

This paper discusses optimal government bailout policy where the costs of systemic failures and moral hazard problems are considered. We find that a three‐tiered bailout policy that includes an ex post monitoring and bailout scheme for financial institutions with large systemic impacts (‘too big to fail’) is optimal. The optimal policy also requires a randomized bailout for medium‐impact institutions (‘Constructive Ambiguity’), and no bailout for institutions that have only minimal systemic consequences (‘too small to save’). However, in a volatile, innovative market environment where individual institutions may know more than the government regulator, monitoring error could contribute to risk taking, leaving the government regulator to always play a ‘catch‐up’ role in revising policy. Moreover, the optimal bailout policy may not be time‐consistent: institutions not deemed ‘too big to fail’ may still have an incentive to take excessive risks and expect to be bailed out in case of insolvency, primarily due to the short‐term orientation of the government. Finally, because an institution's systemic cost affects the probability of a bailout, we show that the boundary of an institution may be extended by the government subsidy.     

A Dynamic Model of Oligopolistic Market Structure,Featuring Positioning Investments

In their efforts to create and maintain a position in a market, firms make positioning investments of various sorts, in R&D, plant, advertising, and location, or more generally, in product development and maintenance. In an environment where the success of positioning investments is stochastic, the positioning game played by firms that compete to serve a market is necessarily dynamic. We model the positioning and operating decisions of firms in an environment of this sort. When the market is large enough to support at least one active firm, in the steady state equilibrium, the expected number of firms serving the market at a point in time is a nearly continuous function of market size, in sharp contrast to the familiar integer-valued step function seen in classic models, and expected total and consumer surplus are higher than standard non-stochastic models would indicate. This suggests that the classic models are not always a sound guide for policy.     

Pricing policies for services by facilities with Weibull lifetimes

To make good profits, pricing is a competitive weapon of service firms. This paper is concerned with pricing strategies for services with substantial facility maintenance costs. To address the problem, a mathematical framework that incorporates service demand and facility deterioration is proposed. The facility and customers constitute a service system driven by Poisson arrivals and exponential service times. The most common log-linear customer demand and Weibull-distributed facility lifetime are also adopted. By examining the linkage between customer demand and facility deterioration in profit model, pricing policies of the service are investigated. Then analytical conditions of customer demand and facility lifetime are derived to achieve a unique optimal pricing policy. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the effects of parameter variations on the optimal pricing policy.     

Who should sell stocks?

Never selling stocks is optimal for investors with a long horizon and a realistic range of preference and market parameters, if relative risk aversion, investment opportunities, proportional transaction costs, and dividend yields are constant. Such investors should buy stocks when their portfolio weight is too low and otherwise hold them, letting dividends rebalance to cash over time rather than selling. With capital gains taxes, this policy outperforms both static buy‐and‐hold and dynamic rebalancing strategies that account for transaction costs. Selling stocks becomes optimal if either their target weight is low or intermediate consumption is substantial.     

论温室气体排放配额的初始分配

温室气体排放配额初始分配的方式有无偿分配和有偿分配两类。无偿分配按照分配方法又分为基于祖父法则的分配和基于基准法则的分配。有偿分配主要有政府定价和拍卖两种。在当前各国的立法实践中,温室气体排放配额分配主要采取无偿分配方式。温室气体排放配额分配应当坚持效率原则、公平原则和环境效益原则,未来排放配额的分配应当采取有偿方式。     

Strategic Trade Policies Under Monopsony and Uncertainty: The Exporter’s Non-Linear Responses Based on the Organization of Its Industry

Players’ access to information, their market power, and the timing and rationale of their decisions are important but often neglected in the making of strategic trade policies. I examine optimal decisions in a monopsonistic market with asymmetric information to determine an exporting country’s policy strategies. The large importing country first sets a producer subsidy and later imposes an import tariff after learning about the welfare-maximizing exporter’s reactions to the subsidy. I assume that at the time of their decisions, the n exporting firms have incomplete information and rely only on noisy signals from their own domestic market to account for the uncertainty in the international market. I find that import tariff and producer subsidy can be substitute rather than exclusively independent policies. Results also show that the exporting country’s optimal reaction is non-linear and is based on the structure of its export industry; the exporting country’s government facing a large importer subsidizes (or taxes) its export when the number of exporting firms is low (or high) relative to a threshold number of firms. More important, before giving out subsidies, the exporting country’s government requires more collusion of its firms especially when the large importer targets a fixed domestic price.     

Free samples, profits, and welfare: The effect of market structures and behavioral modes

This paper addresses an important and underresearched issue in the economics and marketing literatures: what are the managerial and social consequences when firms use business models that are based on the dissemination of free samples? We develop an analytical model of free samples for both digital and physical goods that addresses three fundamental managerial and social questions. First, what is the effect of different market structures (i.e., monopoly and oligopoly) and cost structures on optimal marketing policy and prices? Second, what is the effect of different behavioral modes on prices and free samples? Third, how do different market structures and behavioral modes affect social welfare?The main conclusion is that a number of standard results do not hold when firms have the option of selling products and of distributing free samples. For example, the optimal strategy for oligopolists who produce homogeneous goods and coordinate their marketing policies is to increase - not decrease - the quantity of sold output. Similarly, under well-defined cost and demand conditions, monopoly can lead to a socially inferior outcome to competition. From a policy viewpoint, the managerial and social welfare implications of free samples depend on the type of market structure (monopoly or oligopoly) and the behavioral modes chosen by the firms in an industry (e.g., whether to coordinate their free sample policies or to behave non-cooperatively).