Board governance and corporate performance

We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board‐related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK and in many countries around the world.     

倡导性规范与上市公司治理

上市公司治理领域长期以来依照强制性法律规范来运行,然而,上市公司治理的规范诉求的特性决定了单一的法律规范体系的局限性。以或遵守或解释规则为核心的倡导性公司治理规范迎合了上市公司治理的需求,并取得了显著的执行率。中国《上市公司治理准则》可进行适当的改革:从法律规范转变为倡导性规范;通过证监会信息披露法律规范的形式强化上市公司关于准则遵守或者解释的程序上的披露义务;利用现有的法律机制确保准则的有效执行,并鼓励股东发挥评判监督作用。     

董事责任保险的法律考察

董事责任保险是为公司董事或高级管理人员职业责任提供的一种补偿性保险。对我国上市公司而言,董事责任保险既是对董事及高管人员利益的保障,也可帮助股东监督经营者的行为,对完善上市公司治理结构亦具有积极意义。然而,根据我国目前的董事民事责任制度、证券民事赔偿制度以及诉讼费用制度,董事责任保险并无大多发展空间。为充分发挥董事责任保险的价值,我国在引入董事责任保险制度时,有必要同步完善证券民事诉讼机制,合理设计董事责任承保范围,规定董事适度支付保险费用,并采取期内索赔式保险。     

充分发挥独立董事作用 推动保险业科学发展

正确认识和科学判断形势,是制定正确战略的基本依据,是增强工作能力、提高工作效率的前提和基础。总的看,保险业发展既有挑战、又蕴含机遇,既有困难、又有有利条件。独立董事制度是完善公司治理结构的一项重要制度创新,是完善保险公司治理结构的重要措施;是提升董事会决策能力和水平的有力举措;是保护被保险人利益的重要力量。保险公司独立董事责任重大、任务艰巨。每位独立董事都要坚持操守,敢于担当;恪尽职守,勤勉尽职;独立公正,审慎判断;不断学习,科学决策。独立董事只有在这些事项上把好关、会决策,才能保证公司稳健经营,科学发展。     

Corporate Governance Reform,Board Structure,and Its Determinants in the Banking Industry—Evidence from Taiwan

This study employs the data of twenty-seven banks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2000–11 to examine the determinants of board structure, e.g., board size and the independent directors ratio. The evidence shows that bank size, the degree of revenue diversification, and the CEO’s shareholding are positively associated with the independent directors ratio. A higher outside block shareholding is correlated with a larger board size and a higher independent directors ratio. As the creditors’ stake decreases, a larger board and greater board independence are required to maintain internal corporate governance. Finally, banks with M&A activity tend to downsize their board sizes and reduce board independence in the subsequent period.     

The monitoring role of independent directors in CEO pay–performance relationship: the case of Malaysian government linked companies

This study looks into the pay-performance and monitoring issues in Malaysian government linked companies (GLCs). Our study utilizes 21 Malaysian public listed GLCs data from financial year 2001 until 2006. We adopt panel regression to study pay–performance relationship while the internal monitoring mechanism is measured by board independence. In our analysis, chief executive officer (CEO pay is regressed to individual performance as well as benchmarked against industry average. Generally, we document that the pay–performance relationship in Malaysian GLCs is sporadically significant, implying that CEO pay is not properly aligned to performance. However, pay-earning-sensitivity (EPS) is high and statistically significant when individual performances are benchmarked against industry average in GLCs with more than 50% independent directors (majority board). This implies that for Malaysian GLCs, a majority independent board is required to ensure effective monitoring on CEOs' performance.     

中小板民营上市公司治理调研分析报告

从问卷调查分析结果来看,中小板民营上市公司治理在最近几年有了很大提升,特别是在董事会的独立性和内部制衡机制方面。但中小板民营上市公司治理中存在的最主要问题是一股独大的股权结构,它一方面缓解了股东集体行动的难题,但同时又加剧了股东之间的利益冲突。因此,建构对实际控制人的制约制度是未来提升民营上市公司治理绩效的核心工作。     

Institutional block-holdings of UK firms: do corporate governance mechanisms matter?

Using a sample of UK firms, we find that institutional block-holding is negatively associated with directors’ ownership and is positively associated with board composition, suggesting that institutional block-holders regard directors’ ownership and board composition as substitute and complementary control mechanisms, respectively. We also show that UK institutional block-holders prefer smaller firms and firms with a shorter listing history. The presence of institutional block-holders is associated with smaller boards and lower trading liquidity. Finally, our results indicate that the investment preference of UK institutional block-holders varies with the level of their shareholding.     

基于数据包络分析法的中国保险公司治理研究

本文采用数据包络分析法,使用LINGO和MATLAB两种软件对2003年～2007年中国主要保险公司样本做了技术效率的对比研究。两种方法的结果表明:资本属性对保险公司的治理效率有一定的影响;保险公司体制改革在2005年后开始有了一定效果显现;中资保险公司的股权治理机制还没有完全发挥作用。     

宜宾小企业公司治理现状及对策分析

研究发现宜宾小企业内部治理结构不合理以及外部治理结构的缺失消减了企业应有的价值增长.因此,改造宜宾小企业的内部治理结构,培育形成有效的外部治理结构,让内部治理机制和外部治理机制联动,从满足公司利益相关者利益的角度,制定公司价值增长战略,根据公司价值驱动因素,不断地进行技术创新和管理制度创新,优化价值创造链,形成可持续的核心竞争能力,方可实现宜宾小企业的价值包容性增长.     

The effect of corporate governance on firm’s credit ratings: further evidence using governance score in the United States

We investigate whether corporate governance affects firms’ credit ratings and whether improvement in corporate governance standards is associated with improvement in investment grade rating. We use the Gov‐score of Brown and Caylor (2006) , the Gomper’s G index and an entrenchment score of Bebchuk et al. (2009) to proxy for corporate governance. Using a sample of US firms, we find that firms characterized by stronger corporate governance have a significantly higher credit rating, and that this association is accentuated for smaller firms relative to larger firms. We find that an improvement in corporate governance is associated with improvement in bond rating.     

Institutional investors and corporate environmental and financial performance

We propose a conceptual framework to illustrate that when three conditions hold, institutional investors moderate a positive relation between corporate financial performance and corporate environmental performance. We explore heterogeneities across institution types to demonstrate the importance of each condition. The moderating effect works through the channels of expert consulting and effective monitoring. Our results have important policy and practical implications given the global trend of ownership concentration in institutional investors and the projection that by 2025, one out of three dollars under professional management will be invested in corporate social responsibility assets.     

中国上市银行独立董事制度的运行效率

以往的公司治理研究并没有考虑银行业的特殊性,因此对银行的治理问题不能简单地套用以往的研究结论.本文在充分考虑银行业治理的特殊性基础上,通过建立模型实证考察独立董事在银行中的运行效率.研究证实,由于银行股权制衡能力比较强,独立董事的监督职能被弱化,但是银行独立董事由于其专业背景以及广泛的社会关系,能够提高董事会决策效率,促进银行业绩的提升.研究还发现,独立董事的作用是有滞后性的.当期的独立董事能够明显地促进银行下一期的绩效.独立董事制度在国内上市银行中具有效率,能够促进银行的进一步发展.     

Financial and external reporting research: the broadening corporate governance challenge

This study provides a critical examination of contemporary financial and external reporting research from a corporate governance perspective. Adopting Hines' social constructionist approach to financial reporting, the study investigates research into accounting publishing patterns, published reviews of major subject areas within financial and external reporting research, and interviews a sample of accounting professors in British universities. The findings reveal a strong North American economics and finance-based positivist influence, a largely uncritical acceptance of accounting's subservience to the demands of the market, a reluctance to engage major policy questions and broader reporting constituencies. These appear to be conditioned to a large degree by internal features and pressures within the academic research community. Evidence is presented for greater attention to major environmental shifts impacting accounting and communities globally, a reinvigoration of researchers' direct engagement with reporting constituents in the field, a revisiting of major accounting, business, social and environmental policy questions, and a preparedness to address today's major corporate governance concerns of communities and governments.     

中国上市银行独立董事制度的运行效率

以往的公司治理研究并没有考虑银行业的特殊性，因此对银行的治理问题不能简单地套用以往的研究结论。本文在充分考虑银行业治理的特殊性基础上，通过建立模型实证考察独立董事在银行中的运行效率。研究证实，由于银行股权制衡能力比较强，独立董事的监督职能被弱化，但是银行独立董事由于其专业背景以及广泛的社会关系，能够提高董事会决策效率，促进银行业绩的提升。研究还发现，独立董事的作用是有滞后性的。当期的独立董事能够明显地促进银行下一期的绩效。独立董事制度在国内上市银行中具有效率，能够促进银行的进一步发展。     

Multinationality and capital structure dynamics: A corporate governance explanation

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure dynamics. Using ordinary least squares regressions on 17,496 firm-year observations for 2,294 US multinational companies (MNCs) over the period 1990–2018, we find that MNCs with strong corporate governance use more debt than those with weak governance. Furthermore, strong corporate governance is associated with a faster speed of adjustment to capital structure. This relationship is more pronounced for MNCs than domestic companies, particularly for overlevered firms. We also use the two-part zero-inflated fractional regression model, instrumental variable, and structural equation model estimations to deal with any endogeneity concerns associated with the explanatory variables. Overall, our findings, which withstand a battery of robustness checks, suggest that improvements in corporate governance reduce the costs of monitoring for bondholders, resulting in increased debt financing.     

The impact of corporate fraud on director‐interlocked firms: Evidence from bank loans

We examine the impact of corporate fraud committed by one firm (the “fraudulent firm”) on other firms with interlocking directors (the “interlocked firms”), focusing on the debtholder side. We argue that the revelation of a fraudulent firm's fraud can damage the reputation of the interlocked firms because corporate governance can propagate via director interlocks. Empirically, we find that the interlocked firms' cost of debt is higher and the loan covenants become stricter after the fraud cases of the fraudulent firms are revealed. Consistent with the corporate governance propagation explanation, our results are weaker (stronger) for interlocked firms that have better (worse) pre‐event corporate governance standards. Our findings suggest that corporate fraud of fraudulent firms can affect other firms through director‐interlocks beyond shareholder value.     

Split Share Structure Reform,corporate governance,and the foreign share discount puzzle in China

We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.