WELFARE MEASUREMENT,INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT,AND HETEROGENEITY

This paper concerns welfare measurement in an economy with union wage setting, where the equilibrium is characterized by unemployment. Contrary to results derived in the first best, the current value Hamiltonian is not an exact welfare measure in an economy with unemployment. Instead, the welfare measure also depends on “employment effect,” which are caused by the discrepancy between supply and demand in the labor market. In addition, since unemployment gives rise to heterogeneity, distributional effects will also characterize the welfare measure.     

HETEROGENEITY,REDISTRIBUTION, AND THE FRIEDMAN RULE*

We study monetary models with nondegenerate stationary distributions of money holdings. We find that the Friedman rule does not typically maximize ex post social welfare. An increase in the rate of growth of the money supply has two effects: the standard distortionary, or rate‐of‐return, effect makes money a less desirable asset for all moneyholders. A second, redistributive effect, creates a transfer from one type of agent to the other. An increase in the rate of growth of money away from the Friedman rule can produce a rate‐of‐return effect that dominates the standard effect.     

异质性、出口与中国企业技术创新

本文使用来自中国企业的大样本微观数据,运用Probit模型对影响企业创新的异质性特征从全要素生产率（TFP）因素进行了拓展,同时将所有制异质性作为“基础因子”,综合考察了多维度异质性特征、出口等对中国企业技术创新的影响。结果发现：(1)TFP因素对所有类型企业的创新倾向均具有显著的正向影响,即表现出明显的“创新自选择”效应;(2)出口参与因素显著提高了各类型企业的创新倾向,但出口密度因素对国有和民营企业的技术创新影响存在显著的倒U型关系,而对外资企业技术创新影响的非线性关系并不明显;(3)其他影响因素如企业规模、人力资本等异质性特征在不同类型企业的创新决策中表现各异。     

网络外部性、需求异质性与电子支付创新*

需求方的网络外部性和异质性这两个特质对支付工具形态演变的收敛具有相反的作用力量。信息技术的发展,一方面通过用户基础的拓展和与法币体系的互联互通,缩小了新型电子支付工具与传统支付工具在网络效应上的差距,另一方面,通过支付媒介之外的各种附加功能的创造,使前者更好地契合了多样化的支付需求。电子支付创新丰富了可选择的支付工具种类,但不会威胁到法币的垄断地位。     

TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY,REGULATION AND HETEROGENEITY IN JAPANESE AIRPORTS

In this paper, the random stochastic frontier model is used to estimate the technical efficiency of Japanese airports, with regulation and heterogeneity included in the variables. The airports are ranked according to their productivity for the period 1987–2005 and homogeneous and heterogeneous variables in the cost function are disentangled. Policy implications are derived.     

ENDOGENOUS ROLE ASSIGNMENT AND TEAM PERFORMANCE

We study how the mechanism used for assigning roles within teams affects team performance. Subjects play the takeover game in buyer–seller teams. Understanding optimal play is demanding for buyers and trivial for sellers, so teams should perform better if the buyer is the abler teammate. When teammates are allowed to jointly choose their roles, abler teammates tend to become buyers, but this is more than offset by disruptions to the learning process. We examine two potential sources for the latter effect and find that endogenous role assignment has a negative psychological and emotional effect on buyers.     

IMMIGRATION, POPULATION HETEROGENEITY, AND EARNINGS INEQUALITY IN HONG KONG

This paper analyzes the heterogeneity effect of immigration on earnings in-equality by decomposing the aggregate measure of total inequality. The analysis shows that a substantial portion of an increase in measured inequality could be due to shifts in shares of heterogeneous population groups caused by immigration policy rather than by widening earnings dispersion within these groups. The analysis is illustrated with census data of Hong Kong from 1981 to 1991. Income redistribution policy based on measured total inequality when there are shifts in population shares could be misguided.     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY,RULES OF ORIGIN,AND RULES OF CUMULATION*

This article sheds light on the restrictive nature of rules of origin (ROO) and on the role of diagonal cumulation in mitigating the protectionist content of ROO. Empirical evidence suggests that diagonal cumulation has beneficial effects on trade—particularly among spoke countries. We show that these patterns can be reconciled with a theoretical setting where heterogeneous firms buy intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign sources. The model finds that switching from bilateral to diagonal cumulation relaxes the restrictiveness of the ROO and leads the least productive exporters to stop exporting.     

习惯形成、收入阶层异质性与我国城镇居民消费行为研究

习惯形成是居民消费变化的一个基本特征,收入阶层异质性是居民禀赋差异的主要体现,本文旨在结合两者探究我国城镇居民的消费行为,以探寻扩大居民消费的方法。基于阶层消费函数理论,运用收入阶层面板SUR的结果显示,居民消费具有显著的习惯形成特征,消费行为呈现异质性,表现为低收入居民的消费习惯较弱、消费倾向较高,中等收入居民的习惯较强、消费较谨慎,高收入居民的习惯较强、地位性消费较活跃。当前“金字塔”形的收入分布、不断扩大但谨慎的中等收入居民、地位性消费的外流抑制了城镇居民消费的扩大,居民消费的相对不足主要是结构性问题。应依据各阶层消费的特点,从供给侧出发构建长效机制,促进低收入居民的收入平稳增长,多方面减弱中等收入居民的谨慎性,并提升国内消费品的质量和档次。     

HETEROGENEITY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE POLICY

A model with search and matching frictions and heterogeneous workers was established to evaluate a reform of the public sector wage policy in steady state. The model was calibrated to the U.K. economy based on Labour Force Survey data. A review of the pay received by all public sector workers to align the distribution of wages with the private sector reduces steady‐state unemployment by 1.4 percentage points.     

生育指标和婚姻匹配*

本文通过研究中国计划生育政策改革来检验贝克尔（Becker）关于婚姻的经济学理论。中国从20世纪80年代起实行“一胎化”政策,但随后逐渐允许夫妻均为独生子女的家庭生育第二胎,即“双独二胎”政策。由于“双独二胎”实施前不同省份“一胎化”政策的执行力度不同,所以放开“双独二胎”在不同省份间的政策效果也不同。笔者利用政策实施时间前后和省份间政策力度的差异,采用二重差分的实证设计进行分析,发现“双独二胎”政策增加了独生子女之间的匹配,减少了独生子女和非独生子女的“混合匹配”。笔者建立搜寻—匹配模型对“双独二胎”政策如何影响婚姻市场均衡进行分析。二重差分的实证分析得到的证据与模型的推论相一致,实证结果在一系列检验中保持稳健。     

SINGLE MOMS AND DEADBEAT DADS: THE ROLE OF EARNINGS,MARRIAGE MARKET CONDITIONS,AND PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY

Why do some men father children outside of marriage without providing support? Why do some women have children outside of marriage when they receive little support from fathers? Why is this behavior more common among Blacks than Whites? We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage, employment, fertility, and child support decisions. We consider the extent to which low earnings, marriage market conditions, and preference heterogeneity explain nonmarital childbearing, deadbeat fatherhood, and racial differences in these outcomes. We find the Black–White earnings gap and preference heterogeneity explain a substantial portion of racial differences, whereas marriage market conditions are less important.     

ENDOGENOUS EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND WELFARE UNDER DOMESTIC COST HETEROGENEITY

We present a model of international market share rivalry where the domestic export subsidy is determined by lobbying. Greater domestic cost heterogeneity leads to a higher subsidy level and a larger domestic market share. However, the relationship between cost heterogeneity and welfare is ambiguous. Starting from a near-symmetric situation, an increase in heterogeneity reduces domestic welfare if the number of domestic firms exceeds some critical value. When starting farther from symmetry, the welfare effect is reversed. Our findings are in contrast with the results from the existing literature where lobbying is ignored.     

HETEROGENEITY AND REDISTRIBUTION: BY MONETARY OR FISCAL MEANS?*

In models with heterogeneous agents, issues of distribution and redistribution jump to the fore, raising the question: Which policies—monetary or fiscal—work most effectively in transferring income between groups? From Townsend's turnpike model, two basic results emerge to help answer this question. First, the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates often appears as an obstacle to redistribution by monetary means. Second, assumptions about the government's ability to raise tax revenue without distortion and to discriminate between agents in distributing that tax revenue play a large role in determining whether agents prefer to redistribute income by fiscal means instead.     

域名保护的法律与经济分析

本文从法律和经济学两种视角对域名产权的初始分配进行了分析。文章阐述了有关域名纠纷的产生及司法实践中对其处理的不足。从财产法、知识产权制度、民事行为分析、竞争法等法律角度对域名纠纷解决的缺憾进行了回顾;然后从经济学的产权理论入手,对域名的分配做了效率分析,最终得出了合适的产权分配方案。     

POVERTY,ELITE HETEROGENEITY,AND THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC SPENDING: PANEL EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIAN STATES

In this paper, we explore how in India, the world's largest democracy, the presence of different elite groups—the dominant landed and capitalist elite, and the minority elite (who are the elected representatives of the marginalized women and low caste population)—could affect the nature and extent of public spending on various accounts, especially education. We argue that the productive cooperation between the capitalist elite and workers may induce capitalists to favor spending on education, while the landed elite tend to oppose investment in basic education because they are fearful of dilution of their political dominance by the educated poor. While the minority elite may tend to favor redistributive spending, including that on education, their effectiveness could be limited by their under‐representation in the government. Results from the Indian states for the period 1960–2002 provide support for these hypotheses.     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION*

This article develops a model that incorporates workers' fair wage preferences into a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous firms. In a setting where the wage considered to be fair by workers depends on the productivity of the firm they are working in, we study the determinants of profits, involuntary unemployment and within‐group wage inequality. We use this model to investigate the effects of globalization, thereby pointing to distributional conflicts that have so far not been accounted for: a simultaneous increase of average profits and involuntary unemployment as well as a surge in within‐group wage inequality.     

投资主体决策异质性与货币政策效果差异

本文在对中国近期投资需求现实考察的基础上,构建了各类主体的投资需求新古典模型,根据不同投资主体目标函数和约束条件的差异得出结论:(1)以调整利率(准备金)为主的货币政策对于私营企业固定资产投资、住宅投资具有较大效应,而对于国有企业投资作用相对较小,对于地方政府投资的效应为0,甚至作用相反。(2)以控制信贷规模为主的货币政策对于私营企业投资、家庭具有较明显的作用,对于国有企业投资作用较小,对于政府投资作用非常微小。(3)政府对国有企业上缴利润比例的调整对于国有企业的投资变化具有较强影响,而房地产调控政策如果发挥作用,则对于地方政府投资和住宅投资具有较大效应。     

THE ROLE OF LABOR AND MARRIAGE MARKETS,PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY,AND THE WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE LIFE CYCLE DECISIONS OF BLACK,HISPANIC, AND WHITE WOMEN*

Using data from the NLSY79, we structurally estimate a dynamic model of the life cycle decisions of young women. The women make sequential joint decisions about school attendance, work, marriage, fertility, and welfare participation. We use the model to perform counterfactual simulations designed to shed light on three questions: (1) How much of observed minority–majority differences in behavior can be attributed to differences in labor market opportunities, marriage market opportunities, and preference heterogeneity? (2) How does the welfare system interact with these factors to augment those differences? (3) How can new cohorts that grow up under the new welfare system (Temporary Aid for Needy Families) be expected to behave compared to older cohorts?