QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION*

We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost: when the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly, but when the disclosure cost is high, welfare is higher under duopoly. In either market structure, disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus, but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus.     

Curbing obfuscation: Empower consumers or regulate firms?

This paper develops a market model where consumers refrain from buying products that they are unable to understand and a firm can influence the probability of a consumer understanding its offer. In equilibrium, firms artificially increase product complexity, and firms that offer more transparent products choose on average higher prices. We study two sets of public policies. We show that consumer side policies may have the unintended consequence of encouraging obfuscation while firm side policies are always effective in curbing obfuscation. Interestingly, a consumer side policy can even harm consumers when it protects consumers so much that it greatly increases the marginal effectiveness of obfuscation. Policies on both sides can either increase or decrease social welfare depending on the marginal effectiveness and the marginal cost of obfuscation. Our main insights hold in both asymmetric and symmetric obfuscation equilibria.     

Regulating Data Privacy and Cybersecurity

This paper studies firms' data privacy and cybersecurity choices. We emphasise the strategic interdependence between these decisions and demonstrate that security in both the market equilibrium and the social optimum tends to be higher when data is shared. We also identify important market failures in the sense that firms tend to under-invest in security and over-share data. Our welfare analysis of a minimum security standard, disclosure and consumer education policies, liability rules and consumer mitigation strategies highlights the need for a co-ordinated approach to regulation.     

M&A advisory and the merger review process

Two firms propose a merger to the antitrust authority. They are uninformed about the efficiencies generated by the merger, but can hire an expert to gather information on their behalf. The authority is also uninformed about the merger’s efficiencies, but can run a costly internal investigation to learn them. We analyze the effect of the disclosure of the expert’s contract on consumer welfare, and show that consumers are not necessarily better off with disclosure. This possibility result hinges on a free-riding problem between expert and authority in the information acquisition game, and is more relevant in highly competitive industries.     

Who are the producers and consumers? Value chains and food policy effects in the wheat sector in Pakistan

We develop a disaggregated Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) methodology to disentangle the welfare impacts of policies for various interest groups along the value chain (to disaggregate effects within the “producer” and “consumer” umbrellas). We apply our value chain NRA methodology to the case of Pakistan’s wheat price and trade policy. We analyze the welfare implications for various agents in the wheat-flour value chain from 2000 to 2013, a period characterized by major global price volatility and by regular adjustments of domestic policies. We find that the wheat policy has generally benefitted flour consumers and wheat traders at the expense of wheat farmers, with limited effects on flour millers. Our findings illustrate that the welfare implications of policies can be quite different within the “producer” and “consumer” umbrellas, which has potentially important implications for economic and political economy analyses and for the design of policies that aim to target the poorest groups along value chains.     

Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination

We study competition by firms that simultaneously post (potentially nonlinear) tariffs to consumers who are privately informed about their tastes. Market power stems from informational frictions, in that consumers are heterogeneously informed about firms’ offers. In the absence of regulation, all firms offer quantity discounts. As a result, relative to Bertrand pricing, imperfect competition benefits disproportionately more consumers whose willingness to pay is high, rather than low. Regulation imposing linear pricing hurts the former but benefits the latter consumers. While consumer surplus increases, firms’ profits decrease, enough to drive down utilitarian welfare. By contrast, improvements in market transparency increase utilitarian welfare, and achieve similar gains on consumer surplus as imposing linear pricing, although with limited distributive impact. On normative grounds, our analysis suggests that banning price discrimination is warranted only if its distributive benefits have a weight on the societal objective.     

MARKET SEGMENTATION WITH NONLINEAR PRICING*

We study the benefits and drawbacks of allowing firms to offer different price‐quality menus to captive consumers and to consumers more exposed to competition (market segmentation). We show that the effect of market segmentation depends on the relationship between the range of consumer preferences found in captive and competitive markets. When the range of consumer preferences in captive markets is ‘wide,’ segmentation is quality and (aggregate) welfare reducing, while the opposite holds when the range of consumer preferences in captive markets is ‘narrow.’ Segmentation always harms captive consumers, while it always benefits consumers located in competitive markets.     

Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly

We examine the effect of competition on the incentive of firms to disclose quality to consumers before trade when information disclosure is not costless. We demonstrate that no firm will disclose information in the limit, no matter how small the disclosure cost is; that is, the market outcome converges to complete concealment of information as the number of competing firms becomes larger. Nonetheless, it can be shown that under a mild condition, the equilibrium amount of information disclosure is socially excessive for any number of firms, so discouraging information disclosure by levying a tax may increase social welfare.     

Market regulation of voluntary add-on contracts

This paper analyzes contract choices and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies when firms can offer voluntary add-on insurance for their products. We develop a model in which a base product can be sold together with a voluntary extended warranty contract that insures consumers against the risk of product breakdown. Some consumers do not pay attention to extended warranties before making base product choices, but overestimate the value of such warranties at the point of sale. Under retail competition, the consumers’ option to buy multiple base products can endogenously create a base price floor that may prevent firms from redistributing the full warranty profits via loss-leadership. Inducing competition in the warranty market weakly increases consumer welfare and weakly outperforms a minimum warranty standard, which can even reduce consumer surplus. The results are consistent with the effects of recent changes regarding extended warranty regulation by UK legislators.     

Competitive customer poaching with asymmetric firms

Conditioning the pricing policies on purchase history is proven to generate a cutthroat price competition enhancing consumer surplus. This result typically relies on a framework where competitors are assumed to be symmetric. This paper demonstrates that under significant asymmetries of competing firms, the strong firm trades off current market share for future market share and the weak firm does the opposite. This inter-temporal market sharing agreement generates unidirectional poaching and entails new and distinctive welfare implications. In particular, if consumers are sufficiently myopic, price discrimination softens price competition in relation to uniform pricing, overturning the conclusion of previous studies.     

Implementing COOL: Comparative welfare effects of different labeling schemes

Country-of-origin labeling (COOL) is being implemented in different forms and degrees in the United States and other countries across the world. The first implementation of mandatory country of origin labeling (MCOOL) in the United States was for seafood in 2005. This is an example of partial MCOOL because it exempts the foodservice sector and excludes processed seafood from labeling. Using a conceptual framework, we analyze the welfare impacts of partial MCOOL when compared to no, voluntary, and total mandatory COOL, taking into account imperfect competition in the downstream markets, information asymmetry, and diversion of low-quality product to the unlabeled market. The model is general enough to apply to any incomplete regulation for which the perceived low-quality product is required to be labeled, such as the labeling of genetically modified food in the European Union. Our results show that when consumers have a strong enough preference for domestic relative to imported product, regulators can overestimate the gain in consumer welfare from partial mandatory labeling if they ignore the diversion of lower quality imports to the unlabeled sector. We show that if the preference for domestic product is large enough, total MCOOL benefits the home market the most overall, including domestic consumers and producers, but not the imperfectly competitive downstream agents. However, if total MCOOL is too costly to implement, partial MCOOL is the second-best solution, but only if consumers falsely believe the unlabeled product to be of higher quality than it truly is. Our results suggest more research is needed to determine the extent to which consumers value the information provided by MCOOL and to enable regulators to consider the welfare impact of diversion in evaluating incomplete mandatory labeling regulations.     

Government Policies Supporting Open Source Software for the Mass Market

This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source software (OSS). Mass-market consumers can be divided between those who are informed about the existence of OSS and those who are uninformed. Since OSS producers have little incentive to advertise, there may be a substantial mass of uniformed consumers, leading to market failures that may justify government intervention. We study three government policies: (a) mandated adoption, whereby the government forces public agencies, schools, and universities to adopt OSS, (b) information provision, whereby the government informs the uninformed users about the existence and the characteristics of OSS, and (c) subsidy, whereby the government makes a payment to consumers if they adopt OSS. We show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare, but the subsidy always reduces it. When network externalities are added to the model, we show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare if they help the market to tip towards standardization. The web site www.opensource.org provides further details on the open source software movement     

Keeping it fresh: Strategic product redesigns and welfare

Product redesigns happen across virtually all types of products, yet there is little evidence on the market and welfare effects of redesigns. We develop a model of redesign decisions in a dynamic oligopoly model and use it to analyze redesign activity in the U.S. automobile market. We find automobile model redesigns are frequent despite an estimated average cost around $1 billion. Our estimates also suggest that redesigns lead to large increases in profits and welfare due to the strong preferences consumers have for redesigns. We show that welfare would be improved if redesign competition were reduced, allowing redesign activity to be more responsive to the planned obsolescence channel. The net effect of these changes would reduce total redesigns by roughly 10%, increasing total welfare by roughly 3%. The high valuation that consumers put on newly-designed models drives frequent redesigns and gives automobile manufacturers fairly substantial market power, with a 2-to-1 ratio of firm profits to consumer surplus.     

The Welfare Effect of Advertising Restrictions in the U.S. Cigarette Industry

The welfare effect of advertisingrestrictions in the U.S. cigarette industry dependsupon the impact of advertising on consumer and producer surplus, the transfer to consumers for being exposed to utility-reducing advertising, and smoking externalities. We estimate a demand equation and a supply relation simultaneously and use the parameter estimates to generate predictions of the impact of advertising restrictions on social welfare. Our results show that advertising restrictions benefit producers by limiting competition and generating higher industry profits, and such restrictions lower social welfare if the external cost of cigarette smoking is sufficiently low.     

Demand for farm animal welfare and producer implications: Results from a field experiment in Michigan

This study utilizes a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to assess Michigan consumer demand for animal welfare practices. Results are examined in the context of changing farm production costs and producer marketing margins. We find that while consumers are willing to pay significant premiums for animal welfare standards, failing to account for the costs associated with producing the entire animal under the new system could lead to suboptimal policy that negatively affects producer welfare. Our results suggest that consumer premiums for animal welfare are product specific and that WTP estimates should not be generalized to the entire animal. We discuss policy implications of our findings and highlight the importance of considering producer costs when evaluating consumer demand for farm animal welfare practices.     

Consumer perceptions and the effects of country of origin labeling on purchasing decisions and welfare

The study develops a general analytical framework of heterogeneous consumer preferences to examine the effects of country of origin labeling (COOL) regulation on consumer purchasing decisions and welfare. We show that while differences in consumer perceptions about COOL information, namely, whether it is viewed as an attribute that differentiates products vertically or horizontally, do not alter the nature of the market and consumer welfare effects of mandatory COOL, the relative strength of consumer preferences for COOL are shown to be important in determining the magnitude of these effects. In addition, our results show that the benchmark used (a no COOL versus a voluntary COOL regime) is critical in evaluating the effects of the policy. We show that, under both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, a change from a no COOL to a mandatory COOL regime decreases (increases) the welfare of consumers with weak (strong) preference for COOL while a change from a voluntary to a mandatory COOL regime leads to an unambiguous loss in consumer welfare.     

The impact of expiration dates labels on hedonic markets for perishable products

This study draws inferences from a pre-registered field experiment to investigate how expiration dates impact consumer preferences for food products with different ages. Based on a power analysis, we recruited 373 adult participants for the experiment. The results demonstrate that expiration dates largely influenced the perceived freshness of a food product as they seem to indicate a quality standard. When no explicit expiration date was present, consumers believed that the product’s quality decreased monotonically as time passed. However, in the presence of an expiration-date label, consumers initially perceived the product as more acceptable, but then that perception changed quickly after the date of expiration to levels more consistent with what they would perceive if the expiration date was not present. These results support policies that label expiration dates for consumers, as these labels benefit consumers, producers, and the public, especially for times prior to the expiration date. These results also suggest that it is important to craft policy and market strategies for products that are past the expiration date, but are still safe to consume. Policies that set the expiration dates to the time where the taste quality begins to worsen would likely benefit both consumers and producers, while policies that set the expiration dates to the time where the food is no longer safe probably improve the public outcomes as it minimizes food waste.     

The impact of spectrum assignment policies on consumer welfare

The radio spectrum that governments license to mobile operators is central to the development of mobile broadband services. However, there is significant variation around how much and when spectrum is assigned as well as its costs. We assess whether policies to assign spectrum had an impact on consumer welfare in 64 countries during the 2010–2017 period. We find evidence that policies that reduce the amount of spectrum available to operators, delay the assignment of spectrum and increase the cost of spectrum all impacted two important consumer outcomes - network coverage and quality. The findings have implications for governments and regulators, particularly those betting on 4G and 5G as enablers of economic growth and sustainable development.     

Does advertising mislead consumers to buy low-quality products?

This paper investigates the interaction between consumer learning and advertising using a simulation model. Consumers use advertising to estimate the quality change, but learn advertising's trustworthiness through their consumption experience. Firms spend on not only advertising but also R&D to improve its product quality, following satisficing principles. We found that, if consumer learning is slow, an advertising-intensive firm captures most of the market in the long run despite its low product quality; in this sense, advertising misleads consumers. When learning is fast or when consumers do not rely on advertising at all, advertising is unlikely to mislead them. Easy imitation of rival products also prevents advertising from being misleading. These results are consistent with existing empirical findings on advertising-quality relationships.     

Competitive targeted online advertising

This paper examines how an online publisher utilizes its information about consumer preference to target advertising. In our model, two firms first bid for a prominent ad position in a publisher-organized position auction, and then compete on price in the subsequent product marketplace. We consider two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity. First, consumers are heterogeneous in product preference. Based on their tastes, some consumers prefer one product over the other, whereas other consumers may rank the products in an opposite order. Second, consumers differ in search preference, i.e., “nonshoppers” only consider the advertised product, while “shoppers” always search both firms’ products before buying. We show that targeted advertising based on product preference will mitigate price competition in product markets as well as competition in position auctions, the latter to the detriment of the publisher. In contrast, targeted advertising based on search preference always benefits the publisher, as the winning firm can charge monopoly prices to nonshoppers. We show that the publisher’s optimal choice is to utilize only the information about consumer search preference. We also explore the welfare implications of targeted advertising based on different types of consumer preference.