股权激励与强化监管在规避道德风险中的作用分析

为解决委托代理问题产生的道德风险,需要依赖股权激励和强化监管两大机制。文章将建立一个新的委托—代理模型,分析股权激励和强化监管两种机制的作用效果。研究表明:(1)股权激励对提升代理人工作积极性有较好作用,但在消除道德风险上收效甚微;(2)强化监管虽然能够较好地降低上市公司的道德风险,但是容易打击管理层工作积极性,为企业带来新的问题;(3)如果企业希望在保障代理人积极性的前提下,消除部分道德风险,可以使用股权激励;(4)强化监管一般是在企业的道德风险比较严重,需要大幅降低的时候使用;(5)股权激励和强化监管应该配合使用以达到更好的效果。     

政府与税务人员委托——代理关系分析和激励机制设计

近年来,伴随税收快速增长,我国总体的征税成本率却不降反升、一直居高不下.除了大的税收环境有不尽如人意之处外,税收激励机制不完善也是一个主要原因.对政府与税务人员之间的委托-代理关系进行了分析,并利用让-雅克·拉丰的激励理论设计对税务人员的激励机制.     

信息结构与金融监管激励:理论与政策含义

金融监管的设计是为了纠正市场失灵、保护存款人和投资者的利益,然而信息不对称条件下,监管者的目标会偏离这一社会目标,导致监管者提供有效监管的激励不足和监管的低效率.基于这一认识,本文通过建立存款人与监管部门、监管当局与金融机构三方的监管博弈模型,对金融监管中的激励问题进行了分析.结果表明,不同的信息结构决定着不同的监管激励水平,从而直接影响着监管效率和社会福利水平.信息不对称程度愈大,监管激励水平愈低,监管效率也就愈低.中国当前金融监管中的主要问题也正是监管者及金融市场的透明度较低而缺乏监管激励所致.因而我国金融监管改革的关键不在于是否从宏观层面加强或放松金融监管,而在于如何通过监管当局及金融市场的信息透明度建设为微观监管主体提供有效监管的激励.     

Incentive Regulation and Efficient Pricing

Abstract ** :  One objective of introducing incentive regulation to the newly privatized UK utilities over the past 20 years was to encourage efficient pricing structures. Caps have been imposed on average price levels, giving firms freedom to rebalance amongst prices within the basket. We test how firms have responded to the incentives within such discretion through an extensive review of the relative prices charged within UK price capped industries. We find surprisingly little response to these incentives, suggesting that strategic behaviour dominates short‐term profit incentives even after the introduction or threat of competition .     

Incentive Regulation and Telecommunications Service Quality

We examine the impact of incentive regulation—price regulation and earnings sharing regulation—on retail service quality in the U.S. telecommunications industry between 1991 and 2002. We find that incentive regulation is associated with significantly higher service quality on several dimensions (e.g., more rapid installation of new telephone service, fewer trouble reports, and increased customer satisfaction) but significantly lower quality on some dimensions (fewer installation commitments met and longer delays in resolving reported service problems)JEL Classification: L51, L96, L15We thank Michael Crew and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to Vanessa Cruz and Mircea Marcu for excellent research assistance.     

后危机时代中国金融监管理念变革与政策调整

此次金融危机使我们深刻认识到,始终将为实体经济的需求服务为目标,并维持相对稳健的杠杆水平,是中国金融业在危机中保持较好表现的根本原因.长期来看,中国经济持续稳定发展取决于经济发展模式的成功转型.在这一过程中,金融业的持续稳健发展是重中之重,而这又与金融业监管高度相关.本文在剖析当前中国金融业发展中存在的风险和机遇的基础上,借鉴后危机时代国际金融监管的改进经验,提出金融业监管要探索"中国模式",而这一模式的基础是稳健高效并具有国际竞争力的金融业.     

Financial Regulation in Australia

This paper examines whether a regulatory distinction between banks and other financial institutions, as proposed by the Campbell and Martin Reports, is an appropriate ingredient of financial regulation. Three specific issues relevant to the making of such a distinction are examined. They are entry to the payments mechanism, monetary control, and prudential regulation. In examining each of these three issues the roles of imperfect information and other financial market characteristics are stressed. The paper concludes that while a regulatory distinction between banks and others may be appropriate, the distinctions suggested by the Reports and associated regulatory frameworks are unwarranted.     

论弹性监管与金融效率

本文通过理论分析揭示,非弹性的金融监管会造成金融效率和社会福利的损失,只有实施弹性监管才能实现金融体系的帕累托效率,增进社会福利,最后,文章提出了实施弹性金融监管的制度安排。     

Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises*

Sectors with a long regulatory tradition have recently experienced intense activity by multinationals whose international operations and relocation threats represent a new cause for concern for regulators. I analyze a multinational serving two countries and being regulated by two national authorities. The firm is shown to favor, or cross‐subsidize, the country with a larger stake in the firm's profit, and the linkage among national regulations may induce unexpected effects on outputs. I also analyze a multinational's lobbying decisions and its effects on national regulations. Finally, a credible threat to “fly” away from tough regulators lets the firm obtain larger profits.     

Incentive Effects of Rate-of-Return Regulation in Hong Kong

A recent paper published by this journal (Peles and Whittred 1996) discussed the regulatory arrangement of the Scheme of Control in Hong Kong. Instead of encouraging electric utilities to finance their assets proportionately more by equity as argued by the authors, the Scheme has in fact given them an incentive to rely on debt financing. A major incentive aspect of the Scheme lies in the formation of a development fund for making internal transfers. This development fund arrangement has provided an incentive for the two electric utilities to improve efficiency and has facilitated the expansion of the electric power industry.     

激励规制理论与商业银行监管

激励规制理论认为,消除规制与被规制机构之间的信息不对称问题,关键是激励规制合同的建立要使两者的目标尽可能保持一致.激励规制理论在我国银行监管中的运用之一--事先承诺制的引入就较好地符合了这一要求,从而有助于提高监管效率,防范金融风险,促进社会福利最大化.