Overlapping board connections with banker directors and corporate loan terms: Evidence from syndicated loans

I look at the relationship between corporate loan terms and board members' connections to bankers through employment on other boards, a connection relatively unaffected by confounding factors. Using syndicated loan data, I find that firms connected to bankers via other boards are more likely to borrow, and they receive cheaper pricing. However, loan maturity does not differ between connected and unconnected firms. During the 2007–2008 financial crisis loan availability declined for all firms, but connected firms continued to borrow and to receive lower spreads. Generally, my results support the importance of social connections in decreasing information asymmetry and reducing transaction costs.     

Product Market Imperfections and Loan Commitments

I show in a model of competitive banks that the characteristics of loan contracts are affected by product market imperfections in the borrower's industry. A bank loan commitment increases the value of a borrower firm operating in an imperfectly competitive industry and thus dominates a simple loan even in the absence of risk sharing considerations and informational asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. While it is individually rational for a firm to obtain a loan commitment, all the firms in that industry taken together are made worse off by the existence of loan commitments.     

Insider trading in an equilibrium model with default: a passage from reduced-form to structural modelling

We study, in the framework of Back [Rev. Financial Stud. 5(3), 387–409 (1992)], an equilibrium model for the pricing of a defaultable zero coupon bond issued by a firm. The market consists of a risk-neutral informed agent, noise traders, and a market maker who sets the price using the total order. When the insider does not trade, the default time possesses a default intensity in the market’s view as in reduced-form credit risk models. However, we show that, in equilibrium, the modelling becomes structural in the sense that the default time becomes the first time that some continuous observation process falls below a certain barrier. Interestingly, the firm value is still not observable. We also establish the no expected trade theorem that the insider’s trades are inconspicuous.      

Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks

This article extends the standard adverse-selection model for competitive insurance markets, which assumes a single source of risk, to the case where individuals are subject to multiple risks. We compare the following market situations—the case where insurers can offer comprehensive policies against all sources or risks (complete contracts) and the case where different risks are covered by separate policies (incomplete contracts). In the latter case, we consider whether the insurer of a particular risk has perfect information regarding an individual's coverage against other sources of risks. The analysis emphasizes the informational role of bundling in multidimensional screening. When the market situation allows bundling, it is shown that in equilibrium the low-risk type with respect to a particular source of risk does not necessarily obtain partial coverage against that particular risk.     

Change in market assessments of deposit-institution riskiness

Using the Goldfeld and Quandt switching regression method, this article investigates variability over 1975–1985 in the risk components of bank and saving and loan stock. We develop evidence that the market-beta, interest-sensitivity, and residual risk of deposit-institution stock vary significantly during this period. Reassessing previous event studies in light of these findings suggests that event-study methods tend to overreach their data. The Ohio State University University of Maryland     

Behavior in a simplified stock market: the status quo bias, the disposition effect and the ostrich effect

Previous literature suggests specific behavioral tendencies cause investors to deviate from optimal investing. We investigate three such tendencies in a simplified stock market. Subjects do trade for better stocks, but do not reach their maximum potential earnings, most commonly because they choose to ignore information and continue to hold on to a stock regardless of its performance. The results support the predictions of the status quo bias, but not the ostrich effect or the disposition effect. This research is an extension of Brown’s undergraduate honors thesis at Ohio State University. Financial support was provided by the Honor’s College and the Department of Economics at Ohio State University. Kagel’s research was partially supported by grants from the National Science Foundation. We received helpful comments from Hal Arkes, David Cooper and two anonymous referees.     

Incentives to innovate and financial crises

In this paper I develop a model of a competitive financial system with unrestricted but costly entry and an endogenously determined number of competing financial institutions (“banks” for short). Banks can make standard loans on which plentiful historical data are available and unanimous agreement exists on default probabilities. Or banks can innovate and make new loans on which limited historical data are available, leading to possible disagreement over default probabilities. In equilibrium, banks make zero profits on standard loans and positive profits on innovative loans, which engenders innovation incentives for banks. But innovation brings with it the risk that investors could disagree with the bank that the loan is worthy of continued funding and hence could withdraw funding at an interim stage, precipitating a financial crisis. The degree of innovation in the financial system is determined by this trade-off. Welfare implications of financial innovation and mechanisms to reduce the probability of crises are discussed.     

Does a Bank’s Loan Screening and Monitoring Matter?

We investigate the relationship between the borrower’s abnormal loan announcement return and the bank’s loan screening and monitoring using a new ex-ante proxy for loan screening and monitoring. While recent studies have suggested that bank loan relationships and related loan screening and monitoring services may no longer matter, we find significant loan announcement returns over the 1995–1999 period and, controlling for borrower and loan characteristics, a statistically significant positive relationship between the proxy and the borrower’s standardized CAR. While consistent with a bank’s loan screening and monitoring adding value to the borrower, the economic effect is relatively small.

Incentivizing Calculated Risk‐Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers

We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High‐powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not vary with traits such as risk‐aversion, optimism, or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentives distort the assessment of credit risk, even among professionals with many years of experience.     

Signaling-Screening Equilibrium in the Mortgage Market

The signaling model of Spence (1973a) and the screening model of Rothchild and Stiglitz (1976) have been separately used to explain economic phenomena when there is asymmetric information. In the real world, however, situations of asymmetric information often simultaneously involve signaling and screening. In this paper, we combine signaling and screening mechanisms and demonstrate a signaling-screening separating equilibrium. We present the analysis within the framework of mortgage markets. Borrowers signal their default risk types to lenders by acquiring different credit records. This partially separates borrowers into subsets. Lenders screen each subset by offering menus of mortgage loan contracts. Borrowers, then, self-select by choosing particular contracts from the menu. We show the conditions under which the signaling-screening equilibrium is Pareto superior to a screening-only equilibrium.     

Discrimination in Lending: Theory and Evidence

Using a general equilibrium model of credit market discrimination, I find that both taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination have similar predictions for the intergroup differences in loan terms. The commonly held view has been that if taste-based discrimination exists, loans approved to minority borrowers will have higher expected profitability than those to majorities with comparable credit background. I show that the validity of this profitability view depends crucially on how expected loan profitability is measured. I also show that taste-based discrimination must exist if loans to minority borrowers have higher expected rates of return or lower expected rates of default loss than those to majorities with the same exogenous characteristics observed by lender at the time of loan originations. My analysis suggests that the valid method to test for taste-based discrimination should be reduced-form regressions. Empirically, I fail to find supporting evidence for the existence of taste-based discrimination.     

Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation

Financial intermediation naturally arises when knowing how loan payoffs are correlated is valuable for managing investments but lenders cannot easily observe that relationship. I show this result using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers' payoffs are correlated. When projects have correlated outcomes, learning the state of one project (via enforcement) provides information about the states of other projects. A large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement. Thus, intermediation dominates direct lending, and intermediaries are financed with risk‐free deposits, earn positive profits, and hold systemic default risk.     

Implications of Debt Renegotiation for Optimal Bank Policy and Firm Behavior

This paper analyzes the problems associated with the renegotiation of debt contracts involving a bank (the lender) and a firm (the borrower) when the latter is operated by a risk averse manager. Firms undertake risky projects with loan capital borrowed from the bank. When a firm cannot pay off a loan it is technically bankrupt. Both the borrower and the lender may however experience a Pareto-improvement in their positions by renegotiating the loan. By renegotiating the terms of the debt the financially distressed firm can avoid the stigmatization of bankruptcy and the bank can avoid the costs of seizing the borrower's assets. However, our main finding is that, from the bank's point of view, renegotiating as a policy of recovering loan payments may be inefficient in practice because of false bankruptcy claims and moral hazard problems associated with exposure of the borrowing firm to the risk of default. We present a solution to the false bankruptcy claim problem that involves a mixe d strategy between asset seizure by the bank and debt renegotiation.     

Contagion of accounting methods: evidence from stock option expensing

I examine how a firm’s accounting methods can be influenced by the choices of other firms, which I label contagion. I model accounting method choice as a combination of intrinsic propensities to adopt a method and contagion effects. I predict contagion of accounting methods occurs for two reasons: (1) adoption decisions of other firms are informative for the adoption decision, and (2) prior adoptions change the net benefits of the decision. I test these predictions in the stock option expensing setting where firms had the choice to use the intrinsic or fair value method. Using a firm-level diffusion model, I document evidence consistent with my predictions.     

Search and herding effects in peer-to-peer lending: evidence from prosper.com

I examine loan data from Prosper.com—a website which allows borrowers to post loans and for lenders to bid on those loans. The Prosper market somewhat resembles the theoretical model of search, herding, and crowding in a large market described in Berkovich and Tayon (Phd. dissertation—Essays on search and herding. University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, 2009). That model predicts that assets with high and low prices have high variance in the difference between price and true value. These extreme price regions of the asset-space are where private information provides excess returns. In the Prosper market, I find some evidence for the model since loans with low ex post returns show higher variance of the difference between price and ex post return. I also find that high-priced loans provide excess returns even after accounting for risk-aversion.     

风险态度、合作行为与联保贷款契约:一个实验研究

本文应用实验室实验方法,研究了在不同贷款契约情况下,借款人风险态度等因素对合作水平(努力程度)的影响。研究发现:(1)联保贷款契约下参与者的努力水平之间存在正相关关系,且其努力水平显著高于个人责任契约下参与者的努力水平。说明联保贷款契约参与者存在较高的有条件合作行为;(2)在联保贷款契约下,风险喜好参与者的努力水平显著高于风险规避参与者。说明联保贷款契约对风险喜好参与者具有显著激励作用;(3)风险规避参与者的努力水平随实验期数增加而下降的速度比风险喜好参与者更快,风险规避参与者对联保贷款契约合作水平有较大危害。我们提出:小额贷款机构应当为风险喜好借款人提供联保贷款契约,并且避免风险规避的借款人与风险喜好的借款人组成联保贷款小组。对风险喜好借款人组成的联保贷款小组,联保贷款契约的期限可以较长。     

Optimal Loan Interest Rate Contract Design

This paper analyzes optimal loan interest rate contracts under conditions of risky, symmetric information for one-period (static) and multi-period (dynamic) models. The optimal loan interest rate depends upon the volatility of, and co-variation among the market interest rate, borrower collateral, and borrower income, as well as the time horizon and the risk preferences of lenders and borrowers. For a risk-averse borrower with stochastic collateral, variable interest rate contracts are, in general, Pareto optimal. For plausible assumptions, the optimal loan interest rate for the multi-period model often exhibits muted responses to changes in market interest rates, making fixed rate loans a reasonable approximation for the optimal loan. Hence, in the absence of optimal contracts, long-term (short-term) borrowers tend to prefer fixed rate (variable) contracts.     

Credit rationing in small firm-bank relationships

I study credit rationing in small firm-bank relationships by using a unique data set of matched loan applications and contracts. I establish the degree of credit rationing by relating a firm's requested loan amount to the bank's granted amount. In line with theoretical predictions, credit rationing is higher for opaque than transparent firms at the beginning of their bank relationships and decreases over time for both. After testing for several alternative explanations, the results suggest that information and incentive problems explain the observed credit rationing and its dynamics.     

The Supply‐Side Determinants of Loan Contract Strictness

Using a measure of contract strictness based on the probability of a covenant violation, I investigate how lender‐specific shocks impact the strictness of the loan contract that a borrower receives. Banks write tighter contracts than their peers after suffering payment defaults to their own loan portfolios, even when defaulting borrowers are in different industries and geographic regions from the current borrower. The effects persist after controlling for bank capitalization, although bank equity compression is also associated with tighter contracts. The evidence suggests that recent defaults inform the lender's perception of its own screening ability, thereby impacting its contracting behavior.     

The role of hedge funds as primary lenders

We examine the role of hedge funds as primary lenders to corporate firms. We investigate both the reasons and the implications of hedge funds’ activities in the primary loan market. We examine the characteristics of firms that borrow from hedge funds and find that borrowers are primarily firms with lower profitability, lesser credit quality, and higher asymmetric information. Our results suggest that hedge funds serve as lenders of last resort to firms that may find it difficult to borrow from banks or issue public debt. We also examine the effect of hedge fund lending on the borrowing firms and find that borrowers’ profitability and creditworthiness improve subsequent to the loan. This beneficial effect of hedge fund lending is corroborated by our finding of positive abnormal returns for borrowers’ stocks around the loan announcement date. Overall, our findings are consistent with hedge funds adding value through their lending relationships and financial markets perceiving these activities as good news for the firms.