Is the Efficiency Wage Efficient? The Social Norm and Organizational Corruption

The effectiveness of efficiency wage incentives is often jeopardized by perverse organizational corruption. We model organizational corruption as a phenomenon of social interaction and relate the substantial psychological role characterizing the social norm to the corruption problem. We find that if the status quo bribery rate within the firm is high, social norms can no longer serve as a sufficient sanction against a corrupt supervisor; pandemic organizational corruption tends to generate a critical mass effect—the snowball effect—which intensifies the corruption effect. This intensified effect, due to the snowballing character of social norms, may more than offset the usual incentive effect of wages, resulting in more widespread shirking in the firm.
JEL classification : D 82; J 41     

论朱元璋的惩贪思想

朱元璋的惩贪思想从其萌芽、形成,到其成熟和完备有着一个复杂的过程。他的惩贪思想具有系统性、完整性的特点。朱元璋惩贪态度坚决,手段残酷,规模宏大,诛杀贪官之众多的原因,源于其惩贪思想的体系化。     

法制建设、激励机制与社会规范——治理金融腐败的长效机制设计刍议

对货币资金这一稀缺性资源的垄断性配置及委托—代理问题的普遍存在,使得金融腐败极易孳生,而金融腐败对一国金融稳定和经济增长冲击巨大、影响深远。鉴于金融腐败是法制建设、激励机制、社会规范等多方面因素交互作用的结果,要构建治理金融腐败的长效机制,就必须加强金融反腐法制建设、健全激励机制、加强廉政文化建设,多管齐下,才能从源头治理金融腐败这一痼疾。     

On the persistence of corruption

This paper tries to answer the question why the phenomenon of corruption seems to be inherently existent in any society. The dynamic model presented shows how rational agents may generate multiple equilibria of corruption within the same kind of socio-economic system. We assume that the individual disutility caused by the loss of reputation from a corrupt transaction depends on the acceptance of corrupt behavior by the representative individual. Depending on the values of some key parameters like the marginal utility of corrupt behavior and the initial acceptance of corruption a completely corrupt equilibrium where all people completely accept corruption or a completely honest equilibrium where corruption is not accepted at all may be the limit state of the optimal path. Also inner equilibria in-between exist; however, they are always unstable.     

Why is Corruption Tolerated?

It is maintained that a closer analysis of the features of the underlying contract reveals that under many circumstances corruption is in fact a rational and understandable reaction to institutional failures, which are often far from accidental. Sometimes it can even be considered legitimate, when instrumental in achieving goals shared by the vast majority of the electorate.To this purpose, three different stylized institutional frameworks are analyzed: developed, totalitarian and transition countries. The origin, scope and consequences of corruption vary significantly across the different frameworks. The normative conclusions should therefore be adjusted accordingly.     

城市公用事业民营化中的腐败与削减

城市公用事业民营化虽然作为中国城市公用事业改革的趋势方向,同任何改革一样,也存在着负面效应,民营化中的腐败就是其主要负面效应之一.与民营化相关的腐败主要包括两个方面,即民营化中的国有资产流失与民营化后的寻租.本文分析了城市公用事业民营化中的腐败、形式、成因,并结合模型从预防角度上提出了治理对策.     

Commons,Collective Action,and Corruption

John R. Commons tried to save capitalism by making it good. His career was characterized by a sustained attempt to reduce social inequality by promoting collective action. Thanks to his proximity to the terrain, Commons often found himself close to authentic examples of corruption. Indeed, in his published works, corruption was treated exclusively from this perspective. His analysis reveals that collective action is not only the cause, but also the consequence of corruption, and that, in addition, the struggle against corruption is dependent on collective action for its success. I argue that Commons’s position is diametrically opposed to the theses developed later by Nathaniel Leff and Samuel Huntington. For Commons, the main issue is not that there is too much control over individual actions, but that there is too little.     

从源头上建立科学防治腐败体系的几点思考

提高反腐倡廉建设科学化水平,重在源头上建立科学的防治腐败体系,科学化的源头防治腐败领域归根结底是通过科学规范的程序、完善的权力制约机制和制度,在体制和管理上形成主体清晰、责任明确、权力配置科学的责任体系,为此,从规范管理者入手,构筑和夯实制度防线,加强管理者聘用、行权、行为约束和监督,不断在各项管理工作中,找准隐患,溯本求源,以整体联动的方式,全员进行齐抓共防,并不断创新思路,突出实效,把反腐倡廉建设推向一个新水平。     

土地腐败问题的行政审批视角分析

本文提出目前我国土地行政管理体制中不够合理的土地行政权力配置、有待完善和提高的土地行政审批程序和效率,为土地腐败行为创造了条件,也损害了正常的市场秩序和公众利益。合理配置土地行政审批权力、进一步规范土地行政审批程序、提高土地行政审批效率是抑制土地腐败的有效途径。     

湖南预防腐败合力机制探索

腐败现象作为剥削阶级和剥削制度的产物,它的本质是指国家公务人员借职务之便获取个人利益,从而使国家政治生活发生病态变化的过程。简言之就是权力私有化。通过分析近年来湖南省预防腐败出现困境的原因,试图从预防腐败的文化培育、健全法律法规、体制机制创新等,构建湖南预防腐败的合力机制。     

腐败影响的宏观经济分析

文章首先将腐败引入Arrow-Kurz-Barro新古典生产函数,在Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans模型框架下,建立宏观经济动态模型,求解最优条件、讨论稳态均衡值的存在性和稳定性,并进行稳态比较的动态分析和短期分析。研究结果表明,贿赂水平的永久增加将减少稳态的资本积累,但对稳态消费的影响则呈现多种可能;短期贿赂水平变动对资本存量与消费水平的影响也呈现出多种可能性。     

论学术腐败的社会性质

中国在最近三十年的时间里,由于忽视学术制度建设,加之拜金主义和拜权主义思潮的日益盛行,学术腐败已经成为一个极其普遍化和严重化的问题,日渐吞噬着中国的社会健全、民族文化精神和学术健康,建立在对中国目前面临的以高校为主体的学术腐败问题的实际观察的基础上,对学术腐败的社会性质问题进行了探讨,旨在为健康的学术传统之复归做出一种力所能及的努力。     

经济转轨、集体腐败与政治改革--基于中国转轨经验的经济学分析

腐败是经济转轨国家中普遍存在的现象,中国当前的腐败问题呈现集体腐败的特征.文章主要是运用博弈理论对集体腐败行为进行解释.文章证明了在中国这样的经济转轨国家,由于缺乏一个独立的监督机构,一般都是上级官员作为其下级官员的监督者,他们非常容易合谋,形成集体腐败.随后文章对中国集体腐败问题做了实证分析,并且提出了相应的政治改革措施.     

退休年龄选择机理：基于人力资本与社会保障的视角

近年来,延长退休年龄问题日益成为社会和学界的热点话题。本文从我国人口老龄化社会的到来并渐近达到峰值谈起,指出人口老龄化趋势、人均寿命的延长以及我国人口平均人力资本存量的不断增加要求我们实行延迟退休制度。     

事业单位职工延迟退休年龄影响因素实证分析

本文以生命周期理论为依据,以事业单位职工作为实证研究的对象,对退休年龄的影响因素从个人特征、经济因素、工作因素、制度因素四个维度进行问卷调查,借助二元Logistic回归模型进行分析。结果显示,最适退休年龄、工龄、升职空间、继续工作意愿这4个因素均与职工延迟退休意愿的强烈程度呈正相关关系,退休后社会保障外收入则与延迟退休意愿呈负相关关系。     

The Social Norm of Tipping: Does it Improve Social Welfare?

Some economists believe that social norms are created to improve welfare where the market fails. I show that tipping is such a norm, using a model in which a waiter chooses service quality and then a customer chooses the tip. The customer’s utility depends on the social norm about tipping and feelings such as embarrassment and fairness. The equilibrium depends on the exact social norm: higher sensitivity of tips to service quality (according to the norm) yields higher service quality and social welfare. Surprisingly, high tips for low quality may also increase service quality and social welfare.