K?nnen sich erneuerbare Energien langfristig auf wettbewerblich organisierten Stromm?rkten finanzieren?

In this paper we address the issue of whether renewable energy sources can be integrated into power markets if the use of renewable energies is extended at the desired speed. Market integration means that renewable energy sources have to cover their full costs from revenues on competitive markets. In the first part of this paper, we evaluate the long-term revenues of intermittent renewable energy sources using a high resolution power market model. Considering the renewable targets of the German lead study of 2010, we show that due to the merit order effect, intermittent renewable energy sources, such as wind power and photovoltaic, cannot be financed through power markets alone, even if their full costs fall below those of conventional power plants. This is also true for scenarios with high CO₂-prices and increasing spot market prices. In the second part of this paper, we discuss whether in the long run additional instruments such as green certificates or capacity markets would allow for a more competitive financing of renewable energy sources. Center stage in the discussion is the question under which circumstances these instruments increase competitive pricing and decentralised market decisions.     

Staat versus Markt: Konsumentenpräferenzen und die Förderung erneuerbarer Energien

This paper presents a set of artefacutal field experiments on individual preferences and willingness to pay, respectively, for the consumption of green electricity. Based on an economic model of individual preferences for the provision of public goods, the design of our experiments involved different scenarios: subjects had to decide about their individual spending on green electricity as well as about the level of public subsidies for green electricity. Unlike hypothetical empirical methods, the experiments involved an incentive mechanism, i.e. subjects had to face the monetary consequences of their decisions. Our empirical results are distinct from those of other studies. It seems that the market potential of green electricity is overestimated at present. Hence, the market will not release the public in financing subsidies in this field. The conclusion can be drawn that individuals prefer binding collective contributions rather than individual market-driven activities. However, we contradict the standard explanation of political economy that such a kind of preference for regulatory instruments may be motivated by cost-illusion. Subjects were willing to bear far higher taxes as compared to the price mark-up they were willing to pay for green electricity offered by the market.     

Die Marktprämie im EEG 2012: Ein sinnvoller Beitrag zur Markt- und Systemintegration erneuerbarer Energien?

With the share of renewable energies within the electricty sector rising, improving their market integration (i.e. inclusion in the steering and remuneration processes of the electricity market) and system integration (i.e. enhanced responsibility for grid stability) is of increasing importance. To transform the energy system efficiently while ensuring security of supply, it is necessary to increase the alignment of renewable electricity production with short- and long-term market signals. The German Renewable Energy Sources Act 2012 introduced the market premium to provide market experience to renewable plant operators and incentives for demand-oriented electricity production. Shortly after its introduction, the instrument is already being criticised as ineffective and expensive. Building on early experiences, this article examines whether the market premium in its current design improves market and/or system integration, and if it seems suitable in principle to contribute to these aims (effectiveness). Also, potential efficiency gains and additional costs of “administering integration” are discussed (efficiency). While market integration in a strict sense (i.e. exposing renewables to price risks) is not the purpose of the market premium, it has successfully increased participation in direct marketing. However, windfall profits are high, and the benefits of gradually leading plant operators towards the market are questionable. Incentives for demand-oriented electricity production are established, but they prove insufficient particularly in the case of intermittent renewable energy sources. A continuation of the instrument in its current form therefore does not seem recommendable. To conclude, potential alternative solutions are presented.     

Energiewende und Übertragungsnetzausbau: Sind Erdkabel ein Instrument zur Steigerung der gesellschaftlichen Akzeptanz des Leitungsbaus? Eine empirische Untersuchung auf Basis der Kontingenten Bewertungsmethode

Transmission network development has led to protests throughout Germany. Many studies present underground cables as a means to increase public agreement to transmission line construction and network development. This paper verifies this thesis analyzing the willingness-to-pay of private households for underground cable employment, which allows for a distinct analysis of strategic behavior and opportunity costs that is omitted in classic questionnaire designs. The results of a contingent valuation study conducted in November and December 2012 in four regions of Germany, which are affected by transmission line development in different ways, are presented. At first glance, an analysis of 1.003 household responses confirms common findings with a majority of households favoring underground cables (about 60 %), albeit preferences vary strongly between sample regions. Willingness-to-pay, however, relativizes this result. A near share of 50 % of households voting for underground cables is not willing to accept an increase in electricity prices to finance respective projects (free riders). The fact that positive willingness-to-pay does not correlate positively with increasing lengths of underground cables in 60 % of cases underlines that underground cables are not supported unconditionally. All-in-all, a flat public approval of underground cable technology cannot be presumed based on WTP-evaluation. Preferences about underground cables and corresponding WTP are explained with demographic characteristics and attitudes using regression models. Fundamental thoughts on energy- and environmental policies do not serve to explain responses. Instead, regional factors and subjective opinions on how to finance such kind of infrastructure measures influence preferences for underground cables.