When to ally & when to acquire

Acquisitions and alliances are two pillars of growth strategy. But most businesses don't treat the two as alternative mechanisms for attaining goals. Consequently, companies take over firms they should have collaborated with, and vice versa, and make a mess of both acquisitions and alliances. It's easy to see why companies don't weigh the relative merits and demerits of acquisitions and alliances before choosing horses for courses. The two strategies differ in many ways: Acquisition deals are competitive, based on market prices, and risky; alliances are cooperative, negotiated, and not so risky. Companies habitually deploy acquisitions to increase scale or cut costs and use partnerships to enter new markets, customer segments, and regions. Moreover, a company's initial experiences often turn into blinders. If the firm pulls off an alliance or two, it tends to enter into alliances even when circumstances demand acquisitions. Organizational barriers also stand in the way. In many companies, an M&A group, which reports to the finance head, handles acquisitions, while a separate business development unit looks after alliances. The two teams work out of different locations, jealously guard turf, and, in effect, prevent companies from comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the strategies. But companies could improve their results, the authors argue, if they compared the two strategies to determine which is best suited to the situation at hand. Firms such as Cisco that use acquisitions and alliances appropriately grow faster than rivals do. The authors provide a framework to help organizations systematically decide between acquisition and alliance by analyzing three sets of factors: the resources and synergies they desire, the marketplace they compete in, and their competencies at collaborating.     

Growth outside the core

Growth in an adjacent market is tougher than it looks; three-quarters of the time, the effort fails. But companies can change those odds dramatically. Results from a five-year study of corporate growth conducted by Bain & Company reveal that adjacency expansion succeeds only when built around strong core businesses that have the potential to become market leaders. And the best place to look for adjacency opportunities is inside a company's strongest customers. The study also found that the most successful companies were able to consistently, profitably outgrow their rivals by developing a formula for pushing out the boundaries of their core businesses in predictable, repeatable ways. Companies use their repeatability formulas to expand into any number of adjacencies. Some companies make repeated geographic moves, as Vodafone has done in expanding from one geographic market to another over the past 13 years, building revenues from $1 billion in 1990 to $48 billion in 2003. Others apply a superior business model to new segments. Dell, for example, has repeatedly adapted its direct-to-customer model to new customer segments and new product categories. In other cases, companies develop hybrid approaches. Nike executed a series of different types of adjacency moves: it expanded into adjacent customer segments, introduced new products, developed new distribution channels, and then moved into adjacent geographic markets. The successful repeaters in the study had two common characteristics. First, they were extraordinarily disciplined, applying rigorous screens before they made an adjacency move. This discipline paid off in the form of learning curve benefits, increased speed, and lower complexity. And second, in almost all cases, they developed their repeatable formulas by studying their customers and their customers' economics very, very carefully.     

Getting offshoring right

The prospect of offshoring and outsourcing business processes has captured the imagination of CEOs everywhere. In the past five years, a rising number of companies in North America and Europe have experimented with this strategy, hoping to reduce costs and gain strategic advantage. But many businesses have had mixed results. According to several studies, half the organizations that have shifted processes offshore have failed to generate the expected financial benefits. What's more, many of them have faced employee resistance and consumer dissatisfaction. Clearly, companies have to rethink how they formulate their offshoring strategies. A three-part methodology can help. First, companies need to prioritize their processes, ranking each based on two criteria: the value it creates for customers and the degree to which the company can capture some of that value. Companies will want to keep their core (highest-priority) processes in-house and consider outsourcing their commodity (low-priority) processes; critical (moderate-priority) processes are up for debate and must be considered carefully. Second, businesses should analyze all the risks that accompany offshoring and look systematically at their critical and commodity processes in terms of operational risk (the risk that processes won't operate smoothly after being offshored) and structural risk (the risk that relationships with service providers may not work as expected). Finally, companies should determine possible locations for their offshore efforts, as well as the organizational forms--such as captive centers and joint ventures--that those efforts might take. They can do so by examining each process's operational and structural risks side by side. This article outlines the tools that will help companies choose the right processes to offshore. It also describes a new organizational structure called the extended organization, in which companies specify the quality of services they want and work alongside providers to get that quality.     

Making business sense of the Internet

For managers in large, well-established businesses, the Internet is a tough nut to crack. It is very simple to set up a Web presence and very difficult to create a Web-based business model. Established businesses that over decades have carefully built brands and physical distribution relationships risk damaging all they have created when they pursue commerce through the Net. Still, managers can't avoid the impact of electronic commerce on their businesses. They need to understand the opportunities available to them and recognize how their companies may be vulnerable if rivals seize those opportunities first. Broadly speaking, the Internet presents four distinct types of opportunities. First, it links companies directly to customers, suppliers, and other interested parties. Second, it lets companies bypass other players in an industry's value chain. Third, it is a tool for developing and delivering new products and services to new customers. Fourth, it will enable certain companies to dominate the electronic channel of an entire industry or segment, control access to customers, and set business rules. As he elaborates on these four points, the author gives established companies a systematic way to sort through the risks and rewards of doing business in cyberspace.     

The triple-A supply chain

Building a strong supply chain is essential for business success. But when it comes to improving their supply chains, few companies take the right approach. Many businesses work to make their chains faster or more cost-effective, assuming that those steps are the keys to competitive advantage. To the contrary: Supply chains that focus on speed and costs tend to deteriorate over time. The author has spent 15 years studying more than 60 companies to gain insight into this and other supply chain dilemmas. His conclusion: Only companies that build supply chains that are agile, adaptable, and aligned get ahead of their rivals. All three components are essential; without any one of them, supply chains break down. Great companies create supply chains that respond to abrupt changes in markets. Agility is critical because in most industries, both demand and supply fluctuate rapidly and widely. Supply chains typically cope by playing speed against costs, but agile ones respond both quickly and cost-efficiently. Great companies also adapt their supply networks when markets or strategies change. The best supply chains allow managers to identify structural shifts early by recording the latest data, filtering out noise, and tracking key patterns. Finally, great companies align the interests of the partners in their supply chains with their own. That's important because every firm is concerned solely with its own interests. If its goals are out of alignment with those of other partners in the supply chain, performance will suffer. When companies hear about the triple-A supply chain, they assume that building one will require increased technology and investment. But most firms already have the infrastructure in place to create one. A fresh attitude alone can go a long way toward making it happen.     

The new rules for bringing innovations to market

It's tough to get consumers to adopt innovations--and it's getting tougher all the time. That's because more and more markets are taking on the characteristics of networks. The interconnections among today's companies are so plentiful that often a new product's adoption by one player depends on its systematic adoption by other players. Consider the disparate companies involved with the popularization of digital photography: software vendors, camera manufacturers, broadband communications companies, printer manufacturers, and so on. By contrast, Kodak was pretty much the sole player involved with popularizing film photography. The traditional levers executives use to launch products--such as targeting unique customer segments or developing compelling value propositions--don't work as well in this new environment. Instead, innovators must orchestrate a change of behaviors across the market, unraveling the status quo so that a large number of players adopt their offerings and believe they are better off for having done so. In this article, Monitor Group's Bhaskar Chakravorti outlines a four-part framework for doing just that. The innovator must reason back from a target endgame, implementing only those strategies that maximize its chances of getting to its goal. It must complement power players, positioning its innovation as an enhancement to their products or services. The innovator must offer coordinated switching incentives to three core groups: the players that add to the innovation's benefits, the players that act as channels to adopters, and the adopters themselves. And it must preserve flexibility in case its initial strategy fails. Chakravorti uses Adobe's introduction of its Acrobat software as an example of an innovator that took into account other players in the network--and succeeded because of it.     

The coming battle for customer information

Companies collect information about customers to target valuable prospects more effectively, tailor their offerings to individual needs, improve customer satisfaction, and identify opportunities for new products or services. But managers' efforts to capture such information may soon be thwarted. The authors believe that consumers are going to take ownership of information about themselves and start demanding value in exchange for it. As a result, negotiating with customers for information will become costly and complex. How will that happen? Consumers are realizing that they get very little in exchange for the information they divulge so freely through their commercial transactions and survey responses. Now new technologies such as smart cards, World Wide Web browsers, and personal financial management software are allowing consumers to view comprehensive profiles of their commercial activities-- and to choose whether or not to release that information to companies. Their decision will hinge, in large part, on what vendors offer them in return for the data. Consumers will be unlikely to bargain with vendors on their own, however. The authors anticipate that companies they call infomediaries will broker information to businesses on consumers' behalf. In essence, infomediaries will be the catalyst for people to start demanding value in exchange for information about themselves. And most other companies will need to rethink how they obtain information and what they do with it if they want to find new customers and serve them better.     

The coming commoditization of processes

Despite the much-ballyhooed increase in outsourcing, most companies are in do-it-yourself mode for the bulk of their processes, in large part because there's no way to compare outside organizations' capabilities with those of internal functions. Given the lack of comparability, it's almost surprising that anyone outsources today. But it's not surprising that cost is by far companies' primary criterion for evaluating outsourcers or that many companies are dissatisfied with their outsourcing relationships. A new world is coming, says the author, and it will lead to dramatic changes in the shape and structure of corporations. A broad set of process standards will soon make it easy to determine whether a business capability can be improved by outsourcing it. Such standards will also help businesses compare service providers and evaluate the costs versus the benefits of outsourcing. Eventually these costs and benefits will be so visible to buyers that outsourced processes will become a commodity, and prices will drop significantly. The low costs and low risk of outsourcing will accelerate the flow of jobs offshore, force companies to reassess their strategies, and change the basis of competition. The speed with which some businesses have already adopted process standards suggests that many previously unscrutinized areas are ripe for change. In the field of technology, for instance, the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute has developed a global standard for software development processes, called the Capability Maturity Model (CMM). For companies that don't have process standards in place, it makes sense for them to create standards by working with customers, competitors, software providers, businesses that processes may be outsourced to, and objective researchers and standard-setters. Setting standards is likely to lead to the improvement of both internal and outsourced processes.     

Tailored logistics: the next advantage

How many top executives have ever visited with managers who move materials from the factory to the store? How many still reduce the costs of logistics to the rent of warehouses and the fees charged by common carriers? To judge by hours of senior management attention, logistics problems do not rank high. But logistics have the potential to become the next governing element of strategy. Whether they know it or not, senior managers of every retail store and diversified manufacturing company compete in logistically distinct businesses. Customer needs vary, and companies can tailor their logistics systems to serve their customers better and more profitably. Companies do not create value for customers and sustainable advantage for themselves merely by offering varieties of goods. Rather, they offer goods in distinct ways. A particular can of Coca-Cola, for example, might be a can of Coca-Cola going to a vending machine, or a can of Coca-Cola that comes with billing services. There is a fortune buried in this distinction. The goal of logistics strategy is building distinct approaches to distinct groups of customers. The first step is organizing a cross-functional team to proceed through the following steps: segmenting customers according to purchase criteria, establishing different standards of service for different customer segments, tailoring logistics pipelines to support each segment, and creating economics of scale to determine which assets can be shared among various pipelines. The goal of establishing logistically distinct businesses is familiar: improved knowledge of customers and improved means of satisfying them.     

Price smarter on the Net

Companies generally have set prices on the Internet in two ways. Many start-ups have offered untenably low prices in a rush to capture first-mover advantage. Many incumbents have simply charged the same prices on-line as they do off-line. Either way, companies are missing a big opportunity. The fundamental value of the Internet lies not in lowering prices or making them consistent but in optimizing them. After all, if it's easy for customers to compare prices on the Internet, it's also easy for companies to track customers' behavior and adjust prices accordingly. The Net lets companies optimize prices in three ways. First, it lets them set and announce prices with greater precision. Different prices can be tested easily, and customers' responses can be collected instantly. Companies can set the most profitable prices, and they can tap into previously hidden customer demand. Second, because it's so easy to change prices on the Internet, companies can adjust prices in response to even small fluctuations in market conditions, customer demand, or competitors' behavior. Third, companies can use the clickstream data and purchase histories that it collects through the Internet to segment customers quickly. Then it can offer segment-specific prices or promotions immediately. By taking full advantage of the unique possibilities afforded by the Internet to set prices with precision, adapt to changing circumstances quickly, and segment customers accurately, companies can get their pricing right. It's one of the ultimate drivers of e-business success.     

Social strategies that work

Although most companies have collected lots of friends and followers on social platforms such as Facebook, few have succeeded in generating profits there. That's because they merely port their digital strategies into social environments by broadcasting their commercial messages or seeking customer feedback. To succeed on social platforms, says Harvard Business School's Piskorski, businesses need to devise social strategies that are consistent with users' expectations and behavior in these venues--namely, people want to connect with other people, not with companies. The author defines successful social strategies as those that reduce costs or increase customers' willingness to pay by helping people establish or strengthen relationships through doing free work on a company's behalf. Citing successes at Zynga, eBay, American Express, and Yelp, Piskorski shows that social strategies can generate profits by helping people connect in exchange for tasks that benefit the company such as customer acquisition, marketing, and content creation. He lays out a systematic way to build a social strategy and shows how a major credit card company he advised used the method to roll out its own strategy.     

Breaking out of the innovation box

In most companies, investments in innovation follow a boom-bust cycle. For a time, the cash flows. Then, as the economy sours or companies rethink their priorities, the taps go dry. But when research budgets are slashed, the strong projects are often abandoned along with the weak ones. Promising initiatives are cut off just when they are about to bear fruit. Expensive labs are closed; partnership agreements costing millions in legal fees are thrown away. When disruptive changes in the competitive landscape come, companies are caught flat-footed. Sustainable innovation requires a new approach: Instead of being largely isolated projects, innovation initiatives need to gain access to the insights and capabilities of other companies. To be protected from the ax of short-term cost reductions and the faddishness born of easy money, the initiatives must become part of the ongoing commerce that takes place among companies. But how can businesses traffic in such sensitive information without giving their competitors an advantage? The answer, the author contends, lies in a practice that's been common since the Middle Ages: the use of independent intermediaries to facilitate the exchange of sensitive information among companies without revealing the principals' identities or motives and without otherwise compromising their interests. Executive search firms, for example, allow job seekers to remain anonymous during the early stages of a search, and they protect businesses from disclosing their hiring plans to rivals. A network of innovation intermediaries would be in a unique position to visualize new opportunities synthesized from insights and technologies provided by several companies--ideas that might never occur to businesses working on their own.     

Corporate dealings with the network economy

Many companies seek increasing returns and survive only by continually restructuring their organizations. Technological developments, changes in consumer behavior and economic drivers accelerate this process. Companies that want to deal with these phenomena, have to take into account the characteristics of the network economy. This article shows how, depending on the type of network, a corporate strategy with regard to research & development activities, production, sales and finance can be built. The conclusion is that the expected continued rise of the network economy will change the corporate landscape dramatically. Customers, searching for self-actualization, will succeed in their endeavor more often, and so will the companies that are most connected with the stakeholders in the networks in question.     

Wie man durch Moral ins „Geschäft“ kommt: Ein ordonomischer Beitrag zum betrieblichen Risikomanagement

Through an analysis of Alfred Krupp’s 19th-century social welfare program, this paper develops an ordonomic contribution to corporate risk management. The paper argues that companies can employ ‘morality as a factor of production’ by a differentiated business strategy of moral commitments. In this way, companies can not only considerably reduce their exposure to the undesirable risks of losing core business relationships with important stakeholders. But at the same time, businesses may increase their readiness to take desirable innovation risks that are pivotal for long-term value creation. Ultimately, the paper develops an argument for how companies can better live up to the role of being an agent of societal value creation, often articulated by concepts such as “corporate social responsibility” or “corporate citizenship”.     

What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Let's put consumers in charge of health care

Businesses spend billions on health insurance. And what do they get for their money? A lot of unhappy employees. Workers fret about the quality of the care they receive, the burden of their out-of-pocket expenses, and the gaps in their coverage. For businesses, health care has become a lose-lose proposition: They pay way too much, and they get way too little. The problem is that the health care industry has been shielded from consumer pressure--by employers, insurers, and the government. As a result, costs have exploded even as choices have narrowed. But if companies embrace a new model of health coverage--one that places control over both costs and care directly into the hands of employees--the competitive forces that spur productivity and innovation in consumer markets can be loosed upon the inefficient, tradition-bound health care system. Moving to consumer-driven health care requires that companies revamp their health benefits in six ways: Give employees incentives to shop intelligently; offer a real choice of insurance plans; charge employees prices that accurately reflect the company's costs; let providers set their own prices; adjust payments for each enrollee based on need; and provide relevant information. Putting consumers in charge of health care may seem like a radical approach. But individuals are highly motivated to educate themselves about their health, their insurance, and their care, and they want to seek the most value for their money. Promoting that economic dynamic--the same that fuels consumer markets everywhere--is the best way to enhance the health care industry's productivity and quality.     

How market smarts can protect property rights

Intellectual property comprises an ever-increasing fraction of corporate wealth, but what's the good of that if an ever-increasing fraction of the property is copied or stolen? Faced with developing countries' limited and inadequately enforced patent and copyright laws, some companies are resorting to market-based strategies to protect their intellectual property. These include preempting or threatening competitors, embedding intellectual property in environments that can be protected, bundling insecure intellectual property with its more secure cousins, and actually entering the businesses that pose a threat. The authors urge companies coping with weak property rights to follow a decision tree when choosing which strategies to use and when: Start by thinking of the strategies that will protect your business's core. If, for example, a first-mover advantage is within reach, making yourself more committed to intellectual property could be the answer. If you and your rivals are equally matched, ask yourself, "Can those that threaten me with copying be copied in turn?" The knowledge that each of you can hurt the other may dampen the competitive intensity or even lead to voluntary sharing of property. If these solutions fail or don't apply, try forging a connection with a product or business closely related to your own. Doing so may prevent a valued asset from falling into a rival's hands or make the asset harder to misappropriate. This approach can even help you expand your piece of the market pie or reduce the cost of making the threatened product, perhaps to the point where you can compete against pirated goods. Finally, if there still doesn't seem to be a way of making money from your threatened product, you may choose to move into the very business that has hurt your own. Such strategies are behind the economics of successful companies like Intel and NBC, say the authors.     

Why do investment banks buy put options from companies?

Companies have collected billions in premiums from privately sold put options written on their own stock. It is puzzling that counterparties, investment banks, would agree to make such transactions with better-informed companies which have extraordinary ability to time the market as documented by Jenter et al. (2011). To resolve this puzzle, we develop a model that shows that investment banks, by offering to buy put options from better-informed parties, receive private information about issuing companies. Our model also incorporates the practice of firms (such as Microsoft) of sometimes repurchasing their own put options and thus providing additional private information to investment banks. Empirically, we find support for our theory from an abnormal 9% increase in the stock prices and a 40% increase in the trading volumes around the put sales. Examination of 13D filings reveals that trading by upper management insiders cannot completely account for the change in volume.     

Service transition strategies in service-dominant settings: Towards all finance solutions in SME markets

Intense competition and extensive customer needs are motivating companies to develop so-called ‘solution’ offerings in service industries. Building on service transition strategy literature, this article outlines the practical activities that broad-based financial service providers take in transitioning towards ‘all finance’ solutions and accentuates the inhibitors that their business customers perceive in this process. The empirical data consists of 40 semi-structured interviews among two service providers and 17 of their small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) customers. The results show that the service transition strategies of service extension and relationship focus are increasingly utilized in the financial industry. However, the integration of various components within a comprehensive bank and insurance offering is still in its early stages, suggesting providers rely mainly on a pure component strategy. SME customers, who seem to have taken the role of independent value creators, fail to perceive the benefits of purchasing comprehensive offerings from a single provider. Thereby, they tend to follow price-based purchase behaviour and negotiate their service offering with many different providers.