Audit Probability versus Effectiveness: The Beckerian Approach Revisited

The Beckerian approach to tax compliance examines how a tax authority can maximize social welfare by trading‐off audit probability against the fine rate on undeclared tax. This paper offers an alternative examination of the privately optimal behavior of a tax authority tasked by government to maximize expected revenue. The tax authority is able to trade‐off audit probability against audit effectiveness, but takes the fine rate as fixed in the short run. I find that the tax authority's privately optimal audit strategy does not maximize voluntary compliance, and that voluntary compliance is nonmonotonic as a function of the tax authority's budget. Finally, the tax authority's privately optimal effective fine rate on undeclared tax does not exceed two at interior optima.     

The Tax‐smoothing Hypothesis: Evidence from Sweden, 1952–1999

This paper tests Barro's (1979) tax‐smoothing hypothesis using Swedish central government data for the period 1952–1999. According to the tax‐smoothing hypothesis, the government sets the budget surplus equal to expected changes in government expenditure. When expenditure is expected to increase, the government runs a budget surplus, and when expenditure is expected to fall, the government runs a budget deficit. The empirical evidence suggests that the model provides a useful benchmark and that tax‐smoothing behavior can explain about 60 percent of the variability in the Swedish central government budget surplus.     

Tax Policy When Countries Compete for Third Market Exports

We examine the welfare and other consequences of tax policy in a third market export model where duopolists located in two countries compete in prices. With tax competition between governments, we allow for welfare‐maximizing governments in the two countries to delegate tax setting responsibility to policy‐makers who have different objectives than the governments. The unique equilibrium in the tax competition environment involves both governments delegating tax setting responsibility to tax revenue‐maximizing policy‐makers. This equilibrium yields higher welfare for both countries than the outcome when the governments delegate to welfare‐maximizing policy‐makers. The paper also compares tax competition with tax harmonization and shows that when the entire export market is served, tax harmonization improves the welfare of the country that houses the low cost firm, while the other country may be immiserized.     

Estimating labour supply responses and welfare participation: Using a natural experiment to validate a structural labour supply model

We estimate an economic model of labour supply and welfare participation using data on single men from Quebec drawn from the 1986 Canadian Census. Detailed budget sets for each work‐welfare combination—accounting for income taxes, tax credits and welfare benefit rules—are derived using a micro‐simulation model. We show that predicted reactions to a welfare reform that took place in 1989 replicate actual changes in labour supply and welfare participation. We also illustrate the advantage of having estimated a structural model by showing how labour supply and welfare participation change when income taxes and benefit levels change.     

基于不确定性约束条件的食物浪费行为研究

本文探讨了决策者食物利用能力的不确定性如何引起食物浪费,并比较了食物浪费税和私人信息干预这两个政策工具对食物浪费量和社会福利的影响。研究结果表明,消费者食物最优保有量决策一旦偏离其食物利用能力,就会引发食物浪费。虽然两个政策工具都可以有效地降低食物浪费,但是食物浪费税对社会福利的影响方向不确定,而私人信息干预却可以通过激发学习机制增强决策者对自身食物利用能力的认知,并降低不确定性,从而提高整体社会福利。     

Efficient Dynamic Pollution Taxation in an Uncertain Environment

This paper analyzes efficient pollution taxation within a stochastic model of endogenous growth. Pollution is a by-product of production and causes disutility. Furthermore, the productivity which results from environmental quality is uncertain. This reflects e.g. uncertain capital depreciation induced by natural disasters like hurricanes or floods. This uncertainty is shown to raise an ambiguous impact on the optimal pollution level as well as on optimal environmental taxation. Market equilibrium turns out to be suboptimal, since the households mis-perceive their individual impact on pollution. Conditions for welfare maximizing pollution taxation are stated and it is shown that a direct pollution tax is not appropriate to yield Pareto-optimal growth. Instead, a linear capital income tax together with a linear abatement subsidy build an efficient tax scheme, if secondarily the governmental budget is balanced. Moreover, an increase in the riskiness of environmental productivity may even lead to an increase in the optimal pollution level and to a decrease in optimal environmental taxation, depending predominantly on the preference parameters.      

Political Support for Tax Decentralization

We present a spatial model of a city with two unequally productive jurisdictions. City residents bear a commuting cost to work in either of the two jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction must finance a public budget with a wage and a head tax. We compare the first best optimum to tax decentralization. From the total welfare viewpoint, tax competition is always inefficient. However, majoritarian local governments may prefer the inefficient tax decentralization to the first best.     

Liberalization and tax amnesty in a developing economy

We show that tax evaders can respond to a tax amnesty, even if enforcement activities do not change, if it is timed to coincide with liberalization and rising incomes. The success of the amnesty, in terms of its effect on tax revenue and welfare, depends on the distribution of the gains from liberalization. Our analysis provides a theoretical justification of the link between successful amnesties and economic liberalization and points to factors that a policy maker should consider for success of future amnesties.     

The Federal Budget: How Much Difference Do Elections Make?

This article examines the budget process as a selection of priorities and how these priorities change over time with changing economic circumstances. Labor governments spend more on health, employment creation schemes, on welfare housing but less on industry assistance and on assisted immigration. The rate of growth of expenditure on social security decreased sharply after 1975. The revenue section examines how different governments have restructured the tax system. Broadly, the McMahon government pursued mildly progressive tax policies, the Whitlam government strongly progressive tax policies. Fraser's tax policies were regressive (except for taxpayers with children), with the Hawke government's policies in this area being nearer to Whitlam than to McMahon. Grouping budgets into election, pre-election and post-election budgets provides interesting contrasts. In terms of current (1984–85) prices the 'average' election budget produces tax cuts of $2300 million and expenditure increases of around $1 600 million. The two budgets which preceded the loss of office by the two Liberal Prime Ministers produced particularly large outlay increases. The categories of outlays which show evidence of being used as election-bait are identified.     

Replacing the U.S. income tax with a progressive consumption tax: A sequenced general equilibrium approach

This paper examines the welfare consequences of changing the current U.S. income tax system to a progressive consumption tax. We compute a sequence of single period equilibria in which savings decisions depend on the expected future return to capital. In the presence of existing income taxes, the U.S. economy is assumed to lie on a balanced growth path. With the change to a consumption tax, individuals save more and initially consume less. As the capital stock grows, consumption eventually overtakes that of the original path, and the economy approaches the new balanced growth path with higher consumption and a greater capital stock. Both the transition and the balanced growth paths enter our welfare evaluations. We find the discounted present value of the stream of net gains is approximately $650 billion in 1973 dollars, just over 1 percent of the discounted present value of national income. Larger gains occur if further reform of capital income taxation accompanies the change. We examine the sensitivity of the results, both to the design of the consumption tax and to the values of elasticity and other parameters. The paper also contains estimates of the time required to adjust from one growth path to the other.     

HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING,PUBLIC DEBT AND BALANCED BUDGET RULES

This paper considers a government that chooses its tax and borrowing policy in order to minimize the present value of the excess burden caused by taxation. In doing so, the government uses hyperbolic discounting. It turns out that public deficits are positive even if public expenditures are constant over time. With cyclical expenditures, the government chooses an asymmetric debt policy, i.e., in bad times it borrows more than it repays in good times. In contrast to tax smoothing and political economy theories of public debt, the welfare effects of a balanced budget rule are ambiguous.     

Commodity tax structure under uncertainty in a perfectly competitive market

In a partial equilibrium setting without price uncertainty, the balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax on output for a specific (unit) tax can enhance welfare in imperfectly competitive markets and is without impact in a competitive world. This paper demonstrates that a substitution of this kind can also increase expected output and welfare in a competitive market characterised by uncertainty about the commodity price, if firms can respond to the revelation of demand conditions by altering output.     

Macroeconomic effects of an indirect tax substitution

We study an indirect tax reform in a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition for both the Cournot and the Free entry equilibria. We show that it is possible to attain a positive balanced budget multiplier by means of a substitution of specific by ad valorem taxation. Moreover, although any tax substitution causes higher prices and the flow up of firms in the long-run, the Free entry equilibrium output can increase with respect to that of the Cournot equilibrium. Finally, in contrast with the partial equilibrium, welfare decreasing tax reforms are likely to occur even when the balanced budget multiplier is positive.      

PRODUCTIVE GOVERNMENT SPENDING,PATTERNS OF SPECIALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY*

Constructing a two‐sector small open endogenous growth model with productive government spending, this paper examines patterns of specialization and the growth effects of fiscal policy. It is shown in this model that a change in income tax rate can cause a change in an equilibrium pattern of specialization. Because of this property, the relationship between the tax rate and the growth rate yields either a humped shape or a two‐humped shape, depending on world commodity prices. We also show that the growth maximizing tax rate is not necessarily equal to the tax rate that maximizes the level of social welfare.     

Labour-supply impacts of effective welfare programme parameters: a reanalysis

We quantify the impact of effective welfare programme parameters on the labour supply of single female household heads – the primary group of welfare recipients in the USA. Our panel of data is derived from the US Census Bureau's Current Population Survey for the years 1979 to 1990 inclusive. Behavioural impacts from a range of economic variables are consistent in sign with predictions made by economic theory. We find that effective welfare gurantee levels and the effective tax rate on earned income both significantly decrease labour supply. The marginal effects of these welfare programme parameters are economically small: a US$1000 increase in the expected welfare guarantee level reduces annual labour supply by about 36 hours; a 10 percentage point increase in the effective tax rate on earned income reduces annual labour supply by about 7.5 hours.     

Capital tax,minimum wage,and labor market outcomes

Often an increase in the minimum wage is accompanied by a reduction in the capital tax. This paper analyzes the effects of interactions between the minimum wage and the capital tax in the general equilibrium framework. The analysis is conducted in an inter-temporal search model in which firms post wages. A (binding) minimum wage provides a lower support for the distribution of wages. The paper finds that the interaction of these two policy instruments significantly modify labor market outcomes and welfare cost. In the presence of a binding minimum wage, a decrease in the capital tax leads to an increase in wage dispersion. In contrast, when it is not binding, a lower capital tax may reduce the dispersion in wages. A binding minimum wage magnifies the positive effects of a lower capital tax on labor supply, employment, and output. It also enhances the welfare cost of capital tax. A policy change which involves an increase in the minimum wage and a fall in the capital tax such that employment level remains constant increases welfare and output.     

On a Fundamental Advantage of Permits Over Taxes for the Control of Pollution

We extend the tax versus permits literature by considering permit supply functions and pollution tax functions that are generalizations of the usual constant permit supply and constant pollution tax rate. In our model, pollution is not uniformly mixed and the regulator is uncertain about the polluting firms’ abatement costs. We determine the optimal permit supply functions and the optimal pollution tax functions. Using these functions, we show that permits lead unambiguously to lower total expected costs than taxes. We analyze the magnitude of this difference for a simple model of climate change. By relating the optimal permit supply functions to Weitzman (Am Econ Rev 68:683–691, 1978) we provide a new interpretation of his results.     

Volatile Mining Revenues and State Government Budget Decisions

Mining royalties provide a volatile source of revenue for state governments in Australia. We explore the effects of changes in royalty revenue received by a state government on current-year budget decisions about expenditure, tax revenue and the budget surplus. The literature postulates different models for how lower-level government budget decisions respond to a revenue windfall from a higher level of government. Empirical evidence on these models over 1998–2019 provides strong evidence that over a half of a royalty windfall becomes a change in budget expenditure. Estimates of changes to tax revenues and the surplus are not definitive nor robust.     

The consequences of an unknown debt target

Several proposals to reduce U.S. debt reveal large differences in their targets. We examine how an unknown debt target affects economic activity using a real business cycle model in which Bayesian households learn about a state-dependent debt target in an endogenous tax rule. Recent papers use stochastic volatility shocks to study fiscal uncertainty. In our setup, the fiscal rule is time-varying due to unknown changes in the debt target. Households infer the current debt target from a noisy tax rule and jointly estimate the transition probabilities. Three key findings emerge from our analysis: (1) limited information about the debt target amplifies the effect of tax shocks through changes in expected tax rates; (2) the welfare losses are an order of magnitude larger when both the debt target state and transition matrix are unknown than when only the debt target state is unknown to households; (3) an unknown debt target likely reduced the stimulative effect of the ARRA and uncertainty about the sunset provision in the Bush tax cuts may have slowed the recovery and led to welfare losses.     

Welfare improving distributionally neutral tax reforms

In a new model with incomplete markets, I quantitatively determine tax reforms that are welfare improving, distributionally neutral, and leave the budget balance unchanged in the long run. I consider a new reform. I eliminate capital income taxation and replace it with progressive consumption taxation, consisting of taxing necessities and luxuries at different rates. I compare steady states under various tax regimes. I find that progressive rather than uniform consumption taxation generates higher welfare gains in the long run and during the transition to the steady state. While this type of reform achieves redistribution neutrality only in the long run, it generates welfare gains for the whole population during the transition.