共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Nicolaas J. Vriend 《The Journal of economic education》2013,44(4):358-362
This study reviews the status of student outcomes assessment in departments of economics at colleges and universities across the country. 相似文献
2.
Hannu Salonen 《Games and Economic Behavior》1996,14(2):208-219
In this paper the existence problem of undominated Nash equilibrium in normal form games is analyzed. It is shown that an undominated Nash equilibrium exists, if (a) strategy sets are convex polytopes inRnand (b) utility functions are affine with respect to each player's own strategy. It is shown by counterexamples that, first, it is not sufficient to have concave utility functions instead of affine under condition (b) even when condition (a) is satisfied, and, second, it is not sufficient to have just compact and convex strategy sets instead of polytopes in condition (a) even when condition (b) is satisfied. 相似文献
3.
How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. In this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players' payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that different dependence assumptions lead to different asymptotic results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72. 相似文献
4.
Abderrahmane Ziad 《Bulletin of economic research》2003,55(3):311-317
We consider an n ‐person non‐zero‐sum non‐cooperative game in normal form, where the strategy sets are some closed intervals of the real line. It is shown that if the pay‐off functions are continuous on the whole space and if for each pay‐off function the smallest local maximum in the strategy variable is a global maximum, then the game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
5.
《Journal of Economic Theory》1987,42(1):13-29
In Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (“Coalition-Proof Equilibria. I. Concepts,” J. Econ. Theory 42 (1987), 1–12), we proposed the notion of Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium and Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium as solution concepts for strategic environments in which players can freely discuss their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. This paper undertakes applications to several economic problems, including the behavior of Cournot oligopolists, oligopolistic entry deterrence, cooperation in finite horizon games, and social choice rule implementation. 相似文献
6.
《Journal of Economic Theory》1987,42(1):1-12
In an important class of “noncooperative” environments, it is natural to assume that players can freely discuss their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. In such cases, any meaningful agreement between the players must be self-enforcing. Although the Nash best-response property is a necessary condition for self-enforceability, it is not sufficient—it is in general possible for coalitions arrange plausible, mutually beneficial deviations from Nash agreements. We provide a stronger definition of self-enforceability, and label the class of efficient self-enforcing agreements “coalition-proof.” 相似文献
7.
WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ RICHARD CORNES WOLFGANG PETERS 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2006,8(3):401-408
In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In this paper, first a simple formula is derived that provides a measure for the size of the set of income distributions leading to an interior Cournot–Nash equilibrium in which all individuals contribute to the public good. Furthermore, we give an estimate for the frequency that all members of a certain subgroup of the population are contributors. 相似文献
8.
We consider the class of all abstract economies with convex and compact strategy sets, continuous and quasi-concave payoff functions, and continuous and convex-valued feasibility correspondences. We prove that the Nash correspondence is the unique solution on the foregoing class of abstract economies that satisfies nonemptiness, rationality in one-person economies, and consistency.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D50. 相似文献
9.
Associated with each component of the Nash equilibria of a game are its index and degree. Its index is the local degree of the displacement map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of the game. Its degree is the local degree of the projection map from the Nash graph to the space of games. We show that the index and the degree of each component are the same. Further, they are invariant to adding or deleting redundant strategies, so they depend only on the reduced normal form of the game. Applications include Kohlberg and Mertens' existence theorems for stable sets and a simple procedure for calculating the degree of a component.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. 相似文献
10.
Tristan Tomala 《Games and Economic Behavior》1999,28(2):208
We study a model of repeated games with imperfect monitoring where the payoff vector is observable. In this situation, any profitable deviation is detectable by all the players but the identity of the deviator may be unknown. We design collective punishments directed against the set of potential deviators. A particular class of signals is studied for which a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73. 相似文献
11.
Michael R. Caputo 《Games and Economic Behavior》1996,13(2):201-224
The Envelope Theorem for Nash equilibria shows that the strategic reaction of the other players in the game is important for determining how parameter perturbations affect a given player's indirect objective function. The fundamental comparative statics matrix of Nash equilibria for theithplayer in anN-player static game includes the equilibrium response of the otherN−1players in the game to the parameter perturbation and is symmetric positive semidefinite subject to constraint. This result is fundamental in that it holds for all sufficiently smooth Nash equilibria and is independent of any curvature or stability assumptions imposed on the game.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C61. 相似文献
12.
Douglas Gale 《Economic Theory》1996,7(2):207-235
Summary This paper examines the efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium in an economy with adverse selection. The agents (firms and households) in this economy exchange contracts, which specify all the relevant aspects of their interaction. Markets are assumed to be complete, in the sense that all possible contracts can, in principle, be traded. Since prices are specified as part of the contract, they cannot be used as free parameters to equate supply and demand in the market for the contract. Instead, equilibrium is achieved by adjusting the probability of trade. If the contract space is sufficiently rich, it can be shown that rationing will not be observed in equilibrium. A further refinement of equilibrium is proposed, restricting agents' beliefs about contracts that are not traded in equilibrium. Incentive-efficient and constrained incentive-efficient allocations are defined to be solutions to appropriately specified mechanism design problems. Constrained incentive efficiency is an artificial construction, obtained by adding the constraint that all contracts yield the same rate of return to firms. Using this notion, analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics can be proved: all refined equilibria are constrained incentive-efficient and all constrained incentive-efficient allocations satisfying some additional conditions can be decentralized as refined equilibria. A constrained incentive-efficient equilibrium is typically not incentive-efficient, however. The source of the inefficiency is the equilibrium condition that forces all firms to earn the same rate of return on each contract.Notation
={
1,...,
k
}
set of outcomes
-
:
+
generic contract or lottery
-
A = ()
;
- Ao
A{, where denotes the null contract or no trade
- S={1,...,¦S¦}
set of seller types
-
L(s)
number of type-s sellers
-
M
number of buyers
-
u: × S
seller's utility function, which can be extended toA× S by puttingu(, s)
;
-
v. × S
buyer's utility function, which can be extended toA × S by puttingv(, s)
;
-
f:A
0 ×S
+
allocation of sellers
-
g:A
0 ×S
+
allocation of buyers
-
A
+
sellers' trading function
-
:A ×S +
buyers' trading function
This paper has had a long gestation period, during which I have been influenced by helpful conversations with many persons, by their work, or both. Among those who deserve special mention are Martin Hellwig, Roger Myerson, Edward Prescott, Robert Townsend and Yves Younés. Earlier versions were presented to the NBER/CEME Conference on Decentralization at the University of Toronto and the NBER Conference on General Equilibrium at Brown University. I would like to thank John Geanakoplos, Walter Heller, Andreu Mas Colell, Michael Peters, Michel Poitevin, Lloyd Shapley, John Wooders, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and especially Robert Rosenthal for his careful reading of two drafts. The financial support of the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 912202 is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
13.
We consider two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. The characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs obtained by Hart allows for complex strategies, which are actually required by some equilibrium payoffs in some games. We show that appropriate one-shot public communication mechanisms make Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable by means of simple strategies. Furthermore, these mechanisms satisfy a notion of self-fulfillment.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, C72. 相似文献
14.
《Economics Letters》1986,20(3):203-205
Although the use of Nash equilibria in economic models has been increasing, little attention has been paid to the uniqueness of these equilibria. This paper presents relatively weak conditions that are sufficient for the existence of a globally unique Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
15.
A formula is derived for the probability that a "randomly selected" n-person matrix game has exactly k pure strategy equilibria. It is shown that for all n ≥ 2, this probability converges to e−1/k! as the sizes of the strategy sets of at least two players increase without bound. Thus the number of pure strategy equilibria in large random n-person matrix games is approximately Poisson distributed with mean one. The latter is a known result obtained by a new proof in this note. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. 相似文献
16.
I consider generalisations of the Nash equilibrium concept based on the idea that in equilibrium the players' beliefs should not be contradicted, even if they could possibly be incorrect. This possibility depends on the information about opponents' behaviour available to the players in equilibrium. Therefore the players' information is crucial for this notion of equilibrium, called Conjectural Equilibrium in general and Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium (Rubinstein-Wolinsky 1994) when the game and the players' Bayesian rationality are common knowledge. In this paper I argue for a refinement of Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium showing by propositions and by examples how this equilibrium notion works and how the suitable equilibrium concept depends on the players' information.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83, D82. 相似文献
17.
Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998, Journal of Economic Theory 83 , pp. 1–18) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utility-wise) to their Cournot–Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility-wise, by all consumers over their Cournot–Nash consumption bundles. 相似文献
18.
Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size. Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus - as in the Nash demand game - or remain silent and wait until the surplus was observed. Adding the strategy to wait results in two strict equilibria, in each of which one player takes almost the whole surplus, provided uncertainty is small. If commitments concern only who makes the first offer, the more balanced Nash bargaining solution is approximately restored. In all cases, commitment occurs in equilibrium - despite the risk of breakdown of negotiations. 相似文献
19.
20.
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. We use an extension of the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium to sets of strategy combinations called ‘strict equilibrium set’ and show the following. For a large class of evolutionary dynamics, including all monotone regular selection dynamics, every asymptotically stable set of rest points that contains a pure strategy combination in each of its connected components is a strict equilibrium set. A converse statement holds for two-person games, for convex sets and for the standard replicator dynamic. 相似文献