How is China's coke price related with the world oil price? The role of extreme movements

This paper focuses on the relationship between the world oil price and China's coke price, particularly with respect to extreme movements in the world oil price. Based on a daily sample from 2009 to 2015 and the ARJI-GARCH models and copulas, our empirical results show that China's coke price and the world oil price are characterized by GARCH volatility and jump behaviors. Specifically, negative oil price shocks lead to falls in China's coke returns on the following day while positive oil prices have no significant effects. In addition, current coke returns positively respond to the very recent oil price jump intensity, and a time-varying and volatile lower tail dependence is found between the world oil price and China's coke price. Our results are expected to have implications for coke producers and users and policy makers.     

Scholastic just price versus current market price: is it merely a matter of labelling?

Abstract

From an analytical point of view, some aspects of Just Price theory, probably the most famous and lasting scholastic concept, remain controversial: the cost-of-production versus the subjective-utility theory of value is a main controversy as well as the question of whether the natural just price is conceptually the same as the current market price. Strictly speaking, just price isconceptually the same as the current market price. Of concern is whether the meaning behind the label is the same in both scholastic and liberal traditions. There are different interpretations among scholars. One is that the just price is merely the current market price, and common estimation plays the same role as market forces in a competitive context. Another group states that the just price is quite different from the market price; the fundamental reason is that the ethical framework of the scholastic paradigm sets a corpus of principles that greatly differs from the neoclassical homo economicus. Is it possible to speak of a collaborative market price (scholastic tradition) and competitive market price (liberal tradition)? This article tries to dig into such debate and reflects on the morality of the market price.     

Disinflationary boom in a price–wage spiral model

This paper analyses the impact of the disinflation policy timing on the sign and the magnitude of the sacrifice ratio in a modified price and wage staggered model of Blanchard (1986). When wages are updated every four quarters and prices every two quarters, we show that a “cold-turkey” disinflation is associated to an output boom when the policy is implemented during the last period of life of the wage contract and a recession in the other quarters.     

The “inflow-effect”—Trader inflow and price efficiency

We investigate the impact of cash and trader inflow on price efficiency in multi-period experimental asset markets. Implementing eight treatments with 672 subjects, we find that (i) the joint inflow of cash and traders triggers strong overvaluation and massive price run-ups (inflow-effect). Remarkably, the effect occurs in almost all of the 30 markets with joint cash and trader inflow and is very robust. The effect even prevails in markets with complete and symmetric fundamental information. We further show that (ii) in treatments with the joint inflow of cash and traders, prices crash to fundamentals towards maturity of the asset. The analysis of traders׳ beliefs reveals that (iii) despite fundamental values staying constant, beliefs about fundamentals co-move with upwardly trending prices. Finally, we report a speculative motive only among the optimists in treatments where we observe the inflow-effect.     

HRD in a multipolar world： An introductory study

In the last two decades, the economic and political world was radically transformed. At the start, in the 1980s, the USA and the USSR ruled, in a bipolar context. But, after the fall of the Communist regimes, in the 1990s, a different form of world power sharing emerged, in which the USA, the European Union and Japan were the major players. That change was evident from the documents that were made by those political powers （i.e. the Lisbon agenda on human resource development （HRD））, which in itself contained a forecast of the world situation in 2010. However, life is by nature unpredictable, and the unforeseeable changes happen all the time. And, in the last decade, several main players emerged in the world scene, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China, the Arab World and Africa. In consequence, at the present moment, the world economy exists around at least 9 main players, 3 old and foreseen and 6 new and not foreseen. It is the author＇s opinion that this societal transformation should be addressed by the HRD community, because HRD scholars must study the more national relevant cases in a world that is changing very fast. Accordingly, in this paper, the author tries to make a rather introductory study in which he/she tries to define the basic economic variables for the HRD markets, namely demand, supply, need, equilibrium, investment, stock, flow, and return, for the USA, Japan, Brazil, Russia, India and China. The author uses the last available data, even if we tried to put the analysis in a historical perspective. The author concludes that several very different forms of situations exist in the HRD markets of those very important political entities.     

Putting a price tag on others’ perceptions of us

Standard economic theories assume that people are self-interested and their wellbeing solely dependent on their own material gains or losses. Unless they have an impact on monetary payoffs, the perceptions of anonymous individuals are irrelevant to people’s decision making. However, a large body of research in sociology and social psychology demonstrates that self-identity is developed through one’s understanding of how one is perceived by others. Using (Cooley’s, Human nature and the social order, 1964) concept of the “looking-glass self” as a framework, we evaluate experimentally whether or not people care about the imputed judgment of anonymous others arising from their imagination of their perceptions. We implemented variants of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism to elicit the monetary value attached to the perceptions by participants. In one variant, only nonnegative bids were allowed, while in another, negative bids were allowed. We show that in an environment in which the perceptions of others are only conveyed to participants anonymously and privately, self-interested individuals exhibited strong negative perception avoidance even though the perceptions have no impact on their monetary payoff. The participants were willing to spend a significant amount in order to avoid confirming the supposedly negative perception. Thus, for them, ignorance was truly bliss. We also show that, in the absence of the audience effect, the fair-minded participants adopted a neutral attitude towards the perception of them as fair.     

Is Marx's absolute rent due to a monopoly price?

ABSTRACT

Absolute rent, in Marx's view, has an upper limit represented by the difference between the value and the price of production of agricultural commodities. The relevance of this limit was questioned by Bortkiewicz because of the difficulties concerning the argument which Marx based it on. The lack of this upper limit prompted some scholars to claim that there is no difference between absolute rent and a rent paid by a monopoly price. Referring to the classical/Marxian theory of monopoly price, we shall argue that it is still possible to distinguish absolute rent from a rent due to a monopoly price.     

Full price competition and Dupuit's defense of the long-and-short-haul “discrimination”

Condemnation of the long-and-short-haul discrimination has been nearly ubiquitous in the literature on economic theory and transportation. However, the French economist Dupuit developed a case against all transport regulation by relating it to a defense of the practice of place discrimination before the middle of the nineteenth century. He did so, moreover, within an early elaboration of a full price explanation of competitive functioning. This paper analyzes the idea in Dupuit's context and argues that this so-called form of price discrimination is actually an efficient and necessary form of the competitive process.     

Does a cap on the carbon price have to be a cap on green investments?

Policy makers and economists are discussing a regulatory ceiling for carbon prices, acting as a “safety valve” for the protection of regulated businesses from unexpected price surges. While the pros and cons of such a regulatory feature are widely discussed in the literature, the optimal design of such a cap and the attendant economic and environmental consequences have yet to be subjected to quantitative analyses. We employ a Monte Carlo simulation/dynamic programming approach to investigate the impact of different carbon price cap designs on an individual firm in the energy generation industry. Specifically, we model the firm’s choice between a pulverized coal combustion plant and a combined cycle gas turbine plant, a large hydropower plant, a solid biomass plant and an on-shore wind farm. Our results show that the effects of a maximum carbon price set by the regulator is largely independent of its exact characteristics, albeit not of its level. A higher cap favors low-carbon technologies in general. However, due to differences in their cost structures, a price cap has different impacts on the relative attractiveness of the specific alternative technologies investigated.     

On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game

We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel–fringe game à la Salant, 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop Nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop cartel–fringe game. Thus, the outcome of the cartel–fringe open-loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. However the interpretation of the cartel–fringe model, where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker, as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing Nash–Cournot, does not extend to the case where firms can use closed-loop strategies.     

Talent introduction and housing price: a tale of Xi’an

A comprehensive competition policy for talent introduction was first implemented in Xi’an in February 2017 and has been imitated by many cities in China ever since. Although turned out to be useful in alleviating the problem of talents loss in the lower-tier cities, the policy has been criticized for its potential effect of driving up housing prices. Using the synthetic control method proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), we explore the influence of the competition policy for talent introduction on housing prices in Xi’an. Based on the monthly data of Xi’an and 62 control cities across 30 provinces in China from January 2015 to April 2018, we find strong evidence for the positive effect of the competition policy on housing prices. Specifically, the policy increased housing prices in Xi’an by approximately 43% until April 2018.     

Asymmetric farm–retail price transmission and market power: a new test

A finite mixture model is used to estimate farm–retail price transmission in the US fresh strawberry market. Results suggest two distinct pricing regimes associated with off- and peak-harvesting seasons. The market power parameter is significant in the peak-harvest regime, but not in the off-peak regime. Moreover, price changes are transmitted completely throughout the marketing channel in the off-peak regime when the market power parameter is zero, but not in the peak-harvest regime when the market power parameter is positive. This suggests that produce buyers are more apt to exercise market power when farm supplies are abundant than when they are scarce, and that the exercise of such power causes the farm–retail price linkage to become asymmetric.     

Over the moon or sick as a parrot? The effects of football results on a club's share price

This article considers the impact of match results on the stock returns of English football clubs. We propose that the magnitude of the response to a given result depends on the importance of the game, which is measured in two ways. First, we consider the extent to which the clubs are close rivals vying for similar league positions, as winning such games is particularly significant. Second, we argue that each individual game becomes more important for those clubs likely to be promoted or relegated as the season draws to a close, since a given match will have increasing information content concerning the final league position of the club. Using a fairly large panel comprising data for 19 clubs, we find some support for the notion that stock prices are affected more by the results of important matches than matches of lesser importance. We also observe that the difference between the number of points the club secures from a given match, and the number it was expected to secure, affects its stock price, as does the number of goals that the club under question scores in the match, relative to its competitor.     

A “penalty” discount rate,bank behavior,and price and output stability

The purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the implications of the adoption of a penalty rate discount window policy for bank behavior and for price and output stability. A basic model of the banking firm is used to show that adoption of a penalty rate policy alters the sensitivity of bank portfolio demands to changes in the open market rate, to which the penalty discount rate is deterministically related. In the context of a macroeconomic model that takes into account this interaction of discount window policy and bank behavior, it is demonstrated that adoption of a penalty rate policy generally would have ambiguous implications for the variability of real output and the price level.     

Understanding the Solar Home price premium: Electricity generation and “Green” social status

This study uses a large sample of homes in the San Diego area and Sacramento, California area to provide some of the first capitalization estimates of the sales value of homes with solar panels relative to comparable homes without solar panels. Although the residential solar home market continues to grow, there is little direct evidence on the market capitalization effect. Using both hedonics and a repeat sales index approach we find that solar panels are capitalized at roughly a 3.5% premium. This premium is larger in communities with a greater share of college graduates and of registered Prius hybrid vehicles.     

Is health care really a luxury in OECD countries? Evidence from alternative price deflators

This article examines whether real Health-care Expenditure (HE) is a luxury or necessity for Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 1972 to 2004 within a panel unit root and panel cointegration framework. To realize this objective, we regress HE on real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the proportion of the population aged over 65 (P65) and a time trend (T). We first present results for 18 countries where real HE per capita is obtained using a general GDP deflator. For these countries, we find that health care is a luxury for just one country. Next, we present results for eight countries where real HE is obtained using a specific health-care price index. When the general GDP deflator is replaced with a specific health-care price index, at least one of the GDP, P65 or T coefficients for the eight countries changes in a reasonably dramatic fashion, suggesting that the use of the GDP deflator introduces bias into the regression. We find that HE is a necessity in all eight countries. Given that the reliability of the GDP deflator results is questionable, on the basis of the results for the eight countries, we conclude that HE is a necessity.     

Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a “cover version” of the Heidhues–K?szegi–Rabin model

This paper reformulates and simplifies a recent model by Heidhues and K?szegi (The impact of consumer loss aversion on pricing, Mimeo, 2005), which in turn is based on a behavioral model due to K?szegi and Rabin (Q J Econ 121:1133?C1166, 2006). The model analyzes optimal pricing when consumers are loss averse in the sense that an unexpected price hike lowers their willingness to pay. The main message of the Heidhues?CK?szegi model, namely that this form of consumer loss aversion leads to rigid price responses to cost fluctuations, carries over. I demonstrate the usefulness of this ??cover version?? of the Heidhues?CK?szegi-Rabin model by obtaining new results: (1) loss aversion lowers expected prices; (2) the firm??s incentive to adopt a rigid pricing strategy is stronger when fluctuations are in demand rather than in costs.     

Toward a “constitution” for behavioral policy-making

Behavioral policy interventions aimed at redirecting individuals’ behavior toward optimal choices are characterized by an important issue which is often overlooked: the lack of an instrument to define what “optimal” means. If agents are subject to behavioral biases leading them to make “wrong” choices, the policy-maker can no longer rely on the revealed preferences approach (e.g., what people choose is what people prefer) for defining a welfare criterion. In this article, we reiterate the argument put forward by some scholars that choosing a suitable welfare criterion once the link between observed choices and individuals’ preferences is broken becomes a problematic task. We review the state of the art in the literature and the possible approaches proposed to overcome the problem, concluding that a solution has not yet been reached. Moreover, we argue that the lack of an established welfare criterion characterizing behavioral policy-making could pave the way to government wanting to restrict individual freedom. In the absence of any legislative constraint for the executive, stating that what individuals choose is not what they prefer in principle justifies any freedom-reducing government intervention, since choices can be arbitrarily labeled “sub-optimal” or “welfare-reducing.” To avoid this risk without turning down the potential of behavioral policy-making, we propose that an independent committee establishes ex ante procedural rules and domains where behavioral policy-making can be implemented. The article suggests some possible examples of normative provisions characterizing this constitution-type document, such as the selective identification of the only sectors where behavioral policies could be effectively applied, the periodic evaluation of policy effects, and the use of sunset clauses.     

The gender gap in university enrolment: Do parents play a role beyond investing in skills?

Young men are far less likely than women to attend university across most OECD countries. I use data from the Youth in Transition Survey (YITS) to investigate this issue in the Canadian context, focusing on how parents might influence this gender gap. In particular, my goal is to isolate the incremental effect of parents’ valuations of education during the teenage years, holding constant the stock of skills acquired up to that point. To estimate this effect, I use a factor model based on a framework developed by Foley et al. (2014). My results confirm the importance of skills in determining the gender gap in university attendance. I also find that differences in the distribution of parental valuations of education account for 22% of the gender gap in the YITS data, pointing toward an important role that parents play, not accounted for in prior work.