Public Attention and Auditor Behavior: The Case of Hurun Rich List in China

Adverse client publicity can entail regulatory scrutiny over audited financial statements and impose political costs on auditors. We use the changes in client publicity caused by their controlling owners’ presence on the Hurun Rich List (the rich listing) in China to test the hypothesis that auditor conservatism increases with client publicity. Our evidence indicates auditors issue more adverse audit opinions to clients and charge higher fees following the rich listing events. Moreover, we observe that auditors strategically respond to clients with different attributes—for clients whose owners accumulated wealth in a more questionable manner, auditors choose more stringent audit reporting to better defend themselves from regulatory scrutiny; for clients without such attributes, auditors primarily rely on increasing audit fees to cope with any post-listing increase in audit risks. Our analyses also suggest the impacts of rich listings tend to be concentrated among large audit firms with stronger reputation concerns or among engagement auditors with more conservative reporting styles. By showing how auditors manage political risks associated with heightened public scrutiny, we contribute to both the auditing and political cost literature.     

Effects of Increasing Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality and Audit Quality

A widely held assumption in policy making and empirical research is that increasing the strength of public enforcement improves financial reporting quality and audit quality. This paper provides a more nuanced view. In a model with a manager who can manage earnings, a strategic auditor, and an enforcement institution, we show that enforcement and auditing are complements in a weak enforcement regime but can be substitutes in a strong regime. Although stronger enforcement always mitigates earnings management, the effects of different instruments of strengthening enforcement are ambiguous. We show that they can improve or impair financial reporting quality and audit quality, depending on production risk, accounting system characteristics, and the scope of auditing relative to enforcement.     

内部控制审计风险模型研究

由于对内部控制的审计是对过程进行审计,它在概念上与对结果(财务报表)的审计有显著不同,因此审计师需要一个不同的风险模型以对内部控制的审计提供概念上的指导。本文提出的内部控制审计风险模型着重于严重弱点风险,而不是重大错报风险,从而帮助审计师在内部控制审计和整合审计中决定内部控制审计程序的性质、时间和范围。     

Audit committee diligence around initial audit engagement

Studies focusing on governance mechanisms argue that auditor monitoring is one of several governance mechanisms that exist in the firm, and these mechanisms supplement each other. Extending this argument, I examine whether firms support auditor monitoring with audit committee monitoring when auditor oversight is deemed to be weak. Prior auditing literature argues that audit quality is affected by auditors' lack of familiarity with their clients' activities. Since lack of auditor–client familiarity exists in the first year of auditor–client tenure, I examine whether firms increase their audit committee monitoring during the year of auditor change. For a sample of firms that changed auditors between 2006 and 2012, the findings show that audit committees meet more frequently in the first year of audit engagement. Further tests show that firms' past reporting behavior play a significant role in the demand for more audit committee meetings and the increase in the audit committee meetings in the initial year of auditor engagement positively affects reporting quality.     

GAME THEORY AND THE AUDITOR'S PENALTY REGIME

This paper models the audit as a cooperative game played by the auditor and auditee within a penalty regime imposed by a regulatory authority. The paper investigates the relationship between the penalties set by the regulator and the jointly agreed strategy of the auditor and auditee, and discusses how the penalty regime might be employed so as to induce a particular strategic outcome such as high effort levels on the part of the auditee and/or auditor.     

Client Characteristics and the Negotiation Tactics of Auditors: Implications for Financial Reporting

Although the financial statements of an organization are considered a product of management, prior research suggests that a company's financial statements may be affected by the negotiation strategy employed by the auditor when resolving audit differences with management. However, little subsequent research discusses the potential strategies that auditors may employ during the negotiation process. Our study extends the literature by investigating, in a post–Sarbanes‐Oxley environment, whether auditors will employ a reciprocity‐based strategy for the resolution of audit differences and what client characteristics (client management's negotiating style and client retention risk) increase the extent to which it is utilized. Further, we explore the potential effect of a reciprocity‐based strategy on the quality of the financial statements. Such a strategy involves bringing inconsequential items to management and subsequently waiving these items in an effort to encourage management to be more cooperative in the posting of significant income‐decreasing adjustments. The results of experiment 1 indicate that client management's negotiating style and retention risk have an interactive effect on auditors' use of a reciprocity‐based strategy. Specifically, auditors are more likely to utilize a reciprocity‐based strategy when management's negotiating style is competitive and client retention risk is high. Experiment 2 findings suggest that the auditor's use of reciprocity during negotiation can actually result in more conservative financial statements by helping the auditor manage perceived client pressures to waive or reduce proposed adjustments.     

论民国时期政府审计思想的特点及其启示

民国时期产生了具有近代意义的政府审计思想,本文的目的是归纳它的特点及其启示。通过梳理、分析和归纳相关历史文献,发现民国时期政府审计思想有五大特点:从简单模仿日本审计制度到结合中国国情;注意事前审计;在机构设置、监察权行使方式和报告关系上实行监审合一;政府审计组织独立于行政组织,实行审计人员限制兼职和回避制度,确保人员独立;规定审计会议制度,推进民主审计。这一时期审计思想对当代的启示有:目前政府审计组织的"行政型"模式符合中国国情;由全国人大审计委员会对财政预算进行事前审计,对于预算支出,非经审计核签国库不得支付;合并监察部与审计署为监审部,提高它的地位至副总理级;在审计法规中明确审计会议制度,规定重大审计事项和重要人员调度须经审计会议决定。     

The influence of auditor narcissism and moral disengagement on risk assessments of a narcissistic client CFO

Global capital markets rely heavily on independent and skeptical auditors as gatekeepers to provide assurance that corporate financial reports are free of material fraud. The rise of narcissism among the ranks of both client and audit professionals challenge this gatekeeper function. In addition, auditor moral disengagement may undermine auditor skepticism, further eroding public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process. We conduct a quasi-experiment with 118 auditors from three international audit firms. In a simulated interview with a client CFO, we examine whether auditors underestimate risks of fraudulent financial statements due to the interactive effects of (1) client narcissism (manipulated verbally and nonverbally) and (2) auditor narcissism. We also examine the influence of auditor moral disengagement on client risk assessments. Results indicate that CFO verbal and nonverbal narcissism significantly influenced auditors’ assessment of management-related client risk. Moreover, auditor narcissism was found to interactively influence client risk inferences such that auditors higher in narcissism exhibited narcissistic tolerance (lower risk assessments) when the hypothetical CFO displayed high verbal narcissism. Auditor moral disengagement was negatively associated with client risk assessments. We discuss the implication of these findings on future audit judgment research, audit firm policy and training on maintaining auditor skepticism, and the audit oversight role of standard-setters.     

Determinants of auditor changes for non-accelerated filers

Significant accounting scandals and the imminent collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2001 precipitated a period of heightened regulatory response, most notably the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. In the years that followed, the Securities and Exchange Commission created a separate class of non-accelerated filers (companies with public float of up to $75 million) and provided these companies with significant regulatory relief from certain financial reporting disclosure and auditing requirements, including the extension of scaled disclosure to these companies in 2007. Over the period of 2001 through 2007, as non-accelerated clients anticipated and responded to their different and evolving regulatory regime, audit firms were adjusting to the increased concentration in their market, a new monitoring structure, and significant changes to the scope of their work. We examine whether auditor–client misalignment is a significant determinant of auditor change during this period, particularly for non-accelerated filers, as large auditors sought to rebalance their client portfolios. We find evidence that auditor–client misalignment increases the likelihood of auditor change (resignation and dismissal) for non-accelerated, but not accelerated, filers. We also find that auditor–client misalignment increases the likelihood of downward changes to third-tier auditors for non-accelerated, but not accelerated, filers.     

Audit report lags in the Belgian non-profit sector: an empirical analysis

In the current study, we examine audit report lags (ARLs) among a large sample of Belgian non-profit organisations (NPOs). Doing so, we (i) add to the very recent, but rapidly growing literature on financial reporting and auditing in the non-profit sector; and (ii) test the generalisability of findings regarding the ARL from the for-profit sector to the non-profit sector. We note that ARLs for Belgian NPOs are substantially larger than those reported in prior studies based on for-profit firms, which can be explained by differences in reporting incentives (e.g. the absence of capital markets pressures). In addition to determinants of the ARL that have been identified in prior studies based on for-profit firms (e.g. auditor business risk), we find that also the way of funding the organisation (i.e. the degree of reliance upon donations and/or grants) and its specific area of activity are significantly related to the ARL. The requirement of an external financial statement audit (together with new accounting and financial reporting requirements) for Belgian NPOs was only recently introduced (i.e. from 2006 onwards). We do not observe a decrease in ARLs in the two years after the introduction of the new legal obligations.     

制度变迁、集团客户重要性与非标准审计意见

客户重要性是否影响审计师独立性,是审计理论界和实务界都非常关注的话题。本文以企业集团作为一个整体来研究集团客户重要性对审计师独立性的影响,发现集团客户经济依赖性会损害审计师的独立性,这种现象对于小规模事务所而言尤为严重。此外,本文还进一步考察了2007年新会计准则、审计准则及事务所民事诉讼风险加强等制度环境变化对审计师行为的影响。研究发现,在制度环境改善之后,审计师执业总体上变得更加谨慎,大规模事务所尤其如此。     

The Unintended Consequences of the Frequency of PCAOB Inspection

After more than 50 years of self‐regulation of the US auditing profession, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a quasi‐governmental entity with statutory authority to inspect accounting firms that audit public clients. The frequency of this inspection is annual or triennial, based upon the number of public clients the firm audits. We examine the effects of these two levels of inspection frequency on financial reporting quality and audit fees for clients of small and midsize public accounting firms. Our findings provide evidence of significantly higher audit quality and audit fees for clients of annually inspected firms relative to clients of triennially inspected firms. These findings are robust to auditor‐client alignment analyses, propensity score matching, time‐series analyses, examination of firms that have changed from triennial to annual inspection, and particular examination of firms with inspection deficiencies. Overall, our study suggests that the two‐tier frequency system of PCAOB inspection may have also resulted in two‐tier audit quality and audit fee systems for small and midsize public accounting firms, with more frequent inspection leading to more rigorous and informed auditor decisions. We discuss the implications of our results for the Board and the profession at large.     

Evidence of Fraud,Audit Risk and Audit Liability Regimes

We investigate the effectiveness of proportionate liability in reducing the probability of fraud and audit risk relative to joint and several liability in two strategic audit settings: one that provides conclusive evidence of fraud and one that provides inconclusive evidence of fraud. In both settings the auditor makes an audit effort choice, but in the second setting the auditor also evaluates the audit evidence. Our results show that when the auditor chooses only effort, a proportionate liability rule with large marginal liability relief decreases audit risk. However, when the auditor also evaluates the audit evidence this result no longer holds.     

会计师事务所的行业专门化是一种有效的竞争战略吗?——来自中国审计市场的经验证据

会计师事务所的行业专门化可以被视为一种相对于非行业专家审计师的可持续的竞争优势。本文的经验结果表明:行业专门化的审计师会以目标集聚为基本战略,基于其差异化的能力在大客户市场上实施差异化的具体战略,而基于其规模经济优势在小客户市场上实施成本领先的具体战略;相对于非行业专家,行业专门化的事务所在大小客户市场上均能获得超额利润。这一经验结果支持行业专门化的发展道路可以成为会计师事务所行之有效的一种竞争战略。     

An experimental study of users’ responses to qualified audit reports in China

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on users’ responses to the qualification of audit reports in China. By employing the type of audit report (e.g., unqualified vs. qualified auditor opinion) as a manipulated variable in the experiment, we found mixed responses from the participants towards the perceived impact of a qualified audit report on users’ understanding and use of the financial statements. In general, Chinese users, credit and loan officers in particular, perceived a qualified auditor opinion as having a somewhat negative impact on the credibility of financial statements. However, no significant difference was found in users’ investment or credit decisions with respect to their exposure to the financial statements accompanied by an unqualified or a qualified auditor opinion. The study findings suggest that the U.S.-style qualified audit reports have fairly limited “information content” to users in the present Chinese auditing environment and that there is a need to further improve Chinese auditing standards and practices. In addition, the study provides some insights into recent auditing developments in China.     

Audit and non-audit fees and capital market perceptions of auditor independence

This study provides evidence on whether auditor independence-in-appearance, proxied by earnings response coefficients, is related to the non-audit fee ratio (non-audit to total fees from a client) or client importance (total fees from a client as a percentage of the total revenues of the audit firm). The results from large samples over the period 2001–2006 show, contrary to popular belief and the findings of some prior studies, that there is no evidence of a relation between perceived auditor independence and the non-audit fee ratio. However, perceived auditor independence is negatively associated with client importance, consistent with the economic theory of auditing. Our paper adds to the literature by examining the relative importance of non-audit fee ratios and client importance as determinants of independence-in-appearance.     

Auditor–Provided Consultancy Services and their Associations with Audit Fees and Audit Opinions

This study examines the relationships between non–audit services fees (consultancy fees) paid to auditors and (1) audit fees, and (2) the occurrence of qualified audit opinions. The positive association between consultancy fees and audit fees is shown to be due to certain company specific events that generate a demand for consultancy services as well as requiring additional audit effort. Identified company specific events are mergers and acquisitions, new share issues, new accounting and information systems, new CEOs, and corporate restructurings. When these events are absent, there is no statistically significant relationship between audit fees and consultancy fees after controlling for company size. Companies that have relatively high consultancy fees are more likely to receive a clean audit opinion. This may be due to the non–audit work clearing up problem areas at the client company or it may be due to high consultancy fees impairing auditor independence. With the available data it is not possible to distinguish between these two reasons.     

The effect of benchmarked performance measures and strategic analysis on auditors’ risk assessments and mental models

As the audit environment becomes more demanding and complex, so does the set of analytical tools available to an auditor. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of two complex audit technologies commonly used by auditors, benchmarking of performance measures and strategic analysis, on the risk judgments of auditors carrying out the initial planning of an audit. We conduct an experiment that utilizes a Balanced Scorecard for organizing and evaluating analytical evidence about the performance of business units within a large client. Our first principal finding is that external benchmarking can cause an auditor to focus on performance measures that are unique to a business unit and disregard performance measures that are common to multiple business units but not benchmarked. However, our second finding is that an in-depth strategic analysis completed prior to assessing a client’s business risk or risk of material misstatement allows an auditor to incorporate more information from performance measures in risk assessments regardless of whether the performance measures are benchmarked. Strategic analysis facilitates a more balanced and accurate assessment of the risks across the business units being evaluated. We also provide evidence that the latter result occurs because in-depth strategic analysis allows auditors to develop a more complete mental model of a client, which has been a long time belief of advocates of business risk audit methodologies and consistent with current and emerging auditing standards on risk assessment.     

Auditor Fees, Market Microstructure, and Firm Transparency

Abstract:  Auditors, as corporate insiders, have access to private information regarding the firm's financial and business opacity that is unavailable to outside investors. We test whether auditors price their knowledge of firm opacity in their audit fees by examining two competing hypotheses. The first states that higher audit fees may reflect the greater risk that the auditor faces in auditing an opaque firm. Under this hypothesis, market based measures of opacity will be positively correlated with higher fees. The second hypothesis states that firms buy reputational capital from their auditor by paying high fees in an attempt to improve the market's perception of the firm's transparency. In this case, higher audit fees are negatively correlated with market based measures of opacity. Our results are consistent with the first hypothesis, that auditors price opacity risk into their fees.     

Analysts' Cash Flow Forecasts,Audit Effort,and Audit Opinions on Internal Control

We examine the economic impact of analysts’ cash flow forecasts by looking at how external auditors respond to financial analysts’ issuance of cash flow forecasts. Using a differences‐in‐differences approach, we find that financial analysts’ initiation of cash flow forecasts leads to reduced auditor fees and audit report lags. Moreover, after cash flow forecast initiation, firms report fewer Section 404(b) internal control weakness disclosures. These findings suggest that cash flow forecasts constrain earnings manipulation and improve management accounting behavior, thereby reducing inherent and control risk and strengthening firms’ internal control over financial reporting.