Employee share ownership and job attitudes: The effects of share sale

Although the association between employee share ownership and job attitudes has been documented in the literature, little attention has been paid to the association with share sale. This study uses discriminant analysis, based on selected job attitudes, to generate a function to distinguish between employees who were or were not shareholders in a large financial institution. The discriminant function was then used to classify those employees who had been shareholders but who had subsequently sold their shares. The evidence indicated that those who had sold their shares had similar job attitudes to existing shareholders and dramatically different job attitudes from those who had never purchased shares. Conjectural insights are offered into the original effect of share purchase on job attitudes.     

The Perception and Effects of Share Ownership: Empirical Evidence from Employee Buy-Outs

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Apology British Journal of Industrial Relations 43:4, 751
This paper explores the impact of employee ownership on employee attitudes, using attitudinal data obtained from four UK bus companies which had adopted the ESOP form of employee share ownership. After reviewing the recent UK literature, the paper highlights the findings from US literature that a 'sense of ownership' is an important intervening variable between actual ownership and attitudinal change, and that opportunities for participating in decision-making are more important than ownership per se in generating feelings of ownership. The paper incorporates these possibilities in using a two-stage ordered probit model to explore the relationships between ownership and attitudinal outcomes. The findings support intrinsic and instrumental models of ownership, and indicate that feelings of ownership are significantly associated with higher levels of commitment and satisfaction.     

Do Employee‐Owned Firms Produce More Positive Employee Behavioural Outcomes? If Not Why Not? A British‐Spanish Comparative Analysis

Whether ‘employee ownership’ takes the form of worker cooperatives, co‐ownership or simply employee share ownership plans, there are normally high expectations that a range of positive outcomes will result. Yet many empirically based studies tend to find a much more complex picture. An influential segment of that empirical literature has posited the need for a number of mutually reinforcing workforce management components to be in place alongside co‐ownership. Drawing on detailed case research in two large and successful co‐owned retailers in Spain and Britain this paper examines the role of these wider elements supporting employee ownership. We find that employee ownership can be linked to higher productivity and lower employee turnover, while at the same time being linked to higher absenteeism and mixed effects on attitudes. Expectations held by managers and employees are higher; these expectations are not always fully met. The role of managers was also found to be crucial.     

Whole vs. shared ownership of foreign affiliates

This paper studies why multinational firms often share ownership of a foreign affiliate with a local partner even in the absence of government restrictions on ownership. We show that shared ownership may arise, if (i) the partner owns assets that are potentially important for the investment project, and (ii) the value of these assets is private information. In this context shared ownership acts as a screening device. Our model predicts that the multinational's ownership share is increasing in its productivity, with the most productive multinationals choosing not to rely on a foreign partner at all. This prediction is shown to be consistent with data on the ownership choices of Japanese multinationals.     

The effects of managerial ownership on international and business diversification: Balancing incentives and risks

Research has examined the effects of managerial share ownership on business diversification, typically from the incentive alignment perspective. Yet, share ownership also shifts risk to managers (the efficient managerial contracting perspective). Furthermore, the effects of managerial ownership on international diversification are unexplored. We examine how managerial ownership influences both international and business diversification in light of the trade‐off between incentive alignment and risk bearing. Based on the differing risk profiles of the two types of diversification, we argue that incentive contracts with higher levels of managerial ownership will be inefficient, i.e., counter to shareholder interests—reducing international diversification and increasing business diversification. Our findings support our arguments for international diversification. We find no significant effect for business diversification after accounting for endogeneity and serial correlation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

北京市发展现代制造业的经济分析

北京市发展现代制造业，必须打破传统所有制观念的限制，即国有经济成分的多少代表一定的社会属性的观念，让行业的技术特点和生产组织形式决定行业的各种经济份额比例，使各种所有制资本在现代制造业的发展中各尽所能，发挥其最大作用；并且北京市的一般机械制造业生产技术传统，组织形式落后，只有用现代的光电技术进行改造，才能提升行业的层次，而信息行业和汽车制造业则需通过非国家资本提升行业的生产技术和集中度，至于医药行业则需通过国家资本开发新产品和提高行业集中度，这样才能提高这些行业的经济效益。     

Employee Financial Participation and Productivity: An Empirical Reappraisal

Avner Ben‐Ner and Derek Jones cast doubt on the notion of a simple causal link between financial participation (FP) and productivity, and consequently on the validity of much of the empirical literature that has sought to quantify this relationship. This paper is an attempt to investigate this proposition. Our empirical reappraisal revealed that the route through which employee share ownership and profit‐sharing schemes achieve these gains is quite separate and more involved than either the theory or prior empirical research suggests. This is particularly evident by extending the complementarities thesis beyond purely participatory bundles to embrace firm‐specific and organizational variables. Our analysis also addressed recent calls to aid the interpretation of the observed effects of FP by creating a link between the use and operation of FP and its impact on productivity.     

Employment Change after Takeovers: The Role of Executive Ownership

The article examines the impact of executive ownership and other ownership and governance factors on employment change after takeovers. Drawing on a dataset of 235 takeovers, the results show that there is a reduction in employment in just over 50 per cent of the sample. Higher levels of executive share ownership are associated with lower probabilities of employee layoffs post‐takeover, and there is a positive relationship between executive ownership and employment growth. The effect of executive options on employment change is generally insignificant, as are the effects of other features of ownership and governance. The evidence suggests that executives with higher levels of ownership tend to mount takeovers of better‐performing firms and to implement takeovers aimed at growth.     

改制对企业绩效影响的实证分析

本文运用来自竞争性行业的451家样本企业(1994—1999年)的数据研究了改制对企业经营绩效的影响。通过产权结构作为连续变量的分析，发现国有产权对企业绩效具有显著的负作用，而非国有资本具有积极的绩效效应，其中个人资本具有最为显著的提高效益的正相关作用。在不同资本控股权的分析中，个人资本相对控股权分组的利润率显著高于国有资本相对控股权的分组，并且经营者持股比例的增加可以显著提高改善经营绩效的可能性。     

Board composition,share ownership,and ‘underpricing’ of U.K. IPO firms

Using a sample of 251 IPOs in the United Kingdom, this paper examines interlinks between executive and nonexecutive characteristics, share ownership, and short‐term performance measured in terms of share offer ‘underpricing.’ It argues that executives' power and previous experience directly affect ex ante choice of nonexecutive directors and their ownership interests in the firm. These endogenously developed governance factors may be used by IPO teams strategically to reduce the extent of underpricing. However, there is a selective response of investors to different board characteristics and share ownership structure. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Employee Stock Purchase Plans — Gift and Incentive? Evidence from a Multinational Corporation

Employee share purchase plans (ESPPs) give free or discounted shares of stock to workers who buy shares in the hope that the greater share ownership will retain workers, build loyalty and raise productivity, as in gift exchange models. Using measures of workers’ organizational loyalty and sense of ownership in a multinational firm that puts the ESPP at the heart of its compensation policy, we find that workers who join the ESPP have lower turnover intentions and do less on‐the‐job search than others, motivated in part by gift exchange reciprocity, and also respond to the group incentive of ownership with greater work effort, longer hours, and lower absence rates. Workers in workplaces with high perceived rates of ESPP participation are more likely to intervene against shirkers. The results appear robust to the selectivity of who joins the ESPP. The mix of gifting shares to workers who buy shares and the group incentive of ownership makes ESPPs a unique dual form of compensation.     

The private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms: Do cash flow rights always reduce controlling shareholders’ tunneling?

This study measures the size of private benefits of control (PBC) and explores the impact of ownership structure and board independence on controlling shareholders?? tunneling. Using data of Chinese listed companies between 2003 and 2006, we find that the average size of PBC, as measured by the price premium of block share transactions, is approximately 10.66% in Chinese listed companies. Also, firms with more independent directors on the board and firms with multiple large shareholders have a smaller size of PBC. Therefore, they experience a lower level of expropriation of minority investors by controlling shareholders. We particularly find evidence of a nonlinear U-shaped relationship between controlling shareholders?? PBC and their cash flow rights. On the left half of the nonlinear U-shaped curve, consistent with the interest-alignment effect of increased ownership concentration, increased cash flow rights appear to be effective in reducing controlling shareholders?? tunneling. However, on the right half, increased cash flow rights would exacerbate controlling shareholders?? expropriation of minority investors, which is the entrenchment effect of increased ownership concentration.     

The Impact of Global Capital Market Exposure and Stable Ownership on Investor Relations Practices and Performance of Japanese Firms

This paper examines whether greater exposure to global capital markets, stable share ownership, and group affiliation of Japanese firms have any impact on the quality of their investor relations practices (IR) and market-value added (MVA). The results indicate that foreign ownership and foreign listings are positively associated with IR. Foreign listings are also positively associated with MVA. However, stable ownership and group affiliation do not seem to have any impact on IR. These findings suggest that Japanese firms that are more exposed to global capital markets are more likely to adopt shareholder-oriented policies rather than stakeholder-oriented policies.     

Corporate Governance and Performance in Publicly Listed,Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Taiwan

Using a multi-industry dataset of 228 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) this paper analyses the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in large, publicly traded firms that are controlled by founding families. After taking account of possible endogeneity problems, we do not find that family control is associated with performance measured in terms of accounting ratios, sales per issued capital, earnings per share and market-to-book value. However, share ownership by institutional investors, and foreign financial institutions in particular, is associated with better performance. Our results indicate that board independence from founding family and board members’ financial interests have a positive impact on performance.     

Variable Pay,Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany

We use a representative sample of German establishments to show that those with foreign ownership are more likely to use performance appraisal, profit‐sharing and employee share ownership than those with domestic ownership. Moreover, we show that works councils are associated with an increased probability of using each of the three practices when under domestic ownership but not when under foreign ownership. These results inform the ongoing debate over institutional duality, the extent to which foreign firms adopt uniform practices independent of local institutions, and the extent to which they adapt and participate in those local institutions.     

Levels of Employee Share Ownership and the Performance of Listed Companies in Europe

We investigate the effects of employee share ownership (ESO) on three alternative measures of firm performance in a panel of 1,115 companies from the five largest European economies. The results show that firms with ESO enjoy significantly higher levels of capital market performance and of accounting performance than firms without ESO; however, the marginal effects of ESO are declining with increasing ESO levels. ESO does not have a clear effect on productivity. These findings hold for all countries except Spain. Variations in ESO levels within firms over time exert few performance effects.     

Financial Participation and Collective Conflicts: Evidence from French Firms

Studies on financial participation show positive effects across several “performance” outcomes, yet given the potential to realign employee interests, distribute rewards, and improve commitment little is known about the ability of financial participation to reduce collective conflicts. Using French establishments, we explore the impact of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes on various measures of conflict. Across various specifications, estimators, and time periods, financial participation reveals an ability to reduce some but not all forms of conflict. Employee share ownership seems especially effective in reducing a range of conflicts including the most extensive and costly forms.     

Employee Ownership and Company Performance

This paper investigates how Britain's largest employee-owned firm, the John Lewis Partnership, performs relative to its major competitors. In the context of John Lewis's unique constitutional structure, employee ownership appears to offer significant advantages in the market place. It is difficult to assess the relative importance of particular policies; as a group, employee ownership, open information flows, high wages, and profit share are clearly associated with high productivity.     

Entrepreneurship and paths to business ownership

Alternative paths to ownership are examined, including starting, purchasing or inheriting a firm, as well as being promoted or brought in by existing owners. It is hypothesized that these involve different ‘degrees of entrepreneurship’, which will be reflected in the profiles of owner-managers who have followed each path. Data on 1756 owner-managers are used to test hypotheses relating path to ownership to: the entrepreneurs' background characteristics; motivations and attitudes; and previous careers, incubator organizations and processes of starting.     

Governance,ownership structure,and performance of IPO firms: the impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments

This paper examines performance effects of ownership concentration and two types of private equity investors (venture capitalists and business angels) in firms that have recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in the United Kingdom and France. We expand and contextualize nascent understanding of multiple agency theory by examining heterogeneity of private equity investors and by suggesting that multiple agency relationships are affected by different institutional contexts. We employ a unique, hand‐collected dataset of 224 matched IPOs (112 in each country). Controlling for the endogeneity of private equity investors' retained share ownership, we find support for the agency theory argument that concentrated ownership improves IPOs' performance. The research also shows that the two types of private equity investors have a differential impact on performance, and the legal institutions in a given country moderate this impact. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.