Privatization, Incentive Delegation and Foreign Direct Investment

Despite the empirical relevance, the privatization literature paid little attention to the effects of the owner-manager relationship and the implications of foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus on these aspects, and show the relationship between privatization and greenfield FDI when the owners design strategic managerial incentive contracts. We show that there is complementarity between privatization and greenfield FDI. Whether incentive delegation (compared to no incentive delegation) increases the degree of privatization in the presence of FDI is ambiguous; it depends on whether the degree of privatization that attracts FDI is higher or lower than the degree of privatization that maximizes domestic welfare under FDI.     

Management of Newly Privatized Companies: Its Importance and How Little We Know

Despite the extensive privatization efforts throughout the world since 1980, state-owned enterprises still contribute a significant share of GDP of many countries. Both developing and developed countries are committed to further reduce the role of their state sector and to stimulate efficiency in their economies. Privatization is, and will continue to be, an important and major activity in this process. Successful privatization however, requires sound management policies on the part of newly privatized industries. In order to ensure the success of privatization, more attention should be paid to the reforms in management and in governance of newly privatized industries.     

A contractual analysis of state versus private ownership

We uniquely analyze the advantages and disadvantages of private ownership versus state ownership under various circumstances by focusing on three aspects: external risk, internal governance, and relative importance of owners versus managers. Our theoretical analysis indicates that private ownership is better than state ownership if the business environment is risky, corruption is limited, or the manager plays a more important role than the owner. Our empirical analysis supports our theoretical findings and reveals that better internal governance, more external risk and greater importance of the manager will magnify the benefits of privatization.     

社会地位、在职消费与激励绩效

对企业高管进行有效激励，降低企业的激励成本，有利于企业的平稳运行和经济的繁荣发展。文章以2003-2014年所有A股上市公司为样本，对在职消费通过彰显"地位"、"威望"等而对企业高管产生的激励作用进行检验。研究发现，"地位"、"威望"等精神层面的非物质因素对企业高管具有激励作用，并在激励效果上对货币薪酬具有替代作用：国有企业中，在职消费更可能作为货币薪酬的替代性补偿而产生激励作用；民营企业中，在职消费更可能发挥精神层面的激励替代作用。而在货币薪酬等物质激励得到相对满足的情况下，考虑了"地位"、"威望"等精神因素的激励契约具有更高的激励相容性，能够有效地为企业节约激励成本，提高内部资源配置效率，进而提升股东价值。     

论中小型家族企业治理模式的优化

本文提出了中小型家族企业内部控制权治理、产权治理、关系治理为一体,相互关联、相互影响、相互作用的治理结构。由于治理的重点和主要矛盾在不同的发展阶段所会有所不同,为了克服家族治理的种种弊端,治理结构的动态化成为必然。由于靠监督与制衡不可能解决代理成本与道德风险问题,为了解决委托人与代理人之间关系的动力问题,本文提出来酬激励机制、经营控制权激励机制、声誉或荣誉激励机制、聘用与解雇激励机制等内容。     

我国上市公司管理层内部薪酬差距的影响因素——基于多任务委托代理视角

文章基于多任务委托代理理论,实证分析了上市公司管理层内部薪酬差距的影响因素。研究结果表明,由于政府为了确保国企管理层社会性任务的顺利执行,压低了管理层的薪酬差距。上市公司的第一大股东对公司的控制能力越强,则管理层的薪酬差距越小。文章还发现,上市公司管理层的薪酬差距作为一种激励手段,与股权激励并没有表现出替代性。同时,经典的锦标赛激励模型给出的两个重要假说得到了验证,上市公司管理层的规模确实与薪酬差距正相关,公司外部环境的风险同样与薪酬差距正相关。     

The Effects of Incentive Scheme and Task Difficulty on Employees' Altruistic Behavior Outside the Firm

Employer-sponsored opportunities for altruism outside the workplace can improve employee engagement and passion within the firm, enhance the firm's corporate visibility, and improve its recruitment. There is limited understanding of whether and how a firm's management control system on employees' daily tasks can influence employee willingness to engage in altruism outside the workplace. In this study, we investigate via an experiment how the incentive scheme (tournament vs. piece rate) on employees' daily tasks interacts with the difficulty level of these tasks (low vs. high) to affect employees' altruistic behavior outside the firm. Our results indicate that, compared to a piece-rate scheme, a tournament scheme leads to a greater decrease in non-winning participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm when the original, incentivized task is more difficult compared to when it is less difficult. Consistent with our theory, participants' feelings of excessive entitlement partially mediate the interaction effect of incentive scheme and task difficulty on participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm. This study informs firms about how the design of its incentive scheme on employees' daily task inside the firm and the nature of that task can influence employee willingness to act altruistically outside the firm.     

完善上市公司高管人员薪酬激励机制——基于安徽省上市公司的实证研究

上市公司高管人员激励机制问题，是当前我国上市公司治理改革实践中的一个重点问题。文章以安徽省上市公司为基础对我国上市公司高管人员薪酬激励机制进行研究，发现在高管薪酬水平、高管人员持股、高管薪酬结构、高管薪酬制度规范化等方面存在许多问题，文章对这些问题分别进行了分析，并提出了相应的政策建议。     

中国上市公司长期高额现金持有的动机研究

本文研究了中国上市公司长期高额现金持有行为的动机。研究发现,选择高现金持有政策的上市公司经营绩效与同类公司相比并非显著较好,且后期的资本支出较少。本文得出的结论是,高现金持有政策并不符合公司价值最大化原则,现金持有的预防性动机假说不成立,高现金持有的潜在原因是管理层消极工作的代理问题。上市公司应增加对管理层的治理约束,改善管理层激励机制。这对提高资本市场资源配置效率,进一步提升上市公司质量有重要的现实意义。     

股份制商业银行治理:基于年报的实证分析

采用2001-2003年间11家商业银行的19个年报样本为依据,对我国股份制商业银行的治理机制及其与银行绩效的关系进行实证分析,发现样本银行股权结构并没有对银行绩效产生影响,董事会规模和高管人员薪酬激励对银行绩效有积极的作用,而独立董事比例和董事会会议次数却对银行绩效产生了负面影响;此外银行规模也是提升银行绩效的重要因素。     

The Impact of Internal Auditor Compensation and Role on External Auditors' Planning Judgments and Decisions*

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks — an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task — to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy‐six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation.     

Incentive Contract Design and Employee-Initiated Innovation: Evidence from the Field*

This study examines how the design of incentive contracts for tasks defined as workers' official responsibilities (i.e., standard tasks) influences workers' propensity to engage in employee-initiated innovation (EII). EII corresponds to innovation activities that are not formally assigned to workers but are nonetheless encouraged and considered to be important for the company's success. Like other extra-role behaviors, EII is difficult to incentivize directly. Therefore, it is important to understand whether and how explicit incentive contracts designed for the workers' standard tasks may indirectly influence their EII activity. We use field data from a manufacturing company that uses a dedicated information system to track workers' EII idea submissions. We find theory-consistent evidence that, compared to workers receiving fixed pay, employees rewarded for their standard tasks with variable compensation contracts exhibit a lower propensity to engage in EII. This result is concentrated among ideas benefiting other constituents and activities beyond the proponents' standard task (i.e., broad-scope ideas). In contrast, we find no difference attributable to standard task incentive design in the proposal of innovation ideas narrowly focused on the proponent's standard task (i.e., narrow-scope ideas). Our findings suggest that variable pay narrows employees' conceptual focus around the standard task and hinders employee engagement in broad-scope innovation activities compared to fixed compensation contracts. We contribute to the literature on incentives for innovation by showing that standard task compensation contracts have spillover effects on EII behavior. We also contribute to the nascent literature on EII by showing that innovation types, defined based on their relation with the proponent's standard task, matter. Our results are relevant for practitioners in that managers relying on variable pay contracts to incentivize standard task performance should expect lower employee engagement in broad-scope EII.     

组织间关系中机会主义治理机制的博弈分析——以ASP外包关系为例

有效机会主义治理机制是维持组织间诚信合作的基础，这些机制主要包括：选择伙伴与改变伙伴偏好、设计惩罚与奖酬的激励机制、依靠隐性的社会关系合同、完善信息获取与共享机制等。首先应着力选择诚信的伙伴或增强伙伴的诚信偏好，但仅此而已是不够的，有必要借助激励相容的显性合同与隐性关系合同的共同治理。同时，有效的治理需要有用的信息，因此信息获取与共享机制是关键，这种机制还通过影响参与方获得重复交易机会的方式来抑制机会主义行为。     

中国民营化:“西学东渐”后的一种新范式

兴起于20世纪80年代的西方民营化改革已经成为席卷全球的浪潮,无论是资本主义国家还是社会主义国家都积极投身于民营化的实践之中,"可以说,民营化已超越党派偏好或意识形态,成为了一种务实的得到广泛应用的治理方式和公共服务模式",并分别形成了以英、美、奥为首的三种典范,且日益深刻影响到中国公共事业改革。但由于制度和文化背景的巨大差异,师从西方的中国民营化改革还没有显著的实践效果,因此,我们在学习和借鉴西方民营化经验和教训的同时,我们必须对自身固有的模式进行理性的探讨,辩证地看待民营化之于中国公共事业改革意义。     

Ownership structure and firm performance: Evidence from the Chinese corporate reform

We employ a new classification of ownership identity to analyze the impact of ownership structure on enterprise performance in China. Using both fixed effects model and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), this study finds that marketized state-owned enterprises outperform firms controlled by the government, indicating that partial privatization of state-owned Chinese firms improves corporate governance. Non-controlling large shareholders of marketized state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are found to play active roles in corporate governance. Lastly, there is evidence that ownership concentration of a controlling shareholder decreases the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders.     

项目治理机制改善公共项目管理绩效的研究——以代建人激励效应为中介变量

文章以国内代建制下的公共项目为研究情景,在归纳和总结项目治理理论已有研究成果的基础上,考虑公共项目多层委托代理形成治理结构特殊性,构建出以代建人激励效应为中介变量的"项目治理机制——代建人激励效应——公共项目管理绩效"理论模型,并提出项目治理机制作用于公共项目管理绩效的改善路径假设。通过对147个样本数据的分析,结果表明:公共项目治理机制能够对代建人产生显著的激励效应,代建人的激励效应能够对公共项目管理绩效产生显著的影响,项目治理机制对公共项目管理绩效的直接效应较弱。表明在特定治理结构下,代建人的激励效应是项目治理机制改善公共项目管理绩效的中介变量。研究结果可为政府决策部门完善代建管理制度提供理论支撑。     

国有上市企业经营者股权激励的问题及对策探讨

良好的经营者股权激励有助于降低代理成本,提高企业经济效益。本文重点总结了国有上市企业实施经营者股权激励内部治理结构方面存在的大股东控制、缺乏内部制衡与监督等问题;外部市场环境方面存在的资本市场的弱有效性、职业经理人市场的不健全以及相关配套法律法规不健全等问题。针对存在的问题了提出相应对策,在内部治理方面,通过减持国有股,提高独立董事比例和增强监事会的独立性以解决治理问题;外部环境方面建议加强市场监管和规范信息披露优化资本市场,通过建立经营者的信用和能力档案制度及建立和完善试用期制度健全职业经理人市场,并希望出台税收优惠政策,确保经营者股权激励的实施效果。     

开放源代码组织的激励机制及成功要素

本文分别从内容激励和过程激励两方面分析了开发源代码组织的激励机制,并提出开放源代码组织成功必须具备的三个因素:模块化开发和自治式管理模式、有效的信号发布机制和保护产品的共有知识产权不被私人侵犯。     

Carrots That Look Like Sticks: Toward an Understanding of Multitasking Incentive Schemes

Constructing compensation schemes for effort in multidimensional tasks is complex, particularly when some dimensions are not easily observable. When incentive schemes contractually reward workers for easily observed measures, such as quantity produced, the standard model predicts that unrewarded dimensions, such as quality, will be neglected. Yet, there remains mixed empirical evidence in favor of this standard principal‐agent model prediction. This article reconciles the literature using both theory and empirical evidence. The theory outlines conditions under which principals can use a piece rate scheme to induce higher quantity and quality levels than analogous fixed wage schemes. Making use of a series of complementary laboratory and field experiments we show that this effect occurs because the agent is uncertain about the principal's monitoring ability and the principal's choice of a piece rate signals to the agent that she is efficient at monitoring.     

The effects of governance changes on bank efficiency in China: A stochastic distance function approach

China has accelerated banking reform since joining the Word Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. Employing a stochastic distance function approach, this paper examines bank technical efficiency and differentiates the static, selection and dynamic governance effects on bank efficiency for the 11-year period 1995–2005. The results show that bank efficiency has improved. Joint-stock ownership is associated with better performance in terms of profitability than state ownership (static effect). Strong selection effects are found for both foreign acquisition and going public reform strategies. Foreign acquisition may benefit domestic banks by efficiency gains in the long run, but privatization via initial public offerings (IPOs) appears to have only some short-term effects.