Fiscal news and macroeconomic volatility

This paper analyzes the contribution of anticipated capital and labor tax shocks to business cycle volatility in an estimated New Keynesian business cycle model. While fiscal policy accounts for about 15% of output variance at business cycle frequencies, this mostly derives from anticipated government spending shocks. Tax shocks, both anticipated and unanticipated, contribute little to the fluctuations of real variables. However, anticipated capital tax shocks do explain a sizable part of inflation fluctuations, accounting for up to 12% of its variance. In line with earlier studies, news shocks in total account for about 50% of output variance. Further decomposing this news effect, we find permanent total factor productivity news shocks to be most important. When looking at the federal level instead of total government, the importance of anticipated tax and spending shocks significantly increases, suggesting that fiscal policy at the subnational level typically counteracts the effects of federal fiscal policy shocks.     

Why is there so little tax coordination? The role of majority voting and international tax evasion

It is a striking feature of EU tax policy that countries find it difficult to agree on capital tax coordination. This is in conflict with the prevailing theoretical view, according to which tax coordination is beneficial. This paper develops a political economy argument which may help to explain this puzzle. We consider a model of tax competition where fiscal policy decisions are taken via majority voting and tax evasion is possible but costly. It turns out that tax coordination agreements may fail to generate political support because middle income groups may lose from tax coordination, even if their capital income is below average.     

Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments

Tax policies of two levels of government (state and federal) with overlapping tax bases are considered. This overlap leads to “vertical” fiscal externalities are considered when several different commodities are in the tax base and the tax bases of the two levels of government may not be identical. When the governments share a tax base, the mix of combined taxes is optimal. With different tax bases, combined taxes are no longer optimal as federal tax rates are adjusted to reflect state public service levels. When grants are available, a welfare-maximizing mix of taxes and public services is obtained.     

When Does Government Debt Crowd Out Investment?

We examine when government debt crowds out investment for the US economy using an estimated New Keynesian model with detailed fiscal specifications and accounting for monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Whether investment is crowded in or out in the short term depends on policy shocks triggering debt expansions: higher debt can crowd in investment for cutting capital tax rates or increasing government investment. Contrary to the conventional view, no systematic relationships between real interest rates and investment exist, explaining why reduced‐form regressions are inconclusive about crowding out. At longer horizons, distortionary financing is important for the negative investment response to debt. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries

This paper studies international fiscal coordination in a world of integrated markets and sovereign national governments. Mobile capital and immobile labor are taxed in order to finance a fixed budget. This generates productive inefficiency. Two fiscal reforms are considered: a minimum capital tax level and a tax range, i.e., a minimum plus a maximum capital tax level. It is shown that the introduction of a lower bound to the capital tax level is never preferred to fiscal competition by all countries while there always exists a combination of both a lower and an upper bound (i.e., a tax range) which is unanimously accepted.     

Local business taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate

A theoretical model describes the local choice of the tax rate on capital income. It establishes preferences and various fiscal conditions — including the tax rates of competing jurisdictions — as determinants of the tax rate. The empirical implications are tested using a large panel of jurisdictions in Germany, which have discretion in setting the local rate of the business tax. Tax competition is identified by means of instrumental variables techniques. Despite significant competition effects between local neighbors, where tax rates are strategic complements, jurisdictions are found to have some leeway in using the tax rate as an instrument of their policy. In particular, large jurisdictions set higher tax rates in interjurisdictional competition.     

不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果分析

研究目标：分析不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果及福利效应。研究方法：将内生化的政府支出（税收）政策以及包含汇率的价格（数量）型为主的混合货币政策一并纳入一个小型开放的DSGE模型。研究发现：随着资本账户的逐步放开,财政政策方面,减税政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越好,政府支出政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越差;货币政策方面,国内货币政策的调控效果及利率上升的跨期替代效应减弱。从社会福利损失的角度分析表明：无论是与内生化的政府支出（税收）政策组合还是与财政赤字政策组合,价格型为主的混合货币政策始终优于数量型为主的混合货币政策。研究创新：考察在高、中和低三种资本账户开放背景下中国不同财政货币政策组合的相互作用和经济效应。研究价值：为资本账户放开过程中合理地使用财政货币政策组合提供理论参考。     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.     

A note on tax competition in the presence of agglomeration economies

This paper analyzes tax competition in the presence of agglomeration effects. The obtained results are then compared to the results of the traditional model, without agglomeration effects. As is well known, the presence of a fiscal externality affects the provision of the public good in the standard competitive model of tax competition. In the model with agglomeration effects, in addition to this externality, a new effect shows up. This effect reflects heightened government concern about capital flight, which depresses firm productivity by limiting external economies of scale. As a result, capital tax rates end up being lower than in the case where agglomeration effects are not present, worsening the underprovision of the public good. This conclusion holds in both the competitive and strategic versions of the model.     

Monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits

Allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods – deep habits - can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in rather than crowding-out private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy. We find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy. However, despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits, government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy.     

Growth, debt and public infrastructure

This paper presents a closed economy model of endogenous growth driven by capital externalities arising from both private capital and public infrastructure. The model is calibrated to fit data for India, an approximately closed economy. Simulations suggest that fiscal policy certainly matters and the choice of the income taxation rate, the mix of government spending between infrastructure and public consumption goods, and the long-run government debt/GDP ratio can all significantly affect the long-run growth rate. Intertemporal aspects of fiscal policy are also important and the precommitment (time-inconsistent) and non-precommitment policies differ substantially.     

Innovation dynamics and fiscal policy: Implications for growth,asset prices,and welfare

We study the equilibrium implications of different fiscal policies on macroeconomic quantities and welfare by utilizing an endogenous growth model that matches asset pricing data well. The fiscal instruments of interest are (i) subsidies to R&D expenditure, consumption and capital investment, and (ii) cuts in labor and corporate tax rates. Our equilibrium analysis provides new insights on the interplay of innovation dynamics and fiscal policy. Importantly, we find growth and welfare to be inversely related when changing R&D subsidies. However, this depends on how well the model reproduces asset pricing dynamics. Moreover, only subsidies to capital investments and cuts in the corporate tax rate have the potential to increase both growth and welfare.     

Corporate income taxation of multinationals and unemployment

Within a two-country model with involuntary unemployment, this paper investigates corporate income taxation under separate accounting versus formula apportionment. In contrast to separate accounting, under formula apportionment the corporate tax policy causes a fiscal externality that results from unemployment. This externality is the highest when the apportionment formula contains the payroll factor only. It is minimized for the pure sales (property) formula, if the substitution elasticity is low (high). The unemployment externality tends to compensate other externalities such that tax rates become inefficiently low. The deviation from the efficient tax policy is minimized when the apportionment formula contains the sales factor only.     

Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth

This paper surveys the literature on fiscal policy and economic growth. We present a unifying framework for the analysis of long run growth implications of government expenditures and revenues. We find that several tax rates and expenditure categories exhibit a direct impact on the growth rate of the economy. In a creative synthesis we have assigned the relevant literature to the twelve introduced policy variables. Due to the equivalence of some policy variables we are left with six degrees of freedom, where we need four to internalize the model's intrinsic externalities, leaving two instruments to conduct short run fiscal policy.     

Urbanisation,fiscal decentralisation and economic development: A time series evidence

Several empirical tests using Multiple Regression Analyses were conducted on several hypotheses using time series data obtained from the federal and state governments. The results of our analyses establish that the degree of fiscal decentralisation is dependent on intergovernmental transfers and states income per capita. However intergovernmental transfers were not dependent on expenditure decentralisationper se. The degree of urbanisation was found to be inversely related to fiscal decentralisation. The variable measuring the degree of openess was found not statistically significant as an explanatory variable for fiscal decentralisation. However, the share of agriculture was found significant in revenue decentralisation but loses its importance in expenditure decentralisation.The policy implications of the study are that: (i) There is need for the states to develop plans to increase their per capita income, improve their tax collection system, introduce new tax bases and reduce the high degree of free ridership in public goods and services exhibited by the urban population. (ii) The Federal Government should provide specific grants to state governments for urban development, because of the high per capita cost of public goods and services. (iii) The existing Revenue Allocation Act should be reviewed to reflect state government efforts in generating their own revenue from internal sources.     

Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government

In this paper, we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax, federal transfers, and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit game structures among multiple private agents, multiple local governments, and the federal government. In general, the optimal local property tax is zero if the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative, whereas the optimal local consumption tax is always positive. When the local consumption tax is chosen optimally, the federal income tax can be either positive or negative. For most reasonable parameter values, our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government.     

The Vermont Land Gains Tax Experience With It Provides a Useful Lesson in the Design of Modern Land Policy

Abstract . Vermont is currently the only state which employs a special capital gains tax on certain land sales. A comparison between the Vermont land gains tax and Henry George's Single Tax provides a useful lesson in the design of modern land policy. The Vermont tax is aimed at discouraging short run land speculation, while the Single Tax seeks to discourage the long term quasimonopoly of land ownership. The Single Tax would capture unearned increments to land value while the Vermont tax applies only to realized capital gains and tends to reward long term speculators. An empirical analysis of the Vermont tax reveals that tax revenues have been small, and that the tax has not prevented a rise in land values. In fact, the Vermont tax may have increased land prices by restricting available land supply. Although the Vermont tax intended to curb speculation and reduce land subdivision activity, it is not a substitute for land use planning and carefully designed growth control ordinances and regulations.     

Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) and (Besley and Coate, 1997). As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

Income taxation when markets are incomplete

We investigate the welfare effects of proportional income taxation in a standard general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI). Formally, our analysis is on the allocative effects of state-contingent income tax reforms. Tax reforms are restricted to be anonymous, publicly and truthfully announced before markets open, and they are required to result in an ex-post constrained efficient allocation. Our main result is to show that there do typically exist contingent tax reforms that are Pareto improving. These reforms, acting directly on the asset span, modify private risk-sharing opportunities. Thus, unlike most of the GEI literature, the type of policy transmission mechanism considered does not rely on second-order, relative spot price effects. Yet, the key welfare effects of our tax reforms are substantially equivalent to those induced through changes in relative spot prices, as, for example, in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos et al. (1990), or in Citanna et al. (2001). Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 58E17, 46N10, 93B29 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D52, H21, H24, H25     

Vertical externalities in cigarette taxation: Do tax revenues go up in smoke?

In federal systems, where tax bases are joint property, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper examines the interdependence of US federal and state cigarette tax rates. Our results suggest that states may reduce their cigarette tax rate by as much as 48 cents per dollar increase in the federal tax rate. Thus, a federal tax hike may reduce the amount of generated state tax revenues both directly (the overall tax rate rises and the state tax base declines), and indirectly (the state tax rate declines).