机构投资者实地调研能否缓解股价同步性——基于我国A股上市公司的经验证据

本文以2014-2018年我国深圳A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了机构投资者实地调研与股价同步性的关系,并探究了信息披露质量和机构投资者持股比例对此关系的调节作用.研究结果表明,机构投资者实地调研提升了公司的特质信息含量,显著降低了股价同步性.进一步研究发现,机构投资者实地调研对股价同步性的降低作用在信息披露质量较好的公司和机构持股比例较大的公司更为显著.本文的研究不仅拓展了现有关于机构投资者信息中介作用的研究,丰富了关于股价同步性影响因素方面的相关文献,并为监管部门完善上市公司信息披露制度、引导投资者与上市公司深入交流,提供了有益启示.     

机构投资者与上市公司会计信息相关性分析

本文从机构投资者与会计信息相关性之间的联系来说明机构持股在公司治理中的作用。本研究以1999～2002年深市A股为样本，研究发现，在样本时间区闸内会计信息相关性与机构持股比例相关性不明显；从年度样本研究发现，随着机构持股比例增加，会计信息相关性增强，说明近年求机构投资者已参与公司治理，并发挥一定怍用。     

机构投资者调研行为与上市公司股票流动性

机构投资者调研可以显著提高上市公司股票流动性,且调研的广度和频度越大,上市公司股票流动性越强;机构投资者调研还可以通过增加被调研上市公司的信息披露数量,降低信息不对称程度这一机制来提高个股流动性。机构投资者调研广度对上市公司股票流动性的提高作用在国营或国有控股企业中更加显著。因此,机构投资者应在调研活动中挖掘并披露有效信息,提高市场效率;上市公司应积极接受监管部门的审查及投资者调研,保证信息披露的真实性和可靠性;监管部门应进一步加强监察力度,提高上市公司经营透明度,三方合力构造更加完善和健康的投资环境。     

机构投资者与上市公司治理

二十世纪六十年代以来,全球范围内的机构投资者迅猛发展,机构股东一改过去"用脚投票"的做法,开始了其股东积极主义的实践。机构投资者处于大股东之下、中小股东之上,有望成为我国上市公司治理结构的重要补充。     

机构投资者与上市公司治理

二十世纪六十年代以来,全球范围内的机构投资者迅猛发展,机构股东一改过去"用脚投票"的做法,开始了其股东积极主义的实践。机构投资者处于大股东之下、中小股东之上,有望成为我国上市公司治理结构的重要补充。     

财务报告可读性、投资者实地调研与对冲策略

本文结合文本分析方法,考察了财务报告可读性与投资者实地调研之间的关系。研究发现,财务报告可读性构成了投资者实地调研的重要动因,即当可读性越差时,投资者实地调研活动的频率和可能性都会显著增加;投资者实地调研会恶化财务报告可读性差所导致的信息不对称,同时也会增强财务报告可读性好所带来的信息披露效率的提高,体现出一种"让清者更清,让浊者愈浊"的互补效应。进一步,利用财务报告可读性和投资者实地调研两个维度的差异构建对冲策略,套利组合最低和最高分别可获得7.2%和12.5%的年化收益率。本文的研究结论为如何进一步完善资本市场的信息披露监管提供了有效的经验证据。     

机构投资者、公司治理与上市公司股利政策

本文实证研究了2001—2004年间中国证券市场中机构投资者持股、公司治理与上市公司股利政策之间的关系。针对我国特殊的股权结构制度背景下,现金股利政策的两种理论观点——“自由现金流假说“和“利益输送假说“以及在我国资本市场上呈现的“恶意派现“现象,实证检验了我国机构投资者是否能够发挥治理、监督作用。研究结果发现:在2001—2004年间,机构投资者持股公司的每股现金股利发放水平显著地高于非机构投资者持股的公司,发放现金股利公司的机构投资者的持股比例显著地高于不发放现金股利公司,公司现金股利发放水平成为投资者构建投资组合的重要标准;机构投资者的持股比例不会对上市公司的股利政策产生影响,对于我国上市公司近年来出现的“恶意派现“现象,机构投资者发挥了其监督治理职能,机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司发生“恶意派现“的可能性越小。     

论机构投资者在完善上市公司治理结构中的作用

现代市场经济条件下,机构投资者在证券市场的影响力日益明显,已经成为完善上市公司治理结构的一只重要力量。目前国内上市公司特殊的股权结构,更需要机构投资者的监督、制衡。要有效地发挥机构投资者的作用,可以从建立类别股东表决制度,构建多层次、多品种的证券市场体系,积极促进多种性质类型的机构投资者的发展等方面努力。     

机构投资者与公司治理结构

80年代末的购并浪潮预示着机构投资在公司治理中开始扮演重要角色，此前其作用主要局限于是否向筹意收购出售其股份，然而自80年代末开始，通过干预撤换业绩不良公司的董事会成员，制定并改进包括董事会结构与构成、执行董事的激励以及一系列其他事项在内的公司良性运作规范，并积极参与关于公司法改革的讨论等行为，机构股东开始显示其参与公司治理的影响力。     

论财务会计信息在公司治理中的作用

财务会计信息对于公司治理具有重要意义。高质量的会计信息可以降低管理层与外部人之间的信息不对称,从而有助于解决逆向选择和道德风险问题;信息披露自身可以对管理层形成有效的约束,促使管理层强化受托责任,并可以为相关主体提供治理所需信息,从而加强外部人对管理层的监督和制约;通过降低对其他高成本治理机制的需求,高质量的会计信息还可以有效地降低公司治理的整体成本,提高治理效率。因此,财务会计信息是实现公司治理目标、保护投资者利益的重要工具。我国应当不断地完善会计准则,并加强会计监管,以提高会计信息质量,更好地为公司治理服务。     

机构投资者股权对银行公司治理与绩效的影响

在机构投资者对银行进行投资时,不同类型的机构投资者具有不同的表现.其中,QFII、证券公司、社保和保险基金都能影响银行的公司治理,促进其综合业绩的提高;证券投资基金和企业不能对这两个方面产生显著影响.在选择银行股时,证券投资基金注重银行过去综合业绩的表现,企业、社保基金和保险基金注重银行过去市场价值的增长,QFII和证券公司同时考虑了这两个方面.实行银行股权全流通,放松时机构投资者的管制,改革证券交易方面的税收制度,培养机构投资者的投资理念,有利于发挥机构投资者对银行公司治理的积极作用.     

Institutional Ownership Type and Earnings Quality: Evidence from Iran

Institutional ownership is an important factor in corporate governance. Institutional investors play important roles in firms because of their substantial shareholdings and their capability to monitor managers. However, the question is whether they are capable of monitoring the managers. The literature has provided different evidence for the monitoring role of institutional investors. This study attempts to provide insights into the monitoring roles of institutional investors by examining the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Institutional investors are classified into two groups, namely active institutional investors and passive institutional investors, based on their monitoring power in Iran. A multidimensional method is used to measure the various aspects of earnings quality, such as earnings response coefficient, predictive value of earnings, discretionary accruals, conservatism, and real earnings management. The results show that institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings quality. Similar to total institutional ownership, active institutional ownership has positive effects on proxies of earnings quality. Nonetheless, passive institutional ownership does not have any power to affect earnings quality. Moreover, lead-lag tests of the direction of causality suggest that institutional ownership leads to more earnings quality and not the reverse.     

Institutional Quality,Trade Openness,and Financial Sector Development in Asia: An Empirical Investigation

We examine the determinants of financial sector development in Asia and the Pacific from 1995 to 2011. In terms of economic growth, over the last twenty years the region has outperformed other parts of the world and has also experienced major developments in its traditionally bank-dominated financial system since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. We apply the dynamic generalized method of moments to a panel data set of twenty-six economies in the region. The estimations were done for the whole panel as well as for subpanels of developed and developing economies. We find that better governance and institutional quality foster financial sector development in developing economies while economic growth and trade openness are key determinants of financial depth in developed economies.     

Foreign Direct Investment,Institutional Quality,and Financial Development along the Belt and Road: An Empirical Investigation

ABSTRACT

The source of financial development is less investigated in the literature, especially the role foreign direct investment (FDI) plays on financial development. Using data from 50 countries joining the Belt and Road Initiative, this article at first time tests the impact of FDI on financial development in a host country. Empirical results show that FDI can significantly improve the development of financial sector, especially the development of financial markets. FDI is found to be a stronger driver of financial development for countries with higher quality institutions. Moreover, FDI not only increases financial deepening, but also enhances financial function.     

机构投资者担心企业应用衍生品进行投机吗-来自中国上市公司的证据

以2007-2011年应用过衍生品的中国上市公司为样本,检验机构投资者持股与企业应用衍生品及其投机行为的关系,研究发现:机构投资者担心企业应用衍生品尤其是应用衍生品的投机行为会损害其自身的利益,并且这种担心超出了机构投资者通过积极的监督来保障自身利益的意愿,因此,机构投资者倾向于减少对那些应用衍生品公司的投资,大多维持在一个较低的水平.此外,证据还表明:在我国上市公司中,机构投资者的投资并不普遍,份量也较轻;衍生品在我国上市公司中的应用亦不普遍并且应用的程度很低,大多数应用衍生品的公司是为了套保,但一旦投机则非常严重;机构投资者较为看重应用衍生品公司的成长性,而反感其业绩与盈余管理行为.     

Institutional Ownership and the Selection of Industry Specialist Auditors

This study provides evidence linking corporate governance mechanisms to the choice of auditor, namely industry specialists. Given that institutional investors are likely to prefer higher quality financial reports to lower quality reports, we theorize that institutional investors will influence managers of companies in which they invest to improve reporting quality by using higher quality, industry specialist auditors. Our findings indicate that firms having relatively greater levels of institutional ownership tend to employ industry specialist audit firms. The results of this study contribute to an understanding of an important facet of corporate governance, the selection of a high quality audit firm.     

Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high‐level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three‐month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.     

The Influence of Country‐ and Firm‐level Governance on Financial Reporting Quality: Revisiting the Evidence

This paper examines how firm‐level governance and country‐level governance interplay in shaping financial reporting quality. Using IFRS adoption as a source of variation in firms’ reporting discretion, and a large sample of European firms that mandatorily switch to the new set of standards, we find that in countries with low enforcement and weak oversight over financial reporting, only firms with strong board‐level corporate governance mechanisms experience an increase in financial reporting quality, consistent with firm‐ and country‐level governance mechanisms being substitutes. However, in countries with high enforcement and strict oversight over financial reporting, firms with either strong or weak board‐level governance mechanisms experience an increase in financial reporting quality, even if the increase is larger for the former group. Overall, our findings indicate that in the debate about the effects of governance on the quality of financial reporting, it is important to consider both country‐ and firm‐level corporate governance mechanisms.