关于制止低价倾销行为的思考

氏价倾销行为在产业组织理论中称为掠夺性定价行为，掠夺性定价不是形成垄断的最优选择，如兼并就更优于掠夺性定价，所以在我国视兼并为合法行为的前提下，企业不会选择低价倾销行为以实现垄断；     

掠夺性定价理论综述

掠夺性定价是现代产业组织理论的重要内容之一,长期以来关于其是否理性一直有争议。所谓掠夺性定价是指在位厂商将价格削减至对手平均成本之下,以便将对手驱逐出市场或者遏制进入,即使遭受短期损失。一旦对手离开市场,在位厂商就会提高价格以补偿掠夺期损失。掠夺性定价理论主要包括认为掠夺性定价非理性、不符合厂商的长期利润最大化目标的芝加哥学派理论,以及通过引入信息不对称、认为掠夺性定价是厂商理性行为的后芝加哥学派理论。二者之所以得出截然相反的结论,是因为关于信息的假定不一致。信息在掠夺性定价理论的发展中起了至关重要的作用。因为掠夺性定价是厂商的一种策略性行为,策略性行为就涉及到厂商之间的互动,互动就需要了解对手,猜测对方。因而不同的信息假定得出不同的结论就不足为怪了。信息可以分为完全信息和不完全信息。芝加哥学派的结论是建立在完全信息的基础之上。而后芝加哥学派就是通过引入信息不对称——单边或双边不确定,利用博弈论方法来研究掠夺性定价是否理性的问题。     

策略性掠夺性定价及反垄断规则

策略性掠夺性定价理论显示,掠夺性定价是一种合理的企业策略性行为.掠夺性定价的策略性实施包括两个基本的要素:一是牺牲短期利润;二是在长期能够通过行使市场势力来收回短期损失.通过对主要的掠夺性定价检验规则和加拿大、美国、欧共体的反垄断执法实践的分析,本文认为基于乔斯科-克莱沃里克的两阶段检验规则是较优的掠夺性定价执法规则.     

价格域滥用知识产权市场支配地位的反垄断研究

该文在案例分析与重组的基础上,探讨价格歧视、掠夺性定价和超高定价等与价格相关的滥用知识产权市场支配地位之典型行为,明确不同滥用行为之构成要件及反垄断规制之核心点所在,并对理论与实践中出现的最新发展趋势做出展望。     

反"掠夺性定价"立法与我国的价格战现象

市场经济下,企业虽原则上拥有自由定价权,但掠夺性定价被大多数国家的法律界定为不正当竞争行为。因为在位企业利用在位优势提供了短期的虚假价格信息以达到排挤竞争对手的目的,削弱了整个市场的竞争程度。作者对此进行了探讨并提出了政策建议。     

垄断竞争的电信业定价策略研究

讨论垄断竞争条件下电信业定价策略,对理解电信运营商的竞争行为、制定电信业竞争政策有重要的意义。本文将呼叫外部性引入模型,考察了呼叫方内部化接听方效用条件下企业定价策略,从而扩展了目前理论内容和结论。研究表明：当呼叫方内部化接听方的效用时,在线性定价条件下,电信运营商仍然会通过提高接入费进行合谋;在非线性定价条件下,由于电信运营商可以利用固定费进行市场份额的争夺,电信运营商不再有利用接入费进行合谋的动机;在基于终接网络的价格歧视条件下,当消费者接听效用接近于呼叫效用时,电信运营商将会通过制定无穷大的呼叫异网价格来获取更大的市场份额,因此网络联接发生了中断。     

行为资产定价理论综述

如何刻画投资者行为是资产定价理论 50年来发展的主要脉络。在消费资本资产定价模型基础上 ,通过修正投资者的效用函数而发展起来的行为资产定价理论 ,对投资者行为的认识达到了新的高度。本文构造了行为资产定价的一般均衡研究框架 ,指出了此框架与行为金融理论的区别 ,并在此框架下 ,综述了当前流行的行为资产定价模型。文章最后分析了行为资产定价理论的下一步发展方向。     

平台型产业反垄断规制的几个关键问题研究

近年来平台型产业已成为新经济时代最重要的产业组织形式,与此同时,在某些平台型产业领域中的规制改革也已展开。市场结构与垄断地位、滥用市场势力、掠夺性定价、垄断协议是双边平台型产业反垄断规制改革过程中亟需解决的几个关键性问题。对双边平台型产业的反垄断规制不能简单凭借传统单边市场规制标准来界定,而要从双边平台型产业本身的特点和竞争环境出发谨慎对待。在双边市场条件下,《反垄断法》应该做出相应的调整。     

垄断结构:国有银行的改革研究

国有银行的垄断结构呈现出国家、地方、银行三位一体的垄断性。垄断结构不具有规模经济、排除不确定性风险的优势效应;劣势效应体现为显性的进入壁垒和隐性的掠夺性定价,这为国有银行的改革提供了有益的信息。     

我国信用卡发卡银行定价行为特征及其效应分析

在扩大开放条件下,中国金融服务业的大门开始真正全方位向外资银行敞开。信用卡业务,作为快速提升银行盈利能力的新兴业务领域,必是中外资银行竞争的焦点。信用卡的服务定价问题,是信用卡产业发展的核心。本文在讨论我国信用卡发卡行定价行为特征的基础上,着重分析了信用卡年费竞争的不利影响,提出规范引导下的合作双赢才能够引导发卡行走出信用卡年费定价的恶性竞争。     

Feasibility of predatory pricing in a capacity-constrained duopoly

Predatory pricing is feasible only if the minimax profit of the prey is strictly smaller than the expected profit in the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. We completely characterize the conditions for feasibility of predatory pricing in Kreps and Scheinkman's model of capacity-constrained duopoly. The predator must have a capacity larger than that of the prey, and also larger than the Cournot capacity. Surprisingly, predatory pricing may be infeasible not only if the prey is too large but also if it is too small.     

Predatory pricing in a multiple market experiment: A note

Isaac and Smith (1985a,b) present a strong behavioral case that predatory pricing is not an observable laboratory phenomenon. We propose several modifications of their design, resulting in a multiple-market experiment in which predatory pricing is present. The primary modification involves conducting several markets concurrently, providing an active ‘escape’ opportunity for any prey and a potential reward to a reputation for predation. These results provide a ‘behavioral existence proof’ for the predatory pricing phenomenon. They do not address the issue of the phenomenon's behavioral robustness.     

关于人才资本定价问题的思考

现代经济中,人才资本决定着经济增长的速度和资本的利润率,人才在社会经济发展中的作用日益重要,人才资本的定价问题也越来越受人关注,人才资本定价的扭曲,制约了我国现代企业制度的建立和知识经济的发展。合理的人才资本定价需要一个能够在现代经济条件下正确评价人才资本贡献的理论指导。本文从人才资本的价值和使用价值的角度来思考人才资本的定价问题。     

一种广义虚拟经济的分类方法

本文将广义虚拟经济划分为可直接定价的广义虚拟经济和不可直接定价的广义虚拟经济。又根据供给弹性的差别将可直接定价的广义虚拟经济划分为强广义虚拟经济和弱广义虚拟经济。强广义虚拟经济的价值主要体现在租金上,而弱广义虚拟经济的价值主要体现在产品的多样性上。不可直接定价的广义虚拟经济通过非价格机制来实现,根据不同的社会关系范围,不可直接定价的广义虚拟价值实现的方式有很大差异,在非匿名的小范围内主要以亲缘关系和在共同体关系为基础,而在匿名的大范围内中主要以道德和利他主义为基础。     

基于循环经济视角的资源环境价格形成探讨

循环经济背景下的资源环境价格形成不同于传统市场经济背景下的商品价格形成。它作为一种广义的价格形态,需要政府强力的干预和参与,甚至跨国际的集体行动。要根据循环经济诸环节发生的替代关系,按照四项原则安排资源环境价格,并可通过试错方法或市场方法形成具体价格,使循环经济产业链与价值链相匹配。     

Vertical Integration and International Predation

This paper investigates the interrelationship between a firm's incentive to engage in international predatory pricing and its domestic vertical industry ties in the context of the deep-pockct theory of predation. The deep pocket stems from a vertically integrated firm's ability to shift funds between its upstream and downstream divisions. enabling it to prey on vertically unintegrated upstream competitors. Vertical integration is shown to function as a cause of and a deterrent to foreign predatory behavior.     

Presidential Address: Antitrust restrictions on single-firm strategies

Abstract This article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single‐firm strategies. The strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance. Here, the law has moved sharply in both Canada and the U.S. towards more solid economic foundations. Yet a gap between the law and economics remains. The economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature. The law on a second strategy, predatory pricing, represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing. The remaining single‐firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market. I review, with application to cases, the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies. Are exclusionary, anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants? On the other hand, is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive?     

COLLUSION AND PREDATION UNDER THE CONDITION OF STOCHASTIC BANKRUPTCY

In this paper, on the basis of the framework of repeated games, we consider the strategic interaction between firms that may face financial constraints and go into bankruptcy when they earn low profit. We demonstrate that under asymmetric information concerning the financial constraints of the rival firm, firms adopt a pricing pattern wherein they switch to high (or collusive) prices after maintaining low prices for some periods. There are always such predatory pricing strategies sustained as equilibria when firms are sufficiently patient. We also show that the set of feasible and individual rational payoffs becomes narrower than that of the ordinal repeated games.     

SPATIAL PERFECT COMPETITION: A UNIFORM DELIVERED PRICING MODEL

Abstract.  Spatial competition is often probed in terms of spatial oligopoly and/or monopolistic competition in the literature. This paper considers spatial competition as a form of perfect competition, in the sense that the firms are assumed to be price-takers located at the centre of a market area and practising uniform pricing. It shows that under scale economy competitive equilibria can occur, and may actually be observed in the form of international price differentials. Both a very high price and a very low price can yield conditions of competitive equilibrium in spatially or otherwise separate markets.