Reassessing Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

During the past decade, the use of conditional cash transferprograms to increase investment in human capital has generatedconsiderable excitement in both research and policy forums.This article surveys the existing literature, which suggeststhat most conditional cash transfer programs are used for essentiallyone of two purposes: restoring efficiency when externalitiesexist or improving equity by targeting resources to poor households.The programs often meet their stated objectives, but in someinstances there is tension between the efficiency and equityobjectives. The overall impact of a program depends on the gainsand losses associated with each objective.      

The Welfare Returns to Finer Targeting: The Case of The Progresa Program in Mexico

It is common in developing countries to attempt finer targeting of the benefits from social safety net programs through combining different targeting methods. We evaluate the returns to finer targeting in the context of the PROGRESA program in Mexico. This program is a prominent program in the literature reflecting the fact that it has been widely evaluated, is perceived to be well targeted, and has been used as a prototype for many other programs in the region and beyond. We also identify the relative incremental contribution of each targeting method to the overall targeting performance of the program. We find that geographic targeting dominates demographic targeting (based on linking transfer levels to demographic composition), which in turn dominates household proxy-means targeting. However, the contribution of proxy-means targeting increases substantially as the program expands into less marginal localities. Adjusting for incomplete take-up increases the targeting performance of the program only slightly. JEL Code: D3, H50, O15 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the International Monetory Fund, its Executive Board, or its management.     

Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

Several developing economies have recently introduced conditionalcash transfer programs, which provide money to poor familiescontingent on certain behavior, usually investments in humancapital, such as sending children to school or bringing themto health centers. The approach is both an alternative to moretraditional social assistance programs and a demand-side complementto the supply of health and education services. Unlike mostdevelopment initiatives, conditional cash transfer programshave been subject to rigorous evaluations of their effectivenessusing experimental or quasi-experimental methods. Evaluationresults for programs launched in Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica,Mexico, Nicaragua, and Turkey reveal successes in addressingmany of the failures in delivering social assistance, such asweak poverty targeting, disincentive effects, and limited welfareimpacts. There is clear evidence of success from the first generationof programs in Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua in increasingenrollment rates, improving preventive health care, and raisinghousehold consumption. Many questions remain unanswered, however,including the potential of conditional cash transfer programsto function well under different conditions, to address a broaderrange of challenges among poor and vulnerable populations, andto prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty.      

Tracking NAFTA's Shadow 10 Years on: Introduction to the Symposium

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is arguablythe first "case study" of what might be expected from the increasingnumber of preferential trade agreements involving both developedand developing economies. Ten years after the treaty’sinception, it is time to assess how its outcomes compare withinitial expectations. The articles in this symposium issue provideinsights into the effects of NAFTA on economic geography, trade,wages and migration, and foreign investment from Mexico’sperspective. The contributions paint a complex post-NAFTA realitycharacterized by persistent intrabloc trade barriers, interregionalinequality within Mexico, labor market outcomes that seem closelytied to migration patterns and international trade and investment,and foreign investment flows that appear weakly related to tradeagreements. NAFTA seems to be the first trade agreement in historyfor which the traditional static trade creation or diversioneffects are likely negligible—and hard to identify inany case.     

Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital Structure?

Prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availabilitydepends solely on firm characteristics. However, market frictionsthat make capital structure relevant may also be associatedwith a firm’s source of capital. Examining this intuition,we find firms that have access to the public bond markets, asmeasured by having a debt rating, have significantly more leverage.Although firms with a rating are fundamentally different, thesedifferences do not explain our findings. Even after controllingfor firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure,and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating,firms with access have 35% more debt.     

Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico since the Approval of NAFTA

Cross-country panel data are used to assess the effect of free-tradeagreements on flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Free-tradeagreements are found to have a significant positive effect onFDI flows, and free-trade agreements are found to matter morefor the smaller members of the agreement. For example, the NorthAmerican Free-Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) effect on FDIflows into Mexico is much larger than its effect on flows intothe United States. These cross-country results are used to assessNAFTA’s effect on FDI flows into Mexico. After controllingfor a set of other factors—such as an increase in worldwideFDI flows—the trade agreement is found to generate FDIflows nearly 60 percent higher than they would have been withoutthe agreement.     

Why Capital Efficiency Measures Are Rarely Used in Incentive Plans, and How to Change That

Despite the wide acceptance of DCF valuation and its corollary that value is created only by earning more than the cost of capital, very few companies use performance measures that focus on corporate efficiency in using capital—measures such as return on capital (ROC) or economic value added (EVA)—as the main basis for their top management incentive programs. In this article, the authors begin by documenting the surprisingly limited use of such measures in management incentive plans. Next they analyze three often cited problems—difficulty in retaining managers, discouragement of growth investment, and complexity—that could account for the limited use of such measures. Third and last, they suggest a number of adjustments to standard capital efficiency measures that are designed to address these problems and, in so doing, to give corporate directors more confidence in using measures like EVA to reward and hold managers accountable for value-adding performance.
In illustrating the problems encountered when using such performance measures, the article uses case studies of three long-time "EVA companies"—Briggs & Stratton, Herman Miller, and Manitowoc—to highlight the difficulty of using a "bonus bank" (or "clawback") system to hold managers fully accountable for earning a minimum return on capital. After presenting empirical data that shows "delayed productivity" of invested capital, the authors suggest that conventional capital efficiency measures can discourage value-increasing growth.
The article concludes by recommending that although measures like EVA used in combination with negative bonus banks provide the right incentives, EVA capital charges should be phased in gradually to reflect the delayed productivity of capital. At the same time, corporate boards should consider providing bonus bank "relief" when market and industry factors have excessively large negative effects on the performance measures and bonus awards.     

Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics

Agency problems limit firms’ access to capital markets,curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual waysto mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment?We present a theory of a firm’s investment dynamics inthe presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financialcontracts. We derive results relating firms’ investmentdecisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure,and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasingin current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positivelyserially correlated over time (after controlling for investmentopportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems.(JEL G30, G31, G32, G35, D82, D86, D92)     

Diversification of Macroeconomic Risk and International Integration of Capital Markets: The Case of Mexico

This article tests the arbitrage pricing theory in the contextof the unstable macroeconomic years in Mexico, 1977–87.Using information on returns on assets available to domesticinvestors—primarily stocks traded at the local stock exchange—anattempt is made to ascertain the extent to which these assetshave offered premia for a set of proposed sources of risk. Thepervasive factors that play an important role in asset pricingin Mexico are unexpected inflation, unexpected money growth,innovations in the Standard & Poor's 500 price series, andinnovations in the dollar oil price. A residual market factoris obtained, using the McElroy and Burmeister model. Given thatthese risks get premia over and above the riskless rate, expectedrates of return in Mexico have been higher during the yearsof erratic macroeconomic conditions. Mexico is not consideredto be well integrated with the international capital marketsbecause local sources of risk—such as inflation—arenot priced in the United States, whereas international sourcesof uncertainty—such as oil price shocks—are pricedlocally but not in the United States.     

Foreign banks and credit in Mexico

The role that foreign banks play in developing countries has been arduously debated. Foreign banks can improve the efficiency of the banking sector in the host country but they can also undermine local banks by selecting only the most trustworthy borrowers. In this paper, I analyze the period between 2005 and 2014 and compare the differences between foreign and domestic banks in Mexico and Colombia. Analyzing Mexico is of great importance given that foreign banks control more than 80% of the banking assets. Also, given the difference in institutional development between Mexico and Colombia, I can control for regulatory environment. After controlling for size, institutional development, and country of origin, I find that foreign banks have not stimulated growth in Mexico through commercial loans. Previous studies suggest that this lack of credit to companies may be due to a weak enforcement of contracts rather than to foreign ownership. However, Colombia has a weaker enforcement of contracts environments and foreign banks also do not provide as many commercial loans as domestic banks. This paper is of particular interest to regulators in developing countries that need foreign capital and those that want to intensify the allocation of commercial credit.     

Fund Families as Delegated Monitors of Money Managers

Because a money manager learns more about her skill from hermanagement experience than outsiders can learn from her realizedreturns, she expects inefficiency in future contracts that conditionexclusively on realized returns. A fund family that learns whatthe manager learns can reduce this inefficiency cost if thefamily is large enough. The family’s incentive is to retainany given manager regardless of her skill but, when the familyhas enough managers, it adds value by boosting the credibilityof its retentions through the firing of others. As the numberof managers grows, the efficiency loss goes to zero.     

Poverty traps and intergenerational transfers

In this paper, by adopting an OLG neoclassical growth model, we show that intergenerational transfers may trigger the take off of an economy entrapped into poverty in a twofold way: (1) by eliminating the zero equilibrium, which, under technology with low factor substitutability, is always a “catching” point, so that the economy might start converging to a positive equilibrium. In this case, the appropriate instrument turns out to be a transfer from the old to the young, while there is no room for policies redistributing in the opposite direction (i.e., a pay-as-you-go pension scheme); (2) when the rich equilibrium is unstable—which can be the case under high intertemporal elasticity of substitution of individuals—the introduction of transfers may stabilize such an equilibrium, so that the economy starts converging to it. In the latter case, both policy programs such as pay-as-you-go pension schemes or subsidies to the young may help escaping from poverty. However, we point out that in either circumstance, the “size” of transfers should be sufficiently large (and, as for pensions, not even too large), in order to avoid ineffective and useless burden on the taxpayers without triggering the take off.      

转移支付优化审计策略研究——以事权和支出责任相适应改革为背景

中央与地方财权与事权的不对称使转移支付制度成为实现地方政府财力与事权匹配的基本手段,以弥补政府间纵向财政失衡和横向财政失衡。但目前我国财政转移支付因体制的诱致性变迁、设计理念缺陷、事权与支出责任分离等原因,存在效能不彰、运行效率漏损、结构不合理、规范性水平低、程序规制失范等问题。在全面深化财税体制改革下,国家审计机关可以发挥＆quot;免疫系统＆quot;功能和国家治理作用,对转移支付从审计内容、审计导向、资金流向等方面提升审计层次,把问效、问绩、问责贯穿转移支付审计过程始终,关注转移支付资金的安全性、效率性、经济性,实现政府支出责任随事权转移、各级政府财力与事权相匹配,优化转移支付,完善政府治理。     

DESIGNING CAPITAL STRUCTURE TO CREATE SHAREHOLDER VALUE

In the past decade, many U.S. companies have launched aggressive share repurchase programs with the expectation that value can be created by returning excess capital to shareholders and moving the firm closer to its optimal capital structure. But how much capital does a company really need to support its business activities? This article presents an economic framework or “model” that can be used to simulate the effect of various capital structure choices on shareholder value. The fundamental insight underlying the model is that judicious use of debt can add value by reducing corporate taxes and strengthening management incentives to increase efficiency, but that too much debt can result in a loss of business and perhaps a costly reorganization. Indeed, one of the key findings of the authors' recent research is that companies with highly leveraged balance sheets suffer disproportionately large losses in market share and value during industry downturns. As illustrated in a case study of a hypothetical general merchandiser, the model makes it possible to identify an optimal debt-equity ratio (and percentage of fixed- versus floating-rate debt)—one that balances the value of the tax shield from debt against the increased risk of financial distress.     

Corporate Governance and Development

The literature shows that good corporate governance generallypays—for firms, for markets, and for countries. It isassociated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity,greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders,although the direction of causality is not always clear. Thelaw and finance literature has documented the important roleof institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement,including corporate governance, across countries. Using firm-leveldata, researchers have documented relationships between countries’corporate governance frameworks on the one hand and performance,valuation, the cost of capital, and access to external financingon the other. Given the benefits of good corporate governance,firms and countries should voluntarily reform more. Resistanceby entrenched owners and managers at the firm level and politicaleconomy factors at the level of markets and countries partlyexplain why they do not.      

Public Debt Management and Macroeconomic Stability: An Overview

Recent research suggests that management of the public sector’sdebt can have important effects on a country’s macroeconomicperformance. This article provides an overview of the factorsthat the recent literature has identified as important in determiningthe optimal composition of the public debt. Based on this analysis,it attempts to establish general guidelines for public debtmanagement in emerging economies. To retain market access andpromote domestic financial market development, governments shouldgenerally finance themselves at market rates using a wide varietyof securities. Beyond this general principle, the optimal compositionof the public debt involves a tradeoff between enhancing thegovernment’s anti–inflationary credibility and reducingthe vulnerability of its budget to macroeconomic shocks. Consequently,the optimal composition of the debt depends on a country’scircumstances. Debt should be heavily weighted toward long-termnominal securities for governments that have anti–inflationarycredibility and toward long-term indexed debt for those thatdo not.      

Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price

The article shows that two measures of the amount of privateinformation in stock price—price nonsynchronicity andprobability of informed trading (PIN)—have a strong positiveeffect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price.Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controlsfor managerial information and for other information-relatedvariables. The results suggest that firm managers learn fromthe private information in stock price about their own firms’fundamentals and incorporate this information in the corporateinvestment decisions. We relate our findings to an alternativeexplanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namelythat it is generated by capital constraints, and show that boththe learning channel and the alternative channel contributeto this sensitivity. (JEL G14, G31)     

Why Does Implied Risk Aversion Smile?

Implied risk aversion estimates reported in the literature arestrongly U-shaped. This article explores different potentialexplanations for these "smile" patterns: (i) preference aggregation,both with and without stochastic volatility and jumps in returns,(ii) misestimation of investors’ beliefs caused by stochasticvolatility, jumps, or a Peso problem, and (iii) heterogeneousbeliefs. The results reveal that preference aggregation andmisestimation of investors’ beliefs caused by stochasticvolatility and jumps are unlikely to be the explanation forthe smile. Although a Peso problem can account for the smile,the required probability of a market crash is unrealisticallylarge. Heterogeneous beliefs cause sizable distortions in impliedrisk aversion, but the degree of heterogeneity required to explainthe smile is implausibly large. (JEL: G12, G13)     

国有资本收入对养老保险的划拨率研究

本文试图建立一个基于中国特殊国情基础之上的关于国有资本收入划拨社会保障制度的研究框架,对我国国有资本收入如何与社会保障制度进行联系提供理性分析框架,并提出建设性的意见。本文将国有资本收入转移到养老保险制度的比例定义为划拨率,对于这个划拨率的最优选择问题就是本文研究的重点。通过构建一般均衡模型。研究发现在一定的条件下,随着划拨率的不断提高,以总消费为代表的社会福利水平出现先增长后下降的趋势,这预示存在着使社会福利极大的最优的划拨率水平。     

The Vouchers Privatization Process as a Price Discovery Mechanism

The privatization process through which governments transfertheir holdings vary from one country to another. The coupon(or voucher) privatization process, which has been frequentlyutilized in Eastern Europe, is generally characterized by atransfer of government holdings to the public for less thantheir full economic value. The vouchers process in the CzechRepublic, specifically, is a case in which the transfer waspractically free and in which foreign participation was banned.As such, and in the absence of an actual flow of funds, theprocess constituted an interesting large-scale experiment ofa price discovery mechanism whose empirical conclusions areinconclusive. On the one hand, the variance of the expectedoutcomes declines during this process, but on the other hand,the participants could obtain superior outcomes using publicinformation, while some, who had access to private information,may performed even better. Thus, wondering whether the processin the Czech Republic served as an efficient price discoverymechanism, additional potential distortions should be investigated:(i) the specific rules of the process through which the publicexchanged bidding points for shares, or (ii) the role that funds'managers played, in lieu of the potential conflict between theirobjective functions and those of the shareholders of these funds,and (iii) lack of uniformity in information reporting standards. Generally, a failure to discover prices may lead to inefficiencyin capital markets, because of the potential distortion of relativeprices. If, in fact, the process in the Czech Republic, duringthe ‘second wave’, in which most of the shares ofover 800 companies were transferred to the private sector, didnot serve as an immediate price discovery mechanism, the ‘damage’,if any, was probably not significant, since it was not associatedwith a massive reallocation of funds, and the market could eventuallycorrect itself once real funds started to pour in, in reactionto post-process relative prices.