供应链协调机制研究

供应链是基于“竞争—合作—协调”机制的,协调是供应链稳定运行的基础。本文在对目前供应链协调问题研究现状分析的基础上,阐述了供应链协调机制的概念,从宏观和微观两个角度．提出了供应链协调机制层次划分模型;建立了包含一个供应商和一个零售商的供应链数学模型。研究表明,供应链协调机制能有效地降低零售价格,增加订单数量和提高供应链系统利润。     

基于需求信息泄露的企业利润及社会效益研究

供应链中的信息对于供应链参与者的利益及供应链的绩效是有价值的,旨在对需求信息的泄露问题展开分析。给出了1个供应商2个零售商的基本模型,从供应商是否泄露零售商信息上给出了非泄露均衡和分离均衡下的零售商利润及供应商利润,并进一步从社会效益角度对2种信息保有情况展开了对比分析。研究得出:对跟随者而言,高需求下以及低需求且θ≥3下的零售商利润可以通过平均市场需求的范围进行确定;对于社会效益而言,高需求且非泄露信息下带来的社会效益总是优于分离均衡下的社会效益。     

基于利他行为下的闭环供应链决策研究

随着行为运营管理的发展,利他、公平、信任等行为得到广泛的关注。文章构建一个由供应商和零售商的闭环供应链,供应商负责旧产品回收再加工。将利他行为引入到供应链中,研究利他属性对供应链决策的影响。研究发现,在该模型的供应链中,供应商的利他属性,对于供应链的回收率、零售商的利润、供应商的效用、供应链的整体利润都是有益的。而零售商的利他行为,有利也有弊,带来的效益是局部的。然后通过数值分析对结论作出解释和说明。     

碳标签制度下供应链碳减排成本分担的决策与协调研究

在碳标签制度下,基于Stackelberg博弈模型,构建了由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级低碳供应链。在集中决策、有/无碳减排成本分担的分散决策3种模式中,分析消费者低碳偏好、零售商碳减排成本分担比例及销售努力系数对供应链的影响。结果表明：碳减排成本分担比例增加,制造商倾向于生产碳足迹更低的产品并会获得更高的利润;消费者低碳偏好增加,使得产品的碳足迹降低,产品零售价格先下降后上升。研究发现：当消费者低碳偏好增加时,零售商应增加销售努力水平,会降低产品碳足迹,并使制造商、零售商和供应链整体能获得相对稳定的利润。有碳减排成本分担要优于无碳减排成本分担的模式,前者可以实现供应链的协调共赢。     

零售商主导的创新成本共担期权契约研究

本文在不确定市场环境中,考虑期权契约在零售商主导的单周期二级供应链成员间创新投入的协调,分别讨论在是否允许期权信用违约情形下,要实现供应链协调各决策主体的决策模型。研究发现单纯的期权契约难以实现供应商单方面创新投入行为,为此引入创新投入成本共担机制,对原契约加以修正则可以实现供应链协调。研究表明在创新成本共担下的期权契约机制可以满足零售商主导的供应链协调,能够提高供应商和零售商的期望收益,实现帕累托改进。     

利他行为下基于差别定价的闭环供应链均衡分析

文章构建一个由制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链,对新产品和再造品实行差别定价,同时将利他行为引入到该供应链模型中,研究决策者的利他行为对供应链的影响。研究发现,与利他中性相比,制造商的利他行为虽然会削弱自身利润水平,但会使得零售商和整个供应链的利润增加;零售商的利他行为不会改变整个供应链的总利润,制造商增加的利润等于零售商减少的部分;双方同时具有利他行为时会增加供应链总利润,但双方的利他系数组合必须在一定的范围内才能实现双赢。最后通过数值分析对上述结论作出解释和说明。     

分散决策下的双渠道供应链补偿策略——基于消费者渠道选择行为

为了有效解决由于对消费者的争夺从而引发的渠道之间关于定价、服务水平、利润等方面的冲突,基于消费者渠道选择行为,构建了网络直销市场与传统零售市场需求模型和双渠道供应链利润模型,运用Stackelberg模型,在制造商与零售商实施分决策时,通过制造商对零售商实施补偿激励前后的对比,分析了消费者渠道选择行为对网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道定价、制造商与零售商利润以及供应链总利润的影响,并求得最优定价及制造商的最优补偿额度和零售商的最优销售努力水平,进行了不同情况下的双渠道供应链利润的比较分析。结果表明,无论制造商是否实施补偿激励,都应随着网络消费者比例的增加而增加其网络直销价格;零售商的零售渠道价格应根据网络消费者比例的增加先降低到一定水平后再提升。当更多的消费者选择网络直销渠道时,制造商的补偿激励水平和零售商的销售努力程度均会下降。制造商应提高其补偿水平,进而激发零售商提高销售的努力水平,并使双方利润及供应链总利润最大化。研究结果为基于消费者选择行为的供应链补偿研究提供了新方法,对双渠道的供应链补偿研究有借鉴意义。     

不同博弈结构下基于利他偏好的双渠道供应链价格决策分析

本文将利他偏好引入双渠道供应链, 分析在供应商Stackelberg博弈、零售商Stackelberg博弈及Nash博弈3种结构中的渠道最优定价, 以及其所受利他偏好和博弈结构的影响。研究表明： 直销价不受利他偏好和博弈结构的影响; 批发价与供应商利他程度成反比, 与零售商利他程度成正比, 且其在供应商主导时最高, 零售商主导时最低; 零售价在不同博弈结构中受利他偏好的影响不同, 且其在Nash博弈中最低, 在其他两种博弈中, 利他程度更高的一方作为主导者时零售价更低。最后通过数值分析得出： 供应链成员的利润及总利润都与利他偏好有关, 且供应链成员利润在自身作为主导者时可达到最大,供应链总利润在Nsah 博弈中最大。     

制造商统一定价下双渠道供应链促销及协调策略

考虑制造商统一定价, 本文构建制造商主导的双渠道供应链, 在集中决策、 分散决策和协调决策下, 对促销及协调策略进行了研究, 并通过数值算例分析了零售商谈判能力、 制造商促销成本分担比例对供应链决策的影响。 结果表明： 集中决策下产品价格最高, 总利润最大; 零售商谈判能力大小决定制造商是否采用促销成本分担契约; 当零售商谈判能力较小时, 促销成本分担契约虽不能实现供应链的完全协调, 但会实现供应链各成员利润的 Pareto 改进。     

库存与运输联合优化利润分配研究

零售商和供应商库存运输联合优化(ITIO)利润分配是关系到双方切身利益,库存运输联合优化业务能否顺利开展,供应链能否开拓新的利润增长点,供应链能否提高竞争力的重要问题.本文把讨价还价模型引入ITIO利润分配中,建立了ITIO利润分配讨价还价模型,并使用逆向归纳法解出模型的完美贝叶斯均衡,再对ITIO利润讨价还价的完美贝叶斯均衡进行比较分析.研究发现:当ITIO利润分配在第一阶段达成协议时,双方利润分配份额大小不仅受自身的耐心程度影响,还要受对方的耐心程度影响;耐心程度越高供应商在第一阶段的报价不一定越高;具有较高分散优化利润的供应商不一定总报较低的价格;当ITIO联合优化利润分配进入第二阶段,那么零售商在第二阶段的最优利润分配比例与其分散优化利润和ITIO联合优化利润正相关,与其对供应商分散优化利润分布估值下限负相关.     

零售商的风险规避特性和公平偏好对绿色供应链运作的影响

针对市场需求的不确定性,本文通过建立风险规避型零售商与风险中性供应商的Stackelberg博弈模型,供应商为主导者,综合考虑零售商风险规避特性和公平偏好心理对该供应链运作产生的影响。研究发现,当风险规避型零售商不具有公平意识时,零售商的风险规避程度与供应商的批发价、绿色创新投入水平以及供应商和供应链整体的效用正相关;供应商的绿色成本系数的大小可影响风险规避程度对产品售价以及零售商效用的影响。当风险规避型零售商具有公平偏好时,零售商的公平偏好负向影响产品售价、批发价以及供应商绿色投入水平和供应商效用;零售商公平偏好对零售商以及供应链效用产生的影响受到零售商风险规避程度的影响。     

Managing inventory with two suppliers under yield uncertainty and risk aversion

In this paper, we consider a single-product single-period inventory model in which the retailer can source from two suppliers. The primary supplier is cheaper but unreliable in the sense that it generates supply yield uncertainty, whereas the secondary supplier is perfectly reliable but more expensive. The reliable supplier's capacity is fixed and the retailer cannot order more than the quantity reserved in advance. We study the problem in the context of a risk-averse retailer who has to determine the optimal order quantity from the primary supplier and the optimal reserved quantity from the secondary supplier. We develop the model in the perspective of a low risk averse retailer and quantify the risk via an exponential utility function. We show by numerical experiments how the resulting dual sourcing strategies differ from those obtained in the risk-neutral analysis. We also examine the sensitivity of some model-parameters on the optimal decisions.     

Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes

This paper evaluates the impact of price discount contracts and pricing schemes on the dual-channel supply chain competition. Channel conflict occurs when the supplier enters the online direct channel. Traditional contracts normally require tedious administrational participation, full information of the cost structures, and other factors. The introduction of simple price discount contracts aims at providing easy implementation and effective coordination results. From supplier Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretic perspectives, we show that the scenarios with price discount contracts can outperform the non-contract scenarios. In addition, we show consistent pricing scheme can reduce the channel conflict by inducing more profit to the retailer. The leader in the games might, but is not guaranteed to, have advantages.     

Supply contract with options

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of an option contract for two companies of a supply chain: retailer and supplier. With an option contract the retailer orders a quantity of units and has the right to modify his order if necessary. A model to calculate the performance of an option contract in terms of contract value for the two companies engaged is presented. The two considered cases are multiple suppliers and one retailer, and one supplier and one retailer. The performance improvement obtained using this kind of contract is compared by simulation.     

基于CVaR的第三方回收闭环供应链的优化与协调

利用条件风险值理论研究了第三方回收闭环供应链的优化与协调问题。在随机需求与收益共享———费用共担契约下,建立了由单个风险规避零售商、单个风险规避制造商和单个风险中性第三方回收商组成的三阶闭环供应链的条件风险值模型和基于条件风险值的最优订购与定价决策模型。在对模型进行分析的基础上,揭示了制造商和零售商的风险规避水平对最优订购量、最优定价、条件风险值及闭环供应链协调性的影响。最后通过一个算例验证了研究结论。     

Coordination in a retailer-led supply chain through option contract

This paper develops a model to study channel coordination and risk sharing in a retailer-led supply chain. Such chains are characterized by a dominant retailer who aims to coordinate the upstream production quantity. We investigate a coordinating contract based on an option with two parameters. An option price is paid by the retailer for each additional unit of product reserved beyond the initial order. An exercise price serves as the unit purchasing price when the retailer sets a second order if realized demand is more than the initial order. A successful coordination needs two conditions. One condition is to maintain a negative correlation between exercise price and option price. Particularly, we draw the functional form. The other is that the firm commitment must be lower than the optimal production quantity in a centralized system. In a risk sharing mechanism, we prove that such a contract brings benefit to each party.     

Dynamic supply chain coordination under consignment and vendor-managed inventory in retailer-centric B2B electronic markets

This study examines the dynamic performance of vertically decentralized two-echelon channel coordination for deteriorating goods under consignment and vendor-managed inventory (VMI) contracts with revenue sharing from retailer-centric business-to-business transactions in both traditional markets and electronic markets (EMs). The research presents the profit-maximization problem and devises a method for making cross-enterprise dynamic joint decisions by combining calculus with dynamic programming for a retailer-led Stackelberg supply chain under cooperative and non-cooperative game settings over a multi-period planning horizon. The applicability of the proposed model is assessed using a case study involving a highly perishable product, sliced raw fish, in a supply chain comprising a regional seafood supplier and a local store belonging to a large national retail chain. The analytical results show that, in a cooperative setting, the EM with a consigned revenue-sharing VMI contract tends to achieve lower retail prices, larger stock quantity, improved channel efficiency, and increases in both retailer and supplier profits through an additional one-part tariff. Additionally, consumers benefit from lower retail prices and society benefits from increased overall channel profits in the cooperative channel and EM.     

Retailer policy, uncertainty reduction, and supply chain performance

We investigate how the retailer’s inventory policy affects the total cost of a serial supply chain. When the retailer uses the locally optimal (s,S) policy, there is randomness in order time and order quantity to the supplier whereas the supplier sees randomness only in order quantity for the suboptimal (R,T) policy and only in order time for another suboptimal (Q,r) policy. Using an extensive computational study, we find that the suboptimal policies perform better from the total supply chain perspective. The benefit of policy changes is magnified when the retailer costs are low, when the supplier costs are high, and when there is information sharing.