基于公平心理偏好的投资博弈——敲竹杠问题的一个行为解决

敲竹杠问题是不完全合约理论的中心话题,经典文献认为,如果合约是不完全的,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠风险从而导致无效率的专用性投资。但是,关于敲竹杠问题的文献通常假定事后谈判结果对事前投资成本不敏感。通过在雇佣双方的投资博弈中引入投资成本相关性这种合作的谈判方式,将传统敲竹杠模型中影响谈判力的因素与当事人对公平偏好的行为因素二者融合,本文证明:与传统的投资博弈相比,在投资成本影响企业(雇员)谈判力的情况下,双方有更强的专用性人力资本投资激励。雇佣双方所面临的敲竹杠风险取决于双方的初始谈判力,且双方有可能在事前做出社会最优甚至过度的投资。这也从一个方面解释了现实中大量存在的有效投资现象。     

供应链合作关系调节效应研究

由于具有不同的资源基础、组织经验和市场地位,成熟企业和新创企业在供应链合作中往往表现出不同的专用性投资行为。基于交易费用理论、资源依赖理论和风险管理理论,研究了合作与专用性投资之间关系的调节变量。将314家供应商分为成熟企业和新创企业进行实证研究,发现信任和依赖对合作与专用性投资之间的关系具有调节作用,但在成熟企业和新创企业中的调节作用不同。其中,信任在成熟企业中的调节作用为正向,在新创企业中为负向;依赖在成熟企业中的调节作用不显著,在新创企业中为正向。     

长期贸易关系下劳动力成本对出口价格的影响——兼论专用性资产的调节效应

面对劳动力成本冲击,出口价格调整的幅度反映了长期贸易关系中双方对风险的承担、分担与转化程度.专用性资产既是连接贸易双方利益的纽带,又是平衡风险的杠杆.利用重复博弈的价格调整模型,采用2000-2015年上市公司出口微观层面数据,分析劳动力成本变动对剔除质量因素的出口价格的影响,并对出口企业投入的专用性资产的调节效应进行探究.研究发现:长期贸易关系中,劳动力成本变动导致出口产品价格同方向调整,但调整的幅度小于成本的变动,这表明劳动力成本上涨的压力是由双方共同承担的.专用性资产对出口价格变动幅度有正向调节效应.通过分样本研究发现,如果出口产品的契约依赖度相对较高、目的 国法治体系相对健全和采用加工贸易方式出口,当劳动力成本发生变动时,出口价格调整幅度更大,专用性资产的调节效应更显著.因此,发展长期稳定的贸易关系,科学运用并发挥专用性资产的优势,是企业转化成本压力的重要途径.     

供应链合作关系调节效应研究——基于成熟企业与新创企业的对比

由于具有不同的资源基础、组织经验和市场地位,成熟企业和新创企业在供应链合作中往往表现出不同的专用性投资行为.基于交易费用理论、资源依赖理论和风险管理理论,研究了合作与专用性投资之间关系的调节变量.将314家供应商分为成熟企业和新创企业进行实证研究,发现信任和依赖对合作与专用性投资之间的关系具有调节作用,但在成熟企业和新创企业中的调节作用不同.其中,信任在成熟企业中的调节作用为正向,在新创企业中为负向;依赖在成熟企业中的调节作用不显著,在新创企业中为正向.     

专用性人力资本投资与工资合约——引入不对称信息的敲竹杠模型

经典的不完全合约理论认为,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠行为从而导致专用性投资的无效率。本文通过在经典的敲竹杠模型中引入关于雇员能力的不对称信息,构建一个新的模型来分析企业工资合约的刚性与灵活性,以解决敲竹杠所导致的专用性人力资本投资不足。分析表明:从保护雇佣双方专用性人力资本投资方面看,固定工资合约优于灵活工资合约;且在固定工资合约下,雇员虽然仍可能面临敲竹杠风险,但敲竹杠未必妨碍专用性人力资本投资效率。     

基于大型流通企业商誉的流通秩序治理

为了发挥信息媒介职能,大型流通企业需要进行大量的专用性资产投资,这些专用性资产的积累形成大型流通企业的商誉。这些专用性资产具有非常高的沉没成本,构成了大型流通企业市场退出壁垒。也就是说,大型流通企业在经营过程中必然要努力维护商誉,否则将面临巨大的专用性资产投资损失。为此,大型流通企业将通过自觉规范自身的经营行为,引导生产企业的经营活动来维护自己的商誉,以便从与消费者的长期交易中实现专用性资产投资收益。大型流通企业维护商誉的行为,客观上促进了流通秩序的健康、有序运行。因此,必须站在从根本上治理我国流通秩序的角度,改革和发展大型流通企业。     

基于实物资产专用性的农户绩效实证研究——以山西"十村千户"固定跟踪观察点为例

本文采用实证分析研究方法,根据山西1986—2001年“十村千户”固定跟踪观察资料,选择C～D生产函数建立农户绩效模型,从实物资产专用性的角度对农户绩效及其影响因素进行分组研究,得出结论：（1）农户实物资产专用性的状况：农户实物资产专用性是农户在生产劳动中,为获得收益而进行的必要的投入中逐渐形成的,在追求利润最大化的驱动下,农户实物资产专用性总体水平将会越来越高。（2）农户实物资产专用性与农户绩效的关系：从实物资产专用性的角度看,随着农户实物资产专用性的提高,农户绩效呈现递增的趋势,出现这种情况是因为目前农户固定资产规模并未达到一定的规模,尚处于边际报酬递增的阶段,当固定资产规模达到一定限度时,资产专用性仍在增高,而边际报酬会出现递减,这时当其拥有的实物资产被重新配置时,“锁定”效应加大,风险加大,农户绩效会降低。     

专用性人力资本与企业薪酬制度设计

专用性人力资本强调的是人力资本的专用性,所谓资产的专用性是指交易双方被这种关系锁定。也就是说通过很高的成本,资产专用性使一个完全竞争的、可以反复交易的局面变成了双边垄断的局面。新制度经济学家威廉姆森将资产的专用性分为五类：地理区位（或地点）固定的特性;人力资产的专用性;物理资产的专用性;完全为特定协约服务的资产;名牌商标资产的专用性。威廉姆森对人力资本专用性的分析着眼于这种特性对委托人和代理人合同关系的影响,强调了忽视人力资本专用性将会面临极大的风险。     

禽业龙头企业合作养殖户生产模式及影响专用性资产投资因素研究

随着中国养禽业的不断发展,"龙头企业+农户"已经成为当下禽类生产供应的重要模式,文章以W、L公司的共126户合作养殖户的调查数据为基础,阐明公司与养殖户间的具体契约模式,并运用OLS模型分析了两种模式下养殖户在专用性资产投资方面存在的差异,以及影响养殖户专用性资产投入的因素。研究发现:不同模式对养殖户专用性资产投资产生显著性影响,即不同模式下的养殖户在专用性资产投资方面存在很大差异。     

关系营销的经济学理论框架

在关系营销中 ,信任与承诺是构建长期互利关系的关键变量。独立的渠道机构或成员为共同的目的连接在一起构成了渠道系统 ,特定渠道系统中参与方所具有的信任与承诺程度决定了特定的关系形式。为了构建长期稳定的渠道关系结构 ,渠道关系双方需要在共同的价值认知基础上 ,强化共同的合作意愿并进行积极的沟通。一旦渠道成员间的初步关系结构建立起来 ,双边共同利益为基础的专用资产投资与双边关系规划链接会降低双方的不确定性并限制机会主义行为 ,这会进一步提高关系双方的信任与承诺水平 ,进而巩固和强化业已建立的对称性关系结构。     

Sequential procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers

We compare two procurement mechanisms, bundling and unbundling, in a two-stage auction model with risk-averse suppliers. The mechanisms differ in that the two tasks of investment and production are procured through a single auction or two sequential auctions. Suppliers’ production costs are affected by two risk factors, aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk, as well as by the cost-reducing investment. We show that the bundling mechanism is optimal for a buyer and socially desirable if the aggregate risk is below certain thresholds. The result may not hold true for idiosyncratic risk.     

基于供应商管理库存信用风险的供应链违约风险控制

受宏观经济因素的影响,市场风险和违约风险是密切相关的。而VMI作为一种在供应链相邻两级,其成功运作最重要的一个关键点,便是建立信用风险度量,以销售商违约为例,利用信用违约互换模型规避供应链违约风险,供应商和销售商更易达成交易。     

运用汽车生产商知识对不同类型供应商技术创新的促进作用

基于通过交叉供应商在知识创造能力和与生产商技术相似度两个维度的异质性,将供应商分为4类。采用专利数构建计量指标,探索了不同类型的供应商在技术创新中运用生产商知识的效果。非参数检验与负二项回归结果证明了供应商异质性的存在。研究结果还显示:能力弱的供应商运用生产商知识能获得更好的创新成果--无论它们与生产商技术的相似度高低与否;能力强的供应商不能通过运用生产商知识获得高水平的创新成果。     

出力不确定下基于保险机制的风电供应链 最优交易决策

随着新一轮电力体制改革的日益推进,参与电力市场竞争是消纳风电等可再生能源的必经之路。由于风电出力受风速等自然条件影响,出力具有较强不确定性,导致其实际出力难以预测,使得风电商参与电力市场面临巨大的收益风险。合理地转移风电商的市场风险,引入有效的风险规避机制,对提高风电商收益稳定性具有重要意义。因此本文基于电量损失保险机制,建立了风电商、售电公司以及保险公司的Stackelberg博弈模型,通过逆向递归法求解纳什均衡,分析保险费率与市场三方利润之间的关系,得出市场主体风电商、售电公司以及保险公司的最优交易决策。最后通过具体算例分析验证得出,引入电量保险机制,制定适当的保险费率,能够使风电商、售电公司以及保险公司三方利益实现共赢。     

知识溢出、吸收能力与本土供应商创新绩效——基于珠三角制造业企业的实证分析

笔者利用珠三角制造业企业调查问卷进行实证研究,重点考察吸收能力、知识溢出对本土供应商创新绩效的影响。研究结果表明:跨国公司的显性和隐性知识溢出对供应商技术创新有明显促进作用;供应商的吸收能力对知识溢出和创新绩效有正向调节作用,即供应商的吸收能力不仅有利于其技术创新,而且强化知识溢出对其创新绩效的促进作用;隐性知识溢出在吸收能力的正向调节作用下,对创新绩效的作用更明显。此外,笔者对国内市场导向和出口导向型供应商进行了分组检验。     

Subcontractors for tractors: Theory and evidence on flexible specialization,supplier selection,and contracting

Buyer–Seller networks are pervasive in developing economies yet remain relatively understudied. Using primary data on contracts between the largest tractor assembler in Pakistan and its suppliers we find large variations in prices and quantities across suppliers of the same product. Surprisingly, “tied” suppliers – those that choose higher levels of specific investments – receive lower and more unstable orders and lower prices. These results are explained by developing a simple model of flexible specialization under demand uncertainty. A buyer faces multiple suppliers with heterogeneous types to supply customized parts. Specific investments raise surplus within the relationship but lower the seller's flexibility to cater to the outside market. Higher quality suppliers have a greater likelihood of selling outside and so this cost is greater for them. Therefore even if a buyer typically prefers high types, some low type suppliers might be kept as marginal suppliers because of their greater willingness to invest more in buyer-specific assets. Further empirical examination shows that the more tied suppliers are indeed of lower quality.     

Intraday hedging with financial options: the case of electricity

As market intermediaries, electricity suppliers purchase electricity from the wholesale market or self-generate to deliver their customers. However, electricity suppliers are uncertain about how much electricity their residential customers will use at any hour of the day until they actually turn switches on. While demand uncertainty is a common feature of all commodity markets, suppliers generally rely on storage to manage it. Singularly, electricity suppliers are exposed to joint volumetric and price risk on an hourly basis given the physical attributes of electricity. In the literature on electricity markets, few articles compare the efficiency of forward contracts, options and physical assets (i.e. power plants) within intraday hourly hedging portfolios, whereas electricity markets are precisely hourly markets. We analyse portfolios made of forwards, options and/or power plants for specific hourly clusters (9 am, 12 pm, 18 pm, 9 pm) based on electricity market data from 2013 to 2015 from the integrated German–Austrian spot market. Through a VaR model, we prove that intraday hedging with forwards is structurally inefficient compared to financial options and physical assets, no matter the cluster hour. Moreover, our results demonstrate the contribution of ‘out of the money’ options for all hours within volatile spot markets.     

Contracting out: The Importance of a Solution for the VAT Distortion

In member states of the European Union, the current VAT treatmentof activities of public authorities creates significant distortionsin their decision-making between public provision and contractingout of public services. In several EU-member states, a refundof VAT to local governments eliminates this effect. Therefore,these VAT refund schemes facilitate contracting out. In memberstates with a refund scheme for the VAT costs of local governmentsor another solution to this distortion, in general refuse collectionis contracted out to a relatively greater extent compared tomember states without. Despite these solutions, the VAT distortionis still relevant for private suppliers of tax-exempt activitiesand public suppliers in other member-states. This distortioncould be addressed by a change in the European VAT legislation.(JEL H25; H32)     

The changing role of consumers and suppliers in a food safety event: the 2006 foodborne illness outbreak linked to spinach

This article provides a means for testing whether buyers or sellers are responsible for a drop in sales following a market shock. We show that suppliers’ responses dominated the market reaction to the 2006 US Food and Drug Administration warning to avoid fresh spinach contaminated with potentially deadly bacteria Escherichia coli O157:H7. A modified Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for temporary price endogeneity is developed and used in a leafy green vegetable demand model. Test results indicate the price of bagged spinach was exogenous before the announcement but endogenous for approximately 12 weeks afterward. We show these results are consistent with the notion that suppliers temporarily limited the availability of spinach to consumers. Instead of consumers choosing the quantity purchased given exogenous prices, it was suppliers who limited the quantity marketed and consumers’ choices established the market price.     

How does technology transfer affect backward linkages? A motivating example theoretical analysis

This paper develops a model in which the presence of a multinational leads to a technology transfer to its local suppliers and also modifies the degree of backward linkages in the local economy. First, we identify the domestic market characteristics under which the multinationals increase the level of backward linkages when they enter these markets. Moreover, we investigate the conditions under which the multinational could even benefit itself from transferring technology to its local suppliers. Finally, when the multinational transfers technology, we show when the level of backward linkages in the local economy increases.