竞价交易制度下证券买卖差价的影响因素分析

本文基于市场微观结构理论分析了在竞价交易制度下证券的买卖差价与投资者的委托提交策略之间的关系,还结合对投资者委托提交策略的研究,分析了影响市场买卖差价的因素并运用深圳股票交易所的高频数据进行了实证检验,对影响其股票买卖价差的因素进行了解释。     

投资者关系管理的理论基础

随着资本市场的发展,投资者关系管理开始成为我国社会关注的理论之一.本文从委托代理理论、战略管理理论两个方面分析了投资者关系管理的理论基础,并在此基础上提出了发展我国投资者关系管理的建议措施.     

全球基础设施投资基金研究：投资者偏好和委托代理问题

基于2005年1月至2019年6月间公开发售的2246支来自全球的基建基金数据,本文研究基建基金投资者偏好和委托代理问题。研究结果表明:投资者偏好客户忠诚度较高、投资于国际市场、团队管理型的基建基金;在基建基金公司层面,投资者存在跟风投资行为,且随着信息不透明度和收益不确定性加剧;投资者与基金管理人存在委托代理问题,体现为基金费率与预期业绩不匹配。该现象源于基金管理人利用投资者较高的预期收益设置费率,可以由基金特征因素和年份效应解释,尤其是投资于国际市场、收益分配或非团队管理等特征。本文结论对创新基础设施融资模式、稳定资金来源和微观审慎监管具有重要借鉴意义。     

公众投资者利益与机构投资者委托代理问题研究

伴随着投资主体机构化态势的演进,越来越多的机构投资者成为上市公司的大股东,代理公众投资者参与公司治理。但是否像传统的公司治理理论所强调的,公众投资者的"劣势"地位以及市场效率会因此得到改善呢?针对此,本文系统分析了公众投资者和机构投资者之间的委托代理结构以及由此引发的投资者道德风险行为,对机构投资者在保护公众投资者利益,改善市场效率方面的作用提出了质疑。     

委托单类型及其对市场流动性的影响研究

引言 委托单类型是市场设计中需要考虑的一个重要问题.委托单是投资者对经纪人和交易所发出的要求执行其交易的指令,也是投资者制定交易策略必须考虑的最基本的问题.为了实现有效的交易,委托单明确地规定投资者交易什么股票、是买还是卖、买卖的数量、什么时候交易以及如何交易,然而最重要的是:以什么条件交易?     

基金管理公司资产委托管理业务问题探讨

目前,我国已有包括证券公司、信托公司及类似私募基金性质的咨询公司等三类企业开展了资产委托管理业务.由于资产委托管理业务开办初期还未纳入法制化和规范化的轨道,特别是由于近一年来我国证券市场持续的低迷,一方面导致资产委托管理业务出现了一定的无序和混乱,增加了委托人和受托人的信用风险及财务风险,另一方面也致使资产委托管理业务大幅萎缩.数据表明,截止2001年9月中旬,涉及委托理财的上市公司达到172家,委托理财金额达到216亿元,但是截止2002年9月中旬新发生的上市公司委托理财金额下降到22.77亿元,资产委托管理业务面临很大的挑战.作为我国证券市场最重要机构投资者之一的基金管理公司能否在我国资产委托管理业务出现萎缩的时候挑起资产委托管理业务的大梁,重塑投资人对资产委托管理的市场信心和信念呢?本文主要就基金管理公司从事资产委托管理业务具有的优势和需要解决的几个问题进行分析探讨.     

全球碳交易市场格局及其价格特征——以欧洲气候交易体系为例

工业革命以来,随着全球经济迅速增长,温室气体排放增加对气候造成了前所未有的威胁。为保证全球经济的可持续发展并满足人们改善生存环境的需求,全球各经济体逐步实施建立碳排放交易所的计划。本文探讨了全球碳交易市场格局并选取全球最大交易体系欧盟排放交易体系(EU ETS)为例,使用小波分析、VAR模型研究了其市场运行机制、价格波动规律以及市场有效性。结果表明,碳排放权价格受国际宏观经济形势以及投资者对碳交易市场发展预期的影响较大,欧洲碳交易市场具有一定的市场有效性。     

债券回购市场国际经验及对我国的借鉴

我国的债券回购市场以银行间债券回购市场为主导,近年来交易所回购市场呈现快速发展,债券回购市场成为金融机构、非金融企业、个人等众多市场主体直接参与的金融市场,随着投资者数量及市场规模的扩张,应对债券回购市场发展现状进行审视并寻求进一步完善。文章对国际主要回购市场的情况进行梳理,并提出完善我国债券回购市场的相关建议。     

我国封闭式基金委托代理关系分析

我国基金市场仍然处于发展的初级阶段,目前国内基金存量不过1000亿元,并且存在着法规不健全、投资者不成熟、竞争机制不完善等市场“缺陷”。文章运用信息经济学的原理和观点,对我国投资基金制度中存在的委托代理问题进行分析,从信息、监管、制度风险、收益分配等方面探讨制度缺陷的根源和表现,旨在探索我国投资基金制度进一步完善的途径。     

上市型开放式基金

上市型开放式基金(Listed Open-end Fund LOF)是指在交易所上市交易的开放式证券投资基金,也称为"上市型开放式基金".LOF的投资者既可以通过基金管理人或其委托的销售机构以基金净值进行基金的申购、赎回,也可以通过交易所市场以交易系统撮合成交价进行基金的买入、卖出.     

Quote-based competition and trade execution costs in NYSE-listed stocks

This study examines quotations, order routing, and trade execution costs for seven markets that compete for orders in large-capitalization NYSE-listed stocks. The competitiveness of quote updates from each market varies with measures of the profitability of attracting additional order and with volatility and inventory measures. The probability of a trade executing on each market increases when the market posts competitive quotes. Execution costs for non-NYSE trades when the local market posts competitive (non-competitive) quotes are virtually the same (substantially exceed) costs for matched NYSE trades. Collectively, these results imply a significant degree of quote-based competition for order flow and are consistent with off-NYSE liquidity providers using competitive quotations to signal when they are prepared to give better-than-normal trade executions.     

Market or limit orders?

In this paper we investigate the problem of optimal order placement of an asset listed on an exchange using both market and limit orders in a simple model of market dynamics. We seek to understand under which settings it is optimal to place limit or market orders. Limit orders typically lower transaction costs but increase the risk of incomplete order execution, whereas market orders typically have higher transaction costs but are guaranteed to be executed. Rather than considering order book dynamics to determine if a limit order is executed we rely on price dynamics for this. We look at implementation shortfall in this setup with market impact of trading and propose a dynamic program to find the optimal placement of both market and limit orders for risk-neutral and risk-averse traders. With this we find a bound on the expected cost of trading and show that a trader who behaves optimally should always expect to pay less to trade less. We then solve the dynamic program numerically and examine optimal order placement strategies. We find that the decision between market and limit orders is sensitive to price volatility, risk aversion, and trading costs.     

Optimal order placement in limit order markets

To execute a trade, participants in electronic equity markets may choose to submit limit orders or market orders across various exchanges where a stock is traded. This decision is influenced by characteristics of the order flows and queue sizes in each limit order book, as well as the structure of transaction fees and rebates across exchanges. We propose a quantitative framework for studying this order placement problem by formulating it as a convex optimization problem. This formulation allows the study of how the optimal order placement decision depends on the interplay between the state of order books, the fee structure, order flow properties and the aversion to execution risk. In the case of a single exchange, we derive an explicit solution for the optimal split between limit and market orders. For the general case of order placement across multiple exchanges, we propose a stochastic algorithm that computes the optimal routing policy and study the sensitivity of the solution to various parameters. Our algorithm does not require an explicit statistical model of order flow but exploits data on recent order fills across exchanges in the numerical implementation of the algorithm to acquire this information through a supervised learning procedure.     

A call auction's impact on price formation and order routing: Evidence from the NASDAQ stock market

Electronic call auctions are used globally to open and close equity market trading; as such, they are a critically important facility that needs to be better understood. The paper focuses on the impact NASDAQ's calls (introduced in 2004) have had on bid-ask spreads, price volatility, and order routing in the continuous market that follows daily openings and which precedes daily closings. NASDAQ's closing call has significantly reduced both spreads and volatility for all market capitalization groups. Its opening call similarly reduced spreads, while a generally similar, though somewhat weaker, pattern of volatility reduction was realized. Although the pattern of trading volume has, for the most part, not been significantly affected, our findings, comprehensively viewed, suggest that the calls have had a positive spillover effect on the dynamic behavior of price formation in NASDAQ's continuous market.     

The submission of limit orders or market orders: The role of timing and information in the Reuters D2000-2 system

Recent work in the market microstructure literature suggests that the speed with which orders arrive in the market impacts traders' order submission decisions. In this study we use an asymmetric autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model to empirically investigate the influence on the submission of limit and market orders of changes in the time between the past submissions of different types of orders, changes in the slope of the limit order book, and changes in price uncertainty. We find that the expected time between the arrivals of successive orders in the foreign exchange market depends on the previous type of order submitted and the slope on both sides of the order book. Price uncertainty (volatility) plays a secondary role after accounting for the impact of changes in the slope of the order book. Lastly, we find that there are fundamental changes in the level of information contained in the submission of orders at the opening and closing of markets.     

The Relationship Among Market-Making Revenue, Payment for Order Flow, and Trading Costs for Market Orders

We study the division of market-making revenue among dealer, broker, and trader. When Knight Securities, a major Nasdaq dealer, interacts with market orders in actively traded stocks during the fourth quarter of 1996, we estimate that its revenue is $0.057 per share. Knight pays brokers at least $0.025 per share (44% of revenue) for orders. To examine whether brokers appear to share these payments with traders, we compare net trading costs (trade price net of commissions) for traders using brokers routing Knight orders with estimated net trading costs for traders using the only discount broker we can determine did not directly receive market-making revenue. We find that the net trading cost of the broker refusing order-flow payments does not dominate the net trading cost of all brokers selling order flow to Knight. This finding suggests that order-flow payments do not unambiguously harm traders and challenges the conclusions of extant studies using only trade prices to assess market quality.     

Can Brokers Have It All? On the Relation between Make‐Take Fees and Limit Order Execution Quality

We identify retail brokers that seemingly route orders to maximize order flow payments, by selling market orders and sending limit orders to venues paying large liquidity rebates. Angel, Harris, and Spatt argue that such routing may not always be in customers’ best interests. For both proprietary limit order data and a broad sample of trades from TAQ, we document a negative relation between several measures of limit order execution quality and rebate/fee level. This finding suggests that order routing designed to maximize liquidity rebates does not maximize limit order execution quality and thus brokers cannot have it all.     

Order Imbalance and Its Impact on Market Performance: Order-driven vs. Quote-driven Markets

Abstract:  The behavior of order imbalance and its impact on market performance at the two Taiwan stock index futures markets, the TAIFEX and the SGX-DT, is investigated. The TAIFEX is an order-driven call market, while the SGX-DT uses a quote-driven continuous trading system. Our empirical results show that for the TAIFEX order-driven market, the spread is minimized when order imbalance is high. In contrast, for the SGX-DT quote-driven market, the spread is highest when order imbalance is high. For both markets, order imbalance has an impact on market liquidity and volatility. The impact is larger and more significant for SGX-DT futures. This suggests that the order-driven market mechanism of TAIFEX futures is superior in absorbing order imbalance and in reducing the resulting price impact.     

Do brokers' recommendation changes generate brokerage? Evidence from a central limit order market

We examine the short‐term response to recommendation changes on the Australian Securities Exchange, a central limit order market. In both central limit order markets and dealer‐driven markets, clients may reward the recommending broker with increased trade volumes. But a central limit order market does not have mandatory market makers and hence provides greater opportunity to free ride. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that recommending brokers are rewarded with higher trade volumes and brokerage commission. Consistent with the tipping hypothesis, these rewards are concentrated in the period shortly before the release. There is no evidence of free riding.     

The Manipulator's Poker: Order-Based Manipulation in the Chinese Stock Market

This paper investigates order-based manipulation and its effects on investor behavior and market efficiency. Using a unique data set from the Chinese stock market, we show that (1) order-based manipulation affects market liquidity and trading behavior, (2) the manipulator pretends to be informed or expects to be seen as informed by choosing a "right" time to implement the manipulation, and (3) the manipulation rapidly changes investor reaction to the market order/depth imbalance in the short run, and the effect gradually drops during the postmanipulation period. Our results are robust to alternative measures and offer clear implications for both theory and policy.