Inflation and output dynamics with state-dependent pricing decisions

This paper studies a state-dependent pricing model in which firms face a fixed cost of changing their pricing plans. A pricing plan specifies an entire sequence of time-varying future prices. Allowing firms to choose a pricing plan rather than a single price generates inflation inertia in the response of the economy to small changes in the growth rate of money. Allowing firms to choose when to change their pricing plan generates a non-linear response of inflation and output to small and large changes in the money growth rate. The non-linear solution method also reveals that the model generates an asymmetric response of output and inflation to monetary expansions and contractions.     

Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model

Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence , is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of nontrivial real imperfections. We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation–unemployment relation found in the data.     

A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation

Under a conventional policy rule, a central bank adjusts its policy rate linearly according to the gap between inflation and its target, and the gap between output and its potential. Under “the opportunistic approach to disinflation” a central bank controls inflation aggressively when inflation is far from its target, but concentrates more on output stabilization when inflation is close to its target, allowing supply shocks and unforeseen fluctuations in aggregate demand to move inflation within a certain band. We use stochastic simulations of a small-scale rational expectations model to contrast the behavior of output and inflation under opportunistic and linear rules.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.     

Model Uncertainty and Delegation: A Case for Friedman's k-Percent Money Growth Rule?

Model uncertainty affects the monetary policy delegation problem. If there is uncertainty with regards to the determination of the delegated objective variables, the central bank will want robustness against potential model misspecifications. We show that with plausible degree of model uncertainty, delegation of the Friedman rule of increasing the money stock by k percent to the central bank will outperform commitment to the social loss function (flexible inflation targeting). The reason is that the price paid for robustness under flexible inflation targeting outweighs the inefficiency of money growth targeting. Imperfect control of money growth does not change this conclusion.     

Relative Prices as Aggregate Supply Shocks with Trend Inflation

Ball and Mankiw (1995) use a static menu-cost model to explain the historical behavior of the first and higher moments of commodity price changes in U.S. producer prices. We show that when appropriately modified for a world of positive trend inflation and forward-looking behavior by firms, the menu-cost model predicts a much weaker (possibly zero) correlation between the mean and the skewness of price changes than that found in the data.     

Raise Rates to Raise Inflation? Neo‐Fisherianism in the New Keynesian Model

Increasing the inflation target in a New Keynesian (NK) model may require increasing, rather than decreasing, the nominal interest rate in the short run. We refer to this positive short‐run comovement between the nominal rates and inflation conditional on a nominal shock as Neo‐Fisherianism. We show that the NK model is more likely to be Neo‐Fisherian the more persistent is the change in the inflation target and the more flexible are prices. Neo‐Fisherianism is driven by the forward‐looking nature of the model. Modifications that make the framework less forward‐looking make it less likely for the model to exhibit Neo‐Fisherianism.     

Fiscal Requirements for Dynamic and Real Determinacies in Economies with Private Provision of Liquidity: A Monetarist Assessment

We study the impact of fiscal policies on the inherent links between inflation, unemployment, and asset prices in an environment where firms provide liquidity and the central bank follows a constant money growth rate rule. Firms, other than hiring workers, also supply private assets that are not only useful as a store of value but also as collateral. When firms are not taxed and public debt is scarce, the economy is non-Ricardian so that real indeterminacies can be observed. Moreover, labor market characteristics do not affect the demand for government liabilities. However, when agents face public and private asset scarcity, labor market conditions then impact asset prices and inflation. We further show that irrespective of the type of asset scarcity agents face, when firms are taxed non-ad valorem, not only the level of tax revenues but also its composition matter for real allocations. Moreover, we show that labor market conditions directly affect the dynamics of all government liabilities and inflation.     

On the Asymmetric U‐Shaped Relationship between Inflation,Inflation Uncertainty,and Relative Price Skewness in the UK

We investigate the asymmetric relationships between aggregate inflation and the second and third moments of the cross‐sectional distribution of relative prices using a modified Calvo pricing model with regime‐dependent price rigidities. Calibration experiments reveal that the inflation‐standard deviation and inflation‐skewness relationships exhibit U‐shaped asymmetries around the historical mean inflation rate. UK sectoral data support our results. We conclude that monetary policy should target an inflation rate proximate to the (common) minima of these nonlinear relationships and that core inflation measures should not be used for policy purposes as they exclude much of the information contained in the higher moments.     

The Long‐Run Fisher Effect: Can It Be Tested?

In this paper, I provide a plausible explanation as to why past studies have been unable to find support for the long-run Fisher effect. My argument is that exogenous shocks to the inflation rates in industrialized economies have not produced the permanent change to inflation necessary for testing the Fisher effect. Instead of finding a nonstationary, unit-root process for inflation like previous Fisher effect studies, here each country's inflation rate is found to follow a mean-reverting, fractionally integrated, long-memory process. Applying a bivariate, maximum likelihood estimator to a multivariate, fractionally integrated model of inflation and nominal interest, I find that the estimated inflation rates in 17 developed countries are highly persistent, fractionally integrated, mean-reverting processes with order of integration parameters significantly less than one. Since a permanent change to inflation has not occurred, a test of whether a permanent change to inflation affects the nominal interest rate one-for-one will be uninformative as to the truth or fallacy of the Fisher effect hypothesis.     

Inflation Targeting Matters: Evidence from OECD Economies' Sacrifice Ratios

Using data from OECD economies, we show that inflation targeters suffered smaller output losses during disinflations when compared to nontargeters. We also study why some countries choose to inflation target while others do not and find that higher average inflation and smaller debt levels render the adoption of the regime more likely. Applying Heckman's procedure to control for selection bias does not alter the link between inflation targeting and less costly disinflations.     

An open-economy new Keynesian Phillips curve for the U.K.

We estimate a pricing equation or “new Keynesian Phillips curve” (NKPC) obtained from a structural dynamic model of price setting based on Rotemberg [1982. Sticky prices in the United States. Journal of Political Economy 90(6), 1187-1211] and extended to capture employment adjustment costs and the openness of the United Kingdom. This model nests the baseline Galí and Gertler [1999. Inflation dynamics: a structural econometric analysis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 127-159) and Sbordone [2002. Prices and unit labor costs: a new test of price stickiness. Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 265-292] relationship between inflation and marginal cost in the limiting case of no employment adjustment costs, no impact of relative prices of imported inputs on real marginal cost and a constant equilibrium markup. Our findings indicate that each of our modifications to the baseline NKPC model is important for U.K. data, so that inflation in the U.K. is explained both by changes in employment and by changes in real import prices, in general, and real oil prices, in particular. External competitive pressures also seem to affect U.K. inflation via their impact on the equilibrium price markup of domestic firms.     

Effective Use of Survey Information in Estimating the Evolution of Expected Inflation

The evolution of the term structure of expected U.S. inflation is modeled using survey data to provide timely information on structural change not contained in lagged inflation data. To capture shifts in subjective perceptions, the model is adaptive to long‐horizon survey expectations. However, even short‐horizon survey expectations inform shifting‐endpoint estimates that capture the lag between inflation and the perceived inflation target, which anchors inflation expectations. Results show movements of the perceived target are an important source of inflation persistence and suggest historical U.S. monetary policy was not fully credible for much of the postwar sample.     

New Keynesian Macroeconomics and the Term Structure

This article complements the structural New Keynesian macro framework with a no-arbitrage affine term structure model. Whereas our methodology is general, we focus on an extended macro model with unobservable processes for the inflation target and the natural rate of output that are filtered from macro and term structure data. We find that term structure information helps generate large and significant parameters governing the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Our model also delivers strong contemporaneous responses of the entire term structure to various macroeconomic shocks. The inflation target shock dominates the variation in the "level factor" whereas monetary policy shocks dominate the variation in the "slope and curvature factors."     

The Role of Inflation Target Adjustment in Stabilization Policy

How and under what circumstances can adjusting the inflation target serve as a stabilization-policy tool and contribute to welfare improvement? We answer these questions quantitatively with a standard New Keynesian model that includes cost-push-type shocks. Our proposed inflation target rule calls for the target to be adjusted in a persistent manner and in the opposite direction to the realization of a cost-push shock, which is essentially a makeup strategy. The inflation target rule, combined with a Taylor-type rule, significantly reduces inflation fluctuations originating from cost-push shocks and mitigates the stabilization trade-off, resulting in a similar level of welfare to that associated with the Ramsey optimal policy.     

Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model

Most central banks perceive a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade‐off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of nontrivial real imperfections. We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation–unemployment relation found in the data.     

Inflation Dynamics When Inflation Is Near Zero

We discuss the likely evolution of U.S. inflation in the near and medium terms on the basis of (i) past U.S. experience with very low levels of inflation, (ii) the most recent Japanese experience with negative inflation, and (iii) some preliminary U.S. micro evidence on downward nominal wage rigidity. Our findings question the view that stable long‐run inflation expectations and downward nominal wage rigidity will necessarily provide sufficient support to prices to avoid further declines in inflation. We show that an inflation model fitted on Japanese data over the past 20 years, which accounts for both short‐ and long‐run inflation expectations, matches the recent U.S. inflation experience quite well. While the model indicates that U.S. inflation might be subject to a lower bound, it does not rule out a prolonged period of low inflation or even mild deflation going forward. In addition, micro‐level data on wages suggest no obvious downward rigidity in the firm's wage bill, downward rigidity in individual wages notwithstanding. As a consequence, downward nominal wage rigidity may not be enough to offset deflationary pressures in the current situation.     

Inflation targeting,credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules

In this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target. We present a stylized New Keynesian model in which agents' inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target. To (re-) establish credibility, monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past. Moreover, the central bank responds non-linearly to past inflation gaps. This is reflected in an additional term in the central bank's instrument rule, which we refer to as the ”credibility loss.” Augmenting a standard Taylor (1993) rule with the latter term, we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting (IT) economies. We find, first, that past deviations from IT feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful. Deterioration in credibility (ceteris paribus) forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps. Second, we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses, with the latter dominating the former.     

Inflation dynamics: A cross-country investigation

We document that “persistent and lagged” inflation (with respect to output) is a world-wide phenomenon in that these short-run inflation dynamics are highly synchronized across countries. In particular, the average cross-country correlation of inflation is significantly and systematically stronger than that of output, while the cross-country correlation of money growth is essentially zero. We investigate whether standard monetary models driven by monetary shocks are consistent with the empirical facts. We find that neither the new Keynesian sticky-price model nor the sticky-information model can fully explain the data. An independent contribution of the paper is to provide a simple solution technique for solving general equilibrium models with sticky information.     

Tunneling,propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong

We examine a sample of connected transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders. We address three questions: What types of connected transactions lead to expropriation of minority shareholders? Which firms are more likely to expropriate? Does the market anticipate the expropriation by firms? On average, firms announcing connected transactions earn significant negative excess returns, significantly lower than firms announcing similar arm's length transactions. We find limited evidence that firms undertaking connected transactions trade at discounted valuations prior to the expropriation, suggesting that investors cannot predict expropriation and revalue firms only when expropriation does occur.