Unstable Inflation Targets

This paper studies long‐run inflation targets and stability in an imperfect information environment. When central banks set an inflation target that is not fully communicated, agents draw inferences about inflation from recent data and remain alert to structural change by forming expectations from a forecasting model that is estimated via discounted least squares. Inflation targets can lead agents' beliefs to depart from rational expectations through two channels. First, implementing a higher inflation target can lead to overshooting. Second, there can be nearly self‐fulfilling inflation, disinflation, or deflation that arises as an endogenous response to shocks. Policy implications for implementing a higher target without deanchoring expectations are discussed.     

Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations and Learning

Using the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we estimate a learning model of inflation expectations, allowing for heterogeneous use of private information and lifetime inflation experience. Life experience inflation has a significant impact on individual expectations, but only for 1‐year‐ahead inflation. Public information is substantially more relevant for longer horizon expectations. Even controlling for life experience inflation and public information, idiosyncratic information explains a nontrivial proportion of the inflation forecasts of agents. Women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their idiosyncratic information, and give less importance to recent movements in inflation.     

Heterogeneous Expectations,Optimal Monetary Policy,and the Merit of Policy Inertia

The design and analysis of optimal monetary policy is usually guided by the paradigm of homogeneous rational expectations. Instead, we examine the dynamic consequences of design and implementation strategies, when the actual economy features expectational heterogeneity. Agents have either rational or adaptive expectations. Consequently, the central bank's ability to achieve price stability under heterogeneous expectations depends on its objective and implementation strategy. An expectations‐based reaction function, which appropriately conditions on private sector expectations, performs exceptionally well. However, once the objective introduces policy inertia, popular strategies have similar determinacy properties, but they are less operational. This finding calls for new implementation strategies under interest rate stabilization.     

Inflation Targeting as Constrained Discretion

This paper suggests a simple framework for modeling inflation targeting as constrained discretion. Although it is widely claimed that inflation targeting has been successful in maintaining low and stable inflation, an announcement of an inflation target does not by itself mean that central bankers are precommiting to how they conduct monetary policy. In comparison to the assumption of many theoretical studies, central banks conduct monetary policy in a discretionary fashion and rarely precommit to a rule in reality. Therefore, the central bank in this paper is modeled as discretionary, yet faced with a constraint, that an average of future inflation over a certain horizon should be kept on or near the preannounced target level. It is natural to add this constraint to the central banker’s optimization problem, since inflation targeting involves one way or another an evaluation of the performance over a certain horizon. So it is argued that the better outcome of inflation targeting does not come from a commitment but from “constrained discretion.” This paper also sheds some light on optimal targeting horizon.     

Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous and Misspecified Expectations

In the recent literature on monetary policy and learning, it has been suggested that private sector's expectations should play a role in the policy rule implemented by the central bank, as they could improve the ability of the policymaker to stabilize the economy. Private sector's expectations, in these studies, are often taken to be homogeneous and rational, at least in the limit of a learning process. In this paper, instead, we consider the case in which private agents are heterogeneous in their expectations formation mechanisms and hold heterogeneous expectations in equilibrium. We investigate the impact of this heterogeneity in expectations on central bank's policy implementation and on the ensuing economic outcomes, and the general result that emerges is that the central bank should disregard inaccurate private sector expectations and solely base its policy on the accurate ones.     

从通货膨胀目标制看货币政策透明度建设

近年来，通货膨胀目标制已成为一种新的货币政策框架，而通货膨胀目标制的显著优点在于能通过增强货币政策的透明度，提高政策的可信度，进而提高货币政策的有效性。提高货币政策的透明度正在成为一种国际趋势。因此．本文通过借鉴实施通货膨胀目标制的西方发达国家的成功经验，探讨我国应如何加强货币政策透明度的建设，提高货币政策有效性。     

News on Inflation and the Epidemiology of Inflation Expectations

This paper examines the nexus between news coverage on inflation and households’ inflation expectations. In doing so, we test the epidemiological foundations of the sticky information model (Carroll 2003, 2006 ). We use both aggregate and household‐level data from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. We highlight a fundamental disconnection among news on inflation, consumers’ frequency of expectation updating, and the accuracy of their expectations. Our evidence provides at best weak support to the epidemiological framework, as most of the consumers who update their expectations do not revise them toward professional forecasters’ mean forecast.     

Using Survey Data of Inflation Expectations in the Estimation of Learning and Rational Expectations Models

Does survey data contain useful information for estimating macroeconomic models? We address this question by using survey data of inflation expectations to estimate the New Keynesian model by Smets and Wouters ( 2007 ) and compare its performance under rational expectations and adaptive learning. The survey information serves as an additional moment restriction and helps us to determine the learning agents' forecasting model for inflation. Adaptive learning fares similarly to rational expectations in fitting macro data, but clearly outperforms rational expectations in fitting macro and survey data simultaneously. In other words, survey data contain additional information that is not present in the macro data alone.     

Inflation Targeting Does Not Matter: Another Look at OECD Sacrifice Ratios

Recently in this journal, Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009) concluded that inflation targeters were able to bring inflation down at less cost than nontargeters (p. 242). This comment shows that their conclusion is not robust but instead is the result of comparing a particular subset of inflation targeting (IT) disinflations with nonsimultaneous disinflations that occurred under very different macroeconomic conditions. In their sample, simple extensions such as justifiably varying the treatment group of IT disinflations, to control for common time‐varying effects or to control for the Maastricht Treaty effects, suggest that IT does not matter.     

Inflation Targeting,Fiscal Policy,and the Exchange Rate Regime

Until recently, Turkey’s economy was characterized by high inflation, undisciplined public finance management, and a fragile banking system and experienced multiple economic crises. After the economy was hit by another crisis in 2001, the central bank became independent, adopted inflation targeting as the monetary policy framework, and implemented reforms to adopt a more stringent fiscal policy. Inflation rates decreased to single-digit levels within 3 years after the independence of the central bank. This article analyzes the end of the high inflation period in the context of monetary and fiscal policy interactions within a Markov-Switching Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model in which monetary and fiscal policies are allowed to switch between different regimes.     

Fiscal Adjustment and Inflation Targeting in Less Developed Countries

Inflation targeting may not be viable in less developed countries (LDCs) where policymakers rely too heavily on cuts in infrastructure investment to balance the budget. Using a mix of analytical and numerical methods, we demonstrate that the equilibrium ceases to be saddle point stable under active policy when infrastructure cuts account for 30–70% of fiscal adjustment and the return on infrastructure exceeds a comparatively low threshold value. The result is robust to the form of the Taylor rule, the degree of real wage flexibility, the initial level of debt, the choice of a balanced‐budget or debt‐targeting rule, and the q‐elasticity of private investment spending.     

Determinacy under Inflation Targeting Interest Rate Policy in a Sticky Price Model with Investment (and Labor Bargaining)

In a sticky price model with investment spending, recent research shows that inflation-forecast targeting interest rate policy makes determinacy of equilibrium essentially impossible. We examine a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy under interest rate policy that responds to a weighted average of an inflation forecast and current inflation. This condition demonstrates that the average-inflation targeting policy ensures determinacy as long as both the response to average inflation and the relative weight of current inflation are large enough. We also find that interest rate policy that responds solely to past inflation guarantees determinacy when its response satisfies the Taylor principle and is not large. These results still hold even when wages and hours worked are determined by Nash bargaining.     

Adaptive learning, forecast-based instrument rules and monetary policy

This paper argues that recently popular forecast-based instrument rules for monetary policy may fail to stabilize economic fluctuations. In a New Keynesian model of output gap and inflation determination in which private agents face multi-period decision problems, but have non-rational expectations and learn over time, if the monetary authority adopts a forecast-based instrument rule and responds to observed private forecasts then this class of policies frequently induce divergent learning dynamics. A central bank that correctly understands private behavior can mitigate such instability by responding to the determinants of private forecasts. This suggests gathering information on the determinants of expectations to be useful.     

Inflation,Employment, and Monetary Policy: Objectives and Outcomes in the UK and U.S. Compared

This paper explores how sensitive is monetary policy to the precise preferences of the central bank over inflation and economic activity. It does so in order to address a puzzle—which is that the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England appear to have quite different objectives and yet have adopted strikingly similar policies in recent years. I use a calibrated model to assess how policy might be sensitive to attaching different weights to inflation, output, and the output gap in central bank objectives. I find that a wide range of weights can give rise to rather similar monetary policies.     

Inflation targeting makes the difference: Novel evidence on inflation stabilization

Though 28 and 29 provides theoretical evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting is consistent with an inflation stabilizing monetary policy, empirical evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting actually changes central bank’s behavior is still missing. This paper aims to close this gap and estimates forward-looking monetary policy rules for 20 inflation targeting countries. To this end, we use a data set which is available to the central bank in real-time, published on a frequently basis, comparable among all countries, and which includes the periods before and after the introduction of inflation targeting. We find that the introduction of inflation targeting significantly shifts the central bank’s reaction function toward inflation stabilizing. We also provide evidence of time-varying effects and find that central banks stabilize inflation once inflation targeting is introduced. We take our results as strong evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting makes the difference for monetary policy strategies.     

A New Model of Inflation,Trend Inflation,and Long‐Run Inflation Expectations

This paper develops a bivariate model of inflation and a survey‐based long‐run forecast of inflation that allows for the estimation of the link between trend inflation and the long‐run forecast. Thus, our model allows for the possibilities that long‐run forecasts taken from surveys can be equated with trend inflation, that the two are completely unrelated, or anything in between. Using a variety of inflation measures and survey‐based forecasts for several countries, we find that long‐run forecasts can provide substantial help in refining estimates and fitting and forecasting inflation. It is less helpful to simply equate trend inflation with the long‐run forecasts.     

Adaptive expectations, underparameterization and the Lucas critique

A striking implication of the replacement of adaptive expectations by rational expectations was the “Lucas critique,” which showed that expectation parameters, and endogenous variable dynamics, depend on policy parameters. We consider this issue from the vantage point of bounded rationality, where for transparency we model bounded rationality by means of simple adaptive expectations. We show that for a range of processes, monetary policy remains subject to the Lucas critique. However, there are also regimes in which the expectation parameter is locally invariant and the Lucas critique does not apply.     

Time Aggregation and the Relationship between Inflation and Money Growth

Using panel data for 99 countries, we confirm that the measured elasticity of prices with respect to money is higher, and closer to unity, the higher is money growth and the longer the time horizon over which the data are averaged. We propose two explanations. In one, the true model of inflation involves a lagged response to money growth. In the other, there is negative correlation between shocks to inflation and money growth. Our empirical results can be explained if high–money‐growth countries have (i) shorter lags or (ii) less negative correlation, when compared to countries with low money growth.     

Economic Literacy and Inflation Expectations: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

We present experimental evidence of a link between economic literacy and inflation forecast accuracy. The experiment investigates two channels through which economic literacy may enable better forecasts: (i) choice of information and (ii) use of information. More literate subjects choose more relevant information and use the given information more effectively. Starting from a 10th percentile score, the boost in literacy from taking an economics course predicts a 0.64 standard deviation decline in mean absolute forecasting error. Our findings suggest that a significant portion of demographic heterogeneity in inflation expectations—observed in survey data—may be driven by heterogeneity in economic literacy.     

Nominal GDP Targeting and the Taylor Rule on an Even Playing Field

Some economists advocate nominal GDP targeting as an alternative to the Taylor Rule. These arguments are largely based on the idea that nominal GDP targeting would require less knowledge on the part of policymakers than a traditional Taylor Rule. In particular, a nominal GDP targeting rule would not require real-time knowledge of the output gap. We examine the importance of this claim by amending a standard New Keynesian model to assume that the central bank has imperfect information about the output gap and therefore must forecast the output gap based on previous information. Forecast errors by the central bank can then potentially induce unanticipated changes in the short-term nominal interest rate, distinct from a standard monetary policy shock. We show that forecast errors of the output gap by the Federal Reserve can account for up to 13% of the fluctuations in the output gap. In addition, our simulations imply that a nominal GDP targeting rule would produce lower volatility in both inflation and the output gap in comparison with the Taylor Rule under imperfect information.