Inflation Targeting,Recursive Inattentiveness,and Heterogeneous Beliefs

We consider a monetary authority that provides an explicit inflation target in order to align expectations with the policy objective. However, biased perceptions of the target may arise due to imperfect information flows. We allow agents to revise expectations over time and we model their recursive choice among prediction strategies as an optimization problem under rational inattention. We then investigate whether a simple policy rule can steer the economy toward the targeted equilibrium. Our findings suggest that determinacy under rational expectations may not be sufficient to reach the target. Instead, monetary policy should be fine‐tuned to correct agents' biased beliefs.     

Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations and Learning

Using the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we estimate a learning model of inflation expectations, allowing for heterogeneous use of private information and lifetime inflation experience. Life experience inflation has a significant impact on individual expectations, but only for 1‐year‐ahead inflation. Public information is substantially more relevant for longer horizon expectations. Even controlling for life experience inflation and public information, idiosyncratic information explains a nontrivial proportion of the inflation forecasts of agents. Women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their idiosyncratic information, and give less importance to recent movements in inflation.     

Interest‐Rate Pegs in New Keynesian Models

The conventional policy perspective is that lowering the interest rate increases output and inflation in the short run, while maintaining inflation at a higher level requires a higher interest rate in the long run. In contrast, it has been argued that a Neo‐Fisherian policy of setting an interest‐rate peg at a fixed higher level will increase the inflation rate. We show that adaptive learning argues against the Neo‐Fisherian approach. Pegging the interest rate at a higher level will induce instability and most likely lead to falling inflation and output over time. Eventually, this would precipitate a change of policy.     

Optimal Constrained Interest-Rate Rules

We show that if policymakers compute the optimal unconstrained interest-rate rule within a Taylor-type class, they may be led to rules that generate indeterminacy and/or instability under learning. This problem is compounded by uncertainty about structural parameters since an optimal rule that is determinate and stable under learning for one calibration may be indeterminate or unstable under learning under a different calibration. We advocate a procedure in which policymakers restrict attention to rules constrained to lie in the determinate learnable region for all plausible calibrations, and that minimize the expected loss, computed using structural parameter priors, subject to this constraint.     

Using Survey Data of Inflation Expectations in the Estimation of Learning and Rational Expectations Models

Does survey data contain useful information for estimating macroeconomic models? We address this question by using survey data of inflation expectations to estimate the New Keynesian model by Smets and Wouters ( 2007 ) and compare its performance under rational expectations and adaptive learning. The survey information serves as an additional moment restriction and helps us to determine the learning agents' forecasting model for inflation. Adaptive learning fares similarly to rational expectations in fitting macro data, but clearly outperforms rational expectations in fitting macro and survey data simultaneously. In other words, survey data contain additional information that is not present in the macro data alone.     

Heterogeneous Expectations,Optimal Monetary Policy,and the Merit of Policy Inertia

The design and analysis of optimal monetary policy is usually guided by the paradigm of homogeneous rational expectations. Instead, we examine the dynamic consequences of design and implementation strategies, when the actual economy features expectational heterogeneity. Agents have either rational or adaptive expectations. Consequently, the central bank's ability to achieve price stability under heterogeneous expectations depends on its objective and implementation strategy. An expectations‐based reaction function, which appropriately conditions on private sector expectations, performs exceptionally well. However, once the objective introduces policy inertia, popular strategies have similar determinacy properties, but they are less operational. This finding calls for new implementation strategies under interest rate stabilization.     

Using a long-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument

Using a short-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument can be problematic near its zero bound constraint. An alternative strategy is to use a long-term interest rate as the policy instrument. We find when Taylor-type policy rules are used by the central bank to set the long rate in a standard New Keynesian model, indeterminacy—that is, multiple rational expectations equilibria—may often result. However, a policy rule with a long-rate policy instrument that responds in a “forward-looking” fashion to inflation expectations can avoid the problem of indeterminacy.     

News on Inflation and the Epidemiology of Inflation Expectations

This paper examines the nexus between news coverage on inflation and households’ inflation expectations. In doing so, we test the epidemiological foundations of the sticky information model (Carroll 2003, 2006 ). We use both aggregate and household‐level data from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. We highlight a fundamental disconnection among news on inflation, consumers’ frequency of expectation updating, and the accuracy of their expectations. Our evidence provides at best weak support to the epidemiological framework, as most of the consumers who update their expectations do not revise them toward professional forecasters’ mean forecast.     

Time Aggregation and the Relationship between Inflation and Money Growth

Using panel data for 99 countries, we confirm that the measured elasticity of prices with respect to money is higher, and closer to unity, the higher is money growth and the longer the time horizon over which the data are averaged. We propose two explanations. In one, the true model of inflation involves a lagged response to money growth. In the other, there is negative correlation between shocks to inflation and money growth. Our empirical results can be explained if high–money‐growth countries have (i) shorter lags or (ii) less negative correlation, when compared to countries with low money growth.     

Escaping Volatile Inflation

Why has inflation been so stable in developed economies since the early 1990s? In this paper, we answer that the United States and other countries may have escaped from a volatile inflation equilibrium. Our argument builds on the story proposed by Tom Sargent in The Conquest of American Inflation, where the fall in inflation in the 1980s was attributed to changing government beliefs. To explain the escape in inflation volatility, we unwind one of Sargent's simplifications and allow the government to react to some of the shocks in the economy. In this case, when government beliefs turned against the Phillips curve in the 1980s they not only led to an escape from high inflation, but also stopped government using changes in inflation to offset shocks. Inflation and inflation volatility therefore escaped in tandem. Our analysis also sheds some light on why the escape in inflation occurred at the time it did.     

Learning and the Yield Curve

Two central implications of Expectations Hypothesis under rational expectations are inconsistent with yield curve data: (i) future expected long yields fall, instead of rising, when yield spread rises; (ii) long yields are excessively volatile relative to short yields. I propose an optimization framework in which boundedly rational agents use adaptive learning to form expectations. The belief structure rationalizes pattern of yields observed in the data so that the first puzzle does not arise with subjective expectations: intertemporal income and substitution effects are amplified relative to rational expectations. The second puzzle is partly accounted for by extra volatility due to parameter uncertainty.     

Adaptive learning, forecast-based instrument rules and monetary policy

This paper argues that recently popular forecast-based instrument rules for monetary policy may fail to stabilize economic fluctuations. In a New Keynesian model of output gap and inflation determination in which private agents face multi-period decision problems, but have non-rational expectations and learn over time, if the monetary authority adopts a forecast-based instrument rule and responds to observed private forecasts then this class of policies frequently induce divergent learning dynamics. A central bank that correctly understands private behavior can mitigate such instability by responding to the determinants of private forecasts. This suggests gathering information on the determinants of expectations to be useful.     

Inflation,Employment, and Monetary Policy: Objectives and Outcomes in the UK and U.S. Compared

This paper explores how sensitive is monetary policy to the precise preferences of the central bank over inflation and economic activity. It does so in order to address a puzzle—which is that the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England appear to have quite different objectives and yet have adopted strikingly similar policies in recent years. I use a calibrated model to assess how policy might be sensitive to attaching different weights to inflation, output, and the output gap in central bank objectives. I find that a wide range of weights can give rise to rather similar monetary policies.     

The Role of Media for Inflation Forecast Disagreement of Households and Professional Forecasters

This paper investigates the effects of media coverage about consumer price inflation on inflation forecast disagreement of German households and professional forecasters. We adopt a Bayesian learning model in which media coverage of inflation affects forecast disagreement by influencing information sets as well as predictor choice. Our empirical results show that disagreement of households depends on the heterogeneity of story content and on the reporting intensity, especially of news on rising inflation. Disagreement of professional forecasters does not depend on media coverage. With respect to the influence of macroeconomic variables, we provide evidence that disagreement of professional forecasters primarily depends on the inflation rate and on inflation volatility. The response of households to inflation is much less pronounced.     

Monetary Policy and Inflation in the 70s

An influential paper by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) has attributed the great inflation of the 1970s to the violation of the Taylor principle in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy (weak, indeterminacy inducing response to expected inflation). We evaluate this thesis in the context of a standard New Keynesian model against a version of the model that incorporates incomplete information learning about the true state of the economy. The likelihood‐based estimation of the model overwhelmingly favors the specification with indeterminacy over the alternatives with determinacy, independent of the presence and size of misperceptions.     

Survey Measures of Expected Inflation and the Inflation Process

The accuracy of inflation forecasts obtained from household and professional surveys has deteriorated noticeably of late, to the extent that a simple autoregressive specification outperforms survey forecasts. The decline in (absolute and relative) accuracy has taken place at about the same time as an apparent change in the inflation process. Projections of household forecasts on realized inflation suggests that households have not recognized this change. For the professionals, projections of expected inflation on headline inflation have changed, but on core inflation have not. By contrast, projections of realized headline inflation on core have changed sharply.     

Inflation Dynamics When Inflation Is Near Zero

We discuss the likely evolution of U.S. inflation in the near and medium terms on the basis of (i) past U.S. experience with very low levels of inflation, (ii) the most recent Japanese experience with negative inflation, and (iii) some preliminary U.S. micro evidence on downward nominal wage rigidity. Our findings question the view that stable long‐run inflation expectations and downward nominal wage rigidity will necessarily provide sufficient support to prices to avoid further declines in inflation. We show that an inflation model fitted on Japanese data over the past 20 years, which accounts for both short‐ and long‐run inflation expectations, matches the recent U.S. inflation experience quite well. While the model indicates that U.S. inflation might be subject to a lower bound, it does not rule out a prolonged period of low inflation or even mild deflation going forward. In addition, micro‐level data on wages suggest no obvious downward rigidity in the firm's wage bill, downward rigidity in individual wages notwithstanding. As a consequence, downward nominal wage rigidity may not be enough to offset deflationary pressures in the current situation.     

Adaptive expectations, underparameterization and the Lucas critique

A striking implication of the replacement of adaptive expectations by rational expectations was the “Lucas critique,” which showed that expectation parameters, and endogenous variable dynamics, depend on policy parameters. We consider this issue from the vantage point of bounded rationality, where for transparency we model bounded rationality by means of simple adaptive expectations. We show that for a range of processes, monetary policy remains subject to the Lucas critique. However, there are also regimes in which the expectation parameter is locally invariant and the Lucas critique does not apply.     

Inflation targeting makes the difference: Novel evidence on inflation stabilization

Though 28 and 29 provides theoretical evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting is consistent with an inflation stabilizing monetary policy, empirical evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting actually changes central bank’s behavior is still missing. This paper aims to close this gap and estimates forward-looking monetary policy rules for 20 inflation targeting countries. To this end, we use a data set which is available to the central bank in real-time, published on a frequently basis, comparable among all countries, and which includes the periods before and after the introduction of inflation targeting. We find that the introduction of inflation targeting significantly shifts the central bank’s reaction function toward inflation stabilizing. We also provide evidence of time-varying effects and find that central banks stabilize inflation once inflation targeting is introduced. We take our results as strong evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting makes the difference for monetary policy strategies.     

Learning by Disinflating

Disinflationary episodes are a valuable source of information for economic agents trying to learn about the economy. In this paper, we are particularly interested in how policymakers can themselves learn by disinflating. The approach differs from the existing literature, which typically focuses on the learning of private agents during a disinflation. We build a model where both the policymaker and private agents learn, and ask what happens if the policymaker has to disinflate to satisfy a new central bank mandate specifying greater emphasis on inflation stabilization. In this case, our results show that inflation may fall dramatically before it gradually rises to its new long‐run level. The potential for inflation to undershoot its long‐run level during a disinflationary episode suggests that caution should be exercised when assessing the success of any change in the policymaker's mandate.