What Drives Housing Markets: Fundamentals or Bubbles?

This study applies the dynamic Gordon growth model which is in the circumstance of rational bubbles to decompose log price-rent ratio into three parts, i.e., rational bubbles, discounted expected future rent growth rates and discounted expected future returns. The latter two terms represent housing fundamentals. The magnitudes of the components of price-rent ratio’s variance are estimated to distinguish the relative impact of the three parts on housing prices. Using time series data from the housing markets in the four largest cities in China (1991:Q1–2011:Q1 for Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen; 1993:Q2–2011:Q1 for Beijing), this paper presents a number of empirical findings: (a) the variance of rational bubbles is much larger than the variance of price-rent ratio, and rational bubbles contribute more fluctuations directly to price-rent ratio than the expected returns or the expected rent growth rates do; (b) the covariance between rational bubbles and expected returns or expected rent growth rates is also large; (c) the positive covariance of rational bubbles and expected returns implies that high expected returns coexist with bubbles, which differs from previous findings that lower expected returns drive asset prices; (d) the negative covariance of rational bubbles and expected rent growth rates indicates that the larger the bubbles are, the lower the expected rent growth rates are; (e) the positive covariance of expected returns and expected rent growth rates reveals under-reaction of the housing markets to rents.     

What Drives the Consequences of Intentional Misstatements? Evidence from Rating Analysts’ Reactions

This paper aims to identify the mechanisms through which intentional misstatements adversely affect firms by analyzing rating analysts’ reaction to misstatements. In order to identify the mechanisms through which the misstatement affects firms’ credit ratings, we analyze the content of rating reports. Rating analysts are concerned about seven different mechanisms. They are most concerned about misstatement‐related violations of debt covenants that increase a firm's liquidity risk. We find that, subsequent to an intentional misstatement becoming publicly known, credit ratings of misreporting firms are adversely affected for up to seven years. The adverse impact of an intentional misstatement on a firm's credit rating is most pronounced in cases in which rating analysts mention concerns about misstatement‐related violations of covenants. Our results suggest that these covenant violations are the most severe mechanism through which misstatements adversely affect firms’ creditworthiness.     

What Causes the Positive Price-Turnover Correlation in European Housing Markets?

This paper examines what determines the correlation between prices and turnover in European housing markets. Using a panel vector autoregressive model, we find that there is a particularly strong feedback mechanism between prices and turnover. Momentum effects are another important reason why prices and turnover are correlated. Common underlying factors, such as GDP and interest rates, also explain part of the price-turnover correlation. The results in this paper imply that, to understand price and turnover dynamics, it is important to model prices and turnover as two interdependent processes. There is a considerable bias in the coefficient estimates of standard house price models if this dependency is not explicitly taken into account.     

What Drives Shareholder Reaction and Wealth Effect in Block Trades? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange

The main objective of this article is to present the determinants of shareholder reaction to block trades and their wealth effect on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The positive abnormal returns obtained for the entire sample indicate that block trades create shareholder value. Shareholders reacted positively to block trades without a control transfer in the Polish market, and their reaction was stronger than in the US market. Abnormal returns of block trades concluded at a discount were twice as high as those for the entire sample. Moreover, cross-border block trades had a negative impact on shareholder value creation, as did financial investors as an acquirer. However, cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) were driven up by the relative power of minority shareholders (ocean) prior to the transaction. The absolute size of the block acquired by an investor was also observed to have a positive impact on price rises and abnormal returns.     

What Drives the Property Price-Trading Volume Correlation? Evidence from a Commercial Real Estate Market

The significant price-trading volume correlation found in the residential property market presents a challenge to the rational expectation hypothesis. Existing theories account for this fact with either capital market imperfection (down-payment effect or loss-aversion consideration) or imperfect information (search theoretic models). This paper employs data from a commercial real estate market, which face a different degree of severity of capital market constraint than the residential market, and thus provide an indirect but effective test for alternative theories. Policy implications are also discussed.     

What Happens During the Private Period?: Evidence from Public‐to‐Private Reverse LBOs

This study provides new evidence on the restructuring activities undertaken by public‐to‐private reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) while owned by private equity firms. The authors' comprehensive sample of public‐to‐private LBOs that return to public ownership through IPOs enables them to observe changes in profitability, valuation, financial structure, operating structure, and cost structure from the time the firms go private through (and after) their emergence through (re‐) IPOs. With their exclusive focus on reverse LBOs involving public‐to‐private deals, the authors reach findings that contradict previous conclusions about RLBOs. At the time of the LBO, the target firms in reverse LBOs are more levered than their peers, pay higher dividends, and are more profitable than their peers. At the same time, however, they appear to have lower market valuations before the buyouts. During the private period, the target firms of reverse LBOs achieve significant increases in employee productivity, asset restructuring, and improved gross margins, while operating with substantially higher levels of debt financing, lower levels of cash and working capital, and greater concentration of equity ownership. After the companies return to public ownership through IPOs, such companies continue to operate with higher leverage and ownership concentration than their publicly traded peers while producing further increases in profitability, resulting in substantial increases in both enterprise and equity valuation. The authors' analysis also shows that higher debt levels from the buyout play an important role in increased enterprise values. The evidence suggests that possible undervaluation as well as expected efficiency gains from restructuring actions are the primary motives for such reverse LBOs.     

What Drives CEOs to Take on More Risk? Some Evidence from the Laboratory of REITs

Many have pointed to excessive risk‐taking by the CEOs of financial firms as a contributor to the recent worldwide economic crisis. The same observers often blame questionable corporate governance structures and compensation practices for that risk‐taking. But is this perception correct? And what is the relationship between CEO incentives and risk‐taking outside of the financial industry, where the government guarantees provided by deposit insurance could have distorted incentives? In an attempt to answer these questions, the authors analyze the relationship between CEO incentives and corporate risk‐taking by 101 U.S. REITs during the period 2003 to 2007. Their main finding is that corporate risk‐taking, as measured by the growth rate in corporate debt (the only measure of risk that is completely under the control of the CEO), is inversely related to CEO stock ownership—that is, the larger the CEO's equity ownership stake, the slower the growth in debt financing and financial risk‐taking. At the same time, the authors find that financial risk‐taking is positively related to large cash bonuses for the CEOs and to situations in which the CEO is also chairman of the board of directors. Finally, the authors also report that CEOs who are relatively new to the job grow more slowly and borrow less, suggesting that boards of directors can temporarily contain risky expansion plans by the CEO. These results provide support for those corporate governance reformers who wish to cut cash bonus payments for CEOs in favor of long‐term stock ownership.     

What Drives the Relationship Between Financial Flexibility and Firm Performance: Investment Scale or Investment Efficiency? Evidence from China

Financial flexibility helps improve firm performance. By using data from Chinese listed companies, we examine whether investment scale or investment efficiency drives the relationship between financial flexibility and firm performance via a special mediator testing method that is widely used in the psychology literature (Baron and Kenny, 1986). We find that financial flexibility has a significant and positive effect on both investment and firm performance. However, investment scale rather than investment efficiency seems to drive firm performance. This finding helps us understand that Chinese companies tend to emphasize investment expansion more than they do investment efficiency to improve firm performance.     

Is the Virtual Integration of Financial Markets Beneficial in Emerging Markets? Evidence from MILA

This article analyzes whether the Latin American Integrated Market (MILA) has been beneficial for its participants. Using a dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model proposed by Engle (2002), we found evidence that creating MILA increased the correlation levels in stock returns of member countries. Evidence indicates that this increase occurs mainly due to the increase in traded volume in the country with the least developed stock market—Peru.

In short, findings suggest that in an integration process such as MILA, as stock market members differ, in terms of stock market development, the markets will benefit from the integration. However, in the long term these benefits dissipate over time.     

What Drives the Disposition Effect? An Analysis of a Long‐Standing Preference‐Based Explanation

We investigate whether prospect theory preferences can predict a disposition effect. We consider two implementations of prospect theory: in one case, preferences are defined over annual gains and losses; in the other, they are defined over realized gains and losses. Surprisingly, the annual gain/loss model often fails to predict a disposition effect. The realized gain/loss model, however, predicts a disposition effect more reliably. Utility from realized gains and losses may therefore be a useful way of thinking about certain aspects of individual investor trading.     

Foreign Ownership of Stocks and Long-run Interdependence Between National Housing and Stock Markets—Evidence from Finnish Data

Globalization of the financial markets may have undermined co-movement between stock and housing markets, at least in small open economies. This paper provides an empirical study on the long-term dynamic interrelation between stock and housing markets in a small open economy with special attention to the effect of foreign investors on the dynamics. The empirical findings, based on a quarterly dataset from Finland over 1970-2006, do not support the hypothesis of diminished co-movement between Finnish stock and housing markets after the abolishment of the foreign ownership restrictions of stocks in 1993. The markets still appear to be tightly interdependent in the long run. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the substantial growth in the foreign ownership of Finnish stocks induced a large and long-lasting deviation from the cointegrating long-run relation between stock and housing prices. The results also imply that diversification between stock and housing markets works the worse the longer the investment horizon is.     

What Drives Sell‐Side Analyst Compensation at High‐Status Investment Banks?

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All‐Star” recognition, investment‐banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All‐Star” recognition proxies for buy‐side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment‐banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high‐status bank and obtain similar results.     

How Integrated are Credit and Equity Markets? Evidence from Index Options

We study the extent to which credit index (CDX) options are priced consistent with S&P 500 (SPX) equity index options. We derive analytical expressions for CDX and SPX options within a structural credit-risk model with stochastic volatility and jumps using new results for pricing compound options via multivariate affine transform analysis. The model captures many aspects of the joint dynamics of CDX and SPX options. However, it cannot reconcile the relative levels of option prices, suggesting that credit and equity markets are not fully integrated. A strategy of selling CDX volatility yields significantly higher excess returns than selling SPX volatility.     

Can Markets Discipline Government Agencies? Evidence from the Weather Derivatives Market

We analyze the role of financial markets in shaping the incentives of government agencies using a unique empirical setting: the weather derivatives market. We show that the introduction of weather derivative contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) improves the accuracy of temperature measurement by 13% to 20% at the underlying weather stations. We argue that temperature‐based financial markets generate additional scrutiny of the temperature data measured by the National Weather Service, which motivates the agency to minimize measurement errors. Our results have broader implications: the visibility and scrutiny generated by financial markets can potentially improve the efficiency of government agencies.     

What Drives the Cross‐Section of Credit Spreads?: A Variance Decomposition Approach

I decompose the variation of credit spreads for corporate bonds into changing expected returns and changing expectation of credit losses. Using a log‐linearized pricing identity and a vector autoregression applied to microlevel data from 1973 to 2011, I find that expected returns contribute to the cross‐sectional variance of credit spreads nearly as much as expected credit loss does. However, most of the time‐series variation in credit spreads for the market portfolio corresponds to risk premiums.     

Does an Agency‐Type of Audit Model Fit a Stewardship Context? Evidence from Performance Auditing in Dutch Municipalities

The degree of auditor independence is an important issue in the performance auditing literature. However, little attention has been paid to the influence of the context in which an audit body operates. This paper investigates how an audit model with a high degree of auditor independence, which is consistent with agency theory's rather formal view of relationships in organizations, functions in a context with more informal relationships, as implied by stewardship theory. Based on two case studies and a survey, the paper concludes that Dutch councilors are more satisfied with audit reports if in their municipality there is a fit between context and audit model.     

What does PIN identify? Evidence from the T-bill market

The probability of informed trading (PIN) measure has been increasingly used in empirical research in finance. However, there is a growing debate as to whether PIN measures information-based or liquidity-based trading. We contribute to the discussion by estimating PIN using transaction data for one-month T-bills. Our PIN estimates exceed those reported for equities, despite it being unlikely that the probability of informed trading is higher in T-bills than equities. We conclude that PIN identifies trading clusters and that the source of the clustering depends on the economics of the market. The economics of the T-bill market suggest discretionary liquidity traders are the likely source of the clustering.