股权分置改革效果的实证分析

股权分置改革是我国资本市场的一次根本性改革,它使以往不能上市流通的股票获得可流通性,重建公司治理的共同利益基础,更好地实现国有资本的保值增值以及包括中小投资者在内的各方利益的共赢。本文通过对2006～2008年期间进行股权分置改革的部分上市公司进行统计,试图分析股权分置改革的市场效应以及次贷危机对改革的影响。得出如下结论:(1)股权分置改革的市场效果是积极的,能带给投资者显著的超额收益;(2)股改对价支付率和股东对方案的支持率与上市公司股票的市场效应呈显著正相关;(3)次贷危机严重影响了股权分置改革的市场效应。     

后股权分置时代的中国资本市场

当股权分置这一过去15年来支撑资本市场运行的制度平台不复存在时,中国资本市场会发生什么样的变化? 股权分置是阻碍中国资本市场发展最重要的制度障碍,也是资本市场中的中小股东即流通股股东的利益不断受到侵害的制度基础。因此,2005年4月,证监会等有关部门下定决心,启动了股权分置改革。2005年12月,第12批股权分置改     

股权分置改革、股权层级与企业绩效

针对股权分置改革这一我国资本市场影响深远的事件,基于经济后果的视角,本文利用2001~2010年上市公司数据,考察了股权分置改革前后公司股权层级的变化及对经营绩效的影响。论文研究发现,股权分置改革后随着控股股东与其他小股东间代理冲突的减轻,公司股权层级显著减少。进一步的分析显示,由于代理成本的下降及对管理层监督的加强,股权分置改革后公司业绩因股权层级的降低而上升。最后,我们的考察表明,股权分置改革对公司股权层级及经营绩效的影响在非国有公司中更显著。     

上市公司控制权转移与股价异动——基于事件研究法

继万科股权争夺大战爆发后,控制权转移再次引起众多学者的研究,本文介绍了我国控制权市场特有的股权分置现象,以及股权分置改革的情况。股权分置改革后,我国的控制权市场也得到了进一步的发展和完善,在二级市场上通过举牌的手段来实现控制权转移也越来越频繁,本文通过事件研究法发现控制权发生转移会使目标公司股价发生变化,给股东带来超额收益,同时发现我国资本市场存在信息提前泄露的现象,使得投资机构或内部人员可以通过内幕消息提前操纵股价的变动。     

上市公司股权分置改革之中小非流通股股东会计处理探讨

股权分置的基本含义是上市公司的全部股份由于政策限制被分为两类性质不同的股份，一类是可以在证券交易所挂牌交易的流通股，一类是只能在场外协议转让的非流通股。目前，非流通股约占上市公司总股份的三分之二。股权分置破坏了上市公司利益机制一致性的基础，导致流通股股东和非流通股股东的利益发生冲突。股权分置改革的实质是通过非流通股股东向流通股股东支付对价取得相应的流通权，从而实现所有股东股份的同质化，并以此希求股东价值取向的一体化、决策基础的一致性，在此基础上完善资本市场的功能发挥和促进上市公司的健康发展。     

股权分置改革带来的机遇与风险

股权分置改革经过一波三折,终于在2005年得到顺利推行,近几年股权分置改革随着牛市如火如荼的进行,在这个改革的过程中,我们不仅要看到股权分置改革促进了资本市场的不断优化,还要看到我国这几年股权分置改革带来的挑战。本文从这两个方面出发,对股权分置改革带来的机遇和风险进行系统地论述。     

股权分置改革带来的机遇与风险

股权分置改革经过一波三折,终于在2005年得到顺利推行,近几年股权分置改革随着牛市如火如荼的进行,在这个改革的过程中,我们不仅要看到股权分置改革促进了资本市场的不断优化,还要看到我国这几年股权分置改革带来的挑战。本文从这两个方面出发,对股权分置改革带来的机遇和风险进行系统地论述。     

后股权分置背景下上市公司控制权机制研究

通过对股权分置时代中国上市公司控制权机制存在的缺陷--控制权配置的错位和控制权市场的失效进行的分析可以发现,在股权分置格局下,大股东与小股东的利益机制截然割裂是导致"大股东控制"和"内部人控制"问题以及控制权市场外部治理机能失效的根源所在.同时,通过对股权分置改革对中国上市公司股权结构、控制权内部配置以及控制权外部转移正反两方面的影响的分析表明,后股权分置时代优化控制权机制应当引入"股东实质平等"原则,以增强中小股东的行权便利性,等等.     

是真诚的沟通赢得了投资者的心

历50余天艰辛股改路，2005年10月21日。科华生物管理层的脸上终于露出了欣慰的笑容，公司流通股股东和非流通股股东的手终于紧紧地握在了一起。在当天的股权分置改革相关股东会议上，科华生物股权分置改革方案以全体股东99％和流通股股东92％的表决结果获得高票通过。而这次股东会议也将被永远载入公司发展史册，科华生物成为了我国资本市场股权分置改革的亲历者和见证者之一。     

股权分置对我国资本市场的影响

股权分置是中国证券市场特有的一种现象,它是中国社会经济基础与上层建筑矛盾的产物。解决股权分置问题对中国资本市场的改革具有里程碑的意义,有利于中国资本市场持续建康地发展。本文首先回顾了股权分置的由来并且分析了其对资本市场的影响,然后介绍了几种股权分置的对价方案,最后重点论述了我国股权分置改革对我国资本市场产生的影响。     

香港股市与内地股市的联动性研究

本文分3个阶段考察了香港回归以来,香港股市和内地股市之间的联动关系及其变化。协整分析表明,香港股市和内地股市之间存在长期的均衡关系,这种均衡关系在内地资本市场实行股权分置改革后更趋于稳定。Granger因果检验表明,香港回归以来香港股市和内地股市之间的引导关系在经历B股开放和股权分置改革后发生了变化。脉冲响应函数分析从动态的角度进一步验证了香港股市和内地股市之间的引导关系及其变化,并深入分析了单个变量的波动或冲击对其自身及另一变量的影响程度。     

Dividend clienteles: a global investigation

We compare the cross-sectional variation in the dividend payout policies of companies across 32 countries. Beyond the impact of firm-specific accounting and financial variables, this study investigates how the country level variations: shareholder demand due to demographic variations and consumption needs, agency problems manifested in the extent of minority shareholder protection and business disclosures, and market quality in terms of transparency and liquidity; affect the dividend payout policies. We find that firms have generous dividend payout policies when diverse shareholder demands are strong, extents of business disclosures and legal protections are weak, and the market qualities are poor. The empirical evidence supports the presence of strong dividend clienteles in a global setting.     

The reaction of firm ex ante cost of equity capital to the resolution of shareholder class action lawsuits

Existing research provides evidence that providers of capital (banks, public debt, and equity) all increase the expected return on securities after the initiation of a shareholder lawsuit. Many of these lawsuits are dismissed or settled with trivial monetary penalties, which suggests that an across-the-board permanent increase in the cost of capital is misguided. After estimating the probable outcome of a shareholder lawsuit using only information available at the time the shareholder lawsuit is filed, we study the resolution of shareholder lawsuits to determine if market participants adjust their expected return after a case is resolved. We find an increase (decrease) in the ex ante cost of equity capital when there is a surprise settlement (dismissal), which is consistent with an efficient market. Further, we present evidence consistent with equity market participants monitoring the progress of shareholder lawsuits prior to resolution. Overall, our results suggest that firm ex ante cost of equity capital only changes after the resolution of a shareholder lawsuit if the outcome of the case is different than initially predicted.     

Product Market Competition and Shareholder Rights: International Evidence

This paper examines the interaction between product market competition and international differences in shareholder rights in relation to firm performance and corporate policies. In contrast to existing literature, we provide evidence of complementarities between product market competition and country shareholder rights protections. The benefits of shareholder rights protections for firm performance are conditional on the presence of a competitive industry environment. We find that stronger shareholder rights protections are associated with better firm performance in competitive industries. However, this relation is not significant in concentrated industries. Consistent results are obtained from the analysis of key corporate policies.     

CAN STOCK MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN EMERGING ECONOMIES MITIGATE LEGAL SYSTEMS DEFICIENCIES?

We document positive valuation effects around the time of stock market liberalization. We find that the valuation effects are larger for countries with civil law traditions compared with countries with common law origins. Similarly, we find that countries with weaker shareholder protections exhibit greater market valuation increases compared with countries with stronger shareholder protections. The results reinforce the importance of country legal systems and of shareholder protections in determining the quality of corporate governance systems and financial market outcomes. The findings suggest that stock market liberalization may mitigate deficiencies in the existing institutional environments not supportive of effective corporate governance systems.     

Connected board of directors: A blessing or a curse?

This study attempts to identify the connection between the board of directors (BoD) and the controlling shareholder. We investigate how this connection affects the corporate governance practice and market performance of Hong Kong listed firms. Our results reveal that close connections between the BoD and the controlling shareholder have a negative effect on corporate governance practice. Our findings also indicate a lower market valuation for firms with a connected BoD. The evidence suggests that the market discounts the value of firms with a connected BoD. The evidence seems to reinforce the importance of the role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) to enhance the independence of BoD.     

后股权分置时代上市公司大股东交易行为研究

股权分置改革，有利于上市公司规范市场行为和完善公司治理，减少大股东通过“隧道挖掘”对中小投资者的利益侵蚀。但在后股权分置时代，如果缺乏有效的制度和法律规范，大股东可能由原来对上市公司的控制变成对公司和二级市场双重控制，市场操纵的模式将发生变化。本文在借鉴国际经验和境外市场曾经出现的与大股东交易相关的案例的基础上，通过对大股东交易目的、动机、影响因素、行为方式和各国法律规范的全面考察，重点对大股东可能出现的违规交易行为或侵害中小投资者权益的交易行为进行了分析，并提出了相应的政策建议。     

Market efficiency,managerial compensation,and real efficiency

We examine how an exogenous improvement in market efficiency, which allows the stock market to obtain more precise information about the firm's intrinsic value, affects the shareholder–manager contracting problem, managerial incentives, and shareholder value. A key assumption in the model is that stock market investors do not observe the manager's pay-performance sensitivity ex ante. We show that an increase in market efficiency weakens managerial incentives by making the firm's stock price less sensitive to the firm's current performance. The impact on real efficiency and shareholder value varies depending on the composition of the firm's intrinsic value.     

Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: Shareholder support,board response,and market reaction

Although the owners of publicly traded companies have had the right to offer shareholder proposals using Rule 14a-8 for several decades, the effectiveness of the rule has been frequently questioned because few of these proposals received substantial support from other shareholders and even fewer have been implemented by boards. Using new data from the 2002–2004 proxy seasons, we analyze shareholder voting patterns on these proposals, board reactions to them, and market responses. We find some big changes from earlier periods: many more proposals are receiving majority shareholder support during our sample period relative to earlier studies, and this support has translated into directors implementing more of the actions called for by shareholders. In particular, boards are increasingly willing to remove important anti-takeover defenses, such as the classified board and poison pill, in response to shareholders' requests, something rarely seen in the past. Despite the increase in support for shareholder proposals and board action in response, we find small and insignificant stock market reaction. We conclude that shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 have an emerging role in reducing agency costs by increasing director responsiveness to shareholder concerns to open the market more fully to corporate control.     

“Swimming Ducks Forecast the Coming of Spring”—The predictability of aggregate insider trading on future market returns in the Chinese market

This study systematically examines the ability of aggregate insider trading to predict future market returns in the Chinese A-share market. After controlling for the contrarian investment strategy, aggregate executive(large shareholder)trading conducted over the past six months can predict 66%(72.7%) of market returns twelve months in advance. Aggregate insider trading predicts future market returns very accurately and is stronger for insiders who have a greater information advantage(e.g., executives and controlling shareholders).Corporate governance also affects the predictability of insider trading. The predictability of executive trading is weakest in central state-owned companies,probably because the "quasi-official" status of the executives in those companies effectively curbs their incentives to benefit from insider trading.The predictive power of large shareholder trading in private-owned companies is higher than that in state-owned companies, probably due to their stronger profit motivation and higher involvement in business operations. This study complements the literature by examining an emerging market and investigating how the institutional context and corporate governance affect insider trading.