Additional Evidence on the Association Between Director Stock Ownership and Incentive Compensation

Governance scholars argue that outside directors have little incentive to monitor managers when their equity stake in the firm is not significant. A sample with a substantial level of outside director shareholdings is examined and a negative relationship between incentive compensation and outside director stock ownership is found. While firms pay higher incentive compensation when they have greater investment opportunities, the compensation contains excess pay due to ineffective corporate governance. Overall, the results suggest more effective corporate governance and lower incentive compensation when outside director stock ownership is higher.     

A Model of Equity Based Compensation with Tax

In this paper, we develop a two‐stage continuous time model of employee stock option (ESO) valuation under different tax regimes. We show that tax rules can have significant effects on ESO exercise behavior. In addition, we find that incentive stock options (ISO) are the optimal form of compensation for all levels of employees in the UK. In the US, restricted stock plans are preferred, and tax breaks offered by incentive schemes are only beneficial to employees with high liquid wealth (or small option holdings relative to wealth) or low risk aversion. We also analyze 83b elections for restricted stock plans in the US and find that making an election is a sub‐optimal decision for both the employee and the firm.     

CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.     

Valuation Implications of Investment Opportunities and Earnings Permanence

This study investigates the value-relevance of accounting earnings in the presence of investment (growth) opportunities after making two theoretical and methodological research design refinements. First, we test for the incremental effect of growth on firms earnings response coefficients after controlling for the extent of transitory earnings under the assumption that the value-relevance of earnings with respect to growth should be stronger when earnings are more permanent. Second, we perform comprehensive factor analysis using market-based and accounting-based measures to construct a composite proxy for investment opportunities. We find that firms investment opportunities and the relative permanence of current earnings affect the value-relevance of those earnings. Additionally, we find that the interaction between permanent earnings and investment opportunities produces an even stronger price response to earnings.     

股权激励对上市公司的影响及投资策略分析

本文探讨了我国上市公司实施股权激励的环境条件，分析了股权激励对管理层、股东影响的内在机制，分析了实施股权激励对上市公司价值和业绩的影响。对股权激励类上市公司上涨因素的定量化分析显示，其上涨与公司现有的各项财务指标没有必然联系，而与公司的市场地位、行业发展趋势和关联交易之间存在明显的关系。本文认为，我国上市公司已基本具备实施股权激励的环境条件，实施股权激励有利于解决管理层和股东利益一致性问题，通过价值转移和价值创造，持续、有效地促进上市公司价值和业绩的提高，从而有效推动上市公司股价的上升，给投资者以强有力的信心和巨大的投资机会。     

The Relationship Between Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Risk Taking: Evidence from China

The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms' leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers' portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovate.     

上市公司投资价值分析

本文通过对中国证券市场发展过程中,投资理念逐步转变为价值投资,随着中国证券市场的逐步成熟和法律监管体系的进一步完善,越来越关注企业的内在价值以赚取分红送股。本文分析了国内外上市公司投资价值的背景和重要性,从宏观背景、产业、市场和区域因素和公司情况等方面对上市公司投资价值分析的方法进行了阐述。并重点对公司情况的基本面、财务、投资收益水平、偿债能力和获利及发展水平进行了具体的投资价值的分析,以及各指标公式的使用方法。旨在帮助投资者理性分析选择,挖掘上市公司的内在价值,并能获得较理想的收益。     

股票的权益比、账面市值比及其公司规模与股票投资风险——以上海证券市场的10只上市公司股票投资风险为例

最近20年来一些学者对CAPM理论模型检验的结果大都表明,股票的投资风险(或其收益)并非像该模型描述的那样由β系数唯一决定,还存在其他因素在股票投资风险中起影响作用。国内学者借助于横截面法的回归模型研究指出,股票的权益比率(D/E)、账面/市值价值比(BV/MV)与公司规模是决定股票投资风险除β系数外的三个主要经济变量。为了验证他们理论的正确性与精确性,该文率先运用模糊数学的聚类分析法,对上证市场随机选取10只样本股票的D/E、BV/MV、公司规模与股票投资风险相关性进行实证分析,并与用回归分析方法得到的β指数与风险关系进行比较研究。经研究进一步证实,股票投资风险并非唯一由β系数决定,股票的D/E、BV/MV及其公司规模应当成为β系数以外影响股票投资风险不可忽视的重要因素。本文研究的意义在于建议股票投资者,衡量股票投资风险不仅要考察股票的β系数,还应进一步考察股票的D/E、BV/MV和公司规模等。     

社会责任投资基金的实施契约与代理成本的关系研究

通过对社会责任投资基金契约条款适应社会责任目标而进行的规范和调整进行评估,并采用异质性随机前沿分析和LSDV法阐释基于契约的社会责任约束程度与基金代理成本之间的关系,研究发现,非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金的契约对社会责任主题的约束程度普遍高于市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金,这种差异主要体现在投资目标和投资范围的契约条款设计方面。社会责任投资基金的契约得分与基金的代理成本呈正相关关系,尤其是非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金表现得更加明显。因此,“规则前置”的契约条款对社会责任主题的限制和约束增加了代理成本,契约作为一种硬约束手段在解决委托代理问题上作用有限。     

An IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) Compatible Model for the Valuation of Employee Stock Options

In this paper, we show how employee stock options can be valued under the new reporting standards IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (revised) for share-based payments. Both standards require companies to expense employee stock options at fair value. We propose a new valuation model, referred to as Enhanced American model, that complies with the new standards and produces fair values often lower than those generated by traditional models such as the Black–Scholes model or the adjusted Black–Scholes model. We also provide a sensitivity analysis of model input parameters and analyze the impact of the parameters on the fair value of the option. The valuation of employee stock options requires an accurate estimation of the exercise behavior. We show how the exercise behavior can be modeled in a binomial tree and demonstrate the relevance of the input parameters in the calibration of the model to an estimated expected life of the option. JEL Classification G13, G30     

Investment Opportunities,Free Cash Flow and Stock Valuation Effects of Corporate Investments: The Case of Taiwanese Investments in China

This paper examines the importance of investment opportunities and free cash flow in assessing the stock market reaction to announcements of cross-border investments in China by Taiwanese firms. Our results support the investment opportunities hypothesis that Taiwanese firms with favorable investment opportunities have significantly positive response to the announcements of their investments in China whereas firms with poor investment opportunities have negative response to such announcements. In contrast, we find no support for the free cash flow hypothesis. Our findings add to the understanding of the determinants of the wealth effect of cross-border investment decisions in the Asia-Pacific region.     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.     

Director Compensation and the Reliability of Accounting Information

This paper studies the effect of incentive-based compensation on directors' monitoring of management. Using total accruals to measure the level of earnings management, I find that director stock option compensation is associated with higher levels of total accruals. I interpret this result to suggest that director stock options are more likely to align interests of directors with those of managers and that this convergence of interest manifests in lower transparency and reliability of financial information. The results suggest that director stock option compensation provides incentive for directors to compromise their task in the financial reporting process.     

社会责任投资与公司价值相关性理论探索

社会责任投资的产生和发展与全球社会可持续发展策略密不可分,也是投资从简单追求股东利益最大化向追求满足利益相关者权利转变的实践体现。社会责任投资者通过各种股东行动去影响控股股东或经营管理层的行为,将社会责任投资者的社会价值观灌输、实现到企业行为中去,推动企业在履行社会责任过程中充分考虑利益相关者利益,利益相关者又因此对企业的生存和发展注入专用性投资并分担一定的企业经营风险。同时,企业践行社会责任会降低融资成本和经营风险。长期而言,公司社会责任价值将得到持续提升。     

公司权益价值的非线性效应——基于持续经营和转换期权分析

基于对持续经营价值与转换期权价值的分析,本文将两种非线性效应引入了传统的线性权益定价模型。同时进一步考虑税收摩擦,新的模型刻画了公司权益价值关于其营业收入的凹性关系:即公司的权益价值随公司营业收入单调递增,而其边际贡献却在递减。基于中国A股上市公司财务数据的实证结果表明:就单一行业而言,定价模型所描述的关系基本成立;但由于异质性的存在,不同行业的营业收入与权益价值之间并不存在同一的非线性协整关系。     

The Effect of Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk on Corporate Capital Structure and R&D Investment

In this study we use estimates of the sensitivities of managers' portfolios to stock return volatility and stock price to directly test the relationship between managerial incentives to bear risk and two important corporate decisions. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases firms tend to choose higher debt ratios and make higher levels of R&D investment. These results are even stronger in a subsample of firms with relatively low outside monitoring. For these firms, managerial incentives to bear risk play a particularly pivotal role in determining leverage and R&D investment.     

A Survey of Managerial Incentives and Investment Bias — Common Structure but Differing Assumptions

Recent models within the agency framework concerning investment bias are reviewed, based upon a simplified structure of the pertinent information asymmetry. Tabulated overviews of contractual structures, critical assumptions, main and ancillary results, implications for future research and management are provided. As a general conclusion, the theoretical case of investment bias is rich and wide-ranging. It is now of interest to develop models and perspectives that focus more on economic fundamentals rather than pursuing additional variations of particular assumptions. Moreover, further research is needed in empirical testing and case studies. In particular, the framework promises to bring new perspectives and managerial implications on the administrative use of capital budgeting methods.     

Growth Opportunities and Investment Decisions: A New Perspective on the Cost of Capital

This paper shows that it is not always correct to make an upward adjustment to the stock beta in calculating the hurdle rate for capital budgeting even when the project under consideration is riskier than existing assets. The paper also shows that the correct hurdle rate is smaller than the market capitalization rate calculated from the firm's stock beta when the project under consideration has the same risk as existing assets. In addition, it is shown that the market capitalization rate will be an underestimate (overestimate) of the correct hurdle rate when the risk of future assets is greater (smaller) than both the risk of assets in place and that of future capital expenditures. These new results are direct consequences of the insight that the firm's investment opportunities are in fact real call options written on underlying assets.     

The Effects of Reversible Investment on Capital Structure and Credit Risks

We propose a structural model with an optimal switching of diffusion regimes that integrates a wide range of investment reversibility. The default boundary and switching thresholds are endogenously determined, and they enable us to comprehend the interrelated problems of the investment decision, capital structure, and credit risks. We examine not only the under/overinvestment but also the under/overdisinvestment. The leverage ratio decreases when the firm has an option to invest in a reversible project, which can alleviate the capital structure puzzle. Furthermore, the model significantly reduces the wide dispersion of yield spreads depending on the credit grade of bonds.     

Convertible Securities,Employee Stock Options and the Cost of Equity

We provide a method for calculating the cost of equity and the cost of capital in the presence of convertible securities and employee stock options. We demonstrate how this approach can be applied if a company already has issued convertible claims or if it is considering doing so for the first time. We provide several numerical examples illustrating the significance of errors in estimating the cost of capital that can result when (1) employee stock options are ignored or (2) the observable stock price is used as a proxy for the unobservable underlying asset.