Private information, transferable utility, and the core

We consider transferable-utility, cooperative games, featuring differently informed players. Parties can exchange endowments or undertake joint production, but not pool information. Coalitional contracts must therefore comply with members’ private information. Qualitatively different shadow prices then arise: some for material endowments, others for knowledge. We focus on computable core solutions, generated by shadow prices. Such solutions obtain under standard regularity assumptions.     

Buchanan clubs

This article evaluates the contribution of James M. Buchanan’s theory of clubs. At the outset, the article distinguishes club goods from pure public goods. Next, the article distills the basic mathematical structure of Buchanan’s treatment of clubs. This is followed by some key variants of Buchanan clubs. More general formulations of club theory are also addressed. To demonstrate the wide-ranging importance of Buchanan clubs, the article indicates varied applications of club theory. The article’s message is that club theory remains highly relevant today.     

Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if contributions cover the cost of production. We characterize nonconstant continuous symmetric equilibria, giving sufficient conditions for their existence. We show the common normalization by which players’ values are distributed over [0, 1] is not without loss of generality: if the distribution over this interval has continuous density f with f(0) >  0, then no (nonconstant) continuous symmetric equilibrium exists. We study in detail the case in which players’ private values are uniformly distributed, showing that, generically, when one continuous equilibrium exists, a continuum of continuous equilibria exists. For any given cost of the good, multiple continuous equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Nevertheless, not all continuous equilibria are interim incentive efficient. The set of interim incentive efficient equilibria is exactly determined. The authors thank Manfred Dix, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

Participation rules for Pareto-optimal clubs

This paper presents a unifying framework for the club participation problem using compensating variation measures of willingness-to-pay for membership. With more prospective club members than the equilibrium club population, Pareto-efficient participation rules are derived which depend upon whether or not individuals are assured of club access. Sale of lottery tickets offering club membership is shown to be a socially superior club participation allocation mechanism to sale of vouchers guaranteeing membership. The willingness-to-pay format readily encompasses the Buchanan case where all prospective club members are assured of club participation.     

Convergence clubs in Latin America

The aim of this work is to identify convergence clubs in 17 Latin American countries in terms of GDP per capita during the period 1990–2014. To do this, we apply the methodology developed by Phillips-Sul in order to identify the different convergence clubs on the path of growth in the Latin American economy over this period. The empirical results strongly support the existence of convergence clubs, indicating that the Latin American economy consists of four groups, each converging towards its own steady-state path, with two countries being divergent.     

Financial development,economic growth and convergence clubs

To study the role of financial development in economic growth, we apply an array of convergence tests designed to capture nonlinear transitional dynamics to real outputs per capita. Strong evidence of multiple convergence clubs is observed, implying that the clubs are formed based on the initial level of real output per capita and average growth rate. Our empirical results show that the stage of economic growth of each country plays an important role for the composition of the convergence clubs. Furthermore, financial development emerges to be a significant determinant, albeit plays differently in the economic growth of each convergence club.     

Consumption externalities, rental markets and purchase clubs

Summary. A premise of general equilibrium theory is that private goods are rival. Nevertheless, many private goods are shared, e.g., through borrowing, through co-ownership, or simply because one persons consumption affects another persons wellbeing. I analyze consumption externalities from the perspective of club theory, and argue that, provided consumption externalities are limited in scope, they can be internalized through membership fees to groups. Two important applications are to rental markets and purchase clubs, in which members share the goods that they have individually purchased.Received: 2 June 2003, Revised: 8 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D62.This paper was supported by the U.C., Berkeley Committee on Research, and the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen. I am grateful to Birgit Grodal for her collaboration on the theory that underlies this paper, and for her helpful and motivating comments about these particular extensions. I also thank Hal Varian, Doug Lichtman, Steve Goldman, Karl Vind, anonymous referees, and members of the Berkeley Microeconomics Seminar for discussion.     

Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs

We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results. A fundamental new mathematical result, the partition-balancing effect of large numbers, which promises to have further applications, is contained in Appendix A.     

Technology clubs,technology gaps and growth trajectories

This paper looks at the convergence clubs literature from a Schumpeterian perspective, and it follows the idea that cross-country differences in the ability to innovate and to imitate foreign technologies determine the existence of clustering, polarization and convergence clubs. The study investigates the characteristics of different technology clubs and the growth trajectories that they have followed over time. The cross-country empirical analysis first explores the existence of multiple regimes in the data by means of cluster analysis techniques. It then estimates a technology-gap growth equation in a dynamic panel model specification. The empirical results identify three distinct technology clubs, and show that these are characterized by remarkably different technological characteristics and growth behavior.     

Cost efficiency of French rugby clubs

This article analyses the cost efficiency of French first-league rugby clubs using a stochastic frontier model. The frontier estimation confirmed that the model fits the data well with all coefficients correctly signed and in line with the theoretical requirements. The results show that one of the clubs is operating efficiently, with the majority of clubs clustered around 20% inefficiency. Policy implications are derived.     

The economic theory of clubs : Some clarifications

We provide a classification of club models and relate differences in implications to differences in assumptions. Then we address two main controversies - one concerning the optimality of market provisions of public goods and their optimality and the other concerning the desirability of segregation.     

Growth and human capital: good data,good results

We present a new data set for years of schooling across countries for the 1960–2000 period. The series are constructed from the OECD database on educational attainment and from surveys published by UNESCO. Two features that improve the quality of our data with respect to other series, particularly for series in first-differences, are the use of surveys based on uniform classification systems of education over time, and an intensified use of information by age groups. As a result of the improvement in quality, these new series can be used as a direct substitute for Barro and Lee’s (2001; Oxford Economic Papers, 3, 541–563) data in empirical research. In standard cross-country growth regressions we find that our series yield significant coefficients for schooling. In panel data estimates our series are also significant even when the regressions account for the accumulation of physical capital. Moreover, the estimated macro return is consistent with those reported in labour studies. These results differ from the typical findings of the earlier literature and are a consequence of the reduction in measurement error in the series.      

Corruption clubs: empirical evidence from kernel density estimates

A common finding of many analytical models is the existence of multiple equilibria of corruption. Countries characterized by the same economic, social and cultural background do not necessarily experience the same levels of corruption. In this article, we use Kernel Density Estimation techniques to analyse the cross-country distribution of corruption. Particular emphasis will be given to the question whether the distribution of corruption shows more than one peak. We find that most of the estimated densities exhibit twin peaks. We also provide some evidence on the intra-distribution dynamics and the persistence of corruption. We find the group of countries classified within the two ‘clubs’ to be very stable. Corruption is a highly persistent phenomenon. Substantial changes in the economic, political and cultural environment of countries within the ‘corruption club’ are required before a significant decline of corruption is to be expected.     

Stable governments and the semistrict core

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, depending on conditions we impose on the solution concept. A bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, turns out to be crucial. It generalizes a condition termed “absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions” that was previously used to derive core existence results.