Private information, transferable utility, and the core

We consider transferable-utility, cooperative games, featuring differently informed players. Parties can exchange endowments or undertake joint production, but not pool information. Coalitional contracts must therefore comply with members’ private information. Qualitatively different shadow prices then arise: some for material endowments, others for knowledge. We focus on computable core solutions, generated by shadow prices. Such solutions obtain under standard regularity assumptions.     

Networks and clubs

We formulate a club model where players’ have identical single-peaked preferences over club sizes as a network formation game. For situations with “many” clubs, we provide necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the farsighted core and the direct (or myopic) core. With “too few” clubs, if players are farsighted then the farsighted core is empty. In this same case, if players are myopic then the direct core is always nonempty and, for any club network in the direct core, clubs are of nearly equal size (i.e., clubs differ in size by at most one member).     

Buchanan clubs

This article evaluates the contribution of James M. Buchanan’s theory of clubs. At the outset, the article distinguishes club goods from pure public goods. Next, the article distills the basic mathematical structure of Buchanan’s treatment of clubs. This is followed by some key variants of Buchanan clubs. More general formulations of club theory are also addressed. To demonstrate the wide-ranging importance of Buchanan clubs, the article indicates varied applications of club theory. The article’s message is that club theory remains highly relevant today.     

Value-maximizing football clubs

In this paper, football clubs are modeled as value-maximizing enterprises. With a long-term perspective in this framework, players are not only factors of production, but also assets of the club. It is shown that talent investment is higher with value-maximization than with profit maximization for homogeneous football clubs. Club heterogeneity is then modeled by different time-horizons regarding future profits, which leads to asymmetric levels of talent investment. Teams with longer time-horizons demand more talent and tilt the competition to their favor. Increases in transfer prices for players worsen the competitive balance, while higher player wages improve it.     

Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if contributions cover the cost of production. We characterize nonconstant continuous symmetric equilibria, giving sufficient conditions for their existence. We show the common normalization by which players’ values are distributed over [0, 1] is not without loss of generality: if the distribution over this interval has continuous density f with f(0) >  0, then no (nonconstant) continuous symmetric equilibrium exists. We study in detail the case in which players’ private values are uniformly distributed, showing that, generically, when one continuous equilibrium exists, a continuum of continuous equilibria exists. For any given cost of the good, multiple continuous equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Nevertheless, not all continuous equilibria are interim incentive efficient. The set of interim incentive efficient equilibria is exactly determined. The authors thank Manfred Dix, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

Participation rules for Pareto-optimal clubs

This paper presents a unifying framework for the club participation problem using compensating variation measures of willingness-to-pay for membership. With more prospective club members than the equilibrium club population, Pareto-efficient participation rules are derived which depend upon whether or not individuals are assured of club access. Sale of lottery tickets offering club membership is shown to be a socially superior club participation allocation mechanism to sale of vouchers guaranteeing membership. The willingness-to-pay format readily encompasses the Buchanan case where all prospective club members are assured of club participation.     

Convergence clubs in Latin America

The aim of this work is to identify convergence clubs in 17 Latin American countries in terms of GDP per capita during the period 1990–2014. To do this, we apply the methodology developed by Phillips-Sul in order to identify the different convergence clubs on the path of growth in the Latin American economy over this period. The empirical results strongly support the existence of convergence clubs, indicating that the Latin American economy consists of four groups, each converging towards its own steady-state path, with two countries being divergent.     

Financial development,economic growth and convergence clubs

To study the role of financial development in economic growth, we apply an array of convergence tests designed to capture nonlinear transitional dynamics to real outputs per capita. Strong evidence of multiple convergence clubs is observed, implying that the clubs are formed based on the initial level of real output per capita and average growth rate. Our empirical results show that the stage of economic growth of each country plays an important role for the composition of the convergence clubs. Furthermore, financial development emerges to be a significant determinant, albeit plays differently in the economic growth of each convergence club.     

Consumption externalities, rental markets and purchase clubs

Summary. A premise of general equilibrium theory is that private goods are rival. Nevertheless, many private goods are shared, e.g., through borrowing, through co-ownership, or simply because one persons consumption affects another persons wellbeing. I analyze consumption externalities from the perspective of club theory, and argue that, provided consumption externalities are limited in scope, they can be internalized through membership fees to groups. Two important applications are to rental markets and purchase clubs, in which members share the goods that they have individually purchased.Received: 2 June 2003, Revised: 8 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D62.This paper was supported by the U.C., Berkeley Committee on Research, and the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen. I am grateful to Birgit Grodal for her collaboration on the theory that underlies this paper, and for her helpful and motivating comments about these particular extensions. I also thank Hal Varian, Doug Lichtman, Steve Goldman, Karl Vind, anonymous referees, and members of the Berkeley Microeconomics Seminar for discussion.     

Cost efficiency of French rugby clubs

This article analyses the cost efficiency of French first-league rugby clubs using a stochastic frontier model. The frontier estimation confirmed that the model fits the data well with all coefficients correctly signed and in line with the theoretical requirements. The results show that one of the clubs is operating efficiently, with the majority of clubs clustered around 20% inefficiency. Policy implications are derived.     

Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs

We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results. A fundamental new mathematical result, the partition-balancing effect of large numbers, which promises to have further applications, is contained in Appendix A.     

Technology clubs,technology gaps and growth trajectories

This paper looks at the convergence clubs literature from a Schumpeterian perspective, and it follows the idea that cross-country differences in the ability to innovate and to imitate foreign technologies determine the existence of clustering, polarization and convergence clubs. The study investigates the characteristics of different technology clubs and the growth trajectories that they have followed over time. The cross-country empirical analysis first explores the existence of multiple regimes in the data by means of cluster analysis techniques. It then estimates a technology-gap growth equation in a dynamic panel model specification. The empirical results identify three distinct technology clubs, and show that these are characterized by remarkably different technological characteristics and growth behavior.     

Regional convergence clubs in Europe: Identification and conditioning factors

The aim of this paper is to empirically identify convergence clubs in per capita incomes of European regions and to investigate whether initial conditions − as suggested by the club convergence hypothesis − are responsible for club formation. To tackle this issue, we propose a two-step procedure in which we first endogenously identify groups of regions that converge to the same steady state level, and in a second step we investigate the role of starting conditions and structural characteristics for a region's club membership. Our sample comprises 206 European NUTS2 regions between 1990 and 2002. The results strongly support the existence of convergence clubs, indicating that European regions form six separate groups converging to their own steady state paths. Moreover, estimates from an ordered logit model reveal that the level of initial conditions such as human capital and per capita income plays a crucial role in determining the formation of convergence clubs among European regions.