Pro‐Consumer Price Ceilings under Regulatory Uncertainty*

We examine optimal price ceilings when the regulator is uncertain about demand and maximizes expected consumer surplus. With perfect competition, if regulatory uncertainty is large enough, then softer intervention is called for, with the price ceiling set at a relatively high level compared with a full information scenario. In an imperfectly competitive setting where symmetric firms compete in supply functions, with large enough uncertainty, the optimal ceiling increases with the degree of competition, so greater competitive pressure justifies less restrictive regulation. Under perfect competition, we also determine a cut‐off level of rationing efficiency below which a price ceiling should not be used.     

The underground economy and its macroeconomic consequences

This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.     

Optimal mixed taxation,credit constraints,and the timing of income tax reporting

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit‐constrained low‐income households. Workers receive an even flow of income during the tax year, but report their incomes and make tax payments (receive transfers) at the end of the year. They spend their disposable income on multiple commodities over the year. We show that differentiated subsidies on commodities can be optimal even if the Atkinson–Stiglitz Theorem conditions apply. When the optimal policy leaves low‐income households with binding credit constraints, it may be optimal to subsidize differentially the good that they consume in higher proportion. Uniform subsidies would also relax the credit constraint, but would be more costly to the government since they would equally benefit unconstrained households. Numerical examples suggest that commodity tax differentiation increases with basic needs and with the interest rate at which government borrows.     

A Noncooperative Quantity‐Rationing Theory of Transboundary Pollution

We study a remedy for the problem caused by international transfrontier pollution. Our results are derived from the analysis of a noncooperative game model of the determination of emissions in a quantity‐rationing setting. We model the emission capping negotiations using the best response dynamic process and provide natural conditions under which the process has a unique and globally asymptotically stable stationary point. We then analyze the link between type profiles and the stationary points of the negotiation process to derive various comparative statics results and the type‐contingent ordering of emission allocations. These results are used to study the investment strategies that nations can use prior to the negotiations in order to manipulate the equilibrium emission caps.     

农地确权、信贷配给释缓与农村金融的深度发展*

作为一项基础性、制度环境层面的变革，农地确权帮助更多农户进入金融市场、促进农村金融宽度意义上的“量”变作用已经初步显现。但是，它是否可以提高农户贷款数量，缓解信贷配给并促进农村金融深度意义上的“质”变？这是一个重要但鲜有研究的问题。本文从供给、需求、交易成本、价格、风险配给等角度，分析了农地确权缓解信贷配给、促进农村金融深度发展的理论机理，并通过有序多分类变量回归及倾向得分匹配方法进行实证分析。研究表明，农地确权对农户金融参与深度的影响主要表现为：因降低信息成本而缓解价格配给，因弱化农户的损失规避心理而缓解风险配给；同时，数量配给和交易成本配给的释缓作用尚未充分显示。     

Industry equilibrium with outside financing and moral hazard: Implications for market integration

In this paper, we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that (1) firms need outside financing and (2) they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks. We characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing, where firms choose not to take risks, and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing. In both cases, we show that competition increases and prices decline as markets integrate. However, in markets with credit rationing there is typically more exit, a smaller decline in prices and, most strikingly, the market value of the industry increases rather than decreases.     

The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification

Summary We consider credit rationing in an environment with adverse selection and costly state verification. The presence of costly state verification permits debt contracts to emerge under conditions that we specify. When debt contracts are observed, so is credit rationing. This rationing occurs even if it is possible for rationed borrowers to bid up expected returns to lenders and hence is voluntary. We also show how the adverse selection and costly state verification problems interact and investigate how improvements in information gathering technology impact on the extent of credit rationing.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. We have benefitted from comments on an earlier draft of this paper by Franklin Allen, Charlie Calomiris, V. V. Chari, Ed Green, Craig Holden, Jeff Lacker, George Pennachi, Neil Wallace, Anne Villamil, and an anonymous referee and from discussions with Edward Prescott.     

Credit rationing or overlending? An exploration into financing imperfection

Small and new firms are deemed to be unable to obtain sufficient bank loans. This idea finds a strong theoretical support in credit rationing theory. However, this is vigorously challenged by De Meza and Webb (1987, 2000) suggesting that firms can benefit from an excess of credit, i.e. overlending. Credit rationing or overlending? The contribution of this empirical article is twofold: to our knowledge, it is the first to make an attempt in measuring the relative importance of these two types of financing imperfection and to explore factors leading to one or the other. We exploit a rich panel data set on the access to bank credit for new French businesses during the mid-1990s. Our results show that credit rationing was not highly spread among French new firms. The story told by De Meza and Webb (1987) appears to be a much more realistic model. In addition, we identify factors, linked to the starter, the project or the industry, that are closely associated with credit rationing and/or overlending. Most factors enter into a consistent relation: when they are positively (negatively) associated with credit rationing, they are negatively (positively) associated with overlending.     

The impact of credit rationing on the real sector: a study of the effect of mortgage rates and terms on housing starts

Various studies of the impact of credit rationing on the housing sector have examined its effect on mortgage terms and flows. If credit rationing has a significant effect on the economy, it must affect the real sector, i.e. housing starts. This paper examines the causal relationships between six different variables which describe mortgage rates and terms and single family housing starts. Two different types of tests for economic causality are used. The results indicate that neither credit rationing nor mortgage rates affect housing starts for the period 1963–1980. There is some evidence that housing prices have a causal relationship to housing starts, possibly reflecting speculative motives. On balance, the results are consistent with the rational expectations theory.     

Informality and Long‐Run Growth

One of the most salient features of developing economies is the existence of a large informal sector. In this paper, we use quantitative theory to study the dynamic implications of informality on wage inequality, human capital accumulation, child labor, and long‐run growth. Our model can generate transitory informality equilibria or informality‐induced poverty traps. Its calibration reveals that the case for the poverty‐trap hypothesis arises: although informality serves to protect low‐skilled workers from extreme poverty in the short run, it prevents income convergence between developed and developing nations in the long run. Then we examine the effectiveness of different development policies to exit the poverty trap. Our numerical experiments show that using means‐tested education subsidies is the most cost‐effective single policy option. However, for longer time horizons, or as the economy gets closer to the poverty trap threshold, combining means‐tested education and wage subsidies is even more effective.     

Optimal Taxation of Risky Human Capital*

In a two‐period life‐cycle model with ex ante homogeneous households, earnings risk, and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but they are only targeted at offsetting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, because education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non‐tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education because of risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor‐market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than in the case without education subsidies.     

Credit rationing and the adjustment of the loan rate: An empirical investigation

In this paper, models of credit rationing are analyzed using quarterly data on domestic bank loans of four countries. First, models of temporary (dynamic) credit rationing are considered. The price (interest rate) equation proposed by Bowden is estimated assuming equal and unequal adjustment speeds under excess demand and supply conditions. Second, the stability of the interest-rate equation is tested. We motivate this test by the fact that permanent (supply-side equilibrium) credit rationing implies instability of this regression relationship. Statistically significant credit-rationing effects are found for the countries considered, with the exception of the U.S.     

Export Subsidies and Exchange Rate Pass‐through

This paper investigates effects of exchange rate on optimal trade policies and market prices within a standard export subsidy model. Shifts in exchange rate change relative efficiencies of firms in different countries. We show that depreciation of own currency increases subsidy levels when marginal cost is constant. Import dependency weakens this relationship, decreasing sensitivity of subsidy levels to depreciation. In general, subsidies reduce exchange rate pass‐through. Additionally, perverse exchange rate pass‐through effect arises with sufficiently intensive subsidies.     

Accounting for China's Saving‐Investment Imbalance from 2002–2008

This paper decomposes and analyzes China's saving‐investment imbalance (equivalent to current account imbalance) from 2002–2008. We first use the Flow of Funds Accounts to calculate the saving and investment rates (propensity) of the household, corporate and government sectors and to evaluate their relative contribution to the aggregate saving‐investment surplus. The results indicate that the increase of saving‐investment surplus can be attributed to the steady increase of saving by the household and government sectors and the short‐term downsizing of investment by the corporate and government sectors. We then use more disaggregate supplementary datasets to explore the factors behind the evolution of the saving and investment rates for the three sectors. The rise of the household saving rate mainly sources from the urban sector. The corporate saving rate experienced a steady increase because of the rise of profitability. Government macroeconomic policies have had a strong influence on the saving and investment patterns of the corporate and government sectors.     

ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY EFFECTS ON CREDIT AND STABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

We examine policy‐related economic uncertainty effects on the availability of credit, non‐performing loans and loan loss provisions using a panel of 18 countries. We provide significant evidence that uncertainty reduces the availability of credit while leading to increases in banks' non‐performing loans and loan loss provisions, distorting sectoral stability. Our findings are economically meaningful.     

CURRENCY UNION WITH OR WITHOUT BANKING UNION

We build a symmetric two‐country monetary model with credit to study the interplay between currency integration and credit markets integration. The currency arrangement affects credit availability through default incentives. We capture credit markets integration by the extra cost incurred to obtain credit for cross‐border transactions and, with the euro area context in mind, label as banking union a situation where this cost is low. For high levels of the cross‐border credit cost, currency integration may magnify default incentives, leading to more credit rationing and lower welfare. The integration of credit markets restores the optimality of the currency union.     

Credit mismatch and breakdown

This paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships. Our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by (i) borrowers' endogenous market entry and exit decision (entry frictions) and (ii) time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities (search frictions). A key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions (in the form of moral hazard) with entry and search frictions. We find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate incentive-based equilibrium credit rationing. More generally, entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing and credit mismatch, while search and incentive frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown.     

The suspension of borrowing: an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information

A credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default. Such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check. Our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information. We show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates, but loosened otherwise, to improve the repayment performance of borrowers. We also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information, the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity.     

Do Banks Ration Credit to New Enterprises? And Should Governments Intervene?

Do banks deny credit to new start–ups? The presumption that they do has motivated government intervention in several forms, including publicly backed loan guarantee schemes in the UK and elsewhere. This paper presents an overview of the modern theory and evidence of credit rationing, and concludes that the case for credit rationing is weak. Ultimately, theoretical arguments for or against credit rationing are inconclusive, so evidence is needed to decide the issue. The evidence is not supportive of the view that credit rationing is an important or widespread phenomenon.     

Measuring and Optimizing Portfolio Credit Risk: A Copula‐based Approach*

In this work, we present a methodology for measuring and optimizing the credit risk of a loan portfolio taking into account the non‐normality of the credit loss distribution. In particular, we aim at modelling accurately joint default events for credit assets. In order to achieve this goal, we build the loss distribution of the loan portfolio by Monte Carlo simulation. The times until default of each obligor in portfolio are simulated following a copula‐based approach. In particular, we study four different types of dependence structure for the credit assets in portfolio: the Gaussian copula, the Student's t‐copula, the grouped t‐copula and the Clayton n‐copula (or Cook–Johnson copula). Our aim is to assess the impact of each type of copula on the value of different portfolio risk measures, such as expected loss, maximum loss, credit value at risk and expected shortfall. In addition, we want to verify whether and how the optimal portfolio composition may change utilizing various types of copula for describing the default dependence structure. In order to optimize portfolio credit risk, we minimize the conditional value at risk, a risk measure both relevant and tractable, by solving a simple linear programming problem subject to the traditional constraints of balance, portfolio expected return and trading. The outcomes, in terms of optimal portfolio compositions, obtained assuming different default dependence structures are compared with each other. The solution of the risk minimization problem may suggest us how to restructure the inefficient loan portfolios in order to obtain their best risk/return profile. In the absence of a developed secondary market for loans, we may follow the investment strategies indicated by the solution vector by utilizing credit default swaps.