Determinants and value relevance of UK CEO pay slice

This paper studies the CEO pay slice (CPS) of UK listed firms during the period 2003 to 2009. We investigate the determinants of CPS. We study the links between CPS and measures of firm performance. We find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance ratings and those with more independent boards tend to have higher CPS. In addition, we find that CEOs are more likely to receive lower compensation when they chair the board and when they work in firms with large board size. We also find that higher CPS is positively associated with firm performance after controlling for the firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance variables. We get compatible results when we examine the association between equity-based CPS and firm performance. Our results remain robust to alternative accounting measures of firm performance. Our results suggest that high UK CPS levels do indeed reflect top managerial talent rather than managerial power.     

Networks of common property resources

A tragedy of commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide how much resource to draw from each source they are connected to. We show that the network structure matters. The exploitation at each source depends on the centrality of the links connecting the source to the users. The equilibrium is unique and we provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. Next we characterize the efficient levels of extractions by users and outflows from sources. We provide a graph decomposition which divides the network into regions according to the availability of sources. Then the efficiency problem can be solved region by region.     

Self-reinforcing market dominance

Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in marginal cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. We find that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of firms overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even strengthens the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, mean-preserving spreads of the initial cost distribution have no effects on aggregate investments. Finally, investment spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-profit maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case with spillovers.     

Self-reinforcing market dominance

Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in marginal cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. We find that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of firms overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even strengthens the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, mean-preserving spreads of the initial cost distribution have no effects on aggregate investments. Finally, investment spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-profit maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case with spillovers.     

策略性模糊在信息甄别中的作用——以企业接班人计划为例

与美国等国家的企业相比,我国的企业在实行接班人计划上显得很消极。本文认为,这是中国企业在职业经理人市场发育迟缓的情况下,不得不采用的一种策略性模糊,其用意在于减少对未来接班人的私人信息进行甄别的成本。通过一个简单的两期博弈模型,本文发现,忠诚的高管的比例越低、高管的欺骗行为对企业所造成的损失越大、现任领导人对企业的长远发展越重视,企业就越倾向于采用这种模糊策略,从而不愿意实行接班人计划。     

New vehicle feebates

New vehicle feebate programs encourage improved fleet‐wide vehicle fuel efficiency; yet analyses of these policies have been limited to ad hoc proposals. In this paper, we exploit an extensive, multi‐year dataset which includes more than 16 million observations to evaluate the welfare implications of a long‐standing vehicle feebate program in the Canadian province of Ontario. We: (1) show that second‐best optimal feebates can be written as a function of new vehicle Pigouvian taxes; (2) find that Ontario's feebate program was welfare‐enhancing relative to a no feebate scenario but that a second‐best optimal benchmark would have yielded additional welfare while reducing fleet‐wide emissions; and (3) find that Ontarian consumers responded asymmetrically to fees versus rebates.     

Horizontal mergers,cost savings,and network effects

We consider a horizontally differentiated oligopoly and investigate the relationship between merger cost savings and network effects for the incentives of firms to merge and for the postmerger welfare outcomes. We show that it is more profitable to be an insider rather than an outsider of the merger, unless both cost savings and network effects are too low. Mergers can improve customer and total welfare provided both cost savings and network effects are high enough. We find that the possibility for network effects to lead to a Pareto improvement through merger is shown to depend on the number of outside firms.     

Over- and under-investment according to different benchmarks

In a two-stage oligopoly, with investment in the first stage and quantity or price competition in the second stage, there is a “Common Wisdom” Theorem which states that we find over-investment if the goods are substitutes and competition is in strategic substitutes, or if goods are complements and competition is in strategic complements, and that we find under-investment if we have complements and strategic substitutes or substitutes and strategic complements. The existing literature, however, lacks a proof of this theorem and, in particular, it lacks a systematic comparison of the different benchmarks for over- and under-investment. A “naive” benchmark is the cost efficient investment with respect to the subgame perfect (closed loop) equilibrium quantities. Alternative benchmarks (which are more often proposed) are the open loop equilibrium investment or the welfare maximizing investment. The chosen benchmark is critical because the Common Wisdom Theorem applies (under certain conventional conditions) only for the naive benchmark. The other two benchmarks give rise to subcases.     

How does entry regulation influence entry into self‐employment and occupational mobility?1

We analyse how an entry regulation that imposes a mandatory educational standard affects entry into self‐employment and occupational mobility. We exploit German reunification as a natural experiment and identify regulatory effects by comparing differences between regulated and unregulated occupations in East Germany with the corresponding differences in West Germany after reunification. Consistent with our expectations, we find that entry regulation reduces entry into self‐employment and occupational mobility after reunification more in regulated occupations in East Germany than in West Germany. Our findings are relevant for transition or emerging economies as well as for mature market economies requiring large structural changes after unforeseen economic shocks.     

Distortions,endogenous managerial skills and productivity differences

We develop a span-of-control model where managerial skills are endogenous and the outcome of investments over the life cycle of managers. We calibrate this model to U.S. plant-size data to quantify the effects of distortions that are correlated with the size of production units, and how these effects are amplified by managerial investments. We find a quantitatively important role for managerial investments. Distortions that consist of a tax rate of 20% on the top 50% managers reduce steady-state output by about 14.6% in our benchmark model. When skills are exogenous the reduction is about 9.2%.     

International trade and unionization: Evidence from India

We exploit exogenous variation in tariffs to examine the impact of import competition on unionization and union wages in a developing country. Using a combination of nationally representative household data (National Sample Survey Organization) and nationally representative industry‐level data (Annual Survey of Industries) from India, we find that net‐import industries that experienced larger cuts in tariffs also experienced larger declines in unionization. In addition, we find that these industries also experienced larger increases in union wages. These results are consistent with the predictions of an efficient bargaining framework that we extend to endogenize the union formation decision by allowing for a fixed cost of union formation. We also conduct a back‐of‐the‐envelope calculation to show that the total wage gains to unionized workers marginally exceed the total wage losses to deunionized workers.     

Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets

Diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles. We show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocated ex post. When managers derive utility from the funds under their purview, moving funds across divisions may diminish their incentives. The ex ante reduction in managerial incentives can more than offset the increase in firm value due to the ex post efficient reallocation of funds. This effect is robust to the introduction of monetary incentives. Moreover we show that asymmetries in size and growth prospects increase the diversification discount.     

COST‐SAVING PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIC DELEGATION*

This work analyses a managerial delegation model in which firms choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the later. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost‐saving technology than the strict profit maximisation case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. If the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost‐saving technology is larger under strict profit maximisation (strategic delegation).     

Downstream merger with upstream market power

We examine how a downstream merger affects input prices and, in turn, the profitability of a such a merger under Cournot competition with differentiated products. Input suppliers can be interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or trade unions organising workers. If the input suppliers are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous input prices. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider. For firm-specific input suppliers, on the other hand, results are reversed. We apply our model to endogenous merger formation in an international oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium market structure is likely to be characterised by cross-border merger.     

Using the Hawthorne effect to examine the gap between a doctor's best possible practice and actual performance

Many doctors in developing countries provide considerably lower quality care to their patients than they have been trained to provide. The gap between best possible practice and actual performance (often referred to as the know-do gap) is difficult to measure among doctors who differ in levels of training and experience and who face very different types of patients. We exploit the Hawthorne effect-in which doctors change their behavior when a researcher comes to observe their practices-to measure the gap between best and actual performance. We analyze this gap for a sample of doctors and also examine the impact of the organization for which doctors work on their performance. We find that some organizations succeed in motivating doctors to work at levels of performance that are close to their best possible practice. This paper adds to recent evidence that motivation can be as important to health care quality as training and knowledge.     

A Dynamic Analysis of the Market for Wide-Bodied Commercial Aircraft

This paper uses an empirical dynamic oligopoly model of the commercial aircraft industry to analyse industry pricing, industry performance, and optimal industry policy. A novel feature of the model with respect to the previous literature is that entry, exit, prices, and quantities are endogenously determined in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). We find that many unusual aspects of the aircraft data, such as high concentration and persistent pricing below static marginal cost, are explained by this model. We also find that the unconstrained MPE is quite efficient from a social perspective, providing only 10% less welfare on average than a social planner would obtain. Finally, we provide simulation evidence that an anti-trust policy in the form of a concentration restriction would be welfare reducing.     

‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus selling by an outside innovator

We study various modes of technology transfer of an outside innovator in a spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. In addition to different licensing options, we also look into the option of selling the property rights of innovation and find the optimal mode of technology transfer. For licensing we find the optimal policy is to offer pure royalty contracts to both licensee firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small compared to the transportation cost, otherwise offer a fixed fee licensing contract to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling the innovation to any one of the firms who further licenses it to the rival firm. The result holds irrespective of the size of the innovation (drastic or non-drastic) and the degree of cost asymmetry between the licensees. Social welfare is greater under selling than licensing.     

The quiet life of a monopolist: The efficiency losses of monopoly reconsidered

We study the efficiency losses of monopoly in a model where the firm’s total cost of production decreases with the manager’s effort to control cost. In contrast to the existing analyses of oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive markets that find an ambiguous relationship between competition intensity and managerial slack, we demonstrate that, under the same kind of cost condition, monopoly unambiguously reduces effort level and, in the case where ownership and control are separate, magnifies the effects of the moral hazard problem. Furthermore, under an alternative cost condition monopoly raises effort level rather than reducing it. In such a situation the separation of ownership and control may mitigate the productive inefficiency of monopoly.     

Approximations in power transmission planning: implications for the cost and performance of renewable portfolio standards

Renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) are popular market-based mechanisms for promoting development of renewable power generation. However, they are usually implemented without considering the capabilities and cost of transmission infrastructure. We use single- and multi-stage planning approaches to find cost-effective transmission and generation investments to meet single and multi-year RPS goals, respectively. Using a six-node network and assuming a linearized DC power flow, we examine how the lumpy nature of network reinforcements and Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law can affect the performance of RPSs. First, we show how simplified planning approaches that ignore transmission constraints, transmission lumpiness, or Kirchhoff’s voltage law yield distorted estimates of the type and location of infrastructure, as well as inaccurate compliance costs to meet the renewable goals. Second, we illustrate how lumpy transmission investments and Kirchhoff’s voltage law result in compliance costs that are nonconvex with respect to the RPS targets, in the sense that the marginal costs of meeting the RPS may decrease rather than increase as the target is raised. Thus, the value of renewable energy certificates (RECs) also depends on the network topology, as does the amount of noncompliance with the RPS, if noncompliance is penalized but not prohibited. Finally, we use a multi-stage planning model to determine the optimal generation and transmission infrastructure for RPS designs that set multiyear goals. We find that the optimal infrastructure to meet RPS policies that are enforced year-by-year differ from the optimal infrastructure if banking and borrowing is allowed in the REC market.     

That elusive elasticity and the ubiquitous bias: Is panel data a panacea?

There is often assumed to be a unit elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. But estimates based on neoclassical capital demand equations frequently find a smaller value. Recent time-series work for the United States and Canada has suggested that, once the biases inherent in estimating cointegrating vectors are properly accounted for, the elasticity could indeed be close to 1. We investigate this possibility for the United Kingdom. First we use aggregate data and find that the estimated elasticity is in the neighbourhood of 0.4. We then exploit a unique industry-level dataset for the United Kingdom to try and further pinpoint our estimates. Estimates using dynamic panel data methods are close to our benchmark estimate using aggregate data, providing a robust statistical rejection of a unit elasticity in UK data.