Public Saving and Policy Coordination in Aging Economies

In the coming decades, the share of people of working age will fall significantly in most developed countries. According to optimal taxation theory, public debts should be reduced before the baby‐boom generation retires. I find that if debts are instead maintained at current levels, welfare may be reduced substantially in countries with a large public sector and/or a large demographic change. Since population aging will be less dramatic in the United States than in Europe and Japan, capital will move from Europe and Japan to the United States. These capital movements will facilitate the US demographic transition but aggravate the transition in most European countries.     

International Trade and Growth Miracles: the Implications of Nonhomothetic Preferences

If the rate of saving increases with income then a low per capita level of the capital stock may be self‐sustaining. In these circumstances international trade may allow an economy to quickly increase its per capita capital stock in a self‐reinforcing “growth miracle” process. A labor‐abundant economy trading with a capital‐abundant economy will see its wage rate rise relative to autarky. This rise in the wage rate also increases the savings rate and so raises the following period’s per capita capital stock. In this way a low‐income economy may exhibit large and permanent increases in its level of GDP per capita after opening its markets to international trade.     

Pension Reform, Capital Markets and the Rate of Return

Abstract. This paper discusses the consequences of population aging and a fundamental pension reform – that is, a shift towards more pre‐funding – for capital markets in Germany. We use a stylized closed‐economy, overlapping‐generations model to compare the effects of the recent German pension reform with those of a more decisive reform that would freeze the current pay‐as‐you‐go contribution rate and thus result in a larger funded component of the pension system. We predict rates of return to capital under both reform scenarios over a long horizon, taking demographic projections as given. Our main finding is that the future decrease in the rate of return is much smaller than often claimed in the public debate. Our simulations show that the capital stock will decrease once the baby‐boom generations enter retirement, even if there were no fundamental pension reform. The corresponding decrease in the rate of return, the direct effect of population aging, is around 0.7 percentage points. While the capital market effects of the recent German pension reform are marginal, the rate of return to capital would decrease by an additional 0.5 percentage points under the more decisive reform proposal.     

Does the stock market affect investment by Chinese firms? Some new evidence

During the 1990s, the Chinese government increasingly relied on the stock market as the major tool for state‐owned enterprise (SOE) reform and for the allocation of investment resources. This paper investigates the impact of stock market development in China on firm‐level capital investment by using a panel data set constructed by the author of all Chinese listed firms for the period 1992 to 1999. The results show that stock market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s q, has a highly independent, significant and positive influence on listed firms’ investment decisions, particularly during the stock market boom from 1996 to 1999. Given the sizable real effects of the stock market, deviations of stock prices from fundamentals can have substantially negative consequences. As a result, this study suggests that sensible regulation of the Chinese stock market is needed in order to enhance the efficiency of stock prices and facilitate an effective channeling of investment funds.     

Population age structure and asset returns: an empirical investigation

"This paper investigates the association between population age structure, particularly the share of the population in the 'prime saving years' 45-60, and the returns on stocks and bonds. The paper is motivated by the claim that the aging of the 'Baby Boom' cohort in the United States is a key factor in explaining the recent rise in asset values. It also addresses the associated claim that asset prices will decline when this large cohort reaches retirement age and begins to reduce its asset holdings. This paper begins by considering household age-asset accumulation profiles. Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances suggest that while cross-sectional age-wealth profiles peak for households in their early 60s, cohort data on the asset ownership of the same households show a much less pronounced peak.... The paper then considers the historical relationship between demographic structure and real returns on Treasury bills, long-term government bonds, and corporate stock. The results do not suggest any robust relationship between demographic structure and asset returns.... The paper concludes by discussing factors such as international capital flows and forward-looking behavior on the part of market participants that could weaken the relationship between age structure and asset returns in a single nation."     

Global capital markets,housing prices,and partisan fiscal policies

In recent years, global imbalances have channeled the excess savings of surplus countries toward the real estate markets of deficit countries. By consequence, the deficit countries that attracted lots of foreign capital experienced large run‐ups in house prices, whereas most surplus countries that exported capital exhibited flat or slow house price growth. We first use new house price data and a novel instrumental variable design to show the causal relationship between housing prices and capital inflows, particularly through debt bonanzas. We then argue that international capital flows affect the fiscal policy preferences of both voters and political parties by way of their impact on housing prices. Where capital inflows are large and housing prices are rising, we expect voters to respond by demanding both lower taxes and less publicly‐provided social insurance because rising house prices allow homeowners to self‐insure against income loss. In contrast, declining house prices produce greater demands for social insurance, particularly among those most exposed to housing market risk. We present evidence from two cross‐national surveys that supports these claims, as well as a “before and after” analysis of the housing crash in Eastern Europe. We also show that the connection between house prices and social policy also manifests itself in government spending outcomes, mediated by partisan control.     

THE TREATMENT OF EDUCATION IN NATIONAL ACCOUNTING1

It is argued that the conventions of an accounting system, such as the S.N.A., are a matter of convenience. The treatment of education as a current expenditure, instead of as a form of capital formation, derives from the Keynesian system, and is not appropriate for dynamic problems of developing countries, where weaknesses in education are often the main “bottleneck” in the process of development. In such countries, expenditure on education clearly yields its benefits mainly in the longer run. To treat this as a consumption item biases policy in the direction of using financial resources for fixed capital rather than human investment, and may cause aid agencies to penalize countries which expand their educational systems. A similar problem arises on other expenditures such as health, but the case for treating them as investment is not so strong. To treat educational expenditure as part of capital formation logically requires two major changes. First education needs to be removed from private and public consumption, and for this purpose a fairly broad definition of what is education should be used. Secondly, the stock of educational capital should be valued. The valuation problems are, however, severe. Variations in cost components make historic cost of little value as a yardstick, and calculations of future returns are fraught with difficulties. Using replacement costs, which seems the best method, involves the construction of education profiles in physical terms which can then be valued by present or by standardised costs. The depreciation of human capital through mortality and retirement can be allowed for by applying national average rates to these physical profiles. Switching educational expenditure from current to capital accounts involves no serious practical problem. However, although there should logically be an allowance for depreciation on human capital, this is not recommended; single monetary measures of educational stock are not very meaningful, and this would involve changing the definition of “net” aggregates. Development of statistics of educational stocks and flows in physical terms—the beginnings of “demographic accounting” fully integrated with the rest of national accounting—is strongly advocated.     

商业银行发行理财产品与股价崩盘风险

商业银行在我国金融体系中的地位举足轻重,是金融系统性风险的重要来源。近年来,理财业务的高速成长为商业银行累积了大量的风险,但无论是监管层、业界还是学界,对银行理财产品的关注主要集中在理财产品驱动因素以及其对商业银行业绩的影响上,忽略了商业银行发行理财产品所引发的风险累积及其对资本市场稳定的潜在影响。因此,本文利用2006-2016年中国境内上市银行理财产品的发行数据,从股价崩盘的角度研究其对银行自身股价产生的影响。本文研究表明:银行理财产品的发行会带来自身股价崩盘风险,理财产品发行数量越大,其股价崩盘风险越大;监管压力和理财产品刚性会加剧股价崩盘风险的发生。基于此,本文建议:相关监管机构重点关注监管考核压力较大的商业银行,商业银行要做好投资者的教育工作,淡化预期收益概念,并落实理财产品信息披露制度,更多地发行“开放式净值型”理财产品。     

Socially responsible investment in an environmental overlapping generations model

One of the problems associated with the conservation of the environment is that short-lived individuals fail to account for the long-term effects of pollution, which implies that future generations bear the costs imposed by the current generation. Such inter-generational externalities are usually tackled by (Pigovian) taxes, fiscal policy or environmental regulation. Alternatively, we propose that socially responsible investment funds create a role for the stock market to deal with intergenerational environmental externalities. We analyze the role of the stock market in an environmental overlapping generations model of the Diamond-type, in which agents choose between investing in “clean” government bonds or “polluting” firm equity. We show that although socially responsible investors are short-lived, the forward-looking nature of stock prices can help to resolve the conflict between current and future generations.     

Coffee Boom, Coffee Bust and Smallholder Response in Vietnam's Central Highlands

This paper studies the recent boom and bust in Vietnam’s coffee economy. Data from smallholder coffee farms in the Central Highlands are used to examine responses to a drop in producer coffee prices. A multinomial logistic regression model is used to identify several factors associated with four specific patterns observed among coffee farmers: no response to price change, reductions in use of purchased inputs, changes in crop mix, and responses aimed at enhancing liquidity through off‐farm work or borrowing. Patterns of response are shown to have differed systematically across sub‐groups of smallholders. Policy implications raised by the findings are discussed.     

Does “hot money” drive China's real estate and stock markets?

The paper investigates the extent of the impact from “hot money” or speculative capital inflow on the fluctuations of China's real estate market and stock market. The results indicate that hot money has driven up property prices as well as contributed to the accelerating volatilities in both markets due to its enormous size and its short-term characteristic of investing. In particular, we find that hot money ranks as the second largest contributor in the fluctuations of China's real estate prices. In the “risky” regime, which corresponds to more inflows and higher volatility of hot money, the effects are even more prominent.     

Stocks and the weather: An exercise in data mining or yet another capital market anomaly?

Empirical Economics - We try to replicate the findings in Saunders (1993) that stock prices are “systematically affected by local weather”. Using German data, we find that whether or...     

An aging society: opportunity or challenge?

"This paper steps back from the current political debate [in the United States] over the social security trust fund and examines the more general question of how serious a macroeconomic problem aging is and how policy should respond to it. We focus primarily on issues relating to saving and capital accumulation. We do not consider the broader question of whether the current U.S. national saving rate is too high or too low, but focus on the effect of demographic changes on the optimal level of national saving. In addition, we consider the effects of demographic change on productivity growth and the optimal timing of tax collections. Our general conclusion is that demographic changes will improve American standards of living in the near future, but lower them slightly over the very long term. Other things being equal, the optimal policy response to recent and anticipated demographic changes is almost certainly a reduction rather than an increase in the national saving rate."     

Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Reassessing the Role of International Finance

Global current account imbalances have recently been singled out by many as a key factor contributing to the global financial crisis. Current account surpluses in several emerging market economies are said to have put significant downward pressure on world interest rates, thereby fueling a credit boom and risk taking in major advanced economies with current account deficits (the “excess saving” view). We argue that this perspective on global imbalances bears reconsideration. We highlight two conceptual problems: (i) explaining market interest rates through the saving-investment framework; and (ii) drawing inferences about a country's cross-border financing activity based on observations of net capital flows. We trace the shortcomings of this perspective to a failure to consider the distinguishing characteristics of a monetary (credit) economy. We conjecture that the main macroeconomic cause of the financial crisis was not “excess saving” but the “excess elasticity” of the international monetary and financial system.     

Crossing Hubbert’s peak: Portfolio effects in a growth model with exhaustible resources

This paper elaborates a two-class growth model with an exhaustible resource (“oil”) and an alternative technique (“solar”). Bequest savers accumulate wealth, consisting of capital and oil, saving a constant fraction of their end-of-period wealth. The price of oil obeys Hotelling’s rule. Rising oil prices and the depletion of oil supplies create portfolio effects on the accumulation of capital. When growth is constrained by an exogenously increasing labor force, these wealth effects express themselves in changes in the distribution of income, which first shifts toward profits and then shifts back toward wages as the oil stocks approach depletion. When growth is constrained by capital (the labor force is endogenous), the portfolio effects express themselves in changes in the rate of capital accumulation, which first declines and then rises sharply as the oil stocks approach depletion.     

Exchange Rate Policy and the Resources Boom*

This paper considers some policy choices posed by the prospective Australian resources boom, distinguishing between the investment boom and the export boom and between the adjustment and the non-adjustment options. With adjustment both booms are likely to lead to real appreciation, raising the ‘Dutch disease’ issues. Non-adjustment means accumulating foreign exchange reserves by preventing both nominal appreciation and inflation. It is discussed whether protection by tariffs or quotas should be lowered or raised because of the export boom. An Appendix analyzes the monetary policy implications of both the floating rate (adjustment) and the fixed rate (non-adjustment) cases.     

ACCRUED CAPITAL GAINS, PERSONAL INCOME AND SAVING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1948–1964

Capital gains are an important source of personal income in the United States but they are not included in the national accounts or the official estimate of personal income and saving. Individuals report their realized gains for tax purposes but the economic theorist would include both realized and accrued gains in income. National income theorists continue to debate whether capital gains should be included in income but, because of the many conceptual and statistical problems involved in estimating capital gains, no satisfactory estimates have been developed. Consequently, the debate has stayed mainly at the theoretical level. This paper deals with the methodology of estimating accrued capital gains. A simple analytical model is developed to estimate capital gains from data on market value and net acquisitions of an asset but the model can be adapted to incorporate asset prices directly. It is shown that the methods used for estimating accrued gains in the past are special cases of the model proposed in the paper. The model is then used for estimating gains accruing to individuals in the United States on their holdings of corporate stock, real estate and livestock during 1948–1964.
During this period accrued gains have amounted to roughly five times the realized gains reported for tax purposes; corporate stock and real estate are the most important sources of capital gains and corporate stock accounts for almost two-thirds of all accrued gains. The paper goes on to examine the implications of these estimates for the existing series on personal income and saving in the United States. The inclusion of accrued gains would increase the variance in the official estimates but personal saving is affected more than personal income. The paper concludes with an evaluation of these results and some suggestions for further research.     

Commodity Prices and the Dynamics of Inflation in Commodity‐Exporting Nations: Evidence from Australia and Canada*

A commodity‐price boom is under way. What does this boom mean for inflation in countries with substantial net commodity exports? The answer depends on movements in commodity prices, changes in foreign exchange rates and the determinants of domestic price inflation. We estimate equations to provide indications of the strength of each of these forces for both Australia and Canada. The results show that world commodity prices move pro‐cyclically with world industrial production and that rates of change in commodity prices are directly related to domestic inflation in both countries. However, there is an offsetting impact of exchange‐rate changes, which is strong enough in the case of Australia, but not Canada, to substantially eliminate the inflationary impact of a commodity‐price boom.     

The empirical effects of competition on third‐degree price discrimination in the presence of arbitrage

Since Borenstein ( 1985 ) and Holmes ( 1989 ), a theoretical and empirical literature has emerged that examines the effects of competition on third‐degree price discrimination. Since transaction costs involved in conducting arbitrage are typically unobserved, empirical investigations in this area have largely been restricted to markets such as for air travel where arbitrage is difficult, if not impossible. Using an entirely novel dataset, this paper documents the effect of competition on price discrimination in the presence of arbitrage in the Canadian online sports betting market where prices for Canadian teams are higher than in the world market. I observe how the prices of Canadian teams change in real time in response to the presence of arbitrageurs that establish Canadian sportsbooks’ observable marginal opportunity costs. I exploit the existence of government betting outlets not subject to arbitrage to obtain reduced form counterfactual estimates of the extent to which competition affects price discrimination in the presence of arbitrage. In this new empirical environment, I find results consistent with the airline literature: competition reduces overall price dispersion and markups, but dispersion and markups shrink more for those in the “strong” market than the “weak” market.     

Unilateral climate policy and the green paradox: Extraction costs matter

I analyze the effect of unilateral climate policies in a two‐country model where fossil fuel extraction costs depend on both current extraction and remaining stock and where a constant marginal‐cost clean substitute is available. An intensification of climate policy in the country with an initially stricter policy does not increase early fossil fuel extraction (i.e., there is no “weak green paradox”) or the present value of pollution costs (i.e., there is no “strong green paradox”) if energy demand in that country is initially met with a mix of fossil fuel and a substitute. Whether a stricter climate policy in the country with an initially laxer policy causes a weak green paradox depends on the price elasticity of energy demand and the strength of the flow and stock dependence of extraction costs. If the reduction of total extraction is sufficiently strong, it overcompensates for a weak green paradox with respect to pollution costs. Thus, a weak green paradox does not necessarily imply a strong green paradox, due to stock dependence.