A Unique Informationally Efficient Allocation Mechanism In Economies With Consumption Externalities*

This article investigates the informational requirements of resource allocation processes in pure exchange economies with consumption externalities. It is shown that the distributive Lindahl mechanism has a minimal informational size of the message space, and thus it is informationally the most efficient allocation process that is informationally decentralized and realizes Pareto‐efficient allocations over the class of economies that include nonmalevolent economies. Furthermore, it is shown that the distributive Lindahl mechanism is the unique informationally efficient decentralized mechanism that realizes Pareto‐efficient and individually rational allocations over a certain class of nonmalevolent economies.     

An Extension of the Trade Restrictiveness Index to Large Economies*

The Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) introduced by Anderson and Neary (1994 ) provided the first theoretically satisfying measure of a country’s tariff structure by overcoming the problem of ad hoc specification of indexing weights and the related index number problem. We observe, however, that the TRI may not exist or may not be unique when countries are large. As a remedy, we propose a simple extension.     

External Economies in the International Trade Theory: A Survey

The paper surveys the international trade literature on intraindustrial and interindustrial production externalities. It places particular emphasis upon the literature on variable returns to scale (VRS) developed along the Kemp line that the externalities are output–generated, and the economies of scale are external (internal) to individual firms (industry). The discussion touches upon the literature examining the implications of VRS for fundamental trade theorems, trade policies, economic growth, and welfare. The paper extends the survey to writings on the Meade–type interindustrial production externalities.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Economies of Scale and Product Variety*

It is well known that laissez faire may not be the ‘first-best’ policy in a closed economy where economies of scale are present. Corden has shown that this conclusion can carry over into an open economy, though under his assumption that imported goods are perfect substitutes for home-produced goods, interference with international trade could not raise real income. We have shown that where there are economies of scale, and imported goods are not identical to the home produced goods, interference with trade could raise real national income, though such a form of intervention would not normally be optimal. Further, it could even be desirable to support home production of more than one ‘variety’. Measurements of ‘costs of protection’ that aggregate several varieties into one may mislead not only regarding the size of the cost but even regarding its sign.     

商业信用:源于竞争关系还是合作关系——基于产业价值链企业的商业信用实证研究

本文提出构造一个包含着产业价值链的企业之业务组合,并利用企业β值来表征竞争或合作及其对商业信用影响的研究思路.通过对中国上市公司中"石油-化纤-纺织"产业价值链的实证研究发现,融资性动机是中国企业利用商业信用的主要动机;在产业价值链上,合作比竞争对企业商业信用的影响更大;竞争主导型企业的商业信用链主要以"三角债"方式相链结,合作主导型企业主要以"义务性互惠"方式相链结.     

A Markov‐Switching Model Of Gnp Growth With Duration Dependence*

A Markov‐switching model of postwar quarterly real GNP growth is used to examine the duration dependence of business cycles. It extends the Hamilton model and the duration‐dependent model of Durland and McCurdy, and compares quite favorably to simpler models in out‐of‐sample forecasting. When an expansion begins, the probability of the expansion ending is 0.2, but it gradually decreases as the expansion ages. When a contraction begins, the probability of the contraction terminating is 0.07, but it increases rapidly as the contraction ages. Output growth slows over the course of an expansion. The hypothesis of the 7–10‐year cycle is not supported.     

Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability*

Whether natural resources are good or bad for a country's development are shown to depend on the interaction between institutional setting and, crucially, the types of resources possessed by the country. Some natural resources are, for economical and technical reasons, more likely to cause problems such as rent‐seeking and conflicts than others. This potential problem can, however, be countered by good institutional quality. In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis, we show the impact of natural resources on economic growth to be non‐monotonic in institutional quality, and increasingly so for certain types of resources. In particular, countries rich in minerals are cursed only if they have low‐quality institutions, while the curse is reversed if institutions are sufficiently good. Furthermore, if countries are rich in diamonds and precious metals, these effects—both positive and negative—are larger.     

Trade Structure and Trade liberalization: The emerging pattern between the EU and Transition Economies

The purpose of this study is to find empirical evidence for the assumption that trade liberalization unlocks the potential of the Transition Economies (TEs) to achieve technological upgrading, productivity progress and catching-up (in terms of income). The study examines the trade structure now emerging between the European Union (EU) and the TEs in the light of two sets of differently liberalized trade items identified by the European Agreements. The aim is to determine whether trade liberalization has helped to supersede the structures – reflected mainly in the low quality of products – inherited by the TEs from the command economy. The empirical results are interpreted in the light of the Flam-Helpman quality-cycle model. We find evidence of an ongoing division of labor between high quality products (EU) and low quality products (TEs) according to a cycle. The first stage comprises the already well established dominance of quality advantage products by EU countries producing and exporting high-quality products, which crowd out the TEs' production of similar products. The second stage is the exploitation of cost-advantages by TEs in less liberalized trade, and there they appear to achieve better results. All these results may be taken as support for an active government in TEs.     

Terms of Trade and Welfare: A General Analysis*

We develop a necessary and a sufficient condition for an improvement in terms of trade to reduce welfare under a general setting, which can accommodate various types of market stucture and trade distortions. We also apply the conditions to two specific cases, viz export subsidies and the existence of monopoly in a non-tradeable sector. It is found that a rise in price for an exportable commodity which is subsidized may well reduce welfare. Also, improvements in terms of trade may well harm the economy if there is a non-tradeable monopoly sector.     

贸易与劳工标准挂钩:新的贸易保护主义

贸易和劳工标准的关系问题是当今国际经济学界的一个重要问题,本文首先阐述了贸易与劳工标准挂钩的两派观点,然后从实证的角度探讨了贸易与劳工标准的关联性,笔者发现:劳工标准与国际贸易并没有必然联系,将劳工标准与国际贸易挂钩缺乏理论或者事实依据.本文最后把劳工标准问题置于经济全球化背景下进行研究,剖析了发达国家将劳工标准与贸易挂钩的保护主义实质,并提出了我国应采取的对策.     

The Effect Of Statistical Discrimination On Black–White Wage Inequality: Estimating A Model With Multiple Equilibria*

This article presents the structural estimation of the parameters of a statistical discrimination model. Although the model is capable of displaying multiple equilibria, an estimation strategy that identifies both the model parameters and the equilibrium selected by the economic agents is developed and empirically implemented. A comparison between the selected equilibria and the other potential equilibria reveals that the decline in wage inequality experienced in the U.S. economy cannot be attributed to changes in the equilibrium selection. Nonetheless, a counterfactual experiment shows that in a color‐blind society blacks' wage would have been on average more than 20% higher.     

A Theory of Trade Secrets in Firms*

This article provides a simple theoretical model of trade secrets in hierarchical firms. A crucial assumption is that each manager has access to trade secrets pertaining to his own hierarchical level as well as to all lower levels. The article explores some implications of this assumption for optimal degree of trade secrets accumulation and protection as well as for the wage structure in firms. In addition, the model implies that managers may have an incentive to overpay their subordinates and protect their firms’ trade secrets too much.     

A Model of Trade Liberalization in Services*

This paper develops an intra‐industry service trade model taking into account important features of services. We find that service trade liberalization between identical economies is welfare enhancing when the pre‐trade domestic market liberalization is limited. This holds regardless of the degree of trade liberalization and of the mode of supply. However, if the pre‐trade environment is characterized by a free‐entry equilibrium, then service trade liberalization is not necessarily welfare improving. It is welfare enhancing if the trade liberalization is full and the mode of supply is cross‐border. The gain from trade in our model comes from the improvement in service quality—better matching between consumers’ ideal varieties and firms’ product specificity. The implications for the mode of supply in service trade are also explored.     

The Quality Ladder and Product Variety: Larger Economies May Not Grow Faster

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model that combines the quality ladder model and the variety expansion model. Firms enter an imitation race. After the imitation process, monopolistic competition prevails and a new innovation race begins. A successful firm, by inventing a higher quality product, can take over the entire market. However, the existence of a variety of products limits the price that the successful firm can charge. We show that the present model exhibits an inverted U-shape relationship between market size and growth rate. Relatively large and small economies grow slowly while medium-sized economies grow rapidly.     

A Neo-Ricardian Trade Model with Overlapping Generations*

This paper develops and examines a discrete-time two-by-two-by-two barter trading world which incorporates populations. composed of overlapping, life-cycle-maximizing generations; each provides an economically distinguishable factor of production. It is shown that free trade without compensation can be Pareto inferior to autarky for one country. Conditions for uncompensated free trade to take place under a majority voting system are derived. The model permits intergenerational borrowing and lending to take place domestically but not internationally.     

International Adjustment With Habit-Forming Consumption: A Diagrammatic Exposition*

This paper presents a simple diagrammatic analysis of an open economy's external adjustment process under habit-forming individual preferences. the exposition focuses on the consumption side and alms to make transparent the linkage among wealth, past consumption experience, and current consumption. an extension of the standard representative-agent model to a growing economy of overlapping generations completes the paper. Under habit formation an agent's consumption exhibits a form of hysteresis, in that his current consumption depends on his past consumption experience as well as initial assets. In the overlapping-generations model aggregate hysteresis disappears in the long run.     

Auctions With A Minimum Requirement Of Bids

We show that in a procurement auction with independent and private costs of production and a positive cost of preparing a bid, the requirement of a minimum number of offers for the good to be bought always yields a unique (perfect) Bayesian equilibrium where no firm enters a bid, whatever its cost of production, the number of potential bidders and the size of the bidding cost.
To avoid the no-bid result, the buyer can commit to subsidise the losing bidders in certain circumstances. Alternatively, it can use a stochastic auction, where the provider of the good is not always the firm that bids the lowest price.