Competition between private and public schools: testing stratification and pricing predictions

When there are peer effects in education, private schools have an incentive to vary tuition to attract relatively able students. Epple and Romano [American Economic Review 88(1) (1998) 33] develop a general equilibrium model characterizing equilibrium pricing and student selection into schools when peer effects are present. The model predicts that competition will lead private schools to give tuition discounts to more able students, and that this will give rise to an equilibrium exhibiting stratification by income and ability between the public and private sectors and to a hierarchy of schools within the private sector. The model also yields a variety of comparative-static predictions. The predictions of the model are tested in this paper using a unique data set assembled by Figlio and Stone [Research in Labor Economics (1999) 115]. Tests of equilibrium predictions of the model reveal that: The propensity to attend private school increases with both income and ability, and, among private schools, the propensity to attend the highest-tuition schools rises with both income and ability. Within private schools, tuition declines with student ability, with a substantial number of even high-income households paying little or no tuition. The correlation between income and ability is greater in public than private schools. Tests of comparative static predictions of the model reveal that: Both income and ability become stronger predictors of private school attendance as public school expenditure falls. Income becomes increasingly important in determining placement in the private school hierarchy as public school expenditure falls. Discounts to ability in the lowest-quality private school decline as public school expenditure rises while discounts to ability in the highest-quality private school are little affected by changes in public school expenditure. Expenditure in private schools rises as expenditure in public schools increases. These empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.     

SCHOOL CHOICE AND STUDENT SORTING: EVIDENCE FROM ADACHI WARD IN JAPAN*

We examine whether the school choice programme of public junior high schools in Adachi ward has caused student sorting and has thus increased the differences in scores between the schools. We find that students are sorted in the sense that the students living in the school attendance areas where there is a higher proportion of high‐status occupations are more likely to select private schools even after the introduction of the school choice programme, or they select public schools with higher scores. Adachi's average scores relative to the Tokyo average have improved, while the between school differences in scores have not expanded.     

When do better schools raise housing prices? Evidence from Paris public and private schools

In this paper, we investigate how housing prices react to the quality of education offered by neighboring public and private schools. The organization of secondary schooling in the city of Paris, which combines residence-based assignment to public schools with a well-developed and almost entirely publicly funded private school system, offers a valuable empirical context for analyzing how private schools affect the capitalization of public school performance in housing prices. Using comprehensive data on both schools and real estate transactions over the period 1997–2004, we develop a matching framework to carefully compare sales across school attendance boundaries. We find that a standard deviation increase in public school performance raises housing prices by 1.4 to 2.4%. Moreover, we show that the capitalization of public school performance in the price of real estate shrinks as the availability of private schools increases in the neighborhood. Our results confirm the predictions of general equilibrium models of school choice that private schools, by providing an advantageous outside option to parents, tend to mitigate the impact of public school performance on housing prices.     

Immigration and School Choice in Australia

This article examines the relationship between the share of immigrants in a locality and private versus public school choices of natives and immigrants in Australia. Using the 2001 Australian Census data, it finds that private school attendance among native‐born Australians is higher in localities with a higher share of immigrant populations. Immigrants’ private school attendance is lower where the share of their like‐type immigrants is higher. These effects vary with the presence of a common language and ethnic background between the natives and the immigrants. Overall, the results suggest the possibility of a ‘flight’ from unfamiliar cultures in the Australian school system.     

Private or public school advantage? Evidence from 40 countries using PISA 2012-Mathematics

It is known that in most countries, private school students outperform students in public schools in international assessments. However, the empirical literature recognizes that assessing the true effect of private school attendance requires addressing selection and sorting issues on both observabland unobservables. The existing empirical evidence on the private school effect mostly covers OECD and Latin American countries, with little evidence on other parts of the world. There is recent emerging country-specific evidence doubting the existence of a private school advantage. I use PISA 2012 data for Mathematics and two different methodologies to derive baseline and bias-corrected estimates of the private-dependent and independent school effect for 40 countries. A robust private school advantage is found only in a handful of countries. Public schools generally perform as well as private subsidized schools and outperform independent schools. Accounting for both peer effects and selection is necessary when evaluating school effectiveness, especially in the case of independent schools.     

Explaining Caste Differences in Private School Attendance

Using a nationally representative education survey, we explore caste differences in private school attendance in India. We find lower private school attendance among the disadvantaged castes—Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Castes (OBCs)—when compared with the non‐disadvantaged group (non‐SC/ST/OBC). Controlling for geographical location, household and individual level factors reduces the gaps in private school attendance considerably; however, the gaps remain quite large. We find that variation in parental education and household consumption expenditure explains a significant proportion of the observed gaps. For ST students, geographical location remains important in explaining the gap in private school attendance.     

CLEAN INDOOR AIR LAWS AND THE DEMAND FOR CIGARETTES

This paper empirically tests the effect of clean indoor air laws on smoking. Public place clean indoor air laws restrict cigarette smoking in public places such as restaurants. Private place clean air laws regulate smoking in private work places as well as in public places. This study uses a time series of cross sections of the 50 states of the United States and Washington, D.C., from 1975 through 1985, to estimate single equation and simultaneous equation models of cigarette demand. The single equation results indicate that both the public place law and the private work place law have a negative effect on cigarette demand. However, a test for endogeneity shows that the enactment of clean indoor air laws is a function of cigarette demand. Results from a simultaneous equations model indicate that the public place law has a significant negative impact on cigarette demand, while the work place law has no effect on cigarette demand. Although these results demonstrate that only states with low levels of smoking have passed work place clean air laws, the results do not imply that the level of smoking would not decrease if such a law were imposed in all states.     

Public investment,the rate of return,and optimal fiscal policy in a stochastically growing economy

This study examines the optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic endogenous growth model with private and public capital. The government is willing to actualize a socially optimal equilibrium using a lump-sum tax and government debt linked to public investments, subject to the budget constraint under the golden rule of public finance. A socially optimal fiscal policy states that a deterministic rate of return on government bonds sets the marginal product of public capital. Moreover, public investments optimally adjust the ratio of private capital to public capital to equate the rates of return on such capital. The presence of stochastic disturbances results in a disparity between the optimal marginal products of the two types of capital, as reported in previous empirical studies. This disparity significantly affects the socially optimal growth rate in response to investment risk.     

INTEGRATION AND UTILIZATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION RESOURCES IN REMOTE AND HOMOGENOUS AREAS: A CASE STUDY OF THE UPPER PENINSULA OF MICHIGAN

This article adopts the nonradial Russell measure in the context of data envelopment analysis to measure the relative efficiency of public education in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, a geographically remote but homogenous region. The empirical analysis focuses on the effect of community characteristics on the schools efficiency by using school district–level data. Several different forms of model specifications in the stage of data envelopment analysis are executed to check the robustness of the findings by adopting extreme-bound analysis and thick modeling approach. Interestingly, despite the homogeneity of the Upper Peninsula, wide differences in the efficiency of education are found. These differences are robust as to model specification, suggesting that efficiency studies might be a useful guide for policy makers. Community factors such as income and educational levels, obtained from the census data by school district, are introduced in the second stage because they will influence the efficiency of the schools and the technology by which schools help students learn. Median family income is the most important explanatory variable, whereas the median value of housing is insignificant. In addition, private school enrollments are unrelated to the efficiency of public education, contrary to what many advocates of private schools have contended. These findings help understand education efficiency, having policy implications for education-oriented states such as Michigan. (JEL I2 , N3 , H52 )     

The existence of non-elite private schools

We provide an explanation to the puzzle of the existence of paid-for private schools that offer lower quality education than some tuition-free public alternatives. We consider a model of a city composed of two communities: the urban area and the suburbs. The suburban public school provides higher quality education at an implicit price: the higher tax burden plus a housing rent premium. If that price is high enough and the urban public school has a sufficiently low quality, intermediate income households live in the urban area and use a private school. Intermediate quality private schools, then, exist to serve these households' demand. Lower and higher income households use different quality public schools. Therefore, perfect income stratification across public and private education does not characterize this equilibrium.     

Examining the reliability of self-reported data on school participation

Many studies evaluate the impacts of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs on schooling using self-reports on enrollment and attendance even though there are reasons to doubt the reliability of these data. In this paper, we examine the extent to which school-age girls overstate their school participation. Using administrative data from a cash transfer experiment in Malawi and school attendance ledgers collected as part of the impact evaluation, we find that while all study participants overstate their enrollment and attendance rates, the extent to which this happens is significantly higher in the control group than the CCT arm. This finding implies that exclusive reliance on self-reported school participation data can lead to a serious underestimation of actual program impacts. We recommend that self-reports be supplemented using alternative sources of data on school participation that are appropriate to the experiment at hand — even if such efforts are likely to increase evaluation costs.     

Optimal privatization and uniform subsidy policies: A note

The privatization neutrality theorem states that the share of public ownership in a firm does not affect welfare under an optimal uniform tax‐subsidy policy. We revisit this neutrality result. First, we investigate the case in which the private firm is domestic. We show that this neutrality result does not hold unless public and private firms have the same cost function. Next, we investigate a case in which both domestic and foreign investors own the private firm. We show that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero, and thus, the neutrality result does not hold, even when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.     

The impact of charter school attendance on student performance

We employ a panel of individual student data on math and reading test performance for five cohorts of students in Texas to study the impact of charter school attendance. We control for school mobility effects and distinguish movement to a charter school from movement within and between traditional public school districts. We find students experience poor test score growth in their initial year in a charter school, but that this is followed by recovery in the subsequent years. Failure to account for this pattern may lead to potentially misleading estimates of the impact of charter attendance on student achievement. Students who remain in charters largely recover from the initial disruption within approximately 3 years, and there is weak evidence that there may be overall gains from charter attendance within this period. Furthermore, students who return to traditional public schools after just 1 or 2 years in a charter do not appear to suffer a lasting negative impact despite their poor average performance in their first year of charter attendance.     

Relative consumption and majority voting: supplementing Oates’ “Decentralization Theorem”

This paper reconsiders the question of whether centralized or decentralized provision of local public goods is preferable, taking into account two new elements: the appearance of relative consumption effects and the possibility of an inefficient election outcome due to a right-skewed income distribution. Surprisingly, our results indicate that (1) decentralization may lead to a strictly higher welfare level than centralization, even if regions are homogeneous, and (2) under certain circumstances centralization may be welfare superior, even though traditional public good spillovers are not considered in our framework. Whether centralization or decentralization is preferable crucially depends on the extent to which social interaction takes place between regions.     

International migration,remittances, and schooling: evidence from El Salvador

We examine the effect of remittances from abroad on households' schooling decisions using data for El Salvador. Following the massive war-related emigration of the 1980s, remittances became a significant source of household income throughout the 1990s. We use the Cox proportional hazard model to examine the determinants of school attendance. Measuring income from a source that is uncorrelated with parental schooling—remittances—, we find that remittances have a large, significant effect on school retention. We estimate that while household income net of remittances has a small, though significant, impact on the hazard of leaving school in rural and urban areas, remittances have a much larger impact on the hazard of leaving school. In urban areas, the effect of remittances is, at its smallest, 10 times the size of the effect of other income. In rural areas, the effect of remittances is about 2.6 times that of other income. Our finding is of interest in that it suggests that subsidizing school attendance, particularly in poor areas, may have a large impact on school attendance and retention, even if parents have low levels of schooling.     

School Finance Induced Migration and Stratification Patterns: The Impact of Private School Vouchers

This paper introduces a general equilibrium model of public school finance that includes: (i) multiple school districts that finance local public schools via property taxes set by majority vote; (ii) multiple neighborhoods within school districts where each neighborhood is characterized by a quality level of housing; (iii) local public schools that are obligated to admit all interested students who reside within the school district; (iv) private schools that function as clubs of parents who share the cost of the private school equally and who can choose to exclude others; (v) an educational production process that depends on both per pupil spending and average peer quality within the school; and (vi) individual peer quality levels that are correlated with the socioeconomic status of households. Since it allows for various degrees of imperfect stratification of residents across communities, the model is well suited for investigating empirically relevant migration forces induced by school finance reform proposals. The abstract model itself, however, is too complex to yield many analytic results. A computational counterpart to the model isnb therefore developed, calibrated to data, and utilized for policy experiments. In particular, the impact of vouchers in the context of different types of prevoucher educational finance systems is investigated, and it is found that migration patterns in general would cause vouchers to benefit public schools in poor communities while hurting public schools in wealthy communities.     

PRIVATE EDUCATION IN INDIA: A NOVEL TEST OF CREAM SKIMMING

Students in private schools routinely outperform those in public schools both in the United States and around the world. But do private schools make students better or do they simply cream skim better students? In this article I take advantage of the remarkable fact that in many districts in India a majority of students attend private schools. As the private share of school enrollment increases, cream skimming becomes less plausible as the explanation for a higher rate of achievement in private schools. Evidence for cream skimming is found when the private share of schooling is low, in the range of 0–15%, and thus private schools have a large public pool from which to skim. But the private effect on achievement does not appear to diminish greatly even in districts where more than 70% of students are in private schools. Most importantly, mean scores taken over the entire population of students, private and public, increase with the share of private schooling. These findings support a significant productivity effect of private schools. (JEL I25, I2, L33)     

Non‐Governmental Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies as a Two‐Stage Game of Voluntary Public Good Provision

In small groups, norm enforcement is achieved through mutual punishment and reward. In large societies, norms are enforced by specialists such as government officials. However, not every public cause is overseen by states, for instance those organized at the international level. This paper shows how nongovernmental norm enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. As a first stage, individuals voluntarily contribute to a nongovernmental agency that produces an incentive system. The second stage is the provision of a public good on the basis of private contributions. The incentive system increases contributions by means of public approval or disapproval of behavior. It is shown that, even in large populations, nongovernmental norm enforcement can be supported in a noncooperative equilibrium of utility‐maximizing individuals. This result is in sharp contrast to those obtained in the standard situation of voluntary provision of an intrinsic public good which—without altruism or related motives—is eroded by free‐riding. Reliance on altruistic behavior is not required in supplying the second‐order public good “norm enforcement” in large societies.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Bequests as signals: Implications for fiscal policy

This paper explores how bequests affect redistributive fiscal policies. The main premise underlying our approach is that bequests act as a signal of parental affection. It is shown that private transfers in the form of bequests may not offset public transfers to a significant extent, even though such private transfers are altruistically motivated and are strictly positive for all but a negligible set of households. This is notable since these conditions are normally believed to yield a fully offsetting response (Ricardian equivalence). We explicitly identify circumstances under which the departure from Ricardian equivalence is large. Notably, the departure may be quite large even when our model is observationally very close to one in which Ricardian equivalence is known to hold (in the sense that children care very little about parental affection).