对离婚调节的非道德化倾向的反思

我国改革开放以来离婚率一直呈上升态势,对离婚的调节也出现了日趋明显的非道德化倾向。我国社会的婚姻现实、离婚的道德成因、婚姻关系的伦理本质、离婚的双重影响及道德调节的特殊作用,都决定了当代社会的离婚行为不能没有道德调节。只有将道德调节与法律调节、心理调节有机结合成“金三角”,才能共同构筑家庭和社会的稳定和谐。     

残疾人婚姻家庭研究和发展的现状分析

对国内外有关残疾人婚姻家庭的法律法规、政策纲领及相关调查进行了梳理。残疾人结婚年龄普遍较晚,有配偶比例远远低于非残疾人,婚后离婚率和丧偶率高于非残疾人。有残疾人的家庭,大多存在收入较低、子女素质不高等诸多问题,侵犯残疾人婚姻家庭权益的事件时有发生。由于残疾人存在身体或功能障碍,家庭是其主要活动场所,家庭成员的照料和支持对他们尤为重要。有关残疾人的法律法规亟需完善与发展。     

Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution

This paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting whether people divorce, but it puts as much emphasis on property rights (given, for example, by the law on alimony) as on dissolution rights. The paper sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage. If the dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely. If the dominant issue is child custody, divorce is less likely.     

The National State and Identity Politics: State Institutionalisation and “Markers” of National Identity

Nationality has been a key identity in international relations for much of the modern period, and the marriage of “nation” and “state” produced a powerful polity – the national state – that dominated global politics. This article investigates the forces that “pushed” and “pulled” nations and states together and explores the factors associated with violent identity politics. It argues that while recent decades have witnessed increasing instances of divorce between “nation” and “state” and a simultaneous proliferation of identity conflicts, the likelihood that identity conflicts will be expressed violently depends both on the character of the state (the timing of state institutionalisation relative to the construction of national consciousness, the democratic or non-democratic nature of the state, and the national or non-national basis for the legitimation of state authority) and on the principal “marker” used to construct national identity (blood, language, culture, religion, or citizenship).     

Transfers among divorced couples: evidence and interpretation

An analysis of the economic impact of divorce settlements in the United States is presented using data for a white cohort taken from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972. "The effects of spouses' incomes on the divorce transfer are estimated and used to simulate the welfare effects of divorce on husbands, wives, and children under alternative assumptions about marriage contracts and the ability of a couple to continue coordinating resources in the aftermath of divorce. We find a positive (negative) relationship between divorce transfers and the growth of husband's (wife's) earnings during marriage. The estimated expenditure on children in the divorce state is only half the accustomed level during marriage."     

Rethinking Work and Income Maintenance Policy: Promoting Gender Equality Through a Citizens' Basic Income

A citizens' basic income scheme is based on the principles of individuality, universality, and unconditionality; when combined with the notion of meeting "basic needs" it would serve to provide a minimum income guarantee for all adult members of society. However, implementation would entail radical reform of existing patterns of welfare delivery and would bring into question the institutionalized relationship between work and welfare, a basic premise of modern welfare states. To date, the debate over a citizens' basic income has emphasized its effects on labor markets, thereby displaying an androcentric bias. Although the role of women in society is central to social policy reform, the existing basic income literature is disturbingly void of any comprehensive treatment of women. No genuine discussion has taken place about the nature of women's lives and work and how these should be valued. Social policy reform should take account of all gender inequalities and not just those relating to the traditional labor market. This paper argues that the citizens' basic income model can be a tool for promoting gender-neutral social citizenship rights, but that any future marriage of justice and efficiency must first divorce work from income.     

HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE PROBABILITY OF DIVORCE

Concern about the high poverty rates experienced by children in female‐headed households has led to policies aimed at increasing these households' income. In this paper we present a model that analyses decisions made before and during marriage to invest in the human capital of parents and children. These decisions result from a variety of anticipated post‐divorce monetary transfers between spouses.     

Changing family roles and marital instability

The causes of divorce and its social and ethical consequences in Socialist and capitalist societies are examined in an attempt to improve the effectiveness of research on divorce, with a focus on changes in the family structure and the role of women. The impact of divorce on the institution of marriage, the lives of the divorced partners, the upbringing and character of children, and the reproductive processes of society is explored. Traditional notions and expectations of marriage and of duties within the family are identified. The possibility of changing attitudes in order to adapt to conditions resulting from scientific and technological progress is considered, with emphasis on ways of combining women's employment and the performance of household functions. Problems associated with the application of data obtained in foreign empirical studies to situations in the Soviet Union are addressed, and Western sociological approaches to the study of family dynamics are critically examined.     

Marriage,Divorce and Prostitution: Economicc Sociology in Medieval England and Enlightenment Spain

“Marriage, Divorce and Prostitution: Economicc Sociology in Medieval England and Enlightenment Spain” by Robert B. Ekelund,Jr., Donald R. Street and Audrey B. Davidson.

This paper studies the medieval insititutions of marriage, divorce and prostitution through the prism of the economic sociology and rent-seeking behaviour on the part of the medieval Roman Catholic Church. Regulation by Church or state-Particular prohibitions and regulation of recontracting – created costly alternatives and substitutes for low-cost recontracting of marriage vows. In addition to a brief survey of the instititional situation in medieval England, we bring to light the economic sociology of the Spaniard Francisco de Cabarrùs relating to the marriage market and marital utitlity. Indirectly we suggest that exogenous restrictions in marriage markeers create unappropriated costs and the impetus for change in social institutions over time over time.     

Labor supply of elderly people,fertility, and economic development

Increases in life expectancy and the fertility rate have been observed as per-capita income increases in economically developed countries with high per-capita income. We explain these observations using a synthetic economic model with endogenous lifetime, retirement, and human capital accumulation. In contrast to the result obtained by assuming an institutionally fixed and compulsory retirement, a longer life expectancy attributable to rises in per-capita income can induce elderly people to leave the labor market later, thereby enabling them to increase consumption of goods as well as “children” when young. Consequently, higher per-capita income can be associated with higher fertility.     

The Nature and Avoidance of the ＂Middle Income Trap＂

The ＂middle income trap＂ is a significant theoretical and practical issue closely related to the economic and social transition and sustainable development of a country. This paper explores the essence of the ＂middle income trap＂ and ways to avoid it. It reveals that the inner nature of the ＂middle income trap＂ lies in the institutional transition dilemma, which results essentially from a lack of reasonable and clear definitions of governance boundaries between government and market as well as government and society. This lack of boundaries causes coexistent and interrelated government inefficiency, market distortion/failure and social anomie, leading to a stagnant transition from a factor-driven to an efficiency-driven and further innovation-driven economy. Moreover, this paper proposes that the proper way to avoid the ＂trap＂ can be found in the reconstruction of the state governance mode, that is, to transition from a development-oriented and omnipotent government to a public service-oriented and limited government, from factor-driven to efficiency-driven and further innovation-driven development, and from a traditional society to a modem civil society through defining reasonable and clear boundaries between government and market as well as government and society. Thus, reconstruction can establish a state public governance mode featuring the interactive role of government, market and society, and achieve the modernization of state governance systems and capacity.     

Marriage and trust: some lessons from economics

This paper examines the role of marriage as an institution forproviding couples with the confidence to make long-term investmentsin their relationship. No-fault divorce has undermined the notionof marriage as a contract, thereby reducing the security offeredby marriage and promoting opportunism by men. This has weakenedthe bargaining power of wives, both within marriage and whendivorce occurs. Current legal reforms will improve the economicposition of all divorced wives, including those who are primarilyresponsible for the breakdown of their marriage. The latterfeature will encourage opportunism by women and make men lessprepared to invest in their marriage. The paper argues thatthe only way to achieve parity between men and women, and deteropportunism by either sex, is to return to fault-based divorce.Both divorce settlements and the custody of children shoulddepend on preceding marital conduct.     

对惩罚婚外情的经济学分析

本文就对婚外情实施法律惩罚的可能效果进行了经济学的分析。婚姻是一种受法律保护的长期合同,离婚是解除这一合同的惟一合法手段,而婚外情则是违约。但是,惩罚婚姻违约不一定能增加社会中高质量的婚姻,本文的分析表明,惩罚婚外情只有在离婚成本较低的情况下才能起到好的效果;当离婚成本很高时,它要么惩罚的对象更可能是感情执着的正人君子,要么迫使他们更愿意选择不结婚。中国的离婚成本很高,对婚外情实施法律惩罚难以达到增加高质量婚姻的目的。     

Vested Interests and the Common People in Developing Countries: Understanding Oppressive Societies and Their Effects

The standard economic model of how economies work is that activities are essentially productive. This is not a correct view of reality. The principal difficulty is that there is economic activity that is unproductive and harmful (from the point of view of those being harmed). This is a central feature of the economic organization of these societies, and creates poverty. The first section of the article discusses the concept of harm. The second section describes how societies are run on this basic set of principles: Take and maintain control of the government and other aspects of society, and use the power of government to obtain income. The third section of the article describes how this system harms the common people. Topics include corruption, misappropriation of natural resources, conflict and other harm engendered by the struggle for control, the influence on present society of the past operation of harmful economic systems, and discrimination as well as other “barriers to entry.”     

Do children of the first marriage deter divorce?

In terms of economics, individuals divorce if their expected gains from marriage fall short of their expected utility outside the current marriage, and children represent a marriage-specific type of investment, which generally increases the value of marriage for the spouses. However, children may also disrupt marital stability as they will induce dramatic changes into the household allocation of money and time. In particular, children conceived before or after first marriage may be valued differently by the spouses and this may lead to marital conflicts. It is difficult to assign a priori the direction of the effect of children on marriage stability, and causality may run either way, as couples who anticipate a separation are more likely to have fewer children than those who are happy together, while children born before first marriage may be associated with a lower marriage attachment of their parents. Here, we follow an empirical approach and take advantage of the richness of the data on pre-marital history from the 24 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth79, to estimate the effect of children conceived before or after first marriage on marital stability. We find a significant deterrent effect of young children conceived during first marriage to the likelihood of divorce, while children conceived before first marriage are found to have a disruptive effect on marital stability.     

Three Poverties in Urban China

Radical economic reform and rapid marketization in the late 1990s could be expected to create new poverty and insecurity in Chinese cities. Accordingly, the extent and nature of poverty in urban China is examined by means of a 1999 cross‐section household survey. Three types of poverty—“income and consumption”, “income not consumption” and “consumption not income”—are distinguished. A large proportion of the poor have income above, but consumption below, the poverty line. The estimated consumption function shows the importance of consumption smoothing, of precautionary considerations, of saving for investment opportunities, and of special needs related to the presence of children or sickness. An exercise is conducted to compare the three types of poverty by decomposing the divergence in the consumption of each poverty group from its benchmark consumption. Unpredicted financial assets and income, and differences in special needs, are important in contrasting and explaining the three poverties.     

Unemployment,marriage and divorce

In this article, we examine whether the business cycle plays a role in marriage and divorce. We use data on Spain, since the differences between recession and expansion periods across regions are quite pronounced in that country. We find that the unemployment rate is negatively associated with the marriage rate, pointing to a pro-cyclical evolution of marriage; however, the response of the divorce rate to the business cycle is mixed. Results show the existence of different patterns, depending on geography: divorce rates in coastal regions are pro-cyclical, while in inland regions divorces react to unemployment in a counter-cyclical way.     

Marriage, commitment and divorce in a matching model with differential aging

This paper analyses a matching model of the marriage market with directed, on-the-job search. Everyone is born attractive but “matures” according to a Poisson process into unattractiveness. Marriages between equally attractive people are stable but mixed marriages are not. The implied patterns of marriage and divorce are consistent with those identified in the empirical literature. When the utility from being single is low, in order to commit to their relationship, attractive people in mixed marriages may voluntarily divest of their attractiveness.     

生态环境、经济收入与公众健康的关系——基于我国29个省市区面板数据的经验研究

公众的健康水平受到其所处自然和社会环境的共同影响,文章利用我国29个省市区的面板数据,构建了同时包含生态环境与经济收入因素的公众健康影响模型,检验了生态环境污染、治理状况以及经济收入、收入不均对人口健康的影响。研究结果表明,环境污染已经威胁到人们的健康,而污染治理投入能缓解污染的危害,同时收入公平性比绝对收入水平对健康影响更大。最后,在此基础上指出走人与自然协调、社会公平发展道路的重要意义。     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.