OVERVALUED: SWEDISH MONETARY POLICY IN THE 1930s

The article discusses Sweden's monetary policy in the 1930s, which has been hailed as the first and only example of successful price‐level targeting. Our contribution is twofold. First, we argue that the crucial measure that immediately ended deflationary expectations and enabled a swift recovery was a strong and involuntary devaluation of the currency, not the adoption of a new monetary policy framework. Second, starting from the recent literature on monetary policy at the zero‐lower bound, we conclude that Sweden's exchange rate policy is more relevant for the current discussion than its tentative experience with price‐level targeting.     

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.     

Financial Market Imperfections and the Impact of Exchange Rate Movements on Exports*

This paper analyzes empirically the role of financial market imperfections in the way countries’ exports react to a currency depreciation. Using quarterly data for 27 developed and developing countries over the period 1990–2005, we find that the impact of a depreciation on exports will be less positive—or even negative—for a country if: (i) firms borrow in foreign currency; (ii) they are credit constrained; (iii) they are specialized in industries that require more external capital; (iv) the magnitude of depreciation or devaluation is large. This last result emphasizes the existence of a nonlinear relationship between an exchange rate depreciation and the reaction of a country's exports when financial imperfections are observed. This offers a new explanation for the consequences of recent currency crises in middle‐income countries.     

Debt and Currency Crises—Complements or Substitutes?*

Debt and currency crises are closely interlinked through the government's intertemporal budget constraint. The default tax and the inflation/devaluation tax can be considered as alternative means of financing. Our empirical analysis finds that high‐debt countries choose default rather than inflation/devaluation for financing, while a high money stock reduces the probability of debt crises. Further, we find strong evidence that debt and currency crises share common fundamental causes. Finally, there is a Granger causality running from debt crises to currency crises, but only weakly in the other direction.     

Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing

We develop a game‐theoretic model of private–public contribution to a long‐term project with sequential actions and moral hazard. A private agent is one who is in charge of both the financial contribution and the management effort, these two actions entailing private costs and uncertain ex‐post private and social benefits. A public agent is one who decides the amount of public funding to this quasi‐public good, knowing that the size and the probability of attaining a surplus ex post depend on the private agent's effort. We consider four public‐funding scenarios: benefit‐sharing versus cost‐sharing crossed with ex‐ante versus ex‐interim government intervention. We test our theoretical predictions by means of an experiment that confirms the main result of the model: Cost‐sharing public intervention is more effective than benefit‐sharing in boosting private financial contribution to the project. Furthermore, when public intervention comes after private contribution ( ex‐interim government intervention), both public‐funding scenarios have a negative impact on the private management effort. In our model, the latter result is explained by the private agent's high degree of risk aversion. These results have policy implications for strategic investments with long‐term social consequences. In deciding the optimal timing and method of the contribution, governments should also consider the indirect effects on agents’ long‐term management efforts.     

The Credibility Problem Revisited: Thirty Years on from Kydland and Prescott*

Macroeconomics research has changed profoundly since the Kydland–Prescott seminal paper. In order to address the Lucas Critique, modeling is now based on micro‐foundations treating agents as rational utility optimizers. Bayesian estimation has produced models which are more data‐consistent than those based simply on calibration. With micro‐foundations and new linear‐quadratic techniques, normative policy based on welfare analysis is now possible. In the open economy, policy involves a “game” with policymakers and private institutions or private individuals as players. This paper attempts to reassess the Kydland–Prescott contribution in the light of these developments.     

Convergence as a heterogeneous process: what can be learnt about convergence in EMU from regional experiences?

We augment the existing literature on regional convergence by uncovering a number of stylized facts on the heterogeneity of regional convergence processes in the absence of currency devaluation as a key policy instrument, and use them to highlight reform strategies that are most likely to be conducive to a successful catching-up of the periphery countries of EMU. We show that regional convergence processes in Europe were extremely heterogeneous, highly discontinuous and strongly concentrated during the last two decades. These stylized facts question the focus of the traditional literature on average (β-)convergence and suggest substantial nonlinearities in regional convergence processes that have yet to be understood in detail. Our results further suggest that growth strategies based on increasing human capital investments and innovation capacities are the most likely to be successful in triggering convergence of lagging regions in currency unions.     

MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.     

Combining minimum wage and exchange rate policy to release the external constraint on growth

In this article we analyse the combination of a minimum wage and a devaluation/depreciation so as to release the external constraint on growth. The policy maker aims at achieving both balanced trade and higher growth. These may be reached by devaluating the domestic currency, which however supports traditional industries characterized by high price elasticity and low income elasticity of demand. The release of the external constraint in the short term then yields a stronger constraint in the longer term. If traditional industries are unskilled and labour‐intensive, the setting of a minimum wage distorts the specialization towards sectors with high demand growth. Devaluation/depreciation and minimum wage may thus be combined to release both the short term and longer term external constraint. We determine the condition for such a policy to be efficient. This combined policy must come with an educational policy that supports skill upgrading. It is typically tailored to ‘advanced emerging countries’ which aim at changing their specialization without slowing their growth.     

Disinflation and the December 1994 Devaluation in Mexico

This paper discusses the determinants of the Mexican peso devaluation of December 1994. An examination of basic economic data reveals the shortcomings of existing explanations based on either inconsistent macroeconomic policies or self-fulfilling prophecies. We argue in contrast that the devaluation was related to the exhaustion of the disinflationary programme launched in the late 1980s, and that the timing of policy change was critically influenced by a conflict between the inherited disinflationary stance and the economic goals of the administration taking office in December 1994. The analysis suggests that a prolonged period of real currency appreciation before the devaluation was made possible not only by the strong inflationary aversion of the authorities but by a series of positive shocks that reduced the appreciation's negative effects.     

Foreign capital and the contractionary impact of currency devaluation,with an application to Jamaica

This paper analyses the effects of currency devaluation in a small open economy host to foreign capital. Using a short-run macroeconomic model of the Krugman-Taylor (1978) type, it is shown that the presence of foreign capital provides devaluation with an additional contractionary mechanism, besides those already identified in the literature. The mechanism has its basis on the redistribution of income from wages to profits creasted by devaluation, which raises the foreign component of domestic income and tends to reduce GNP and GDP. The role of taxation policy in this context is examined. Finally, estimates of the relevant effects are offered for Jamaica, a small mineral exporter, showing that an expansionary effect of devaluation must rely on a relatively high value of the supply elasticity of non-mineral exports.     

Evaluating currency crises: A Bayesian Markov switching approach

In this paper we examine the nature of a currency crisis. We do so by employing an out-of-sample forecasting exercise to analyse the Mexican crisis in 1994. Forecast evaluation was based on modern econometric techniques concerning the shape of forecaster’s loss function. We also extend the empirical framework suggested by Jeanne and Masson [Jeanne, O., Masson, P., 2000. Currency crises and Markov-switching regimes. Journal of International Economics 50, 327–350] to test for the hypothesis that the currency crisis was driven by sunspots. To this end we contribute to the existing literature by comparing Markov regime switching model with a time-varying transition probabilities with two alternative models. The first is a Markov regime switching model with constant transition probabilities. The second is a linear benchmark model. Empirical results show that the proxy for the probability of devaluation is an important factor explaining the nature of currency crisis. More concretely, when the expectation market pressure was used as a proxy of probability of devaluation, forecast evaluation supports the view that currency crisis was driven by market expectation unrelated to fundamentals. Alternatively, when interest rate differential is used as a proxy for probability of devaluation, currency crisis was due to predictable deterioration of fundamentals.     

Currency devaluation in an open-shop union

This paper sets up an efficient wage–employment bargaining model embodying both styles of closed- and open-shop union in the context of an open economy. The paper's main purpose is to highlight the impacts of a domestic currency devaluation on the labor market and aggregate output. It is found that the effects of currency devaluation, in general, are not unequivocal. Particularly, owing to the influence of the membership effect, its impacts are crucially related to the operation style (closed shop or open shop) of the union.     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.     

Collapsing exchange rate regimes in the presence of a parallel market

This paper develops a model of an economy where the fixed exchange rate is overvalued and coexists with a parallel market for foreign currency. Such a situation persists because the parallel marker is used by the central authorities as an instrument to delay policy changes. Using the Haïtian experience, this paper estimates a rationing parameter of foreign currency in the official market which translates the extent of tolerance of the parallel market. The paper also produces estimates of onestep-ahead probability of devaluation. Rationing has been severe and the probability of collapse has reached high levels during the period studied.     

Is energy consumption sensitive to foreign capital inflows and currency devaluation in Pakistan?

This study investigates the relationship between foreign capital inflows and energy consumption by incorporating economic growth, exports and currency devaluation in energy demand function for the case of Pakistan. The long-run and short-run effects are examined via ARDL bounds testing procedure. Foreign capital inflows and currency devaluation (economic growth and exports) decrease (increase) energy consumption in long-run. The results confirm a feedback effect between foreign capital inflows and energy consumption. These findings would be helpful to policy makers in designing comprehensive economic and energy policies for utilizing foreign capital inflows as a tool for optimal use of energy sources to enhance economic development in long run.     

Macroeconomic implications of voucher privatization in a model with incomplete information

Voucher privatization implies a significant wealth transfer from state to private agents who, in turn, would increase consumption. This paper investigates the consequences of this wealth effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium in a high unemployment economy. The model builds on a two-stage sequential game between the government and private agents. We verify the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which private agents cannot guess whether a policy of fast privatization will be continued in the future or not. This configuration presents an endogenous probability of privatization slowdown; as a consequence, the wealth effect is moderated and the genuine fast privatizer government bears an “undue” credibility cost in terms of employment     

Controlled Dismantlement of the Eurozone: A Strategy to Save the European Union and the Single European Market

The problems with a single currency in Europe are neither temporary nor curable. Any persistent defence of the euro will result in a long‐lasting recession and high unemployment in countries using fiscal austerity to pursue ‘internal devaluation’. It may lead to a revival of populist and nationalist movements, political collapse and disorderly eurozone break‐up. This article argues for a controlled segmentation of the eurozone via the exit of the most competitive countries and an agreement on a new European currency coordination system.     

Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study

This paper addresses the question of whether public information destabilizes the economy in the context of signals of a different nature. We present an experimental evaluation of the speculative attack game of Morris and Shin (1998 ). Our objective is two‐fold: to evaluate whether public information destabilizes the economy within a context of signals of different nature and to enlarge upon the results of Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004 ) (HNO). Our evidence suggests that in sessions with both private and common signals, the fact that the common signal plays a focal role enhances the central bank’s welfare: it reduces the probability of crisis and increases its predictability. Therefore, we raise doubts about the policy implications of HNO’s findings. The new policy lesson is that the central bank has more control over the beliefs of traders if it discloses one clear signal when agents also get private information from other sources.     

Limited participation,private money,and credit in a spatial model of money

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of private money issue for the effects of monetary policy, for optimal policy, and for the role of fiat money. A locational model is constructed which gives an explicit account of the role for money and credit, and for limited financial market participation. When private money issue is prohibited, there is a liquidity effect as the result of a money injection from the central bank, but this effect goes away when private money is permitted. Private money issue changes dramatically the nature of optimal monetary policy. With private money, fiat currency is no longer used in transactions involving goods, but currency and central bank reserves play an important part in the clearing and settlement of private money returned for redemption.Received: 5 May 2003, Revised: 1 December 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E4, E5.The author thanks seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and Duke University, conference participants at the Texas Monetary Conference at U.T. Austin, February 2002, and the Conference on Recent Developments in Money and Finance at Purdue University, May 2003, as well as Gabriele Camera, Ed Nosal, Will Roberds, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.