A POSITIVE THEORY OF GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY AND SOCIAL INSURANCE*

This article presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model explaining cross‐country data on geographical mobility, unemployment, and labor market institutions. Rational forward‐looking agents vote on unemployment insurance (UI). Agents with higher moving costs (larger attachment to their location) prefer more generous UI. Attachment is assumed to increase with the duration of residence. UI mitigates incentives for moving and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. This self‐reinforcing mechanism can yield two steady‐states: one “European” and one “American.” The former (latter) features high (low) unemployment, low (high) geographical mobility, and high (low) UI.     

Optimal unemployment insurance with heterogeneous agents

The framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model is used to study the optimal design of an unemployment insurance (UI) scheme and preferences for unemployment policy reforms. In a first step, the optimal defined benefit and defined replacement ratio UI systems are obtained in simulations. Then, the question whether switching to such an optimal system from the status quo would be approved by a majority of the population is explored. Finally, the transitional dynamics following a policy change are analysed. Accounting for this transition has an important influence on the support for a policy change.     

Institutional specifics and unemployment insurance eligibility in Canada: How sensitive are employment duration effects?

The paper examines the influence of unemployment insurance on the duration of employment spells in Canada using the 1988–90 Labour Market Activity Survey. The primary focus of the paper is to evaluate whether estimated UI effects are sensitive to the degree to which institutional rules and regulations governing UI eligibility and entitlement are explicitly modelled. The key result of the paper is that it is indeed important to allow for institutional detail when estimating unemployment insurance effects. Estimates using simple proxies for eligibility indicate small, often insignificant UI effects. The size and significance of the effects rise as more realistic versions of the variables are adopted. The estimates using the eligibility variables incorporating the greatest level of institutional detail suggest that a jump in the hazard rate by a factor of 2.3 may not be an unreasonable estimate of the effect.     

Running out of time: Limited unemployment benefits and reservation wages

We study unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium environment in which unemployed workers only receive benefits for a finite length of time. Although all workers have identical productivity and leisure value, the random arrival of job offers creates ex-post differences with respect to their time remaining until benefit expiration. Firms, which are also homogeneous, can exploit these differences, leading to an endogenous wage distribution.This allows us to examine the equilibrium effect of policy changes in both the size and length of UI benefits. Surprisingly, an increase in benefits can actually cause wages to fall, which is contrary to the predictions of on-the-job-search models. Moreover, we explain well-documented patterns of how the hazard rate of exiting unemployment responds to these policy changes. Our theory also explains why this hazard rate jumps at the time of benefit exhaustion.     

A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance

In an influential paper, Baily (1978) showed that the optimal level of unemployment insurance (UI) in a stylized static model depends on only three parameters: risk aversion, the consumption-smoothing benefit of UI, and the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the benefit rate. This paper examines the key economic assumptions under which these parameters determine the optimal level of social insurance. I show that a Baily-type expression, with an adjustment for precautionary saving motives, holds in a general class of dynamic models subject to weak regularity conditions. For example, the simple reduced-form formula derived here applies with arbitrary borrowing constraints, durable consumption goods, private insurance arrangements, and search and leisure benefits of unemployment.     

HOW TO VALUE THE POORER PROSPECTS OF YOUTH IN THE EARLY 1990s?

Young workers in the 1990s can expect greater economic insecurity, as well as lower average earnings, compared to older workers, or compared to the youth of previous decades. The cost of greater insecurity depends upon an individual's probability of unemployment, marginal utility of income gains/losses and the extent to which individuals can smooth consumption over time by borrowing and drawing down assets. Since unemployment insurance cutbacks and higher unemployment have increased the risk exposure of youth, changes in the expected value of their income may understate utility losses as measured by the change in certainty equivalent income.
This paper uses a behavioural microsimulation model to compare the impacts of 1971 and 1994 unemployment insurance legislation and unemployment rates in Canada. It calculates both the expected value of income changes and, using a Stone-Geary utility function, the change in inequality of well-being (as measured by certainty equivalent income) for youth and for prime age workers. Both calculations reveal that youth were disproportionately affected by Canada's changing labour market environment. Very few youth have enough assets to finance consumption during spells of unemployment.     

Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment*

This paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is unobservable, which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may generate a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EXPERIENCE RATING: INSURANCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY*

Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts firms' layoff decisions by reducing the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested that UI should be financed with an experience‐rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of experience rating can reduce unemployment, it can reduce the insurance coverage workers receive. With high experience rating, firms may reduce their severance payments by more than the UI benefit. We build a model where competitive firms offer contracts with severance payments to risk‐averse workers. Frictions in the labor market lead to incomplete insurance. This article shows that less than full‐experience rating enables the government to increase the insurance coverage workers receive. Welfare implications are also investigated.     

Layoffs,wages and unemployment insurance

The influence of unemployment insurance on wage and layoff behavior is analyzed in the context of optimal labor contracts. Responses of contract terms to changes in economic parameters are shown to depend in general on the nature of the initial contract, the degree of workers' risk aversion, and the resolution of bargaining conflict. Layoffs are not necessarily reduced by an increase in experience rating or a reduction in the UI benefit. Product demand fluctuations tend to induce procyclical employment fluctuations but not wage fluctuation. An implication of optimal contracts with private insurance suggests a reason for government intervention in UI provision.     

Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance

This paper examines the incentive effects of interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components of Sweden's social insurance system. The main topic is how the sickness‐report rate among the unemployed is affected by (i) the limit of 300 workdays for UI benefits, and (ii) the difference in maximum compensation between UI and SI benefits. Results obtained by duration analysis suggest that sick reports increase as the UI benefit expiration date approaches. There is also evidence of an incentive effect on the sick‐report rate because SI offers higher compensation than UI.     

Job search,wage offers,and unemployment insurance

Several previous studies have estimated that unemployment insurance (UI) causes an increase in the duration of unemployment and have concluded from this that UI raises reservation wages. However, job-search theory implies that UI can also affect duration through its impact on job offer arrival rates and/or through an impact on wage offers. In this paper we attempt to identify these possible additional effects using survey data on a sample of unemployed individuals. Like previous studies, we find that UI significantly increases unemployment duration. However, part of this effect is estimated to stem from a decrease in the offer arrival rate as well as from a higher reservation wage.     

Labor market cycles, unemployment insurance eligibility, and moral hazard

If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this paper were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits.     

Unemployment insurance, moral hazard, and economic growth

It is important but difficult to distinguish between desirable and undesirable effects of unemployment insurance (UI) that are observationally equivalent when designing optimal UI schemes. For example, a UI-induced rise in the wage rate caused by workers taking more time to match their skills with job vacancies is desirable. However, another view of the same observation is that UI causes permanently higher involuntary unemployment by raising the reservation wage. This paper avoids this problem by regarding the trade-off between the UI replacement rates and unemployment as an intermediate relationship that matters only as far as it impacts economic growth. An empirical analysis of UI replacement rates, unemployment rates, and growth rates using annual panel data finds UI replacement rates are associated with higher unemployment. However, no significant relationship is found between UI-related unemployment and the real growth rate of gross domestic product.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fiftieth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 15–18, 2000, Charleston, South Carolina. Financial support from the Scottish Economic Society and the University of Stirling is gratefully acknowledged. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development generously provided access to their database on benefit entitlements and gross replacement rates. The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for constructive comments.     

Accelerating the transition to employment at benefit exhaustion: still possible after four years of unemployment?

This paper provides evidence of how the long-term unemployed react to the threat of running out of unemployment insurance (UI) after receiving it for nearly 4 years. To identify the effect of UI exhaustion, we make use of a 1999 Danish legislative change that progressively reduced potential benefit duration from 5 to 4 years. We find that shortening UI duration hastens the transition to employment throughout the unemployment spell up to benefit exhaustion even if it occurs as long as 4 years later. However, although the proportional effect is large, it is small in absolute value.     

Labor market dynamics over the business cycle: evidence from Markov switching models

This paper explores the evolution of the U.S. labor market across the business cycle and specifically the relationship between the unemployment rate and the average duration of unemployment. Labor market recoveries have long been thought of as lagging recoveries in broad economic activity. In particular, the unemployment rate peaks several months after official business cycle troughs and the average duration of unemployment lags further behind. Using estimates from Markov switching models of the unemployment rate, average duration of unemployment, jobless claims, and the exhaustion rate of regular unemployment insurance, this paper dates contractionary and expansionary phases of various aspects of the labor market and their relationship to the official phases of the business cycle. Evidence from these models suggests that inflows into unemployment recover almost contemporaneously with broad economic activity, while outflows recover almost a year after the end of official recessions. The differential timing in the recoveries of unemployment inflows and outflows, which is not a characteristic of most macro models of the labor market, accounts for the observed pattern between the unemployment rate and average duration of unemployment. Finally, when comparing the phases of the labor market to periods where Congress extends unemployment insurance benefits, it appears that policymakers target periods where the job finding rate is low, rather than periods where the stock of unemployed workers is high.     

OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE,WITH HUMAN CAPITAL DEPRECIATION,AND DURATION DEPENDENCE*

This article introduces the possibility of a deterioration in job opportunities during unemployment into the standard optimal unemployment insurance (UI) design framework and characterizes the efficient UI scheme. The optimal program may display two novel features, which cannot be present in stationary models. First, UI transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient contract. Second, the optimal scheme implies a wage subsidy for long‐term unemployed workers. Numerical simulations based on the Spanish and U.S. economies suggest that both assistance transfers and wage subsidies should be part of the UI scheme in these countries.     

Unemployment compensation and episodes of nonemployment

This paper examines the influence of unemployment insurance (UI) on the length of nonemployment spells experienced by young workers. The analysis introduces a flexible duration model to estimate the effects of the weekly benefit amount and weeks of eligibility on the amount of time spent between jobs by men, distinguishing between the experiences of UI and non-UI recipients. The empirical findings suggest three conclusions: (1) UI recipients experience longer spells of nonemployment than their non-UI recipient counterparts, at least up to the point of exhaustion of UI benefits; (2) the level of the weekly benefit amount does not significantly affect the length of nonemployment spells; and (3) increasing the number of weeks of eligibility offered by a UI program leads to longer episodes of nonemployment.     

Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs

A Welfare-to-Work (WTW) program is a mix of government expenditures on various labour market policies targeted to the unemployed ( e.g. unemployment insurance (UI), job search monitoring (JM), social assistance (SA), wage subsidies). This paper provides a dynamic principal–agent framework suitable for analysing chief features of an optimal WTW program, such as the sequence and duration of the different policies, the dynamic pattern of payments along the unemployment spell, and the emergence of taxes/subsidies upon re-employment. The optimal program endogenously generates an absorbing policy of last resort ("social assistance") characterized by a constant lifetime payment and no active participation by the agent. Human capital depreciation is a necessary condition for policy transitions to be part of an optimal WTW program. The typical sequence of policies is quite simple: the program starts with standard UI, then switches into monitored search and, finally, into SA. The optimal benefits are decreasing during unemployment insurance and constant during both JM and SA. Whereas taxes (subsidies) can be either increasing or decreasing with duration during UI, they must decrease (increase) during a phase of JM. In a calibration exercise, we use our model to analyse quantitatively the features of the optimal program for the U.S. economy. With respect to the existing U.S. system, the optimal WTW scheme delivers sizeable welfare gains to unskilled workers because the incentives to search for a job can be retained even while delivering more insurance and using costly monitoring less intensively.     

Does unemployment insurance crowd out home production?

In this paper, we study the interaction between self insurance and public insurance. In particular, we provide evidence on a negative correlation between unemployment insurance benefits and home production using the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and the state-level unemployment insurance data of the U.S. The empirical results suggest that moving to a two times more generous state would decrease time spent on home production about 22% for the unemployed. Then, we pursue a quantitative assessment of this empirical finding using a dynamic competitive equilibrium model in which households do home production as well as market production. The model is able to generate the empirical facts regarding the unemployment benefits and home production. The fact that unemployment insurance benefits crowd out home production is interpreted as a substitution between the two insurance mechanisms against loss of earnings during unemployment spells.     

The German Unemployment Compensation System: Effects On Aggregate Savings And Wealth Distribution

The effects of the German unemployment compensation system on aggregate savings and the distribution of wealth are studied in a general equilibrium 60–period OLG model. The distribution of wealth is derived as an endogenous function of the parameters characterizing the unemployment compensation system, which comprises unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld), unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), and welfare payments (Sozialhilfe), the latter two being subject to a means test. As our main results: (i) both aggregate savings and wealth equality are a monotone decreasing function of unemployment benefits; (ii) optimal unemployment compensation declines over the spell of unemployment; (iii) asset–based means tests are shown to reduce welfare if the allowable wealth level is below the average wealth in the economy.