On the Use of Targeting to Reduce Moral Hazard in Agri‐environmental Schemes

This paper investigates the role of targeting in the context of agri‐environmental schemes involving monitoring and penalties. By separating participants into a target and a nontarget group the aim of targeting is to reduce the moral hazard problem. The paper analyses three approaches to targeting which have different implications for the level of monitoring resources and the focus is on reducing the extent of cheating by participants in the nontarget group. By complementing the adoption of targeting with appropriate adjustments to the monitoring/penalty parameters, it is shown how such an approach can exploit the risk aversion of participants to completely eliminate cheating by those participants in the nontarget group. The implementation of such a system of targeting is discussed in the context of existing agri‐environmental policies.     

Moral Hazard,Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri‐Environmental Policy

This article extends the multi‐period agri‐environmental contract model of Fraser (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 55 , (2004) pp. 525–540) to include a more realistic specification of the inter‐temporal penalties for non‐compliance, and therefore of the inter‐temporal moral hazard problem in agri‐environmental policy design. It is shown that a farmer has an unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period based on differences in the expected cost of compliance. It is then shown how the principal can make use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring resources intertemporally, and in so doing, to encourage full contract duration compliance.     

Moral Hazard and Risk Management in Agri‐environmental Policy

This paper develops the key finding of Ozanne, Hogan and Colman (2001) that risk aversion among farmers ameliorates the moral hazard problem in relation to agrienvironmental policy compliance. It is shown that risk averse farmers who face uncertainty in their production income are more likely to comply with such a policy as a means of risk management. In addition, it is shown that a principal who has control over both the level of monitoring and the size of penalty, if detected, can reduce non‐compliance by adjustments to these instruments which increase the variance of farmers' income but leave the expected penalty unchanged. It is concluded that risk management by both principals and agents has the potential to diminish the moral hazard problem, especially given proposed developments in agri‐environmental policy in the European Union.     

A Note on Imperfect Monitoring of Agri-Environmental Policy

In this note the impact of imperfect compliance monitoring on the implementation of agri-environmental policy is analysed. A principal-agent model is used to demonstrate how imperfections in the monitoring process lead to higher levels of incentive payments to ensure compliance. This means that less accurate compliance monitoring results in higher social costs from policy implementation. Technical enhancements in the accuracy of compliance monitoring will therefore lead to a reduction in social costs. This is an important result with significant implications for the design and implementation of agri-environmental policy.     

To Cheat or Not To Cheat: Moral Hazard and Agri‐environmental Policy

This Address examines the moral hazard problem in agri‐environmental policy. It begins with a theoretical analysis of moral hazard in this context, including the identification of eight potential causes of cheating behaviour among farmers. But is cheating behaviour among farmers actually a problem for agri‐environmental policy? And if it is, which are the statistically significant causes of concern? The answer seems to be: “we don't know” as there are currently no empirical analyses of the moral hazard problem and its causes in agri‐environmental policy. On this basis I analyse a set of policy solutions – to a problem for which we have no evidence of its causes or extent!     

Use of Compliance Rewards in Agri‐environmental Schemes

Ensuring that farmers comply with the terms of agri‐environmental schemes is an important issue. This paper explores the use of a ‘compliance–reward’ approach under heterogeneous net compliance costs with respect to cost‐share working lands programmes such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) in the United States. Specifically, we examine the use of a reward under asymmetric information and output price uncertainty. We examine two possible sources of financing under the assumption of budget neutrality: (i) funds obtained by reducing monitoring effort; and (ii) money saved by reducing the number of farmers enrolled. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each source of funding and analyse these numerically for both risk‐neutral and risk‐averse farmers. We also examine the trade‐off between increased expenditure on monitoring effort and compliance rewards when additional budgetary resources are available. We show that under certain conditions a compliance reward can increase compliance rates. For risk‐averse farmers, however, conditions that ensure a positive outcome become more restrictive.     

Delivering on the Potential of the New CAP

Recent discussions on the CAP have focused on the budget. However, in the public debate the policy itself is often still a caricature of the old CAP that existed until the early 1990s. The CAP has changed fundamentally over the past decade. The recent direction of the CAP – markets and rural development – was set by the European Council in Göteborg and Lisbon. Strong economic performance must go hand in hand with the sustainable use of natural resources. The key elements of the new CAP are a market policy where intervention is a safety net, income stabilisation is delivered through decoupled aids subject to cross-compliance, and a reinforced rural development policy that focuses on jobs, growth and sustainability. We must use the new CAP to unlock the potential for growth, jobs and innovation and put good ideas into practice. We need to work in partnership with farmers, foresters, the agrifood business, NGOs, the population of rural areas, the research community and of course public authorities. But to achieve all of this we need a stable budgetary environment, in which farmers and businesses can plan. In short, we need the resources to deliver on the potential of the new CAP.     

Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy

This paper examines the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when a farmer is risk-neutral and risk-averse. The optimal contract model presented here significantly extends and generalises the results and conclusions of Choe and Fraser (1998). In this paper the environmental agency explicitly chooses monitoring accuracy and monitoring costs as well as rewards for farmers. It is found that, by modelling the environmental agency as being cost-conscious optimal monitoring accuracy may or may not be higher for a risk-averse farmer than for a risk-neutral farmer. Essentially, the environmental agency faces an explicit trade-off between monitoring costs and incentive payments as a means to ensure the desired behaviour from the farmer. The importance of the results derived are discussed in the context of agri-environmental policy design and implementation     

Assessing the Impact of Direct Payments Convergence on Farm Income Inequality: The Case of Italian Farms

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of the convergence process of direct payments (DPs) on farm income inequality. The analysis uses the Gini coefficient concept and its decomposition on the FADN Italian sample in 2014 and 2019 to assess the impact of the DPs reform in Italy. Results of the analysis show that a marginal increase in direct payments will reduce income concentration. However, a shift of resources toward mountain areas could occur. The results of the analysis have some policy implications regarding the application of the convergence mechanism of the CAP in Italy: in fact, the convergence process leads to a redistribution of resources in favour of mountain areas. These results could feed the debate on the future of CAP direct payments after 2020, when the cut or, at least, the reduction of DPs could increase income concentration.     

Setting Climate Action as the Priority for the Common Agricultural Policy: A Simulation Experiment

We quantitatively assess the impacts of re-allocating budgetary resources within Pillar 1 of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) from direct income support to a direct greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction subsidy for EU farmers. The analysis is motivated by the discussion on the future CAP, with calls for both an increased ambition on climate action from the agricultural sector and for a more incentive-based delivery system of direct payments under strict budgetary restrictions. By conducting a simulation experiment with an agricultural partial equilibrium model (CAPRI), we are able to factor in farmers’ supply and technology-adjusting responses to the policy change and to estimate the potential uptake of the GHG-reduction subsidy in EU regions. We find that a budget-neutral re-allocation of financial resources towards subsidised emission savings can reduce EU agricultural non-CO₂ emissions by 21% by 2030, compared to a business-as-usual baseline. Two-thirds of the emission savings are due to changes in production levels and composition, implying that a significant part of the achieved GHG reduction is offset globally by emission leakage. At the aggregated level, the emission-saving subsidy and increased producer prices compensate farmers for the foregone direct income support, but differences in regional impacts indicate accelerated structural change and heterogeneous income effects in the farm population. We conclude that the assumed regional budget-neutrality condition introduces inefficiencies in the incentive system, and the full potential of the EU farming sector for GHG emissions reduction is not reached, leaving ample room for the design of more efficient agricultural policies for climate action.     

Reasons why some irrigation water users fail to comply with water use regulations: A case study from Queensland,Australia

Non-compliance with regulation can be a major reason for policy ineffectiveness. Environmental non-compliance can cause environmental harm and undermine the sustainability of resource uses through, for example, overexploitation of water resources. If environmental non-compliance is identified as an issue, it is important to understand why it is occurring so that the causes can be effectively addressed. This paper reports empirical research conducted to identify the reasons why water users in two coastal irrigation areas in Queensland, Australia, may be taking water in excess of license conditions and thereby committing water theft. It applied the Table-of-Eleven (T11) framework, which distinguishes between ‘enforcement dimensions’, i.e., regulatory aspects meant to detect and deter non-compliance, and ‘spontaneous compliance’ dimensions. The research involved 67 water users of whom 24 participated in focus group discussions and 43 in face-to-face interviews. The research findings suggest that most water users are compliant with water rules principally because of strong spontaneous compliance, which is chiefly grounded in the belief that the rules are required to safeguard a common water resource. The research results suggest, however, that some water users may be intentionally taking water in excess of license conditions in order to maximize business profitability. Non-compliance is underpinned by perceived low probability of successful prosecution and a comparatively small penalty if a breach can indeed be proven. From a water management perspective, the findings highlight the critical role of ongoing education and communication efforts for maintaining high levels of spontaneous compliance. Stronger deterrents may be needed to address the intentional unlawful taking of water in the given context, including increasing penalties to ensure fines result in a net cost to offenders and reduction of water entitlements of repeat offenders. Improvements in water administrative processes can minimize the likelihood of offenders escaping a penalty.     

Fostering integrated land and water management approaches: Evaluating the water footprint of a Mediterranean basin under different agricultural land use scenarios

In the Genil River Basin (southern Spain), agriculture is the greatest pressure on freshwater demand. Furthermore, water degradation caused by soil erosion is becoming a key environmental concern. This study aims to assess the water-related impacts of agriculture combining the use of an ecohydrological model (SWAT) with a spatiotemporal water footprint assessment to evaluate the current status of streamflow (blue water), soil water (green water) and the assimilability of sediments by streamflow (grey water footprint). The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) requires farmers to adopt certain agricultural practices that are beneficial for the environment. Such practices could affect the conditions of available land and water resources. Because of the importance of applying the best land management practices for the maintenance of sustainable water resources, the study also infers probable water availability and water pollution level changes under different post-2013 CAP scenarios. The Genil streamflow is highly regulated, and, as a result, it is hard to discern significant changes (p < 0.05) under the proposed scenarios. However, there is a shift with afforestation measures from unproductive (i.e., direct soil evaporation) to productive water (i.e., evapotranspired water from agricultural and natural areas, excluding non-growing periods) consumption. The probability of annual evapotranspiration from natural areas being greater in afforestation scenarios than in the baseline scenario is 0.70 to 0.88, whereas the likelihood of soil water evaporation being lower is 0.60. Evapotranspiration in natural areas increases by about 521% from September to May under afforestation measures compared with the baseline scenario, whereas soil water evaporation decreases by 30% in winter. The grey water footprint and water pollution level decrease by 19% and 9%, respectively, with the highest streamflow conditions under afforestation as opposed to current conditions. However, water pollution levels of suspended solids greater than 1 indicate that the river flow is not capable of assimilating the existing sediment loads. Since land use changes and agricultural practices have a major impact on water resources, the post-2013 CAP reform can provide environmental benefits for water allocation and mitigation of water pollution. However, further efforts are required to better align the policy goals of the CAP and the Water Framework Directive.     

The economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement

This study relaxes the assumption of perfect and costless policy enforcement found in traditional agricultural policy analysis and introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the economic analysis of output subsidies. Policy design and implementation is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between the regulator who decides on the level of intervention, an enforcement agency that determines the level of policy enforcement, and the farmer who makes the production and cheating decisions. Analytical results show that farmer compliance is not the natural outcome of self‐interest and complete deterrence of cheating is not economically efficient. The analysis also shows that enforcement costs and cheating change the welfare effects of output subsidies, the efficiency of the policy instrument in redistributing income, the level of government intervention that transfers a given surplus to agricultural producers, the socially optimal income redistribution, and the social welfare from intervention.     

Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri‐environmental Schemes

A model of adverse selection and moral hazard in agri‐environmental schemes is developed based on the input quota mechanism of Moxey et al. (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 187–202) and Ozanne et al. (European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347), rather than the input charge mechanism of White (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 353–360), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. (European Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347) is used. Incentive‐compatible contracts, including the optimal probabilities of detection (and, therefore, monitoring frequencies and costs) for more and less efficient farmers, are identified. It is shown that the input charge and input quota approaches lead to identical outcomes – in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs and probabilities of detection – confirming the equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information. It is also shown that the optimal contracts are independent of the risk preferences of farmers with regard to being caught cheating.     

EU‐wide Economic and Environmental Impacts of CAP Greening with High Spatial and Farm‐type Detail

In this paper we analyse the economic and environmental impacts of CAP greening introduced by the 2013 CAP reform using the CAPRI model. CAPRI captures the farm heterogeneity across the EU and it allows to depict the implementation of the greening measures in high detail while integrating the environmental effects and the market feedback of the simulated policy changes. The simulated results reveal that the economic impacts (land use, production, price and income) of CAP greening are rather small, although some farm types, crops (fallow land and pulses) and Member States may be affected more significantly. The CAP greening will lead simultaneously to a small increase in prices and a small decrease in production. Farm income slightly increases because the price effects offset the production decline. Similarly to economic effects, the environmental impacts (GHG emissions, N surplus, ammonia emissions, soil erosion, and biodiversity‐friendly farming practices) of CAP greening are small, although some regions may see greater effects than others. In general, the environmental effects at EU level are positive on a per hectare basis, but the increase in UAA can reverse the sign for total impacts. Overall, simulated GHG and ammonia emissions decrease in the EU, while the total N surplus, soil erosion and biodiversity‐friendly farming practices indicator slightly increase due to the CAP greening.     

The future of olive groves on sloping land and ex-ante assessment of cross compliance for erosion control

Under the past Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) olive oil subsidy regime, farmers were eligible for subsidies on the basis of the amount of olive oil they produced. This led to an intensification of production, particularly on flat land, and had in most cases negative environmental effects, such as more soil erosion on sloping land and more pollution. With the decoupling of agricultural support under the newly established rules of the CAP, formalised in 2005, cross compliance measures have become obligatory.In this paper an ex-ante assessment is made of the application of cross compliance for soil erosion control (natural cover crops and terrace maintenance) in hilly and mountainous olive groves in Trás-os-Montes in Portugal. A linear programming model was developed to assess the various socio-economic and environmental effects of four different development scenarios for olive groves. The scenarios were developed on the basis of changing market prices, wage rates and subsidies; their effects included shifts towards intensification, abandonment and organic farming. Simulations considering a minimum return to labour constraint showed very high levels of abandonment, particularly in combination with cross compliance obligations. However, even without this minimum return to labour constraint, abandonment would reach more than 20% in three out of the four scenarios. The model showed that cross compliance obligations could be quite effective in reducing erosion, but that they would depress income in all scenarios as a result of higher abandonment and lower percentage shifts towards intensive systems.     

Sustainability impact assessment using integrated meta-modelling: Simulating the reduction of direct support under the EU common agricultural policy (CAP)

Assessing the impact of macro-level policy driven land use changes on regional sustainability is an important task that can facilitate complex decision making processes of introducing reforms. The research work demonstrates the ability of Sustainability Impact Assessment Tool (SIAT), a meta-model, in conducting ex ante spatially explicit cross sectoral impact assessments of changes in common agricultural policy (CAP). The meta-model is able to appraise impacts of CAP amendments on land use and their repercussions on multiple indicators of sustainability. The presented study comprehensively analyses the possible impacts of discontinuing direct financial support to farmers under CAP. The simulations of the meta-model are able to reveal the land use changes both at EU and regional levels as well as to bring forth the subsequent changes in a number of indicators representing the regional sustainability (for five case study regions). In a nutshell, the simulations indicate that a reduction in direct support brings in general, a decrease in farmed area, an increase in forested land, less fluctuation in natural vegetation coverage, increase in abandoned arable land area and negligible changes in built-up area despite regionally diverging land use trends. The simulated changes in sustainability indicators for the study regions in consequence to these land use changes show that the discontinuation of subsidies evokes responses that are in general climate friendly (reduction in methane and N₂O emissions, diminishing energy use and reduction in global warming potential), economically beneficial (increase in gross value of agriculture) and socially desired (decrease in unemployment rate) as well as environmentally harmful (increase in pesticide use). Even though the appraisals of diversity indicators such as forest deadwood and farmland birds are not conclusive for all regions, the changes are positive for the former indicator and slightly negative for the latter in general. The trade-offs among these regional sustainability indicators using their directional associations are also presented for a comprehensive assessment of the impacts.     

The EU Budget and the CAP: An Agenda for the Review?

The promised review of the EU Budget in 2008 offers an opportunity to bring CAP financing into line with logic, justice and the rest of EU policy. Currently, the CAP is unique amongst European policies in being both mandatory and requiring 100 per cent financing by the EU budget. While this made good sense at the policy's inception, it is now an obsolete anachronism. A sensible and defensible agenda for financial reform, which is all that is on the reform agenda at present, is to make the EU budget responsible for only a fraction (say 25 per cent) of the costs of the current CAP, instead of the present 100 per cent. This would bring CAP financing into line with other EU policies, and make member states separately responsible for the balance for their own farmers, as they so wish, up to the CAP budgetary ceiling already agreed. Any resulting competition between member states in the extent and means by which they continue (or not) to support farmers through direct payments would be controlled through EU Competition and single market policies. Such competition would also provide a good opportunity for experiments with policy development, to the advantage of all, since different policies are required for the different stages of development and different local conditions now evident within the EU.