Relative performance evaluation and executive compensation: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on top managers’ compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms’ use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque’s (2009) method are similar to those obtained using traditional methods. In addition, we find that RPE is used more in non-SOEs than in SOEs. This may be due to the regulation of compensation, various forms of incentives and the multiple tasks of managers in SOEs.     

Propping by controlling shareholders,wealth transfer and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Propping acts by controlling shareholders are common in Chinese listed firms. In this paper, we use data on related-party transactions of all listed Chinese firms from 2002 to 2008 to investigate the motivation behind controlling shareholders’ propping acts and subsequent wealth-transfer behavior and how both affect firm performance. We find that such institutional motivators as the maintenance of shell resources and qualification for refinancing have a significant effect on the propping behavior of controlling shareholders of Chinese listed firms and that such behavior is often followed by more serious tunneling when shareholders are driven by these motivators. Compared with non-state-owned firms, state-owned firms with the motivation to qualify for refinancing exhibit more severe tunneling after engaging in propping behavior. We also find that while propping by controlling shareholders improves a firm’s current operating performance, in firms whose controlling shareholders’ are motivated by the desire to maintain shell resources or obtain a refinancing qualification their performance declines in the following year because of subsequent tunneling. The results presented in this paper provide us with a better understanding of the relationship between propping and tunneling, controlling shareholders’ engagement in both and the consequences of that behavior.     

Business strategy,executive compensation and firm performance

We investigate the impact of business strategy on the use of performance‐linked compensation (PLC) and long‐term incentive plans. We also examine the relation between strategy and compensation structure fit and performance. Using cluster and content analyses to classify a firm’s business strategy, we predict and find that product differentiation firms use a higher proportion of PLCs than cost‐leadership firms. Furthermore, we find that the misfit between business strategy and compensation structure has a negative impact on performance. This study contributes to the executive compensation literature by recognizing that business strategy influences the compensation structure and that a strategy and compensation structure misfit negatively affects performance.     

State ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies

While the relationship between state ownership and firm performance has been widely researched, the empirical evidence has provided mixed results. This study applies panel data regression techniques to 10,639 firm-year observations of non-financial Chinese listed firms during 2003–2010 to examine the relationship between state ownership and firm performance. The results show that state ownership has a U-shaped relationship with firm performance. The Split Share Structure Reform in 2005–2006 played a positive role in enhancing the relationship between state ownership and firm profitability ratios. Although state ownership decreased significantly after 2006, it remains high in strategically important industry sectors such as the oil, natural gas and mining sector and the publishing, broadcasting and media sector. The findings reveal that a higher level of state ownership is superior to a dispersed ownership structure due to the benefits of government support and political connections. The Split Share Structure Reform made previously non-tradable shares legally tradable, improving corporate governance and reducing the negative effect of non-tradable state shares.     

Managerial expertise,corporate decisions and firm value: Evidence from corporate refocusing

This paper investigates how managerial expertise—specifically, industry expertise—affects firm value through divestiture. Using CEOs’ managerial experiences in industries throughout their careers as a measure of their industry expertise, I find that CEOs in diversified conglomerates are more likely to divest divisions in industries in which they have less experience. This finding is consistent with CEOs who divest such divisions in order to refocus on those divisions in which they have specialized—that is, to achieve a better match between their expertise and their firms’ retained assets. Firms that divest for a better CEO-firm match experience significant improvements in operating performance, as well as significant abnormal stock returns that persist for an average of three years following a divestiture. Further, among firms that divest for a better match, those firms with more experienced CEOs realize greater gains in firm value. In contrast, divestitures that increase corporate focus, but do not improve the expertise-asset match, do not lead to long-run increases in firm value.     

Managerial ownership,board monitoring and firm performance in a family‐concentrated corporate environment

Using data from Hong Kong, a market that has family‐concentrated ownership structure, we examine the relation between managerial ownership, the board of directors and firm performance. We first conduct analysis on the managerial ownership and firm performance to derive the turning points where either ‘convergence of interest’ or ‘entrenchment’ effect of managerial ownership is dominant. Based on these estimated turning points, we find that at low and high level of ownership, effective board mitigates the entrenchment effect associated with managerial ownership; at medium level of ownership, board effectiveness is less demanded. These findings suggest that managerial ownership and board monitoring are substitutes in mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. We also find that effective board curbs the excessive compensation by entrenched managers to themselves at low level of managerial ownership.     

Impact of managerial ownership on investment and liquidity constraints: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

We examine the impact of managerial ownership on investment and financial constraints in the context of China. Using the system generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation, we find that investment decisions are related to managerial ownership in two ways. First, managerial ownership exerts a positive direct effect on corporate investment decisions by aligning management’s incentives with the interests of shareholders. Second, managerial ownership helps to reduce the degree of financial constraints faced by firms, suggesting that managerial ownership acts as a form of credible guarantee to lenders, signaling the quality of investment projects to the capital markets. Our findings suggest that recent policies enacted by the Chinese government, aimed at reforming ownership structure and encouraging managerial ownership in listed firms, help reduce agency costs and asymmetric information; thereby facilitating firms’ investment efficiency. Our findings will be of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policy makers interested in the financial impacts of management-compensation contracts.     

Costs of voting and firm performance: Evidence from RegTech adoption in Chinese listed firms

Employing the 2014 mandatory adoption of online shareholder voting in China, we show that the reduction of voting costs through online voting is positively related to participation in shareholder meetings and future firm performance. Our mechanism analysis suggests that the improved firm performance is mainly driven by the enhanced governance role played by informed investors and institutional investors. Further analysis shows that online shareholder voting makes the firms more attractive to mutual fund managers who are far away from the firms. Moreover, we find that the improved firm performance is concentrated in firms with low controlling shareholder ownership, and that online shareholder voting is associated with an increased likelihood of vetoing proposals and lower tunneling.     

Profits and losses from changes in fair value,executive cash compensation and managerial power: Evidence from A-share listed companies in China

According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value (CFV) and levels of executive compensation. In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value (PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value (LCFV). Furthermore, we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.     

Macroeconomic control, political costs and earnings management: Evidence from Chinese listed real estate companies

Firms in China have faced high political costs during China’s economic transition, because they are affected by macroeconomic policies. However, research to date has offered no consistent conclusions on the relationship between political costs and earnings management in China. This study tests whether real estate firms attempt to decrease earnings during periods of macroeconomic control, using variables related to the national real estate market as proxies for political costs. We find that political costs are negatively related to earnings management in listed real estate firms. In addition, we find that non-state-owned enterprises utilized more income-decreasing accruals during this period. Our results are consistent with the political costs hypothesis.     

Corporate social responsibility,industry concentration,and firm performance: Evidence from emerging Asian economies

Social and environmental performance are two pillars of corporate social responsibility that integrate the desires of firms to enhance their competitive advantages and demonstrate their commitment to society. Based on a sample of eight emerging Asian markets, this study investigates the role of firms’ social and environmental performance in their financial performance, and how this may vary under different levels of industry competition. The results show that the social dimension is more effective in increasing firm performance relative to the environmental dimension. Further, the performance of socially oriented firms is more stable in highly competitive industries relative to environmentally oriented firms. Overall, this study supports the view that socially responsible firms have a competitive edge over their rivals that leads to higher profitability.     

Security regulations,access to capital markets,and firm performance: Evidence from China

This study explores the cost of security regulations in China, where firms are required to meet a certain profitability benchmark before applying for permission to raise more equity via secondary equity offerings (SEOs). Using a difference-in-differences setting, we show that firms affected by the regulation (i.e., firms with high external financing demands (EFD) but profitability lower than the regulatory requirement) significantly underperform their counterparts, while unaffected firms do not. The affected firms’ performance decline increases (decreases) when the requirement of profitability is more (less) restricted. Consistently, the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of firms with high EFD is significantly negative (positive) when the regulation is tightened (loosened). Our study provides evidence on how the cost of regulation affects companies that have growth opportunities.     

财务重述、管理层权力与股价崩盘风险：来自中国证券市场的经验证据

股市震荡引发投资者和监管层对股价崩盘风险的关注。从财务重述背后所反映的财务信息质量低下和公司治理失效出发,探讨其对股价崩盘风险的影响,结合管理层权力这一影响组织行为和产出能力的代理人特征,探讨其对财务重述与股价崩盘风险之间关系的影响。研究结果表明：相比未发生财务重述的公司,发生了财务重述的公司的股价崩盘风险明显更高;进一步纳入代理人特征———管理层权力后,发现代理人的这一特征对上述关系有明显的促进作用。     

The informativeness of domestic and foreign investors’ stock trades: Evidence from the perfectly segmented Chinese market

This paper uses the perfect market segmentation setting in China's stock market to compare the information content of the stock trades of domestic and foreign investors. We study 76 firms that issue both A-shares (for domestic investors) and B-shares (for foreign investors) and compare the price discovery role of the two segmented markets in China. Before Feb 19, 2001, the A-share market led the B-share market in price discovery, as the signed volume and quote revision of the A-share market had strong predictive ability for B-share quote returns, but not vice versa. After Feb 19, 2001, because some domestic investors were allowed to invest in the B-share market, we find evidence for a reverse causality from the B-share to the A-share market. Nevertheless, the [Hasbrouck (1995). One security, many markets: determining the contributions to price discovery, Journal of Finance 50, 1175–1199.] information share analysis reveals that A-shares continue to dominate the price discovery process.     

Competition,Quality and Contract Compliance: Evidence from Compulsory Competitive Tendering in Local Government in Great Britain, 1987–2000*

The introduction of competition has frequently been found to cause costs to fall. There has, however, been a question as to whether this was partly achieved at the cost of quality. Auction theory predicts prices would fall more the greater the competition to provide the service. There has been some debate about whether the smaller budgets would make contract compliance more difficult. Evidence is found in support of this hypothesis. We also find some evidence that the better recorded performance of the in‐house direct service organisations (DSOs) during this period was due to the information advantage they had from being incumbents.