DEPRIVATION,INEQUALITY AND WELFARE*

Welfare ranking of income distributions involves a trade‐off between equity and efficiency. A person's feeling of deprivation about higher incomes may be of a relative or absolute type. We consider an intermediate notion of deprivation, a convex mix of relative and absolute deprivations. We then look at the problem of welfare ranking of income distributions when welfare increases under a globally equitable redistribution and under an income increase that keeps intermediate deprivation fixed. All deprivation indices can be regarded as inequality indices but the converse is not true. We also provide a numerical illustration of our results.     

Decomposing poverty changes into vertical and horizontal components

Variations in aggregate poverty indices can be due to differences in average poverty intensity, to changes in the welfare distances between those poor of initially unequal welfare status and/or to emerging disparities in welfare among those poor of initially similar welfare status. This note uses a general cost‐of‐inequality approach that decomposes the total change in poverty into a sum of indices of each of these three components. This decomposition can serve inter alia to integrate horizontal and vertical equity criteria in the poverty alleviation assessment of social and economic programmes. The use of these measures is briefly illustrated using Tunisian data.     

HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING,PUBLIC DEBT AND BALANCED BUDGET RULES

This paper considers a government that chooses its tax and borrowing policy in order to minimize the present value of the excess burden caused by taxation. In doing so, the government uses hyperbolic discounting. It turns out that public deficits are positive even if public expenditures are constant over time. With cyclical expenditures, the government chooses an asymmetric debt policy, i.e., in bad times it borrows more than it repays in good times. In contrast to tax smoothing and political economy theories of public debt, the welfare effects of a balanced budget rule are ambiguous.     

Public debt and welfare in a quantitative Schumpeterian growth model with incomplete markets

This paper quantifies the welfare effects of counterfactual public debt policies using an endogenous growth model with incomplete markets. The economy features public debt, Schumpeterian growth, infinitely-lived agents, uninsurable income risk, and discount factor heterogeneity. Two versions of the model are specified, one with households holding equity in the group of innovating firms. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy to match the degree of wealth inequality, the share of R&D expenditure in GDP, the firms’ exit rate, the average growth rate, and other standard long-run targets. When comparing balanced growth paths, I find large welfare gains in equilibria characterized by governments accumulating public wealth. The result is robust to the mechanism used to generate a highly concentrated wealth (i.e., preference heterogeneity or “superstar” income shocks). Welfare effects decompositions show that level effects and growth effects reinforce each other. The responses of both the intermediate goods and their market conditions are key in explaining the large level effects. The version of the model without equity is computationally easier to solve, allowing to consider transitional dynamics. Taking into account the dynamic adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium, I show that the transitional welfare costs are not large enough to change the sign of the welfare effects stemming from a change in public debt. I find that eliminating public debt would lead to a 0.8% increase in welfare, while moving to a debt/GDP ratio of 100% would entail a welfare loss of 0.5%. A decomposition analysis shows that growth accounts for approximately 50% of the overall welfare effects.     

A SIMPLIFIED MODEL FOR SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS: AN APPLICATION TO SPAIN, 1973–74 TO 1980–81

Most of the literature on income distribution has concentrated on inequality. In this paper we introduce a concern for efficiency in a social welfare model. We propose a simple but useful specification which combines three features: (i) the selection of measurement instruments in the relative and the absolute case on the grounds of their properties for applied work; (ii) a procedure to make welfare comparisons across households with different needs, in a model in which equivalence scales depend only on house-hold size; and (iii) the use of household specific statistical price indices to make intertemporal comparisons in real terms. The methodology is applied to the study of the role of prices and demographic effects in the evolution of the standard of living in Spain from 1973–74 to 1980–81.     

Household inequality, social welfare, and trade

Working with Sen social welfare functions (meaning explicit separability between mean income and income dispersion), we develop a generalized dual approach to tracking household inequality aspects of social welfare in general equilibrium. We highlight how household equity can be examined analytically alongside production efficiency in duality-based models, using our dual framework to explore potential trade-offs between efficiency and equity effects of trade policy. Our results complement the set of standard inequality results in trade theory focused on functional rather than household inequality. We also find that the relative distributional impact of tariffs on welfare is conditional on the initial level of inequality.     

The welfare implications of resource allocation policies under uncertainty: The case of public education spending

In this paper, we examine whether policy interventions, aimed at improving resource allocation, also have important stabilization effects over the business cycle. To this end, we employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which public education expenditures, financed by distorting taxes, enhance the productivity of private education choices. We then calculate the welfare implications of competing operating targets using a state-contingent instrument rule for public education spending. Our main findings are: (i) there can be important cyclical effects of different resource allocation policies depending on the operating target used and the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty; (ii) it is important to use an operating target which is as close as possible to the heart of the market imperfection that justifies policy action; (iii) policy action should not be monotonic in the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty.     

IDIOSYNCRATIC AND AGGREGATE RISKS,INEQUALITY AND GROWTH

The paper disaggregates productivity shocks at a firm level into idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, and studies their impacts on inequality, growth and welfare. It develops a growth model with human capital and incomplete insurance and credit markets that provides a closed‐form solution for income inequality dynamics. We find that uninsured idiosyncratic risks are the most important determinants of inequality, growth and welfare. They are the source of nondegenerate wealth distribution. A lower weight of these shocks leads to lower steady‐state inequality, higher growth and welfare. A redistribution of income that serves as social insurance against such risks increases welfare and decreases inequality. But, it also decreases growth by distorting individual consumption and saving decisions.     

Economic Growth,Public Debt and Welfare: Comparing Three Budgetary Rules

Abstract. We present an endogenous growth model with externalities of capital and elastic labor supply where we allow for public debt and welfare‐enhancing public spending. We analyze different debt policies as regards convergence to a balanced growth path and their effects on long‐run growth and welfare. Three budgetary rules are considered: the balanced budget rule, a budgetary rule where debt grows in the long run but at a rate lower than the balanced growth rate and a rule where public debt grows at the same rate as all other economic variables but where it guarantees that the intertemporal budget constraint is fulfilled.     

Migration,growth, distribution and welfare

In this note we argue that the inverted U curve of inequality is a technical derivative of the attributes of the conventional indices of inequality; that these indices are inadequate measures of the change in welfare associated with the typical distributional consequences of rural-to-urban migration; and that an explicit welfare judgment with respect to this process should and can be made.     

Earnings inequality and the business cycle

Economists have long viewed recessions as contributing to increasing inequality. However, this conclusion is largely based on data from a period in which inequality was increasing over time. This paper examines the connection between long-run trends and cyclical variation in earnings inequality. We develop a model in which cyclical and trend inequality are related, and find that in our model, recessions tend to amplify long-run trends, i.e. they involve more rapidly increasing inequality when long-run inequality is increasing, and more rapidly decreasing inequality when long-run inequality is decreasing. In support of this prediction, we present evidence that during the first half of the 20th century, when earnings inequality was generally declining, earnings disparities indeed appeared to fall more rapidly in downturns, at least among workers at the top of the earnings distribution.     

Comparing Income Distributions Using Atkinson's Measure of Inequality

This article is aimed at undergraduate and graduate economics students, and public sector economists, who are interested in inequality measurement. It examines the use of the Atkinson inequality measure to compare income distributions. A major feature of this measure is that distributional value judgements are made explicit, via the use of a particular form of social welfare function. Emphasis is given to the interpretation of changes in inequality and the role of the relative inequality aversion parameter, which reflects an important feature of those value judgements.     

The Intergenerational Incidence of Government Spending*

This paper analyzes the effect of an increase in government spending on the welfare of different generations in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The paper shows that the intergenerational incidence of government spending on a public good is determined not only by the welfare effects due to the public good and to financing the good but also by a welfare effect due to intertemporal substitution between private consumption when government spending is increased. The degree of substitutability between private consumption and public spending is shown to be a key determinant of this incidence.     

Inequity in American Schools: A New Perspective on the Distributional Effects of School Expenditures on Economic Well‐Being

This article explores how inequities in public K‐12 school spending impact the distribution of economic well‐being across American households with public school students in 1989 and 2000. Adapting concepts from the public finance literature, I explore the impact of school spending on the vertical and horizontal equity and its impact relative to other types of public spending on social programs and taxation. Conventionally, vertical equity refers to the size of the income gaps between households. Horizontal equity refers to the ranking of households along the income distribution with any change in ranks producing horizontal inequity. My main findings show that school spending, when converted into a component of income, served to reduce extended‐income inequality through improvements in vertical equity without the discriminatory implications of exacerbating horizontal inequity across households. Additionally, this impact was at least as large as that of spending on other social programs. This finding bolsters standard arguments for equity and progressivity of school finance across students.     

A note on redistributive fairness and economic reform

To understand reasons for possible failures of ‘good’ economic reforms, we consider an institution which is always successful in making the best public decision from the utilitarian perspective. We show it is bound to introduce inequality if costs of a reform are privately known: the losers can not be always compensated. Thus, if equity is a primary concern, then some reforms with positive aggregate net gain might not be undertaken. If the utilitarian welfare is the only guide for making public decisions, implementing a reform might require the ability to ignore the associated social costs of inequality.     

Redistribution in the age of austerity: evidence from Europe 2006–2013

We examine the relationship between changes in a country’s public sector fiscal position on inequality at the top and bottom of the income distribution during the age of austerity from 2006 to 2013. We use a parametric Lorenz curve model and Gini-like indices of inequality as our measures to assess distributional changes. Based on Statistics of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and IMF data for 12 European countries, we find that more severe adjustments to the cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., more austerity) are associated with a more unequal distribution of income driven by rising inequality at the top. The data also weakly suggests a decrease in inequality at the bottom. The distributional impact of austerity measures reflects the reliance on regressive policies and likely produces increased incentives for rent-seeking while reducing incentives for workers to increase productivity.     

Human capital formation and public debt: growth and welfare effects of three different deficit policies

We analyze an endogenous growth model public educational spending. We show that the balanced budget policy and the policy with a slight deficit yield higher growth than a debt policy where public debt grows at the same rate as GDP, unless the government is a creditor. As concerns welfare, it can be demonstrated that a strong deficit policy yields lower welfare than a balanced budget and a slight deficit policy, unless initial debt ratios are low and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is high. Finally, there may exist an inverted U-shaped relation between welfare and deficit-financed educational spending.     

A Model of Inequality and Interest Group Politics

In this paper we examine inequality of process and inequality of outcomes in interest group politics. The model has interest groups that compete for rents in a non-cooperative game. It allows for a self-interested rent-setting political decision-maker, and democratic or popular pressure as a check on that self-interest. We consider differences in the effectiveness and pre-commitment abilities of interest groups. We show that: (i) the costs of influence activities may be highest when groups are relatively equal in their effectiveness; (ii) if social welfare incorporates enough concern for equity of outcomes, that ranking is reversed; (iii) depending on voter responsiveness to rent-setting, the political decision-maker may set rents to be higher or lower, when increases in inequality of effectiveness lower the unit costs of rent-seeking.     

On the Evaluation of Economic Mobility

This paper presents a framework for the evaluation and measurement of "reversal" and "origin independence" as separate aspects of economic mobility. We show that evaluation depends on aversion to multi-period inequality, aversion to inter-temporal fluctuations, and aversion to future risk. We construct "extended Atkinson indices" that allow us to quantify the relative impact of reversal and origin independence on welfare. We apply our approach to the comparison of income mobility in Germany and in the U.S.. When aversion to inequality is the only consideration, the U.S. gains more from mobility than Germany. This reflects similar gains from reversal in the two countries but greater gains in the U.S. from origin independence. The introduction of aversion to intertemporal fluctuations and aversion to future risk makes the impact of mobility in the two countries more similar.     

Monopolistic supply of sorting,inequality, and welfare

Why is an increase in income inequality often accompanied by an increase in socioeconomic segregation? And what are the welfare implications of this comovement? This paper uses a theoretical model to analyze the relationship between income inequality and socioeconomic segregation. It shows that rising inequality can trigger sorting according to income, as a monopolist's profits from offering sorting increase with income inequality. It also examines the relationship between sorting and social welfare and shows that profit-maximizing sorting patterns are not necessarily optimal from a welfare perspective. In fact, for a broad field of income distributions (monopolist) profits increase with inequality, while at the same time total welfare from sorting decreases.